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Some Pro-MS Tears and an Antidote: Findings of Fact, USA v. MS
Tuesday, April 04 2006 @ 03:33 PM EDT

There is a truly hilarious article on IT-Director today, by an analyst moaning about poor Microsoft being unfairly and unwisely hounded by the EU Commission over Vista, when all it has ever done is try to make software easy and safe for Grandma. Here is my favorite morsel:
Yes, let's not forget to complain about all that unfair competition against Netscape. That competition started prior Netscape's commercial existence when Microsoft indicated it would build a browser into its OS back in 1994; back when Mr. Andreesen was busy creating his browser over at NCSA. That unfair competition that took the form of Microsoft helping Netscape along as an ISV until such time as Andreesen and company started bashing Windows publicly as an irrelevant collection of device drivers. Is it at all odd that the Redmond crew decided to be less than helpful to Netscape going forward? And just who is irrelevant today? But, I digress...

That's not the verb I would have chosen, "digress". Perchance "revise". As in revisionist history. I told you it was hilarious. Before we cry a river for Microsoft, perhaps a little historical reality is in order to help us keep our heads clear about truth, justice and the American way. With that noble goal, here are some relevant sections of the Findings of Fact in the United States of America v. Microsoft antitrust litigation. They were not overturned.

I'm highlighting paragraphs 67-92 and 133-174, because I believe they provide a sufficient antidote to the IT-Director version of the Netscape story.

There is a great deal more about Netscape, and how it was treated by Microsoft, so feel free to read it all. You will note in particular how Microsoft used withholding APIs as a strategy, and if you are new to this saga, it will certainly help you to understand why the EU Commission is insisting that Microsoft reveal APIs.

While I'm at it, I'll point you to a Business Week article from 2000, "Microsoft's All-Out CounterAttack", which explains a bit about how Microsoft used think tanks and analysts back then. Here's a taste:

For the past two years, Krumholtz and his colleagues in Redmond have been laying the groundwork by openly doling out millions in contributions to lawmakers in both parties. What has been less apparent is a strategy that includes funding think tanks to pump out pro-Microsoft tomes--and withdrawing largesse from any group that strays from the party line. The company also runs a grassroots letter-writing campaign in all 50 states....

Even seasoned Washington hands say they have never seen anything quite as flamboyant as the Microsoft effort. It's all the more surprising, considering that none of this existed five years ago, when Justice first began its antitrust assault....

Sometimes, Microsoft's handiwork is disguised. As the 19 state AGs involved in the case were deliberating throughout the spring on what remedy to seek, an obscure trade group called Americans for Technology Leadership (ATL) weighed in with a poll. ATL concluded that the public believes state AGs should devote their energy to causes other than Microsoft. What is ATL? Turns out, it's a largely Microsoft-funded group. ...

Another Microsoft tactic is to spread hefty amounts of legal work--much of it unrelated to the case--to major firms around town. So an army of lawyers is ethically constrained from working for Microsoft's competitors. The Progress & Freedom Foundation, a business-funded conservative think tank that supports a breakup, found this out when it tried to hire a lawyer from Pillsbury Madison & Sutro. The firm begged off because it was doing other work for Microsoft. "They've got the whole town conflicted out," muses one attorney. "They've sucked out all the oxygen." Microsoft plays a similar game with think tanks and advocacy groups. It secretly funds those that do its public-relations work and pulls funding from those that dare question its positions....

That's interesting about the lawyers, isn't it? So clever, in a dark -- and may I so bold as to suggest an anticompetitive? -- kind of way. Of course, Microsoft is free to spend its money as it pleases, within the law, and anyone who wishes can defend Microsoft for any reason he or she wishes. Heaven only knows there seems to be no immediate lightning from heaven zapping all the ethically challenged individuals or corporations on earth. But we, the public, are also free to draw conclusions, or at least to have some skepticism in our minds, when every now and then an analyst or a think tank shows up telling us fervently how unfair it is that Microsoft is being compelled to abide by antitrust law as interpreted by those with the legal authority to make them do so. And when folks try to rewrite history, we're free to remember how it really was, and to share that information.

By the way, if you are curious about the Iowa class action suit against Microsoft mentioned by I Cringely, here is an article from 2000, which will help you understand what it's all about. As I understand it, this action is unique in two respects -- consumers are being allowed to sue Microsoft directly under Iowa's own state Competition Law, whereas in other states only OEMs had standing to sue, and the remedy sought is money, not vouchers. Trial is set to begin on November 13. Microsoft tried to get the case heard in Federal court but was unsuccessful, as you can see for yourself in this order [PDF] dated November 22, 2005.

And so with that, here is the history of what Microsoft did to Netscape, as told by the court, and then you can decide for yourself who has it right, the analyst or the judge:


Extracts from Findings of Fact, USA v. Microsoft, Civil Action No. 98-1232 :

67. Microsoft's monopoly power is also evidenced by the fact that, over the course of several years, Microsoft took actions that could only have been advantageous if they operated to reinforce monopoly power. These actions are described below.


68. Middleware technologies, as previously noted, have the potential to weaken the applications barrier to entry. Microsoft was apprehensive that the APIs exposed by middleware technologies would attract so much developer interest, and would become so numerous and varied, that there would arise a substantial and growing number of full-featured applications that relied largely, or even wholly, on middleware APIs. The applications relying largely on middleware APIs would potentially be relatively easy to port from one operating system to another. The applications relying exclusively on middleware APIs would run, as written, on any operating system hosting the requisite middleware. So the more popular middleware became and the more APIs it exposed, the more the positive feedback loop that sustains the applications barrier to entry would dissipate. Microsoft was concerned with middleware as a category of software; each type of middleware contributed to the threat posed by the entire category. At the same time, Microsoft focused its antipathy on two incarnations of middleware that, working together, had the potential to weaken the applications barrier severely without the assistance of any other middleware. These were Netscape's Web browser and Sun's implementation of the Java technologies.

A The Netscape Web browser

69. Netscape Navigator possesses three key middleware attributes that endow it with the potential to diminish the applications barrier to entry. First, in contrast to non-Microsoft, Intel-compatible PC operating systems, which few users would want to use on the same PC systems that carry their copies of Windows, a browser can gain widespread use based on its value as a complement to Windows. Second, because Navigator exposes a set (albeit a limited one) of APIs, it can serve as a platform for other software used by consumers. A browser product is particularly well positioned to serve as a platform for network-centric applications that run in association with Web pages. Finally, Navigator has been ported to more than fifteen different operating systems. Thus, if a developer writes an application that relies solely on the APIs exposed by Navigator, that application will, without any porting, run on many different operating systems.

70. Adding to Navigator's potential to weaken the applications barrier to entry is the fact that the Internet has become both a major inducement for consumers to buy PCs for the first time and a major occupier of the time and attention of current PCs users. For any firm looking to turn its browser product into an applications platform such to rival Windows, the intense consumer interest in all things Internet-related is a great boon.

71. Microsoft knew in the fall of 1994 that Netscape was developing versions of a Web browser to run on different operating systems. It did not yet know, however, that Netscape would employ Navigator to generate revenue directly, much less that the product would evolve in such a way as to threaten Microsoft. In fact, in late December 1994, Netscape's chairman and chief executive officer ("CEO"), Jim Clark, told a Microsoft executive that the focus of Netscape's business would be applications running on servers and that Netscape did not intend to succeed at Microsoft's expense.

72. As soon as Netscape released Navigator on December 15, 1994, the product began to enjoy dramatic acceptance by the public; shortly after its release, consumers were already using Navigator far more than any other browser product. This alarmed Microsoft, which feared that Navigator's enthusiastic reception could embolden Netscape to develop Navigator into an alternative platform for applications development. In late May 1995, Bill Gates, the chairman and CEO of Microsoft, sent a memorandum entitled "The Internet Tidal Wave" to Microsoft's executives describing Netscape as a "new competitor ‘born' on the Internet." He warned his colleagues within Microsoft that Netscape was "pursuing a multi-platform strategy where they move the key API into the client to commoditize the underlying operating system." By the late spring of 1995, the executives responsible for setting Microsoft's corporate strategy were deeply concerned that Netscape was moving its business in a direction that could diminish the applications barrier to entry. ...


A Microsoft's Attempt to Dissuade Netscape from Developing Navigator as a Platform

79. Microsoft's first response to the threat posed by Navigator was an effort to persuade Netscape to structure its business such that the company would not distribute platform- level browsing software for Windows. Netscape's assent would have ensured that, for the foreseeable future, Microsoft would produce the only platform-level browsing software distributed to run on Windows. This would have eliminated the prospect that non-Microsoft browsing software could weaken the applications barrier to entry.

80. Executives at Microsoft received confirmation in early May 1995 that Netscape was developing a version of Navigator to run on Windows 95, which was due to be released in a couple of months. Microsoft's senior executives understood that if they could prevent this version of Navigator from presenting alternatives to the Internet-related APIs in Windows 95, the technologies branded as Navigator would cease to present an alternative platform to developers. Even if non-Windows versions of Navigator exposed Internet-related APIs, applications written to those APIs would not run on the platform Microsoft executives expected to enjoy the largest installed base, i.e., Windows 95. So, as long as the version of Navigator written for Windows 95 relied on Microsoft's Internet-related APIs instead of exposing its own, developing for Navigator would not mean developing cross-platform. Developers of network-centric applications thus would not be drawn to Navigator's APIs in substantial numbers. Therefore, with the encouragement and support of Gates, a group of Microsoft executives commenced a campaign in the summer of 1995 to convince Netscape to halt its development of platform-level browsing technologies for Windows 95.

81. In a meeting held at Microsoft's headquarters on June 2, 1995, Microsoft executives suggested to Jim Clark's replacement as CEO at Netscape, James Barksdale, that the version of Navigator written for Windows 95 be designed to rely upon the Internet-related APIs in Windows 95 and distinguish itself with "value-added" software components. The Microsoft executives left unsaid the fact that value-added software, by definition, does not present a significant platform for applications development. For his part, Barksdale informed the Microsoft representatives that the browser represented an important part of Netscape's business strategy and that Windows 3.1 and Windows 95 were expected to be the primary platforms for which Navigator would be distributed.

82. At the conclusion of the June 2 meeting, Microsoft still did not know whether or not Netscape intended to preserve Navigator's own platform capabilities and expand the set of APIs that it exposed to developers. In the hope that Netscape could still be persuaded to forswear any platform ambitions and instead rely on the Internet technologies in Windows 95, Microsoft accepted Barksdale's invitation to send a group of representatives to Netscape's headquarters for a technology "brainstorming session" on June 21. Netscape's senior executives saw the meeting as an opportunity to ask Microsoft for access to crucial technical information, including certain APIs, that Netscape needed in order to ensure that Navigator would work well on systems running Windows 95.

83. Early in the June 21 meeting, Microsoft representatives told Barksdale and the other Netscape executives present that they wanted to explore the possibility of building a broader and closer relationship between the two companies. To this end, the Microsoft representatives wanted to know whether Netscape intended to adopt and build on top of the Internet-related platform that Microsoft planned to include in Windows 95, or rather to expose its own Internet-related APIs, which would compete with Microsoft's. If Netscape was not committed to providing an alternative platform for network-centric applications, Microsoft would assist Netscape in developing server- and (to a limited extent) PC-based software applications that relied on Microsoft's Internet technologies. For one thing, the representatives explained, Microsoft would be content to leave the development of browser products for the Mac OS, UNIX, and Microsoft's 16-bit operating system products to Netscape. Alternatively, Netscape could license to Microsoft the underlying code for a Microsoft-branded browser to run on those platforms. The Microsoft representatives made it clear, however, that Microsoft would be marketing its own browser for Windows 95, and that this product would rely on Microsoft's platform-level Internet technologies. If Netscape marketed browsing software for Windows 95 based on different technologies, then Microsoft would view Netscape as a competitor, not a partner.

84. When Barksdale brought the discussion back to the particular Windows 95 APIs that Netscape actually wanted to rely on and needed from Microsoft, the representatives from Microsoft explained that if Netscape entered a "special relationship" with Microsoft, the company would treat Netscape as a "preferred ISV." This meant that Netscape would enjoy preferential access to technical information, including APIs. They intimated that Microsoft's internal developers had already created the APIs that Netscape was seeking, and that Microsoft had not yet decided either which ISVs would be privileged to receive them or when access would be granted. The Microsoft representatives made clear that the alacrity with which Netscape would receive the desired Windows 95 APIs and other technical information would depend on whether Netscape entered this "special relationship" with Microsoft.

85. After listening to Microsoft's proposal, Barksdale had two main questions: First, where would the line between platform (Microsoft's exclusive domain) and applications (where Netscape could continue to function) be situated? Second, who would get to decide where the line would lie? After all, the attractiveness of a special relationship with Microsoft depended a great deal on how much room would remain for Netscape to innovate and seek profit. The Microsoft representatives replied that Microsoft would incorporate most of the functionality of the current Netscape browser into the Windows 95 platform, perhaps leaving room for Netscape to distribute a user-interface shell. Where Netscape would have the most scope to innovate would be in the development of software "solutions," which are applications (mainly server- based) focused on meeting the needs of specific types of commercial users. Since such applications are already minutely calibrated to the needs of their users, they do not present platforms for the development of more specific applications. Although the representatives from Microsoft assured Barksdale that the line between platform and solutions was fixed by a collaborative decision-making process between Microsoft and its ISV partners, those representatives had already indicated that the space Netscape would be allowed to occupy between the user and Microsoft's platform domain was a very narrow one. Simply put, if Navigator exposed APIs that competed for developer attention with the Internet-related APIs Microsoft was planning to build into its platform, Microsoft would regard Netscape as a trespasser on its territory.

86. The Microsoft representatives did not insist at the June 21 meeting that Netscape executives accept their proposal on the spot. For his part, Barksdale said only that he would like more information regarding where Microsoft proposed to place the line between its platform and Netscape's applications. In the ensuing, more technical discussions, the Netscape executives agreed to adopt one component of Microsoft's platform-level Internet technology called Internet Shortcuts. The meeting ended cordially, with both sides promising to keep the lines of communication open.

87. The executive who led Microsoft's contingent on June 21, Daniel Rosen, emerged from the meeting optimistic that Netscape would abandon its platform ambitions in exchange for special help from Microsoft in developing solutions. His sentiments were not shared by another Microsoft participant, Thomas Reardon, who had not failed to notice the Netscape executives grow tense when the Microsoft representatives referred to incorporating Navigator's functionality into Windows. Reardon predicted that Netscape would compete with almost all of Microsoft's platform-level Internet technologies. Once he heard both viewpoints, Gates concluded that Rosen was being a bit naive and that Reardon had assessed the situation more accurately. In the middle of July 1995, Rosen's superiors instructed him to drop the effort to reach a strategic concord with Netscape.

88. Had Netscape accepted Microsoft's proposal, it would have forfeited any prospect of presenting a comprehensive platform for the development of network-centric applications. Even if the versions of Navigator written for the Mac OS, UNIX, and 16-bit Windows had continued to expose APIs controlled by Netscape, the fact that Netscape would not have marketed any platform software for Windows 95, the operating system that was destined to become dominant, would have ensured that, for the foreseeable future, too few developers would rely on Navigator's APIs to create a threat to the applications barrier to entry. In fact, although the discussions ended before Microsoft was compelled to demarcate precisely where the boundary between its platform and Netscape's applications would lie, it is unclear whether Netscape's acceptance of Microsoft's proposal would have left the firm with even the ability to survive as an independent business.

89. At the time Microsoft presented its proposal, Navigator was the only browser product with a significant share of the market and thus the only one with the potential to weaken the applications barrier to entry. Thus, had it convinced Netscape to accept its offer of a "special relationship," Microsoft quickly would have gained such control over the extensions and standards that network-centric applications (including Web sites) employ as to make it all but impossible for any future browser rival to lure appreciable developer interest away from Microsoft's platform.

B Withholding Crucial Technical Information

90. Microsoft knew that Netscape needed certain critical technical information and assistance in order to complete its Windows 95 version of Navigator in time for the retail release of Windows 95. Indeed, Netscape executives had made a point of requesting this information, especially the so-called Remote Network Access ("RNA") API, at the June 21 meeting. As was discussed above, the Microsoft representatives at the meeting had responded that the haste with which Netscape received the desired technical information would depend on whether Netscape entered the so-called "special relationship" with Microsoft. Specifically, Microsoft representative J. Allard had told Barksdale that the way in which the two companies concluded the meeting would determine whether Netscape received the RNA API immediately or in three months.

91. Although Netscape declined the special relationship with Microsoft, its executives continued, over the weeks following the June 21 meeting, to plead for the RNA API. Despite Netscape's persistence, Microsoft did not release the API to Netscape until late October, i.e., as Allard had warned, more than three months later. The delay in turn forced Netscape to postpone the release of its Windows 95 browser until substantially after the release of Windows 95 (and Internet Explorer) in August 1995. As a result, Netscape was excluded from most of the holiday selling season.

92. Microsoft similarly withheld a scripting tool that Netscape needed to make its browser compatible with certain dial-up ISPs. Microsoft had licensed the tool freely to ISPs that wanted it, and in fact had cooperated with Netscape in drafting a license agreement that, by mid- July 1996, needed only to be signed by an authorized Microsoft executive to go into effect. There the process halted, however. In mid-August, a Microsoft representative informed Netscape that senior executives at Microsoft had decided to link the grant of the license to the resolution of all open issues between the companies. Netscape never received a license to the scripting tool, and as a result, was unable to do business with certain ISPs for a time. ...

D. Developing Competitive Web Browsing Software

133. Once it became clear to senior executives at Microsoft that Netscape would not abandon its efforts to develop Navigator into a platform, Microsoft focused its efforts on ensuring that few developers would write their applications to rely on the APIs that Navigator exposed. Developers would only write to the APIs exposed by Navigator in numbers large enough to threaten the applications barrier if they believed that Navigator would emerge as the standard software employed to browse the Web. If Microsoft could demonstrate that Navigator would not become the standard, because Microsoft's own browser would attract just as much if not more usage, then developers would continue to focus their efforts on a platform that enjoyed enduring ubiquity: the 32-bit Windows API set. Microsoft thus set out to maximize Internet Explorer's share of browser usage at Navigator's expense.

134. Microsoft's management believed that, no matter what the firm did, Internet Explorer would not capture a large share of browser usage as long as it remained markedly inferior to Navigator in the estimation of consumers. The task of technical personnel at Microsoft, then, was to make Internet Explorer's features at least as attractive to consumers as Navigator's. Microsoft did not believe that improved quality alone would depose Navigator, for millions of users appeared to be satisfied with Netscape's product, and Netscape was known as ‘the Internet company.' As Gates wrote to Microsoft's executive staff in his May 1995 "Internet Tidal Wave" memorandum, "First we need to offer a decent client," but "this alone won't get people to switch away from Netscape." Still, once Microsoft ensured that the average consumer would be just as comfortable browsing with Internet Explorer as with Navigator, Microsoft could employ other devices to induce consumers to use its browser instead of Netscape's.

135. From 1995 onward, Microsoft spent more than $100 million each year developing Internet Explorer. The firm's management gradually increased the number of developers working on Internet Explorer from five or six in early 1995 to more than one thousand in 1999. Although the first version of Internet Explorer was demonstrably inferior to Netscape's then- current browser product when the former was released in July 1995, Microsoft's investment eventually started to pay technological dividends. When Microsoft released Internet Explorer 3.0 in late 1996, reviewers praised its vastly improved quality, and some even rated it as favorably as they did Navigator. After the arrival of Internet Explorer 4.0 in late 1997, the number of reviewers who regarded it as the superior product was roughly equal to those who preferred Navigator.

E Giving Internet Explorer Away and Rewarding Firms that Helped Build Its Usage Share

136. In addition to improving the quality of Internet Explorer, Microsoft sought to increase the product's share of browser usage by giving it away for free. In many cases, Microsoft also gave other firms things of value (at substantial cost to Microsoft) in exchange for their commitment to distribute and promote Internet Explorer, sometimes explicitly at Navigator's expense. While Microsoft might have bundled Internet Explorer with Windows at no additional charge even absent its determination to preserve the applications barrier to entry, that determination was the main force driving its decision to price the product at zero. Furthermore, Microsoft would not have given Internet Explorer away to IAPs, ISVs, and Apple, nor would it have taken on the high cost of enlisting firms in its campaign to maximize Internet Explorer's usage share and limit Navigator's, had it not been focused on protecting the applications barrier.

137. In early 1995, personnel developing Internet Explorer at Microsoft contemplated charging OEMs and others for the product when it was released. Internet Explorer would have been included in a bundle of software that would have been sold as an add-on, or "frosting," to Windows 95. Indeed, Microsoft knew by the middle of 1995, if not earlier, that Netscape charged customers to license Navigator, and that Netscape derived a significant portion of its revenue from selling browser licenses. Despite the opportunity to make a substantial amount of revenue from the sale of Internet Explorer, and with the knowledge that the dominant browser product on the market, Navigator, was being licensed at a price, senior executives at Microsoft decided that Microsoft needed to give its browser away in furtherance of the larger strategic goal of accelerating Internet Explorer's acquisition of browser usage share. Consequently, Microsoft decided not to charge an increment in price when it included Internet Explorer in Windows for the first time, and it has continued this policy ever since. In addition, Microsoft has never charged for an Internet Explorer license when it is distributed separately from Windows.

138. Over the months and years that followed the release of Internet Explorer 1.0 in July 1995, senior executives at Microsoft remained engrossed with maximizing Internet Explorer's share of browser usage. Whenever competing priorities threatened to intervene, decision-makers at Microsoft reminded those reporting to them that browser usage share remained, as Microsoft senior vice president Paul Maritz put it, "job #1." For example, in the summer of 1997, some mid-level employees began to urge that Microsoft charge a price for at least some of the components of Internet Explorer 4.0. This would have shifted some anticipatory demand to Windows 98 (which was due to be released somewhat later than Internet Explorer 4.0), since Windows 98 would include all of the browser at no extra charge. Senior executives at Microsoft rejected the proposal, because while the move might have increased demand for Windows 98 and generated substantial revenue, it would have done so at the unacceptable cost of retarding the dissemination of Internet Explorer 4.0. Maritz reminded those who had advocated the proposal that "getting browser share up to 50% (or more) is still the major goal."

139. The transcendent importance of browser usage share to Microsoft is evident in what the firm expended, as well as in what it relinquished, in order to maximize usage share for Internet Explorer and to diminish it for Navigator. Not only was Microsoft willing to forego an opportunity to attract substantial revenue while enhancing (albeit temporarily) consumer demand for Windows 98, but the company also paid huge sums of money, and sacrificed many millions more in lost revenue every year, in order to induce firms to take actions that would help increase Internet Explorer's share of browser usage at Navigator's expense. First, even though Microsoft could have charged IAPs, ISVs, and Apple for licenses to distribute Internet Explorer separately from Windows, Microsoft priced those licenses, along with related technology and technical support, at zero in order to induce those companies to distribute and promote Internet Explorer over Navigator. Second, although Microsoft could have charged IAPs and ICPs substantial sums of money in exchange for promoting their services and content within Windows, Microsoft instead bartered Windows' valuable desktop "real estate" for a commitment from those firms to promote and distribute Internet Explorer, to inhibit promotion and distribution of Navigator, and to employ technologies that would inspire developers to write Web sites that relied on Microsoft's Internet technologies rather than those provided by Navigator. Microsoft was willing to offer such prominent placement even to AOL, which was the principal competitor to Microsoft's MSN service. If an IAP was already under contract to pay Netscape a certain amount for browser licenses, Microsoft offered to compensate the IAP the amount it owed Netscape. Third, Microsoft also reduced the referral fees that IAPs paid when users signed up for their services using the Internet Referral Server in Windows in exchange for the IAPs' efforts to convert their installed bases of subscribers from Navigator to Internet Explorer. For example, Microsoft entered a contract with AOL whereby Microsoft actually paid AOL a bounty for every subscriber that it converted to access software that included Internet Explorer instead of Navigator. Finally, with respect to OEMs, Microsoft extended co-marketing funds and reductions in the Windows royalty price to those agreeing to promote Internet Explorer and, in some cases, to abstain from promoting Navigator.

140. Even absent the strategic imperative to maximize its browser usage share at Netscape's expense, Microsoft might still have set the price of an Internet Explorer consumer license at zero. It might also have spent something approaching the $100 million it has devoted each year to developing Internet Explorer and some part of the $30 million it has spent annually marketing it. After all, consumers in 1995 were already demanding software that enabled them to use the Web with ease, and IBM had announced in September 1994 its plan to include browsing capability in OS/2 Warp at no extra charge. Microsoft had reason to believe that other operating-system vendors would do the same.

141. Still, had Microsoft not viewed browser usage share as the key to preserving the applications barrier to entry, the company would not have taken its efforts beyond developing a competitive browser product, including it with Windows at no additional cost to consumers, and promoting it with advertising. Microsoft would not have absorbed the considerable additional costs associated with enlisting other firms in its campaign to increase Internet Explorer's usage share at Navigator's expense. This investment was only profitable to the extent that it protected the applications barrier to entry. Neither the desire to bolster demand for Windows, nor the prospect of ancillary revenues, explains the lengths to which Microsoft has gone. For one thing, loading Navigator makes Windows just as Internet-ready as including Internet Explorer does. Therefore, Microsoft's costly efforts to limit the use of Navigator on Windows could not have stemmed from a desire to bolster consumer demand for Windows. Furthermore, there is no conceivable way that Microsoft's costly efforts to induce Apple to pre-install Internet Explorer on Apple's own PC systems could have increased consumer demand for Windows.

142. In pursuing its goal of maximizing Internet Explorer's usage share, Microsoft actually has limited rather severely the number of profit centers from which it could otherwise derive income via Internet Explorer. For example, Microsoft allows the developers of browser shells built on Internet Explorer to collect ancillary revenues such as advertising fees; for another, Microsoft permits its browser licensees to change the browser's start page, thus limiting the fees that advertisers are willing to pay for placement on that page by Microsoft. Even if Microsoft maximized its ancillary revenue, the amount of revenue realized would not come close to recouping the cost of its campaign to maximize Internet Explorer's usage share at Navigator's expense. The countless communications that Microsoft's executives dispatched to each other about the company's need to capture browser usage share indicate that the purpose of the effort had little to do with attracting ancillary revenues and everything to do with protecting the applications barrier from the threat posed by Netscape's Navigator and Sun's implementation of Java. For example, Microsoft vice president Brad Chase told the company's assembled sales and marketing executives in April 1996 that they should "worry about your browser share [ ] as much as BillG" even though Internet Explorer was "a no revenue product," because "we will lose [sic] the Internet platform battle if we do not have a significant user installed base." He told them that "if you let your customers deploy Netscape Navigator, you will loose [sic] leadership on the desktop."

F Excluding Navigator from Important Distribution Channels

143. Decision-makers at Microsoft worried that simply developing its own attractive browser product, pricing it at zero, and promoting it vigorously would not divert enough browser usage from Navigator to neutralize it as a platform. They believed that a comparable browser product offered at no charge would still not be compelling enough to consumers to detract substantially from Navigator's existing share of browser usage. This belief was due, at least in part, to the fact that Navigator already enjoyed a very large installed base and had become nearly synonymous with the Web in the public's consciousness. If Microsoft was going to raise Internet Explorer's share of browser usage and lower Navigator's share, executives at Microsoft believed they needed to constrict Netscape's access to the distribution channels that led most efficiently to browser usage.

1 The Importance of the OEM and IAP Channels

144. Very soon after it recognized the need to gain browser usage share at Navigator's expense, Microsoft identified pre-installation by OEMs and bundling with the proprietary client software of IAPs as the two distribution channels that lead most efficiently to browser usage. Two main reasons explain why these channels are so efficient. First, users must acquire a computer and connect to the Internet before they can browse the Web. Thus, the OEM and IAP channels lead directly to virtually every user of browsing software. Second, both OEMs and IAPs are able to place browsing software at the immediate disposal of a user without any effort on the part of the user. If an OEM pre-installs a browser onto its PCs and places an icon for that browser on the default screen, or "desktop," of the operating system, purchasers of those PCs will be confronted with the icon as soon as the operating system finishes loading into random access memory ("RAM"). If an IAP bundles a browser with its own proprietary software, its subscribers will, by default, use the browser whenever they connect to the Web. In its internal decision-making, Microsoft has placed considerable reliance on studies showing that consumers tend strongly to use whatever browsing software is placed most readily at their disposal, and that once they have acquired, found, and used one browser product, most are reluctant — and indeed have little reason — to expend the effort to switch to another. Microsoft has also relied on studies showing that a very large majority of those who browse the Web obtain their browsing software with either their PCs or their IAP subscriptions.

145. Indeed, no other distribution channel for browsing software even approaches the efficiency of OEM pre-installation and IAP bundling. The primary reason is that the other channels require users to expend effort before they can start browsing. The traditional retail channel, for example, requires the consumer to make contact with a retailer, and retailers generally do not distribute products without charging a price for them. Naturally, once Microsoft and Netscape began offering browsing software for free, consumers for the most part lost all incentive to pay for it.

146. The relatively few users who already have a browser but would prefer another can avoid the retail channel by using the Internet to download new browsing software electronically, but they must wait for the software to transmit to their PCs. This process takes a moderate degree of sophistication and substantial amount of time, and as the average bandwidth of PC connections has grown, so has the average size of browser products. The longer it takes for the software to download, the more likely it is that the user's connection to the Internet will be interrupted. As a vanguard of the "Internet Age," Navigator generated a tremendous amount of excitement in its early days among technical sophisticates, who were willing to devote time and effort to downloading the software. Today, however, the average Web user is more of a neophyte, and is far more likely to be intimidated by the process of downloading. It is not surprising, then, that downloaded browsers now make up only a small and decreasing percentage of the new browsers (as opposed to upgrades) that consumers obtain and use.

147. The consumer who receives a CD-ROM containing a free browser in the mail or as a magazine insert is at least spared the time and effort it would take to obtain browsing software from a retail vendor or to download it from the Web. But, just as the consumer who obtains a browser at retail or off the Web, the consumer who receives the software unsolicited at home must first install it on a PC system in order to use it, and merely installing a browser product takes time and can be confusing for novice users. Plus, a large percentage of the unsolicited disks distributed through "carpet bombing" reach individuals who do not have PCs, who already have pre-installed browsing software, or who have no interest in browsing the Web. In practice, less than two percent of CD-ROM disks disseminated in mass-distribution campaigns are used in the way the distributor intended. As a result, this form of distribution is rarely profitable, and then only when undertaken by on-line subscription services for whom a sale translates into a stream of revenues lasting into the future. The fact that an OLS may find it worthwhile to "carpet bomb" consumers with free disks obviously only helps the vendor of browsing software whose product the OLS has chosen to bundle with its proprietary software. So, while there are other means of distributing browsers, the fact remains that to a firm interested in browser usage, there simply are no channels that compare in efficiency to OEM pre- installation and IAP bundling.

148. Knowing that OEMs and IAPs represented the most efficient distribution channels of browsing software, Microsoft sought to ensure that, to as great an extent as possible, OEMs and IAPs bundled and promoted Internet Explorer to the exclusion of Navigator.

2 Excluding Navigator from the OEM Channel

a Binding Internet Explorer to Windows

i The Status of Web Browsers as Separate Products

149. Consumers determine their software requirements by identifying the functionalities they desire. While consumers routinely evaluate software products on the basis of the functionalities the products deliver, they generally lack sufficient information to make judgements based on the designs and implementations of those products. Accordingly, consumers generally choose which software products to license, install, and use on the basis of the products' functionalities, not their designs and implementations.

150. While the meaning of the term "Web browser" is not precise in all respects, there is a consensus in the software industry as to the functionalities that a Web browser offers a user. Specifically, a Web browser provides the ability for the end user to select, retrieve, and perceive resources on the Web. There is also a consensus in the software industry that these functionalities are distinct from the set of functionalities provided by an operating system.

151. Many consumers desire to separate their choice of a Web browser from their choice of an operating system. Some consumers, particularly corporate consumers, demand browsers and operating systems separately because they prefer to standardize on the same browser across different operating systems. For such consumers, standardizing on the browser of their choice results in increased productivity and lower training and support costs, and permits the establishment of consistent security and privacy policies governing Web access.

152. Moreover, many consumers who need an operating system, including a substantial percentage of corporate consumers, do not want a browser at all. For example, if a consumer has no desire to browse the Web, he may not want a browser taking up memory on his hard disk and slowing his system's performance. Also, for businesses desiring to inhibit employees' access to the Internet while minimizing system support costs, the most efficient solution is often using PC systems without browsers.

153. Because of the separate demand for browsers and operating systems, firms have found it efficient to supply the products separately. A number of operating system vendors offer consumers the choice of licensing their operating systems without a browser. Others bundle a browser with their operating system products but allow OEMs, value-added resellers, and consumers either to not install it or, if the browser has been pre-installed, to uninstall it. While Microsoft no longer affords this flexibility (it is the only operating system vendor that does not), it has always marketed and distributed Internet Explorer separately from Windows in several channels. These include retail sales, service kits for ISVs, free downloads over the Internet, and bundling with other products produced both by Microsoft and by third-party ISVs. In order to compete with Navigator for browser share, as well as to satisfy corporate consumers who want their diverse PC platforms to present a common browser interface to employees, Microsoft has also created stand-alone versions of Internet Explorer that run on operating systems other than 32-bit Windows, including the Mac OS and Windows 3.x.

154. In conclusion, the preferences of consumers and the responsive behavior of software firms demonstrate that Web browsers and operating systems are separate products.

ii Microsoft's Actions

155. In contrast to other operating system vendors, Microsoft both refused to license its operating system without a browser and imposed restrictions — at first contractual and later technical — on OEMs' and end users' ability to remove its browser from its operating system. As its internal contemporaneous documents and licensing practices reveal, Microsoft decided to bind Internet Explorer to Windows in order to prevent Navigator from weakening the applications barrier to entry, rather than for any pro-competitive purpose.

156. Before it decided to blunt the threat that Navigator posed to the applications barrier to entry, Microsoft did not plan to make it difficult or impossible for OEMs or consumers to obtain Windows without obtaining Internet Explorer. In fact, the company's internal correspondence and external communications indicate that, as late as the fall of 1994, Microsoft was planning to include low-level Internet "plumbing," such as a TCP/IP stack, but not a browser, with Windows 95.

157. Microsoft subsequently decided to develop a browser to run on Windows 95. As late as June 1995, however, Microsoft had not decided to bundle that browser with the operating system. The plan at that point, rather, was to ship the browser in a separate "frosting" package, for which Microsoft intended to charge. By April or May of that year, however, Microsoft's top executives had identified Netscape's browser as a potential threat to the applications barrier to entry. Throughout the spring, more and more key executives came to the conclusion that Microsoft's best prospect of quashing that threat lay in maximizing the usage share of Microsoft's browser at Navigator's expense. The executives believed that the most effective way of carrying out this strategy was to ensure that every copy of Windows 95 carried with it a copy of Microsoft's browser, then code-named "O'Hare." For example, two days after the June 21, 1995 meeting between Microsoft and Netscape executives, Microsoft's John Ludwig sent an E- mail to Paul Maritz and the other senior executives involved in Microsoft's browser effort. "[O]bviously netscape does see us as a client competitor," Ludwig wrote. "[W]e have to work extra hard to get ohare on the oem disks."

158. Microsoft did manage to bundle Internet Explorer 1.0 with the first version of Windows 95 licensed to OEMs in July 1995. It also included a term in its OEM licenses that prohibited the OEMs from modifying or deleting any part of Windows 95, including Internet Explorer, prior to shipment. The OEMs accepted this restriction despite their interest in meeting consumer demand for PC operating systems without Internet Explorer. After all, Microsoft made the restriction a non-negotiable term in its Windows 95 license, and the OEMs felt they had no commercially viable alternative to pre-installing Windows 95 on their PCs. Apart from a few months in the fall of 1997, when Microsoft provided OEMs with Internet Explorer 4.0 on a separate disk from Windows 95 and permitted them to ship the latter without the former, Microsoft has never allowed OEMs to ship Windows 95 to consumers without Internet Explorer. This policy has guaranteed the presence of Internet Explorer on every new Windows PC system.

159. Microsoft knew that the inability to remove Internet Explorer made OEMs less disposed to pre-install Navigator onto Windows 95. OEMs bear essentially all of the consumer support costs for the Windows PC systems they sell. These include the cost of handling consumer complaints and questions generated by Microsoft's software. Pre-installing more than one product in a given category, such as word processors or browsers, onto its PC systems can significantly increase an OEM's support costs, for the redundancy can lead to confusion among novice users. In addition, pre-installing a second product in a given software category can increase an OEM's product testing costs. Finally, many OEMs see pre-installing a second application in a given software category as a questionable use of the scarce and valuable space on a PC's hard drive.

160. Microsoft's executives believed that the incentives that its contractual restrictions placed on OEMs would not be sufficient in themselves to reverse the direction of Navigator's usage share. Consequently, in late 1995 or early 1996, Microsoft set out to bind Internet Explorer more tightly to Windows 95 as a technical matter. The intent was to make it more difficult for anyone, including systems administrators and users, to remove Internet Explorer from Windows 95 and to simultaneously complicate the experience of using Navigator with Windows 95. As Brad Chase wrote to his superiors near the end of 1995, "We will bind the shell to the Internet Explorer, so that running any other browser is a jolting experience."

161. Microsoft bound Internet Explorer to Windows 95 by placing code specific to Web browsing in the same files as code that provided operating system functions. Starting with the release of Internet Explorer 3.0 and "OEM Service Release 2.0" ("OSR 2") of Windows 95 in August 1996, Microsoft offered only a version of Windows 95 in which browsing-specific code shared files with code upon which non-browsing features of the operating system relied.

162. The software code necessary to supply the functionality of a modern application or operating system can be extremely long and complex. To make that complexity manageable, developers usually write long programs as a series of individual "routines," each ranging from a few dozen to a few hundred lines of code, that can be used to perform specific functions. Large programs are created by "knitting" together many such routines in layers, where the lower layers are used to provide fundamental functionality relied upon by higher, more focused layers. Some preliminary aspects of this "knitting" are performed by the software developer. The user who launches a program, however, is ultimately responsible for causing routines to be loaded into memory and executed together to produce the program's overall functionality.

163. Routines can be packaged together into files in almost any way the designer chooses. Routines need not reside in the same file to function together in a seamless fashion. Also, a developer can move routines into new or different files from one version of a program to another without changing the functionalities of those routines or the ability to combine them to provide integrated functionality.

164. Starting with Windows 95 OSR 2, Microsoft placed many of the routines that are used by Internet Explorer, including browsing-specific routines, into the same files that support the 32-bit Windows APIs. Microsoft's primary motivation for this action was to ensure that the deletion of any file containing browsing-specific routines would also delete vital operating system routines and thus cripple Windows 95. Although some of the code that provided Web browsing could still be removed, without disabling the operating system, by entering individual files and selectively deleting routines used only for Web browsing, licensees of Microsoft software were, and are, contractually prohibited from reverse engineering, decompiling, or disassembling any software files. Even if this were not so, it is prohibitively difficult for anyone who does not have access to the original, human-readable source code to change the placement of routines into files, or otherwise to alter the internal configuration of software files, while still preserving the software's overall functionality.

165. Although users were not able to remove all of the routines that provided Web browsing from OSR 2 and successive versions of Windows 95, Microsoft still provided them with the ability to uninstall Internet Explorer by using the "Add/Remove" panel, which was accessible from the Windows 95 desktop. The Add/Remove function did not delete all of the files that contain browsing specific code, nor did it remove browsing-specific code that is used by other programs. The Add/Remove function did, however, remove the functionalities that were provided to the user by Internet Explorer, including the means of launching the Web browser. Accordingly, from the user's perspective, uninstalling Internet Explorer in this way was equivalent to removing the Internet Explorer program from Windows 95.

166. In late 1996, senior executives within Microsoft, led by James Allchin, began to argue that Microsoft was not binding Internet Explorer tightly enough to Windows and as such was missing an opportunity to maximize the usage of Internet Explorer at Navigator's expense. Allchin first made his case to Paul Maritz in late December 1996. He wrote:

I don't understand how IE is going to win. The current path is simply to copy everything that Netscape does packaging and product wise. Let's [suppose] IE is as good as Navigator/Communicator. Who wins? The one with 80% market share. Maybe being free helps us, but once people are used to a product it is hard to change them. Consider Office. We are more expensive today and we're still winning. My conclusion is that we must leverage Windows more. Treating IE as just an add-on to Windows which is cross-platform [means] losing our biggest advantage — Windows marketshare. We should dedicate a cross group team to come up with ways to leverage Windows technically more. . . . We should think about an integrated solution — that is our strength.

Allchin followed up with another message to Maritz on January 2, 1997:

You see browser share as job 1. . . . I do not feel we are going to win on our current path. We are not leveraging Windows from a marketing perspective and we are trying to copy Netscape and make IE into a platform. We do not use our strength — which is that we have an installed base of Windows and we have a strong OEM shipment channel for Windows. Pitting browser against browser is hard since Netscape has 80% marketshare and we have 20%. . . . I am convinced we have to use Windows — this is the one thing they don't have. . . . We have to be competitive with features, but we need something more — Windows integration.

If you agree that Windows is a huge asset, then it follows quickly that we are not investing sufficiently in finding ways to tie IE and Windows together. This must come from you. . . . Memphis [Microsoft's code-name for Windows 98] must be a simple upgrade, but most importantly it must be killer on OEM shipments so that Netscape never gets a chance on these systems.

167. Maritz responded to Allchin's second message by agreeing "that we have to make Windows integration our basic strategy" and that this justified delaying the release of Windows 98 until Internet Explorer 4.0 was ready to be included with that product. Maritz recognized that the delay would disappoint OEMs for two reasons. First, while OEMs were eager to sell new hardware technologies to Windows users, they could not do this until Microsoft released Windows 98, which included software support for the new technologies. Second, OEMs wanted Windows 98 to be released in time to drive sales of PC systems during the back-to-school and holiday selling seasons. Nevertheless, Maritz agreed with Allchin's point that synchronizing the release of Windows 98 with Internet Explorer was "the only thing that makes sense even if OEMs suffer."

168. Once Maritz had decided that Allchin was right, he needed to instruct the relevant Microsoft employees to delay the release of Windows 98 long enough so that it could be shipped with Internet Explorer 4.0 tightly bound to it. When one executive asked on January 7, 1997 for confirmation that "memphis is going to hold for IE4, even if it puts memphis out of the xmas oem window," Maritz responded affirmatively and explained,

The major reason for this is . . . to combat Nscp, we have to [ ] position the browser as "going away" and do deeper integration on Windows. The stronger way to communicate this is to have a ‘new release' of Windows and make a big deal out of it. . . . IE integration will be [the] most compelling feature of Memphis.

Thus, Microsoft delayed the debut of numerous features, including support for new hardware devices, that Microsoft believed consumers would find beneficial, simply in order to protect the applications barrier to entry. 169. Allchin and Maritz gained support for their initiative within Microsoft in the early spring of 1997, when a series of market studies confirmed that binding Internet Explorer tightly to Windows was the way to get consumers to use Internet Explorer instead of Navigator. Reporting on one study in late February, Microsoft's Christian Wildfeuer wrote:

The stunning insight is this: To make [users] switch away from Netscape, we need to make them upgrade to Memphis. . . . It seems clear to me that it will be very hard to increase browser market share on the merits of IE 4 alone. It will be more important to leverage the OS asset to make people use IE instead of Navigator.

Microsoft's survey expert, Kumar Mehta, agreed. In March he shared with a colleague his "feeling, based on all the IE research we have done, [that] it is a mistake to release memphis without bundling IE with it."

170. Microsoft's technical personnel implemented Allchin's "Windows integration" strategy in two ways. First, they did not provide users with the ability to uninstall Internet Explorer from Windows 98. The omission of a browser removal function was particularly conspicuous given that Windows 98 did give users the ability to uninstall numerous features other than Internet Explorer — features that Microsoft also held out as being integrated into Windows 98. Microsoft took this action despite specific requests from Gateway that Microsoft provide a way to uninstall Internet Explorer 4.0 from Windows 98.

171. The second way in which Microsoft's engineers implemented Allchin's strategy was to make Windows 98 override the user's choice of default browser in certain circumstances. As shipped to users, Windows 98 has Internet Explorer configured as the default browser. While Windows 98 does provide the user with the ability to choose a different default browser, it does not treat this choice as the "default browser" within the ordinary meaning of the term. Specifically, when a user chooses a browser other than Internet Explorer as the default, Windows 98 nevertheless requires the user to employ Internet Explorer in numerous situations that, from the user's perspective, are entirely unexpected. As a consequence, users who choose a browser other than Internet Explorer as their default face considerable uncertainty and confusion in the ordinary course of using Windows 98.

172. Microsoft's refusal to respect the user's choice of default browser fulfilled Brad Chase's 1995 promise to make the use of any browser other than Internet Explorer on Windows "a jolting experience." By increasing the likelihood that using Navigator on Windows 98 would have unpleasant consequences for users, Microsoft further diminished the inclination of OEMs to pre-install Navigator onto Windows. The decision to override the user's selection of non- Microsoft software as the default browser also directly disinclined Windows 98 consumers to use Navigator as their default browser, and it harmed those Windows 98 consumers who nevertheless used Navigator. In particular, Microsoft exposed those using Navigator on Windows 98 to security and privacy risks that are specific to Internet Explorer and to ActiveX controls.

173. Microsoft's actions have inflicted collateral harm on consumers who have no interest in using a Web browser at all. If these consumers want the non-browsing features available only in Windows 98, they must content themselves with an operating system that runs more slowly than if Microsoft had not interspersed browsing-specific routines throughout various files containing routines relied upon by the operating system. More generally, Microsoft has forced Windows 98 users uninterested in browsing to carry software that, while providing them with no benefits, brings with it all the costs associated with carrying additional software on a system. These include performance degradation, increased risk of incompatibilities, and the introduction of bugs. Corporate consumers who need the hardware support and other non- browsing features not available in earlier versions of Windows, but who do not want Web browsing at all, are further burdened in that they are denied a simple and effective means of preventing employees from attempting to browse the Web.

174. Microsoft has harmed even those consumers who desire to use Internet Explorer, and no other browser, with Windows 98. To the extent that browsing-specific routines have been commingled with operating system routines to a greater degree than is necessary to provide any consumer benefit, Microsoft has unjustifiably jeopardized the stability and security of the operating system. Specifically, it has increased the likelihood that a browser crash will cause the entire system to crash and made it easier for malicious viruses that penetrate the system viaInternet Explorer to infect non-browsing parts of the system.


Some Pro-MS Tears and an Antidote: Findings of Fact, USA v. MS | 150 comments | Create New Account
Comments belong to whoever posts them. Please notify us of inappropriate comments.
Corrections Here
Authored by: Mr Zog on Tuesday, April 04 2006 @ 05:34 PM EDT
Keep them nice and tidy and all in 1 place.

Freedom is Unconstitutional???

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Off Topic
Authored by: Mr Zog on Tuesday, April 04 2006 @ 05:35 PM EDT
Please make links clicky

Freedom is Unconstitutional???

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Some Pro-MS Tears and an Antidote: Findings of Fact, USA v. MS
Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, April 04 2006 @ 06:22 PM EDT
It's on The Register too, here just below and advert for Microsoft...

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Windows and 3rd party software
Authored by: Woad_Warrior on Tuesday, April 04 2006 @ 06:48 PM EDT
Did you ever notice that if you installed and used 3rd party software, that wintendo would become more unstable? And the more 3rd party software you used, it would reach instability faster until it got to the point that it was virtually unusable and would require reinstallation? Oh, and let us not forget how win98 would corrupt a netscape download so that it couldn't be installed. (after 3 attempted downloads I gave up and had my friend who used Linux d/l it for me.)

But I'm sure that those sort of problems were just "operater error". It couldn't have been a deliberate effort to push people away from software that wasn't written in Redmond? Could it? Naaahh..... They wouldn't resort to that sort of behavior. Would they? (end sarcasm)

Well even if that was their goal, it failed miserably with me as I have been happily running various flavors of Linux exclusively for the last 5 or 6 years. Now if I could only convince my family to dump windows so that I don't have to fix it every few months........

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A promise of an embedded Web browser in 1994 seems unlikely
Authored by: alangmead on Tuesday, April 04 2006 @ 07:16 PM EDT

Consider what MSN looked like when Microsoft first shipped it with Windows 95. It was not the Web Portal that has the MSN name today. It was an online service that didn't use Internet protocols, and displayed only MSN services. To call it an overgrown BBS system might be a bit unkind, but its chief competitors at the time were services like Compuserve, GEnie, Prodigy and a non-Internet based AOL which was also very different from today.

On December 7, 1995, Microsoft held a press conference describing their move from proprietary online services to Internet based ones. In February 1996, it canceled the Blackbird Development Tools project and directed developers using MS tools to build online applications with HTML and IIS server components.

If it wasn't until 1996 when Microsoft told developers to stop developing their services as custom MSN components, plans to embed an Internet Web browser in the OS two years earlier seem unlikely. To do so would be to intentionally coax their 3rd party developers into spending months or years on development knowing ahead of time it would be thrown away and never could be deployed. I can believe (and have plenty of third hand anecdotal evidence) that Microsoft can be that devious with their competitors, but what purpose would they have in hiding an Internet strategy for two year from the the clients that are buying their tools and services and leading them all astray?

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History repeating?
Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, April 04 2006 @ 07:26 PM EDT

MS is giving away Virtual Server;
MS licensed .vhd to XenSource (virtual hard disk);
MS still lags behind VMWare for 'hypervisor' virtualization - and will continue
to do so for at least the next 18 months.

Perhaps they are trying to get traction with the $0 price point until they can
successfully bundle the virtualization into the OS?
What other similarities to the 'browser wars' are there?


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Also Check Out Paragraphs 341 to 356
Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, April 04 2006 @ 07:32 PM EDT
A couple of quotes:

> 349. A few days after the exchange with Waldman, Gates informed those
Microsoft executives most closely involved in the negotiations with Apple that
the discussions "have not been going well at all." One of the several
reasons for this, Gates wrote, was that "Apple let us down on the browser
by making Netscape the standard install." Gates then reported that he had
already called Apple's CEO (who at the time was Gil Amelio) to ask "how we
should announce the cancellation of Mac Office . . . ."

> 354. ...Sounds like we give them the HTML control for nothing except
making IE the "standard browser for Apple?" I think they should be
doing this anyway. Though the language of the agreement uses the word
"encourage," I think that the spirit is that Apple should be using it
everywhere and if they don't do it, then we can use Office as a club.

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Tony Soprano
Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, April 04 2006 @ 08:45 PM EDT
This is what Tony Soprano did to Carmela.

She discovered Tony went to all the Attorney's in town so she could not get a good one for her divorce.

How do you spell RICO Sauve?

    Another Microsoft tactic is to spread hefty amounts of legal work--much of it unrelated to the case--to major firms around town. So an army of lawyers is ethically constrained from working for Microsoft's competitors. The Progress & Freedom Foundation, a business-funded conservative think tank that supports a breakup, found this out when it tried to hire a lawyer from Pillsbury Madison & Sutro. The firm begged off because it was doing other work for Microsoft. "They've got the whole town conflicted out," muses one attorney. "They've sucked out all the oxygen."

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article on IT-Director - start of the FUDstorm
Authored by: tangomike on Tuesday, April 04 2006 @ 08:52 PM EDT
We knew it was coming; lots of people predicted it, here and elsewhere.

It's interesting that they're trying to rewrite the Netscape saga. Microsoft
toadies still don't seem to "get" the Internet. They write this
krud/fud as if it's for the print media, in a time before the Net was so
ubiquitous. It's as if Bill and Steve have their secretaries do their Internet
stuff for them. Nah... that couldn't be right, could it?

If Bill Gates had a nickel for every time Windows crashed...
Oh wait! He does!

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Has the Alexis de Tocqueville Institution been replaced?
Authored by: Brian S. on Tuesday, April 04 2006 @ 08:57 PM EDT

By the Sageza Group, Inc?


Brian S.

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Undocumented feature
Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, April 04 2006 @ 09:01 PM EDT
MS has a habit to put undocumented feature in their product. Example : the
document said that setting certain register prior to calling DOS interupt (I
forget the interupt number) will put the character on certain location of the
screen. Experiment revealed that the color of the character is controlled by
other register (that's not in the document).

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How is WordPerfect coming along?
Authored by: thorpie on Tuesday, April 04 2006 @ 09:43 PM EDT

Would anyone know how the WordPerfect case is coming along?

I used WordPerfect for a a couple of months last year and was amazed that it appeared to have been written without using much of Windows API functionality. Little things functioned differently, such as mouse movement. It was as if they did not use the Windows API functions and wrote all functionality from scratch. And some of the functions don't work as they should

Of course the reason for this may not be that M$ abused it position by withholding info on Windows API functionality or otherwise used its monopoly position to hold up WordPerfect development. It may be that WordPerfect considered itself to be a cut above M$ and may have decided that they could reproduce the Windows functionality better themselves

Given that M$'s only profitable products are Windows and Office, and that Office's main function is word processing, this case has the ability to seriously damage M$. If M$ is proved to have bumped the market leader by absuing its position then the market leader would expect damages of what, say 50% of Office's sales in losses and an equivalent amount in punitive, say a couple of hundred billion $.

Life would be particularly interesting wouldn't it? Dream on!

The memories of a man in his old age are the deeds of a man in his prime - Floyd, Pink

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Some Pro-MS Tears and an Antidote: Findings of Fact, USA v. MS
Authored by: jsusanka on Tuesday, April 04 2006 @ 10:31 PM EDT
now that is what I call a "Get the Facts on the Facts"

keep it coming Groklaw - I am so glad that sites like
yours exist to state the FACTS and not rubbish.

I don't like what you say sometimes but at least I know
you state the FACTS and it isn't some PR campaign like
"Get the FACTS"

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Silver lining :-)
Authored by: golding on Wednesday, April 05 2006 @ 12:32 AM EDT
Let us not forget that good quality browsers are free of cost due to the
MS/Netscape 'war'.

Prior to that I had a Netscape licence, paid in full, till their demise. I
reckon that browsers could very well be a costly addition, indeed quite
expensive (like MS Office), if not for the unlawful inclusion of IE within
Windows for no additional cost.

Regards, Robert

..... Some people can tell what time it is by looking at the sun, but I have
never been able to make out the numbers.

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Vista in the EU
Authored by: Anonymous on Wednesday, April 05 2006 @ 02:36 AM EDT
I heard, their system font was caught as plagium in the EU.
They won't be allowed to distribute Vista with this truetype font...

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Some Pro-MS Tears and an Antidote: Findings of Fact, USA v. MS
Authored by: Anonymous on Wednesday, April 05 2006 @ 03:23 AM EDT
Not to forget that IE is based on "Marc Andreesen's Browser" - Mosaic
(check the IE Help->About):

Based on NCSA Mosaic. NCSA Mosaic(TM); was developed at the National Center for
Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

A useful data point to counter anti open source arguments from Micosoft Lovers.
Also a good demostration of why MS likes the BSD license.

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Some Pro-MS Tears and an Antidote: Findings of Fact, USA v. MS
Authored by: Anonymous on Wednesday, April 05 2006 @ 03:29 AM EDT
"But, I digress..."

Really means: "That's all the nonsense I can spout in one breath"

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He's not the only one
Authored by: Anonymous on Wednesday, April 05 2006 @ 05:38 AM EDT
Analyst house Ovum also seems to think we should all move on and leave Microsoft to it. CBR Online has a nice riposte: "The perspective appears to ignore one significant point, however: that Microsoft was found guilty of breaking European Union competition law in March 2004, and so long as its actions are not remedied, it continues to benefit from its illegal actions."

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Some Pro-MS Tears and an Antidote: Findings of Fact, USA v. MS
Authored by: Anonymous on Wednesday, April 05 2006 @ 06:16 AM EDT
Am I alone in thinking that *everyone* is missing the best oppourtunity we have
for improving the quality of commercial software ?

1) Anti virus and other security vendors :
You would not exist if (insert propriatary OS vendors here) didn't do such a
consistently bad job of writing an OS. So shut up and take it where it hurts
and find another business. (If you need help consult your local coal miners).

2) Commercial Software Vendors (You know who you are.)
You are in business to make our lives smoother. NOT ROUGHER. Viruses, ADware,
SPAM etc make our lives a misery. Yet YOU cannot be held liable.

No NEW (new will need defining to catch "version upgrade" or
"feature pack" etc evasions) *commercial* software release can be
marketed within the EU *UNLESS* the following condidtions are met :

1) Vendor will provide on request a specific (yet to be determined) level of

2) Vendor would be required to certify their code quality and provide free and
timely fixes (witin 5 business days of having recieved notfication of the
vulnerability/bug). The vendor can choose to continue supporting the product,
or release the code as open source (at any time of their choosing), releasing
them from their obligation to maintain their product.

3) In the event that a vendor is repeatedly ( a full definition of repeatedly is
needed but not included at this time) in violation of their support obligations
(5 day fix time for the lifetime of the product) they will face being forced
open source their code.

Sound a bit harsh ????

Take a look at the automotive industry where supplying 3 years cover on new
products (ok in this case cars) is a standard business practice. Furthermore
"product recalls" (bug fixes) are commonplace and are accepted by the

To add insult - vehicles have to pass rigorous safety checks before they are
permitted to be manufactured and sold.

We are *almost* if not *more* dependant on our IT systems than we are our cars.
The results of software errors can be more fatal than a car crash. Yet there is
*NO* enforced code of conduct ?????

Software Vendors :
We are not your crash test dummies.
If you want your patents - this is my price.

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Authored by: Anonymous on Wednesday, April 05 2006 @ 07:53 AM EDT
Re: There is a truly hilarious article on IT-Director today, by an analyst moaning about poor Microsoft being unfairly and unwisely hounded by the EU Commission over Vista, when all it has ever done is try to make software easy and safe for Grandma. But what does the article actually say?
  • analyst moaning - yes
  • poor Microsoft - no
  • unfairly and unwisely hounded - no, no and no
  • when all it has ever done - no
  • try to make software easy - yes
  • safe for grandma - no
Is the main part of this article more accurate? This must be in doubt, which is a pity.

In contrast "Interview with FSFE's Counsel Carlo Piana After the MS Hearing" was excellent - giafly.

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  • I did - Authored by: tangomike on Wednesday, April 05 2006 @ 09:48 AM EDT
Some Pro-MS Tears and an Antidote: Findings of Fact, USA v. MS
Authored by: shiptar on Wednesday, April 05 2006 @ 08:07 AM EDT
At what point does this become our fault?

I grew up reading about this garbage, and it's the same as when I was 15 years
old. At some point, it stops being 'their' fault, and it becomes ours. Where
were you people then?

No one else out there to blame but ourselves, our ignorance, and our laziness.

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We really need a simple law to force accuracy in media.
Authored by: Anonymous on Wednesday, April 05 2006 @ 09:52 AM EDT
Something along the lines of a libel law, but with with a streamlined process
where fact is not in dispute, as in this case where it has been documented in

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Some Pro-MS Tears and an Antidote: Findings of Fact, USA v. MS
Authored by: Anonymous on Wednesday, April 05 2006 @ 12:42 PM EDT
Eeek! With such a large quote, it would be nice to have the salient passages
highlighted in red for us dimwits.


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One of the most Unread documents
Authored by: tz on Wednesday, April 05 2006 @ 03:01 PM EDT
At our local user's group I pointed one of the directors at the PDF and it
became the topic of the next meeting.

I tend to be libertarian, but some tend to mistake corporatism for capitalism.
Microsoft plants logic bombs (DrDOS-Win3.1), engages in fraud (don't buy X,
our's will be out in 3 months, oops years), and does all kinds of things but
because the evil government is attacking them for anti-trust, they must be OK.

I generally ask them "Did they READ the findings of FACT"?, and they
say they didn't. The other case was Hillary Clinton's health care proposal - it
mentioned prison more often than hospital and had other interesting things, but
no one read that either. Nor things like the Patriot act or whatever copyright
or patent bill - usually with an orwellian name - comes along.

I said that to note my point about open source is what you see is what you get.
You can read and analyze things. And find problems.

But in law and software, people rarely read past the label.

Not even to the ingredients list.

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MSW95 internet ready? WARNING -- rough analogy
Authored by: jo_dan_zukiger on Thursday, April 06 2006 @ 04:00 AM EDT
This is a pretty rough analogy, but I think it's appropriate.

MSWindows 95 on the internet was something like a woman without clothes
walking in the streets.

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