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Gordon v. Microsoft Exhibits
Gordon vs. Microsoft Exhibits
These are the exhibits used in the antitrust trial of Gordon v. Microsoft, which took place from March 18-April 15, 2004. The antitrust litigation settled during the trial, but we at Groklaw saved the exhibits first, before they disappeared. We did some group work on them, then we got distracted, and now, finally, here they are, the entire collection for us and for historians.
The numbers take you to PDFs we made of the exhibits; the links marked
TIFF take you to the exhibit as it originally appeared on the
Plaintiff’s website. Where we have finished a text version, you will
find a link marked Text.
Below the list of the exhibits, you will find text versions of the ones
we have completed. Also, you will find links to the text within the
list. Feel free to help us complete that task.
Gordon v. Microsoft Trial Exhibits
| Jump to: | Plaintiff |
[0100], [0200], [0300],
[0400], [0600], [0800],
[0900], [1000], [1200],
[1500], [2100], [2300],
[2400], [3200], [4400],
[4500].
|
| Respondent |
[0000], [0500], [0600],
[0700], [1000], [2300],
[3500].
|
| Plaintiff’s Exhibits |
| 0017 |
Microsoft/HP license agreement, May 23, 1988 [107 pages]
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0027 |
Microsoft/GO Corporation Nondisclosure Agreement, signed by Bill Gates, dates 7/8/88
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0035 |
Microsoft internal emails, one from billg: “You never sent me a response on the question of what things an app would do that would make it run with MSDOS and not run with DR-DOS.” [2 pages]
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0035A |
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0058 |
GO Corporation letter to Jeff Raikes, dated Feb. 19, 1989, documenting a joint project between the two companies
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0062 |
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0068 |
[Tiff] |
|
| 0094 |
IBM internal memo, dated May 3, 1989, re Microsoft “back doors”
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0101 |
J.Kaplan memo to “rc”, May 10, 1989, suggesting tactics to contain Microsoft access to documents
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0108 |
Bill Gates 6-page memo to Steve Ballmer et al, May 18, 1989, Subject: Operating System Strategy – “The DOS gold mine is shrinking and our costs are soaring – primarily due to low prices, IBM share and DR-DOS…. Going full bore on Windows leaves the following major problems: 1. OS/2 consistent; 2. OS/2 more powerful…Government standards are a problem – I think we need to invest more people in this. I have been very successful explaining how a desktop binary standard is better than a source standard when I get to talk to the right people. The EEC meeting has me feeling better about this.”
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0109 |
Microsoft 10-page memo from Mark Chestnut to Russ Werner, Status Report for April 1989
[Tiff]
|
[Text]
|
| 0115 |
3 pages of emails dated May 4 – June 8, 1989 reporting on Microsoft meeting with GO Corporation, on what they were doing. “The one key piece we need in order to put Windows on flat computers made by other manufacturers is the handwriting recognition software…Eventually, we will have to decide if we want to acquire this technology or build it ourselves.”
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0116 |
Robert Carr, Agenda, 6/9/89
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0117 |
Confidential GO Corporation memo from Robert Carr to file, with cc to Jerry K, dated June 16, 1989, Subject: “Draft Response to Microsoft Pitch for Cooperation” [2 pages]
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0135 |
Bill Gates 2-page memo, August 6, 1989, Subject: OS strategy. “IBM never knew our plan and if they did they shouldn’t like it…”
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0136 |
Emails regarding an 1989 memo from a Far East Product Engineering product manager: “Bill Gates ordered to all application business units to include checking routines of operating environments and if it is Microsoft DOS, nothing will happen. But if it is non MS-DOS (such as DR-DOS), application will display messages saying that ‘This application has been developed and tested for MICROSOFT MS DOS. Since you use different environment, this application may not work correctly…” [2 pages]
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0141 |
Email asking, “The question is, do you think it is feasible to document ‘DefineHandleTable’ for ISV programmers to use?… I am not sure about this since Microsoft’s public position has been that Apps Division programmers do not have special hooks into Windows, when, in fact, they do.”
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0161 |
IBM confidential internal memo from J. A. Cannavino, attached to Microsoft letter from Bill Gates, dated October 16, 1989, to Cannavino, suggesting IBM adopt a Windows strategy: “I am confused by the IBM strategy.” [4 pages]
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0162 |
Confidential IBM memo, dated October 18, 1989, re “Windows vs. OS/2 Comparison” with comparative charts attached. “There is no hardware platform where Windows is clearly better than OS/2.” [8 pages]
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0178 |
Joint Microsoft/IBM press release re expanding partnership and setting future DOS and OS/2 directions. [5 pages]
[Tiff]
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|
| 0181 |
Bob Frankston email, November 16, 1989, Subject: Update on Microsoft’s view of the world. “Before leaving I dropped by Microsoft’s reception for user groups. Gates summary of the IBM announcement is that 75% of the 286/386 machines shipping have 2MB or less and are thus Windows machine and that all they did was to cede a part of the remaining 25%. It wasn’t an appropriate place for me to challenge him or accuse of changing the story.”
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0186 |
Microsoft memo from Steve Ballmer, dated December 1, 1989, Subject: Windows/OS/2 Positioning and COMDEX Events. “It is now over two weeks since Bill and Jim Cannavino reaffirmed the Microsoft/IBM relationship at Comdex… Let me clarify our positions on a few points. We will work to correct the Press and IBM’s understanding of these issues.” [21 pages]
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0212 |
Email from cameronm to peterm, Jan. 20, 1990. “SCO is a DOMINANT Unix supplier and they make NO MONEY AT ALL. ZERO PROFIT, a very tiny cash reserve, and I will add, probably a lot lower development coests than we have. AND they have an apps business to boot!… Yes, we have to beat UNIX, but we have to beat it ONLY BECAUSE it’s a long term strategic threat. It isn’t a market that is profitable …Can we back off OS/2 as the successor to DOS? How do we beat a successful retreat path? How much of the industry do we alienate? I will just assume that OEMs and IBM are irrelevant, that they are so jaded it doesn’t matter what we do. What about large corporations who have bought our story, what about ISVs ho have invested in OS/2? What will the press say? I don’t buy that we can hide behind this insipid claim that we’ve always pushed Windows and that it’s their own fault. It just isn’t true, we’ve told ISVs to develop for OS/2 and clearly put a lot more behind getting OS/2 apps than Windows apps…. Ultimately we have to think about whether we make more money… by keeping on our present course … or whether we will make more money in repositioning Win 3 strongly on the desktop and OS/2 as the server/Unix alternative platform. I hope we realize, or that I have shown, there isn’t a lot of money we can wring from the Unix market in the next couple of years…. We can’t outwardly reposition OS/2 immediately (until we are ready).” [6 pages]
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0215 |
MS/IBM Systems Software Plan: 1990-92 [51 pages] – “Flirtation with UNIX: some corps attracted by ‘open’/standards message… govt giving leadership to UNIX movement. Currently limited issue, but could become large scale movement if viable, alternative vision not supplied…. else risk ceding share in large way to UNIX over time…. OS/2 is having mixed/poor acceptance… not differentiated sufficiently from Windows… both can’t win desktop in 1991.” [P. 36: AT&T System V.4 listed as having 5% marketshare of servers; <1% on desktops. P. 37: SCO System V.3.2 listed as having 1% market share on desktops, 3% on servers. P. 46 Novell NetWare listed as having 60-70% market share.]
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0243 |
Internal confidential memo from J. A. Cannavino, dated 3/14/90, with attached letter to him from Bill Gates. “I am disappointed that we did not meet before IBM made a font decision…. I was disappointed to see that the AIX networking strategy conflicts with the PC networking strategy…. I was surprised to read that a group in IBM is implementing Novell protocols on the mainframe…. We have discussed the need for IBM to disclose its video strategy to us so we can plan to support your hardware aggressively….The only way I think that OS/2 will take off quickly is to get it bundled with 386 hardware.” [4 pages]
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0259 |
Confidential IBM memo, subject: Microsoft, dated April 9, 1990. “Attached please find several items which came out of Microsoft work sessions… Let me put one caveat on all of this material. It all assumes we continue to dialog with Microsoft on the complete ‘partnership’ we have been discussing. Should different direction come out of the April 11 meeting, a new strategy, agenda and ‘IBM interests and concerns’ position for each product will have to be developed….Microsoft is unwilling to have a partnership on DOS and Windows at all. IBM is simply to be another OEM. Microsoft does not want IBM to participate in managing these products. Throughout the history of our relationship, IBM has always played an important role in planning DOS. We cannot agree to abdicate that role now for such an important product…. Microsoft now also wants to manage OS/2 in a way that is inconsistent with the existing JDA.” [12 pages]
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0275 |
Internal Microsoft memo from Scott Old, dated April 30, 1990, cc to Bill Gates and Steve Baller, et al, Re: FY91 USSMD Strategic Planning: “We should create a means to ensure that our product demos and attract loops are a permanently installed on the resellers demo machines. We should capture the loyalty of the reseller sales rep via training programs and a reward system for selling Microsoft products. We will launch the Microsoft Programs Reseller in order to do the aforementioned on an on-going basis.” (“Produced using Microsoft Word for the Mac and the Apple LaserWriter Plus printer.”) [6 pages]
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0285 |
IBM memo with attached OS/2 marketing slides. [9 pages]
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0286 |
Memo to Bill Gates regarding DRI, DOS 5.
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0293 |
Memo to Bill Gates et al Re “GO competition”, dated May 28, 1990. “We did not convince them (Intel) not to invest in GO…. One appropriate followup is probably for us to write a letter to Grove with a follow-up phone call by Bill.” [9 pages]
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0298 |
Steve Ballmer letter to IBM’s Lee Reiswig, dated June 1, 1990, 2 pages. “If we had distinctly different markets this divergence might not be disastrous. But there are many areas where our products will conflict.”
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0305 |
Microsoft Board of Directors’ Report/Finance & Administration. [180 pages]
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0310 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0319 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0349 |
[Abstract: [Pages 1 2 3 ] Microsoft email From gregw Jul 31, 1990 To: billg darrylr jeffr mikemap Cc: bradsi jabeb lloydfr tonyw Subject: Re: GO threat. [Page 3] of the email has a reply-included email from Bill Gates dated Jul 31, 1990.]
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0355 |
[Abstract: Page 1: Microsoft Memo From: lloydfr To: billg darrylr, jeffr, mikemap, bradsi [handwritten underline] jabeb, tonyw, gregw, [s?]andyt, pradeeps, marline Subject: GO Corp Info. Date: 8/1/1990 Pages 2-14: Various screenshots of the Go PenPoint computer user]
[Tiff] |
[Text] |
| 0359 |
[Abstract: Microsoft email from lloydfr to mikemap Cc: cathyw Aug 9, 1990 Subject: GO Info. lloydfr tells mikemap to return confidential information that lloydfr had given mikemap the week before, so that lloydfr can destroy it.]
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0370 |
[Abstract: Microsoft email. jeffr asks debem to print a 3-page email “for the GO file” from claraj to jeffr rice, dated Aug, 29 1990, subject: GO]
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0373 |
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0443 |
[Abstract: Pages [1 2]: Microsoft email. jeffr asks debem to print a two-page email from lloydfr to billg gregs jeffr mikemap pradeeps, dated Oct 31, 1990, subject: Approaching GO]
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0461 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0462 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0465 |
[Tiff]
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| 0466 |
[Tiff]
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| 0478 |
[Abstract: [Page 1 2 3 4 ] Jerry Kaplan notes for meeting with Jim Cannavino December 2, 1990 GO Corporation Confidential Mar 5, 1994]
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0502 |
[Tiff]
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| 0619 |
[Tiff]
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|
| 0638 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0645 |
[Tiff]
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|
| 0687 |
[Abstract: Page [ 1 2 ] Page [ 1 ] Fax Cover Sheet Page [ 2 ] Apr 18, 1991 Fax of a letter from Jerry Kaplan to Bill Gates. (Letter is dated Apr 17, 1991.)]
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0690 |
[Tiff]
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|
| 0709 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0718 |
[Abstract: Pages [ 1 2 ]: May 3, 1991 Letter from Bill Gates, Chairman, Microsoft Corporation, to S. Jerrold Kaplan, Chairman of Go Corporation]
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0733 |
[Abstract: Pages 1, 2: May 13, 1991 Letter from S. Jerrold Kaplan, Chairman of Go Corporation, to Bill Gates, Chairman of the Board & CEO MICROSOFT CORPORATION]
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0746 |
[Abstract: Pages 1 2 3 4 5: Mar 16, 1992 Microsoft email From nathanm To: pradeeps Cc: billg bradsi cameronm gregs jeffr jonl karenh lloydfr marline makemap raleighr robg steveb Subject: RE: PCs that aren’t PCs]
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0786 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0805 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0809 |
[Abstract: Page [ 1 2 ]: Jul 3, 1991 Bill Gates letter to S. Jerrold Kaplan, CEO of Go Corporation, (2 pages) Page [ 3 ]: Jul 14, 1988 Bill Gates email To: gregm jeffr joachimk jons mikemap steveb Subject: GO corporation Cc: charless jeffh tandyt (1 page) Page [ 4 ]]
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 0828 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0841 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0843 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0859 |
[Abstract: [Page 1 2 3 4 ] Microsoft Memo by Greg Slyngstad Jul 24, 1991 “Re: Challenges to Pen Win” “Threats to Windows For Pens”]
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0868 |
[Tiff]
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| 0869 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0874 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0959A |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0978 |
[Tiff]
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| 0979 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0981 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0984 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0985 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0986 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0990 |
[Tiff]
|
[Text] |
| 1002 |
[Abstract: [Page 1 ] Microsoft Email Oct 1991 Fujitsu Poquet “Go Corporation” toshim richardf joachimk jeffr “No mercy is an option for us.”]
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 1048 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 1077 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 1079 |
[Tiff]
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| 1081 |
[Tiff]
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| 1130 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 1133 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 1142 |
[Tiff]
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| 1146 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 1183 |
[Tiff]
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| 1192 |
[Tiff]
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| 1219 |
[Tiff]
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| 1221 |
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| 1222 |
[Tiff]
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| 1232 |
[Tiff]
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| 1243 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 1265 |
[Tiff]
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| 1273 |
[Tiff]
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| 1324 |
[Tiff]
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| 1394 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 1397 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 1413 |
[Tiff]
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| 1416 |
[Tiff]
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| 1513 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 1519 |
[Tiff]
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| 1520 |
[Abstract: Jan 13, 1993 letter from Joachim Kempin, Vice President OEM Sales, Microsoft, to Eckhard Pfeiffer, President and Chief Executive Officer, Compaq Computer Corporation, on Microsoft’s desire for a “Strategic Partnership” Agreement and partnership with Comp]
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 1521 |
[Tiff]
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| 1522 |
[Abstract: Compaq PDA Operating System Selection – Portable and Software Marketing – PC Division A January 13, 1993 powerpoint presentation arguing the risks v. return of angering Microsoft by choosing to partner with GO Corporation.]
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 1660 |
[Tiff]
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| 1744 |
[Tiff]
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| 1745 |
[Tiff]
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| 1797 |
[Tiff]
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| 1999 |
[Tiff]
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| 2132 |
[Tiff]
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| 2151 |
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| 2214 |
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| 2235 |
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| 2246A |
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| 2251 |
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| 2253 |
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| 2258A |
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| 2264 |
[Tiff]
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| 2274 |
[Tiff]
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| 2299 |
[Tiff]
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| 2311 |
[Tiff]
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| 2322 |
[Tiff]
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| 2348 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 2350A |
[Tiff]
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| 2373 |
[Tiff]
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| 2374 |
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[Text] |
| 2399 |
[Tiff]
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| 2417 |
[Tiff]
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| 2418 |
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[Text] |
| 2426 |
[Tiff]
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| 2428 |
[Tiff]
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| 2446A |
[Tiff]
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| 2529 |
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| 2662 |
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| 2706 |
[Tiff]
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| 2904 |
[Tiff]
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| 3159 |
[Tiff]
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| 3174 |
[Abstract: Two similar screenshots: Page [ 1 ] PenPoint computer table of contents, Page [ 2 ] Microsoft NotebookApplet]
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 3190 |
[Tiff]
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| 3247 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 3383D |
[Tiff] |
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| 3475 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 3505 |
[Tiff]
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| 3534 |
[Tiff]
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| 3667 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 3668 |
[Tiff]
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| 3686 |
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[Tiff]
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| 3994 |
[Tiff]
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| 4178 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 4396 |
[Tiff]
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| 4400 |
[Tiff]
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| 4401 |
[Tiff]
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| 4402 |
[Tiff]
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| 4407 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 4410 |
[Tiff]
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| 4411 |
[Tiff]
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| 4421 |
[Tiff]
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| 4422 |
[Tiff]
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| 4423 |
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[Text] |
| 4424 |
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| 4427 |
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[Tiff]
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[Tiff]
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| 4439 |
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| 4440 |
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| 4448 |
[Tiff]
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| 4470 |
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| 4516 |
[Tiff]
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| 4517 |
[Tiff]
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| 4521 |
[Tiff]
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| 4546A |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 4559 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 4560 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 4561 |
[Tiff]
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| 4562 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 4563 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 4564 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 4574 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 4576 |
[Abstract: Internal IBM memo from Administrative Assistant, Office of the AGM, Market Development and Operations: Briefing Sheet for Lou Gerstner Call to Bill Gates May 26[, 1993]]
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 4588 |
Bill Gates 2-page memo to Intel’s Andy Grove, with internal cover memo, dated May 25, 1995, regarding NSP and software standards, presenting offer to cooperate with competitive benefit for each company
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 4602 |
[Tiff]
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| Respondent’s Exhibits |
| 0017 |
[Tiff]
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| 0071 |
[Tiff]
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| 0080 |
[Tiff]
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| 0082 |
[Tiff]
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| 0116 |
[Note: same as Plaintiff 0116.]
[Tiff]
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| 0164 |
[Tiff]
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| 0178 |
[Tiff]
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| 0333 |
[Tiff]
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| 0417 |
[Tiff]
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[Text] |
| 0478 |
[Tiff]
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| 0515 |
[Tiff]
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| 0517 |
[Tiff]
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| 0534 |
[Tiff]
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| 0541 |
[Tiff]
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| 0543 |
[Tiff]
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| 0547 |
[Tiff]
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| 0548 |
[Tiff]
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| 0570 |
Nov. 1, 1989 letter from IBM VP James Cannavino to Bill Gates re OS/2 partnership concerns
[Tiff]
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| 0574 |
[Tiff]
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| 0585 |
[Tiff]
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| 0595 |
[Tiff]
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| 0604 |
[Tiff]
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| 0608 |
[Tiff]
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| 0609 |
May 5, 1995 internal memo from IBM’s Dan Lautenbach re “IBM OS.2 Warp Brand Plan”
[Tiff]
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| 0624 |
[Tiff]
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| 0625 |
[Tiff]
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| 0627 |
[Tiff]
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| 0629 |
[Tiff]
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| 0631 |
[Tiff]
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| 0633 |
7/27/94 internal IBM memo from Neil Isford to J.M. Thompson, Subject: OS/2 (why poor sales results: “Lead by Gates and his media machine, Microsoft is spreading fear, uncertainty, and doubt to the media about OS/2 to the press, our channels, and most recently directly to our large accounts…. Influencers like Gartner are now carrying the Microsoft message….”
[Tiff]
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| 0642 |
John W. Thompson August 7, 1995 ISV (Solution Developer) Strategy report
[Tiff]
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| 0653 |
[Tiff]
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| 0664 |
[Tiff]
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| 0665 |
[Tiff]
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| 0666 |
[Tiff]
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| 0667 |
[Tiff]
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| 0669 |
[Tiff]
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| 0671 |
[Tiff]
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| 0672 |
[Tiff]
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| 0675 |
[Tiff]
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| 0684 |
[Tiff]
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| 0689 |
[Tiff]
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| 0710 |
[Tiff]
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| 0721 |
[Tiff]
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| 0723 |
[Tiff]
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| 0738 |
[Tiff]
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| 0759 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0768 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0771 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0793 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0794 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0805 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 0810 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 0812 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 1026 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 1057 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 1061 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 1205 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 1271 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 1436 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 1448 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 1659 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 1660 |
[See Plaintiff 1660]
[Tiff]
|
|
| 2318b |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 2491 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 2494 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 2496 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 2497 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 2499 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 2502 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 2507 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 2508 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 2529 |
See Plaintiff 2529
[Tiff]
|
|
| 2535 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 2639 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 2646 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 2673 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 2690 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 2706 |
See Plaintiff 2706
[Tiff]
|
|
| 3511 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 3715 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| 3725 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 3726 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 3727 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 3734 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 3735 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 3744 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 3745 |
[Tiff]
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| 3747 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 4431 |
[Tiff]
|
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| 4468 |
[Tiff]
|
|
| |
| Text transcripts |
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 35 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 35 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 1 of 2
will get upset. There is a strong likelihood however that we could get
rid of debug exe3bin and link. That is 60 pages and 15% of the user’s
ref/guide
One thing we can get rid of though is the user’s guide which is geared
at the user which has never used MS DOS before That’s 62 pages and
about 15% more of the manual right there.
Finally as far as GW BAsic [sic] is concerned we need to incorporate a
quick reference or whether we like it or not we will get zillions of
calls for the manual.
From: mikeswl [indistinct]
To: mikescale [indistinct]
Cc: srkamr [indistinct]; tomle
Subject: DOS 4.0 Retail Upgrade Tree
Date: Thursday, September 22, 1988 12:17PM
Srkam [indistinct] and I created a project for the DOS 4.0 retail
upgrade. We put it on \\TROJAN\DOS2. The project is called 40RETAIL.
-Mike
Susan Johnson
From: billg
To: pascalm; russw; tomle
Cc: philba
Subject: Dr dos
Thursday, September 22, 1988 12:41 PM
You never sent me a response on the question of what things an app
would do that would make it run with MSDOS and not run with DR-DOS. Is
there any version check or api that they fail to have? Is ther[e a]
feature they have that might get in our way? I am not looking for
something they can’t get around. I am looking for something that their
current binary fails on.
This is a fairly urgent question for me and I have received nothing.
Susan Johnson
From: tomle
To: pascalm; rossw
Cc: philba; tomle
Subject: Dr dos
Date: Thursday, September 22, 1988 1:28 PM
Page 43
[STAMPED] Exhibit 7
[STAMPED] X 565988 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0185971 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] EXH 1 DATE 5/17/[20]02 WITNESS Barrett MARY W. MILLER
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 35 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 2 of 2
I am assuming your [sic] handeling [sic] this one based on the info you
got from AaronR pascal. Please correct me if I am wrong?
Tom
P.S. I am referring to Bill’s quiestion [sic]
Susan Johnson
robertre
anthonys; davidma; vich
msSteam; rsype
NP faults in device drivers
Thursday, September 22, 1988 1:35PM
After discussing this with Ross Cook, I decided to do some research. On
page 8-91 of the IBM OS/2 Technical Reference, Vol. 1 (VerifyAccess) I
see the following paragraph:
Once the process has been verified as
having the needed access to a specific address location, the device
driver doesn’t need to request access verification each time it yields
the CPU during task-time processing of this process’s request. If the
process makes a new request, then the device driver must request access
verification.
If I were reading this, I would not assume that I had to do any kind of
locking of the segment. The next paragraph says
Note also that, prior to requesting the
Lock on user process-supplied addresses, the device driver must verify
the user process’s access to the memory with the VerifyAccess DevHlp
call. The device driver must not yield the CPU between the VerifyAccess
and the Lock, *otherwise the user process could shrink the segment
before it hsa been locked* [then, in square brackets: ] [emphasis
mine]. Once the user access has been verified, the device driver may
convert the virtual address to a physical address and lock the memory.
The access verification is valid for the duration of the lock.
So the documentation implies that the only reason you’d want to lock a
segment would be to prevent a shrink (and presumably a free). There is
no mention anywhere in the VerifyAccess man page that says anything
about having to protect the segment from swapping or discarding.
I suggest someone check our documentation on this.
It may be wrong, but it’s documented, albeit badly. A question: can we
detect if a device driver was built with 1.0 tools, or something
similar? We may be able to do something to let 1.0 DOs [sic] run
unhindered. I asked why this was never seen before, and Ross told me
that the EE guys tend to run machines with lots of memory, so they’ve
just never had this happen before.
Based on the above, I’m leaning towards either taking out the message
or putting it under vmstrict control. Comments?
-rpr
Page 44
[STAMPED] X 565989 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0185972 CONFIDENTIAL
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT
35A Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 35A Gordon v. Microsoft p. 1 of 1
[STAMPED] Depo. Ex. 8
[STAMPED] Depo. Ex. 132
>From pasacala Thu Sep 22 14:55:51 1988
To: billg
Cc: aaronr philba russw timle
Subject: Re: DR DOS
Date: Thu Sep 22 14:47:50 1988
Here follow the three “differences” (between DR and MS DOS) that Aaron
has been able to find so far. Except for these differences, the two OSs
behave similarly, including documented calls.
The bottom line is that, given Aaron’s current findings, an application
can identify DR DOS. However, most apps usually have no business making
the calls that will let them decide which DOS (MS or DR) they are
running on.
Do you think differently?
[STAMPED] MATERIAL REDACTED
:
This is the list of differences aaron was able to find.
The DR DOS BOOT RECORD is different. It contains the OEM ID string
“DIGITAL” in it.
Undocumented DOS system call 52H returns a pointer to an internal DOS
structure known as the “sysinit variables”. The DR DOS structure does
not match well with MS-DOS:
SysInitVers STRUC SYSI_DPS DD ? ; DPS chain SYSI_SFT DD ? ; SFT chain SYSI_CLOCK DD ? ; CLOCK device SYSI_CON DD ? ; CON device SYSI_MAXSEC DW ? ; maximum sector size SYSI_BUF DD ? ; buffer chain SYSI_CDS DD ? ; CDS list SYSI_FCB DD ? ; FCB chain SYSI_Keep DW ? ; keep count SYSI_MMIO DS[?] ? ; Number of block devices SYSI_MCDS DS[?] ? ; number of CDS's SYSI_DEV DD ? ; device list SysInitVers ENDS
SYSI_DFS == 0:0 on DR DOS, never see this on MS-DOS SYSI_BUF == 0:0 on DR DOS, never see this on MS-DOS SYSI_CDS == 0:0 on DR DOS, never see this on MS-DOS
Undocumented DOS system calls 12H and 1FH return a pointer to an
internal DOS structure known as the “Drive Parameter Block”. On MS-DOS
all of the DFSs are linked together into a dword linked list. The DR
DOS DFSs all have FFFF:FFFF is [sic] the link field and do not form a
linked list (this is consistent with the fact that SYSI_DFS == 0.0).
[STAMPED] EXH 2 DATE 5/17/[20]02 WITNESS Barrett MARY W. MILLER
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1175720 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X0196084 [or X01960S4, intelligible]
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 26 C.A. No. 2:96CV645B
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 109 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 109 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 1 of 10
[STAMPED] MSC00474985
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] EXH 3 DATE 5/17[20]02 WITNESS Barrett MARY W.
MILLER
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1175831 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 51 D.A. No. 2:96CV645B
Microsoft Corporation [address/tel/telex/fax]
[MICROSOFT branding mark]
Microsoft Memo
TO: Russ Werner
FROM: Mark Chestnut
SUBJECT: Status Report for April, 1989
DATE: 5/22/89
The following summarizes major product marketing activities this
past month. A
summary of the current status of DOS group projects is also attached.
ROM DOS
This was a great month for ROM DOS, as two very high volume
potential OEMs
who were on the verge of signing with DRI both committed to MS ROM DOS.
Vendex/Hcadstart, which is launching a very low cost 8088 machine for
distribution through the mass merchant channel, committed to 250K units
of ROM
DOS and $1 million for the first year. Emerson, which is introducing a
full line
of low cost PCs (8088, 286 and 386SX), also for distribution through
mass
merchants, also committed to 250K units and $1.75 million for the first
year.
Both Vendcx and Emerson were planning to sign with DRI because it
did not
appear that we could deliver ROM DOS in the very short term, which is
when they
needed it Closure of both of these deals was made possible by our
decision to do a
ROM copy version of DOS 3.31 with large disk partition support, for
shipment by
the end of this month. Thanks to Tom Lennon and the entire DOS team for
moving very quickly and making it possible for us to get this business.
Good progress was also made in getting Intel to move closer to
licensing ROM DOS
for their Wildcard product I told Intel about our short term plans for
ROM copy
DOS, and they have agreed to reference sell this with the Wildcard for
the time
being. Once we have our ROM executable version done, indications are
that they
will license this from us and distribute it with the Wildcard.
Philba, Tomlc and I also had a meeting with Bruce McCormick, Intel’s
marketing
guy for Flash EPROM. Intel is really pushing their FEPROM technology
(they
claim to be 2 years ahead of the Japanese), and are actively trying to
get OEM
design-ins. A big plus for them towards this end is support in DOS for
FEPROM
which we happen to be working on and will have completed in a couple of
months.
Intel is very interested in doing some type of joint PR announcing the
availability
of the FEPROM file system for DOS from MS and Intel’s next generation
of
FEPROM products (target late summer timeframe). I proposed that, at the
same
time, we announce our ROM executable DOS and that Intel is licensing it
and
distributing with the Wildcard. Intel is very receptive to this. I will
be taking Rich
Freedman (our summer intern who will focus on the embedded market) to
meet
with Intel in early June to discuss this further. Getting Intel to
license ROM DOS
for the Wildcard would be a big win, and the joint PR could give us a
great head
start in attacking the embedded market
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 109 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 2 of 10
RUP
The RUP plan was revised this month so that some additional
utilities could be
added. Final release is now targeted Tor Sept 30. We .have looked
closely at
several utilities and feel at this point that we can prqbably include
the following
in time for a 9/30 release:
- QuickHelp
- command line editor
- undelete command
- EMM386 with “loadhigh” option
We also looked very closely at doing “Extended Where”, a
Magellan-type disk
organizer that would be integrated with the shelL It would also have an
extensible
architecture that would allow for ISVs to easily develop “viewers”
(ability to view
the files created in a specific application in native form) for their
applications.
This would be a major advantage over Magellan, which is a closed system
(Lotus
has to develop the viewers for each application that Magellan supports,
resulting in
limited app support). We ultimately concluded that we can’t do Extended
Where for
a 9/30 release, but we’ll continue to work on it for RUP version 2.
There are some issues with the RUP which need to be resolved. They
include:
- 3rd party peripheral support. There are concerns about our
ability to support weird mass storage devices, WORM drives, etc
- OEM support We are currently lacking cooperation from NEC and
Toshiba, which represent several hundred thousand machines in the US.
- Cost to support the product through PSS.
We will be putting together a plan to address the above and will
present this along
with our recommendations to Steveb on 5/25.
DOS/Win
The DOS group’s action items from the last IBM DOS/Win meeting have
been
completed, and IBM is working towards presenting a plan for DOS/Win to
Hanrahan on 6/7. Tomle is coordinating our end of this and is working
on a plan
designed to gain MS development control over the DOS portion of
DOS/Win.
DOS 4.01
DOS 4.01 continues to gain momentum, as several more OEMs began
shipping DOS
4.01 in April The list of OEMs currently shipping now includes:
- Compaq
- Unisys
- Olivetti
- Siemens
- Amstrad
- Intel
- Dell
- Compuadd
- Phoenix
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 109 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 3 of 10
Another big boost to DOS 4.01 momentum will come in the first part
of June, when
we expect to issue a “DOS 4 works great with networks” press release.
The release
will announce 3 COM’s shipment of the 3+ redircctor that works with DOS
4, and
will also include favorable statements from Novell and Banyan that
their products
work fine with DOS 4, etc. All three companies have agreed to
participate, and I
will be working with Marianne Allison to get this thing finalized over
the next
couple of weeks.
PRI Competitive Response
The first MS product with the nonnested DOS warning code. Quick
Pascal, was
released. Tom Reeve and Cindy Kasin have committed to implementing it
in all
new MS application and language releases from this point forward,
including
international.
I am also planning to hire an independent DOS guru to do an in-depth
comparative
analysis of MS vs. DR DOS, with the idea of somehow making those
results
available to the press. This could be useful ammunition to have against
DRI, and
will be of value even if we choose not to make it public. I approached
Ray Duncan
about doing this, but he finally said “no thanks”, so I am now talking
to Rick
Wilton, another DOS guru who writes for MS Press.
DOS Royalty and Packaged Product Business
DOS OEM Royalty, Domestic and International
Royalty business continues to be very strong, with both domestic and
international
OEM well above budgeted unit shipments for the year (see attached
spreadsheet
and charts). Domestic revenue is only 92% of budget, however, primarily
due to
the effect of several OEMs having prepaid balances (meaning that they
previously
paid royalties on units shipped this year, which explains why units
shipped exceeds
revenue recognized for the year). .
International royalty revenue is 174% of budget, so overall DOS
royalty revenue is
$19 million ahead of budget year to date.
DOS Packaged Product, Domestic and International
Domestic packaged product shipments continue their upward trend for
April was the
best month this year with over 22K units shipped. International
packaged product
shipments were down in ApriL
Both domestic and international packaged product shipments for April
show an
increase in DOS 3-3 shipments relative to DOS 4.01 shipments. This is
because DOS
4.01 shipments were temporarily suspended in April until the Amstrad
bug was
fixed and all inventory re-worked. I therefore expect DOS 4.01
shipments to
continue to increase relative to 3.3, as was the trend in the months
prior to April
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 109 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 4 of 10
Performance Against April Objectives
1. Get commitment from Vendex to license ROM.DOS
Done.
2. Get commitment from Emerson to license ROM DOS
Done.
3. Finalize plans for utilities, online doc, etc. to be included in RUP
Progress.
4. Set up European trip with MS subs, get all info needed for RUP
support of European OEMs.
Turned over to Tomle.
5. Reach agreement with IBM on functional spec and plan for 6/90
seamless product
Progress.
6. Finalize ROM DOS business plan
Done.
May/June Objectives
1. Finalize and issue “DOS 4 works great with networks” press release
2. Finalize plans for utilities, online doc, etc. to be included in RUP
3. Ship ROM DOS 1.0
4. Get closure on Intel licensing ROM DOS for distribution with Wildcard
5. Bring Rich Freedman on board, get him going on embedded market
analysis
6. Get closure with DOS guru on MS/DR DOS comparative study
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 109 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 5 of 10
MS-DOS year-to Budget vs Actual
| Domestic OEM, Royalty |
|
Q1 Budget |
Q1 Actual |
% Budget |
Q2 Budget |
Q2 Actual |
% Budget |
Q3 Budget |
Q3 Actual |
% Budget |
YTD Budget |
YTD Actual |
% Budget |
| Units |
484,200 |
769.800 |
159% |
726.700 |
817,900 |
113% |
760.900 |
1,054.300 |
139% |
1.971,800 |
2,642,000 |
134% |
| Revenue |
$12.658,000 |
$12,958,000 |
101% |
$14,184,000 |
$14,337,000 |
101% |
$20,721,000 |
$16,638,000 |
80% |
$47,763,000 |
$43,933,000 |
92% |
| |
| Domestic OEM, Packaged Product |
|
Q1 Budget |
Q1 Actual |
% Budget |
Q2 Budget |
Q2 Actual |
% Budget |
Q3 Budget |
Q3 Actual |
% Budget |
YTD Budget |
YTD Actual |
% Budget |
| Units |
35,200 |
8,704 |
25% |
46.100 |
23,200 |
50% |
40,300 |
52.024 |
129% |
121.600 |
83,828 |
69% |
| Revenue |
$2,146,000 |
$543,000 |
25% |
$2,812,000 |
$1,456,000 |
52% |
$2,457,000 |
$2,643,000 |
108% |
$7,415,000 |
$4,642,000 |
63% |
| |
| International OEM, Royalty |
|
Q1 Budget |
Q1 Actual |
% Budget |
Q2 Budget |
Q2 Actual |
% Budget |
Q3 Budget |
Q3 Actual |
% Budget |
YTD Budget |
YTD Actual |
% Budget |
| Units |
595,600 |
1.191.100 |
200% |
636,500 |
$1,217,000 |
191% |
778.500 |
2,422,400 |
183% |
2,010,600 |
3,838,500 |
191% |
| Revenue |
$12,845,000 |
$15,613,000 |
122% |
$14,506,000 |
$19,613,000 |
135% |
$18,264,000 |
$20,933,000 |
115% |
$32,326,000 |
$56,159,000 |
174% |
| |
| Int’l OEM. Packaged Product |
|
Q1 Budget |
Q1 Actual |
% Budget |
Q2 Budget |
Q2 Actual |
% Budget |
Q3 Budget |
Q3 Actual |
% Budget |
YTD Budget |
YTD Actual |
% Budget |
| Units |
17,285 |
14.503 |
84% |
23,645 |
27.112 |
115% |
24.249 |
30.369 |
125% |
68,646 |
71.984 |
105% |
| Revenue |
$1,420,436 |
$953,224 |
67% |
$1,949,640 |
$1,937,190 |
99% |
$2,013,299 |
$2,126,057 |
106% |
$5,383,375 |
$5,016,471 |
93% |
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 109 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 6 of 10
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MSC 00474990
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1175836 CONFIDENTIAL
[The exhibit page is a bar graph. Approximate numerical values have
been eyeball-estimated from the bargraph for purposes of this
transcript.]
Worldwide DOS OEM Royalty Revenue, FY [19]89 Actual vs Budget
Q1: Budget $25,000,000 Actual $30,000,000
Q2: Budget $30,000,000 Actual $35,000,000
Q3: Budget $41,000,000 Actual $40,000,000
YTD: Budget $97,000,000 Actual $102,000,000
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 109 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 7 of 10
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1175837 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MSC 00474991
[The exhibit page is a bar graph. Approximate numerical values have
been eyeball-estimated from the bargraph for purposes of this
transcript.]
Worldwide DOS OEM Packaged Product Revenue, FY [19]89 Actual vs. Budget
Q1: Budget $3,800,000 Actual $1,700,000
Q2: Budget $4,900,000 Actual $3,800,000
Q3: Budget $4,200,000 Actual $4,900,000
YTD: Budget $12,900,000 Actual $9,000,000
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 109 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 8 of 10
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MSC 00474992
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1175838 CONFIDENTIAL
[The exhibit page is a bar graph. Approximate numerical values have
been eyeball-estimated from the bargraph for purposes of this
transcript.]
International DOS Packaged Product Units Shipped
[Presumably, 3.3 Refers to DOS Version 3.3. 4.01 Refers to DOS Version
4.01]
Jan: Version 3.3: 2,000 Units. 4.01: 7,400 Units.
Feb: Version 3.3: 1,900 Units. 4.01: 7,900 Units.
Mar: Version 3.3: 2,000 Units. 4.01: 10,000 Units.
Apr: Version 3.3: 3,700 Units. 4.01: 5,000 Units.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 109 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 9 of 10
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MSC 00474993
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1175839 CONFIDENTIAL
[The exhibit page is a bar graph. Approximate numerical values have
been eyeball-estimated from the bargraph for purposes of this
transcript.]
Domestic DOS Packaged Product Units Shipped
[Presumably, 3.3 Refers to DOS Version 3.3. 4.01 Refers to DOS Version
4.01]
Jan: Version 3.3: 4,300 Units. 4.01: 8,100 Units.
Feb: Version 3.3: 8,000 Units. 4.01: 12,000 Units.
Mar: Version 3.3: 8,100 Units. 4.01: 11,900 Units.
Apr: Version 3.3: 11,900 Units. 4.01: 11,800 Units.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 109 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 10 of 10
DOS Group Projects
5/22/89
| Project |
Status |
Major Issues |
| |
| 1. ROM DOS |
– Development on schedule for July release
– FEPROM development on schedule
– Vendex, Emerson deals closed
– Business plan complete
|
– Need to do 3.31 level ROM executable
|
| |
| 2. RUP |
– Stevcb meeting 5/25 to finalize utilities, etc.
– Development finishing sizing of utilities
– European status: some OEMs have agreed to cooperate, others needed
– Corpcomm communications plan complete
– Marketing Plan complete
– Initial BOM complete
|
– Need to plan European OEM trip for June – PSS support
issues – Wang, Zenith issues |
| |
| 3. DOS/Win Merge |
– DOS group action items complete
– IBM presenting to Hanrahan 6/7
|
– Externals group work items not complete
|
| |
| 4. Non MS/PC DOS warning code |
– Code complete and fully tested
– Code shipping with QuickPascal
– Apps, languages, int’l program mgrs. have committed to incorporating
into all MS products from this point on
|
| |
| 6. Packaged Product |
– packaging to be changed in June to reduce COGS by ~$3 (GW
Basic manual to be removed)
|
| |
| 7. DOS 4 Maint |
– no resources to address other reported bugs currently
assigned |
– Several potentially severe bugs need attention |
| |
| 8. LIM Issues |
– MS involvment in Quarterdeck response complete
– Awaiting Intel proposal for LIM 4.1
|
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT
136 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 136 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 1 of 2
year old for a day when my regular sitter couldn’t one day last month.
she lives on 156th just north of Redmond campus. 5 minutes away. she
called last week and asked me to let people know she was available
periodically. she lives in an apt., has 2 kids (4 and 7), great outdoor
play areas. my daughter had a great time there. you might give her a
call ([telephone number]) let me know if it works out.
theresa
>From bjbank We Aug 9 15:31:08 1989
To: tomle
Cc: bclee bjbank yasukim yongchi
Subject: dos clone check on windows
Date: Fri Jul 03 13:52:46 PDT 1992
Hi Tom,
I need your help again.
MSH of Korea is localizing windows 2.10 and they want to make it check
whether the system is real MSDOS or not. If it is it not, it should
generate a warning message. I talked to philba and davidw, and davidw
said you could help us.
If you read the following emails, I think you will understand our
current situation.
Thanks.
bjbank
——-
>From davidw Wed Aug 9 14:04:57 1989
To: bjbank
Cc: jodys philba tomle
Subject: dos clone check on windows
Date: Wed Aug 09 14:01:11 1989
Windows has no such code in it. Since we do not have any code that does
this we put up no warnings. However our testers have informed us that
we crash while booting Windows if running under some dos not our own.
Tomle can give you checking for a warning message.
>From bjbank Wed Aug 9 13:10:07 1989.
>From philba Wed Aug 2 15:53:18 1989
Sender: jodys Wed Aug 2 15:47:16 1989
Sender: bjbank Wed Aug 2 15:41:33 1989
Hi, Jody.
I am a project manager at Far East Product Engineering group. My main
responsibility is to support far east subsidiaries (MSKK and MSCH)
technically. You have been great help to us and we really appreciate
it. Recently, I have an inquiry from Korea about the windows product.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 136 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 2 of 2
The question from MSCH is “How to check
the DOS is MS-DOS or clone”. MSCH wants to include such routine in
Hangeul Windows so that Hangeul windows can run only on Hangeul MS-DOS.
Could you tell me to whom I can ask to resolve this problem?
Thanks
bjbahk/Far East Product Engineering Group
————-
Sender: yongchi Thu Jul 20 18:08:50 1989
To: bjbahk
Subject: DOS clone check on Windows
Cc: bclee dkkim ischoi ivys sangc ucmoon yhjeon
Date: Thu Jul 20 18:08:49 1989
Hello BJ,
We will finish our Windows project before October. Now I must decide
our product retail Windows sepc. Would you please let me know how
Windows(or other Apps too) check current dos is MS-DOS or MS-DOS clone
? And if it is MS-DOS clone how original WIndows [sic] handle
them – stop windows, warning messages ?
Thanks, yongchi
————-
>From tomle Wed Aug 9 16:06:08 1989
To: ibmboca?b391747
Cc: philba tomle
Subject: Busmaster interface review
Date: Fri Jul 03 13:52:50 PDT 1992
I understand the busmaster interface proposed by Ralph Lipe is going in
front of the architectural review board tomorrow (8/10). I would like
to talk to you for a moment to find out if you are on that board as
well as getting your impression of the appropriate process to follow.
We have not had any previous dealings with the architecture board and
so are uncomfortable with the lack of any crisp process to gain
acceptance of the interface.
If you don’t object, I would like to call you first thing in the
morning to talk about this.
Thanks,
Tom
>From billg Wed Aug 9 16:32:07 1989
To: markcl
Cc: darrylr paulma tomle
Subject: Extended attributes
Date: Fri Jul 03 13:52:50 PDT 199
[document footer:]
WinMail 1.21 brucen Fri Jul 03 13:42:36 199Page: 150
[STAMPED] X 571035 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1148521 CONFIDENTIAL
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT
286 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 286 Page 1 of 1]
[STAMPED] Depo. Ex. 822
>From russw Wed May 16 07:36:52 1990
To: billg steveb
Subject: I have asked philba to spend a lot of time making dos 5 happen
fast
Cc: ericst jeremybu joachimk markche richardf
Date: Wed May 16 07:34:40 1990
given the aggressive stance taken by dri this week, I have asked philba
to spend more of his time on dos 5 than on win 3.1 planning — like
60-70% to make sure this product happens as fast as it can and that it
checks out and to get the troops pumped up.
we are also planning some more extensive pr around our beta ship ( in
about 3 weeks) to get acros the message that the product is a now thing
vs. a later thing — dri is spending time saying that our dos 5 won’t
be around for a long time.
also, I believe that their ems and load-hi modes are incompatible with
Win 3.0. we are trying to verify this by the announce timeframe.
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 118 C.A. No. 2:96CV645B
[STAMPED] XO196018
Plaintiff’s Exhibit
841 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 841 Page 1 of 4]
File ; c:\bradsi\novell.fld
Messages ; 1 – 19
######################################################## 1
>From davidcol Wed Jul 17 08:46:49 1991
To: bradc bradsi gregle philbe richt russs tomle
Subject: novell
Date: Wdd Jul 17 08:46:14 1991
I think we should use Windows to get a Microsoft OS back onto
the Netware clients which will bundle or require DR. DOS. We
should alter our plans a bit and move all the DOS 6.0 improvements
directly into Windows. When the user starts Windows, they get
the Microsoft OS (including networking) and all the other cool
features that go with that. When they quit, they get Netware
and DR DOS and no Windows apps. The key is getting a piece of
MS system software on that client so we can deliver our stategy
and vision. We can leverage Windows and Windows apps to to this.
We should not consider things that stop Windows from working
on Netware. (Netware here = netware + DR DOS.) If it was
just DR DOS alone, then we should prevent Windows from working
there. Netware has too much market share and too many customers
are loyal to it for us to exclude windows from that market.
I think this dictates that we maintain good relationships with
Novell so we can stay abreast wjth what they are doing at the
detailed technical level. However, I do think that we should
do our own winnet drivers and other Novell provider components.
If we are going to take over the desktop when Windows starts,
it MUST be all Microsoft written software since Novell won’t
help us do that.
######################################################## 2
>From jimell Wed Jul 17 08:54:44 1991
To: billg bradsi mikemur paulme steveb
Cc: jimell
Subject; Fw: Novell/Digital Research reach definitive agreement…
Date: Wed Jul 17 08:53:48 PDT 1991
I thought about it all night. Since I came here I said there were
two things that concerned me related to Novell: one Novell partnering
with IBM and two Novell coming at us at the desktop. Both fears have
now come true.
I had planned to call Novell this morning and ask them (I know lots
of
people there) how they plan to position, etc. But the release below
makes it pretty clear.
Given this, I suggest (at least for Systems) that we
a) do not change our public posture
b) do not appear alarmed .. “that’s interesting or curious or
something” would be a good quote.
c) we get serious about supporting our networking more than
others. This is the strategy that Novell will adopt as soon as
they have a product to do so. They will of course continue
to support “foreign” OSs like Windows and DOS, but their focus
will be on building a new generation OS for the desktop.
I understand the difficulties of working with ISVs to get them
to change their support from Windows, but we shouldn’t kid
ourselves. I have been fighthing Novell for years — we shouldn’t
underestimate their technical or marketing abilities. Their
intentions are clear.
Our posture should be the same. We support out networking and
also “foreign” servers such as Novell, etc.
d) I suggest that we only include our software on the diskettes
for Windows 3.1 and future DOS versions. We can be open without doing
this. (Note that doing Netware and LM dual redirectors and
the service provider environment are still critical components of
the system.) (We ship compatibility software to other formats
— we should do the same for networking. We don’t ship parts
of 123 or other products in Excel. I never have agreed with
this strategy and still don’t. Actually for the current set
of products and given where LM has been, that was probably the
right strategy, but we must change this for the future.)
e) I suggest that we include winball into 3.1 as a standard feature
as soon as its ready with minimal price change.
f) We should provide some part of LM as a standard packaged part of
NT.
Support pricing must be worked out.o
g) We consider changing our apps to not run unless the OS is our OS.
h) We must leverage our networking and OS strengths together to
win this battle. Not doing so already has hurt the networking
business and if the release is any indication, it will hurt the
OS business in the future.
jlm
| >From rooternef Wed Jull 17 08:12:40 1991
| To: execnews
| Cc: sharonb
| Subject; Novell/Digital Research reach definitive agreement…
|
| Date: Wed Jul 17 08:02:56 1991
|
|
| NOVELL DGTL RESEARCH: Novell and Digital Research sign definitive
merger
| agreement
|
| July 17, 1991
|
|
| PROVO, Utah–(BUSINESS WIRE)–Novell Inc.
(NASDAQ:NOVL) and
| Digital Research Inc., a developer of advenced operating system
| software. Including the first DOS 5 operating system, Wednesday
| signed a definitive agreement to merge the two companies, making
| Digital Research, headquartered in Monterey, Calif., a wholly-owned
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 841 Page 2 of 4]
| subsidary of Novell.
| Under the terms of the definitive agreement
signed yesterday,
| existing shares of Digital Research common stock, convertible
| securities and options will be exchanged for $1.5 million newly
| issued shares od Novell common stock.
| Digital Research is a private company
incorpotated in the state
| of California, It is the originator of CP/M, the precursor of
| today’s disc operating systems and DR DOS.
| “Our strategy is to provide computer users
and industry partners
| with easier to use, more powerful, software products to support tight
| integration between desktop computers, computer networks and host
| computer systems,” said Ray Noorda, Novell’s president and chief
| executive officer.
| “Digital research is an important part of
this strategy, Novell
| is welcoming a talented organization with technology leadership not
| only in DOS operating system products, but also forward looking
| expertise in multi-tasking and graphical user interface technology.”
| Novell said it is responding to customer
demand for tightly
| coupling network operating system software with desktop and host
| computer operating systems. Novell has already become the largest
| outside investor in UNIX System Laboratories, the developer of UNIX
| System V release 4.
| With the merger with Digital Research, Novell
is adding DOS,
| multi-tasking and real-time operating system technology. The
| combined resources are seen as providing a dynamic technology
| platform for better integrating DOS, UNIX and Netware operating
| system environments.
| In addition, the company will continue to
develop innovative
| software products to support customer utilization of OS/2, Windows,
| Apple Macintosh and other operating system environments.
| Dick Williams, president and CEO of Digital
Research, said the
| merger gives Digital research significant new market reach through
| Novell’s relations with leading computer vendors, its presence in the
| systems integration market, and far reachind distribution, marketing,
| education and customer support resources.
| “We have long understood the value to
customers of significantly
| extending the capabilities of DOS. Digital Research and DR DOS have
| already set the standard for DOS capabilities in the 1990s. Tightly
| integrated products from Novell and Digital Research will simplify
| network use and better support our mutual customers and industry
| partners.”
| “With novell, we see ourselves as supplies of
total, operating
| system solutions for the enterprise computing environment, from
| banking to industrial automation real-time requirements, to advanced
| graphical user interface technology,” Williams added.
| Digital Research brings two new software
engineering centers to
| Novell. In Monterey, Digital develops graphical user interface
| technology and FlexOS, a real-time, multitasking, multiuser operating
| system for the Intel family of microprocessors.
| FlexOS combines general purpose operating
system ease-of-use with
| real-time, transaction oriented capability necessary for
| point-of-sale, and industrial and process control systems. Original
| equipment manufacturers who deliver FlexOS with their systems include
| FANUC, IBM, ICL, TEC and Siemens.
| In Hungerford, Berks, the United Kingdom,
Digital develops its
| general operating system family of products, including DR DOS, DR
| Multiuser DOS and Concurrent DOS. DR DOS represents between 10 and
| 15 percent of the overall DOS market, is translated into major
| languages, and is sold to end-users worldwide through both software
| distribution channels and more than 200 OEM vendors.
| The merger agreement has been approved by the
boards of directors
| of each company, but remains subject to the approval of Digital
| Research stockholders, regulatory approvals and other normal
conditions
| to closing. Certain digital Research stockholders, including each of
| its directors, have signed agreements to vote their shares in favor of
| the merger, which is expected to be completed in October 1991.
| As part of the agreement, Digital research
has agreed to pay a fee
| in the event the merger fails to be completed due to a vote of their
| shareholders, or a change in recommendation by the Digital Research
| board. The merger agreement is expected to be accounted for as a
| pooling-of-interests.
| Digital research, with 273 employees, had
revenue of $40.9 million
| in its fiscal year ended Sept. 30, 1990, up from $36.2 million in
| fiscal 1989.
| Novell, Inc. is the leading providor of
network server operating
| system software that integrates desktop computers, servers, and
| minicomputer and mainframe hosts for information sharing.
| Novell’s NetWare network computing products
manage and control
| the sharing of services, data and applications among PC workgroups,
| departmental networks and across business-wide information systems.
|
|
| CONTACT: Novell Inc.
| Peter Troop, XXX/XXX-XXXX
| or
| Digital Research
| Joe Taglis, XXX/XXX-XXXX
######################################################## 3
>From philbe Wed Jul 17 08:S9:13 1991
To: bradsi
Subject: ReL novell
Date Tue Jul 16 08:47:52 1991
I think we need to carefully measure our ewsponse. Totally freezing
them out will force them to compete on a wider basis and could cause
the disaster scenario to occur. Not to mention the thin FTC ice that
we would be on. On the other hand, we have an advantage with windows
and should press it in the system arena. One approach would be to
deny enhanced mode to all but real-mode dos customers. This can be
to move kernel (or major components of it) into a VxD and thus
significantly up the cost of entry to running ‘full’ windows. This has
the ‘side effect’ of disallowing enhanced mode under a dpml server
and not running the more advance components except in enhanced mode.
It is, however, a bunch of work — my guess is 1+ MM.
As for denying them access to windows info, I think this is
something
we should not do. Having shitty windows support in netware will only
hurt us.
| > From bradsi Tue Jul 16 23:33:12 1991
| To: bradc davidcol greglo philbe richt russs tomle
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 841 Page 3 of 4]
| Subject: novell
| Date: Tue Jul 16 23:32:44 1991
|
| this novell thing bugs me. we need to think through what kind
| of relationship we can/should have with novell now
| for dos, windows, dos6 and win32. i’m
| sure jimall and stevea are thinking the same for winx/win4.
| send me your thoughts on novell, I’ll pass along
| some of mine. I want to put together recommendations
| and present to other execs.
|
######################################################## 4
>From tomle Wed Jul 17 09:29:18 1991
To: bradsi
Cc: tomle
Subject: Re: novell
Date: wed, 17 Jul 91 09:28:03 PDT
I spent time last night since I couldn’t sleep very well. Her is
what I came up with:
Why would Novell do this?
This seems like an odd move if they really understand the position
we
were placing them in, why would they make the move gauranteed to get us
the most angry?
1) Their greedy. They see a marvelous opportunity to take Microsoft’s
position in the systems market. With IBM and MS going at it, it would
be a great time for Novell to leverage their Net dominance, their
current relationship with IBM and their advantage in Corporate loyalty
to muscle our cash cow away from us.
2) They are planning to use the DR-DOS threat to force MS to do what
Novell wants in both Dos and Windows. My understanding from Kaveen and
Terry is that Novell has a strong Windows strategy so unless they are
moving away from that strategy, this move somehow has to make sense in
a Windows strategy.
3) Both of the above.
4) They think that
offering a complete Novell solution gives them an edge in the corporate
environment. You must question, an edge over what? Can they achieve
this knowing that Windows will be everywhere?
The really scary part for me is that we were in the infancy stages
of
developing a relationship with Novell so we know very little. The first
question I want to try to answer is, given Novell control over Dos,
what would they do to it? My strategy would be to release Dos products
very early on that hit key features on the list of things we think
Novell
would do.
How do we deal with Novell now that
this has happened.
1) Windows gets
another reason it must succeed. Because of that I strongly recommend
the Windows group NOT close off to Novell. Windows must execute on the
strategy of being the best network workstation environment and Novell
is the key player there. I have to trust the windows folks to be in bed
with my enemy while still being on my side. This is exactly what i
asked of the lanman guys in Dos 5.00 and it worked.
2) Dos can’t be that
close yet. I am sure it was a little disconcerting for the Novell guys
to start talking to the Dos group but we gave them assurances and we
were building trust. We need assurances from Novell that these groups
are maintained separatly and that their NDAs are meanigful before the
Dos group can continue developing it’s Novell relationship.
Strategy for dealing with Novell DR-Dos
I am assuming they will take over the Dos
market if they can and if they can’t they will force some control over
Windows directions.
DR-Dos 6.00 is real and is in beta. If I
am right about what they are doing, they will release DR-Dos 6.00
before adjusting the DR-Dos priorities on a Network focus. We can’t let
Novell take the lead in the Dos technology market. This will bw a real
challange for us but one I think we have to meet.
We must convice Novell there is real
value in Windows and Dos having a close intimate relationship.
Tom
| > From bradsi Tue Jul 16 23:33:12 1991
| To: bradc davidcol greglo philbe richt russs tomle
| Subject: novell
| Date: Tue Jul 16 23:32:44 1991
|
| this novell thing bugs me. we need to think through what kind
| of relationship we can/should have with novell now
| for dos, windows, dos6 and win32. i’m
| sure jimall and stevea are thinking the same for winx/win4.
| send me your thoughts on novell, I’ll pass along
| some of mine. I want to put together recommendations
| and present to other execs.
|
######################################################## 5
>From russa Wed Jul 17 10:16:16 1991
To: bradsi
Subject: Re: novell
Data: Wed Jul 17 10:15:07 PDT 1991
My initial thoughts on this are that:
1) this is a strategic mistake for Novell
2) If they change their product strategy mush (ie. build net products
that
are proprietary to DR DOS) it will be to their detriment
3) they have acquired some programers that will make them more
agressive
(and successful?) at GUI work
4) the biggest danger for us that they try to be very agressive with DR
DOS
pricing
5) that competition is not all bad: it may have some shirt/longterm
effect
on our profits, but it will get us all that much more focused
6) relationship-wise we do have to tread lightly with them
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 841 Page 4 of 4]
In a nutshell, I don’t see why it will be an easier for them to
enter our
market (DOS) as it was for us to enter theirs (Netware). I suspect if
they
try a frontal assault on the DOS/desktop os biz it will cost then big
$’s
and they will not succeed. On the other hand if they use it as a
platform
for “proprietary” net products (ie. that don’t run on DOS 5.0/6.0) they
will
be shooting themselves in the foot. And if they offer 2 versions, a
“better
one” on DR DOS and a “normal one” on DOS 5/6, I think the market will
shrug.
If they try to beat us to mky with a 32 bit DOS, again, I think the
market
will shrug, and this might complicate their relationship with IBM.
Product
wise in desktop or market, if we execute, then I don’t see what they
gain.
The flip side of this is, I don’t see why we would change our
product
strategy to somehow “exclude” them, which would be suicide from a net
mkt
perspective. From a winball perspective, I don’t think it changes our
Netware plans. We still have to co-exist with installed NetWare LANs,
and
if we can get them to sign up for licensing us the redir/xport, we’d
still
like to make it easier for the NetWare customer to install
winbell/windows
on a NetWare LAN. This is good for them, but good for us.
As far as our relationship with them, I think there are some open
issues
that we need to think through carefully. We obviously need them to
continue
to support Windows (including winbell), so if they come to us and ask
to
help them write VxD’s etc, I think we have to help. On the other hand,
what
if they come and want help getting their new peer to peer product to
co-exist with winbell? It’s windows, but it’s a directly competitive
product. This is the sticky territory where I think we are bound to
have to
work with them, but it will be difficult for both companies. One way to
look at it is, for the first time we are looking out at a company that
is in
2 businesses and that causes conflict for us because we compete with
them
and need to be friends with them at the same time. Of course this is
exactly what companies like Novell have been faced with in dealing with
MS
for so long. We’ll just have to continue to tread the fine lines. Both
companies need each other too much.
The 2 biggest residual effects of the deal are that they can cut the
price
of DR DOS If they choose to, which might cause us some short term price
pressure, and they have apparantly acquired some good GUI programmers.
This
will probably make them more aggressive about graphical interfaces
throughout their product line, which will be good for them.
######################################################## 6
>From russe wed Jul 17 11:43:41 1991
To: bradsi
Subject: RE; Novell/Digital Research
Date: Wed Jul 11:44:38 PDT 1991
Between you and me, I don’t see what has changed that would make us
reconsider this. I hope no one at MS, including myself, gets defocused
reconsidering this transaction just because Adrian is at Artisoft now.
We are embarked on a dev course that makes sense for and we should be
single minded in pursuing it. The decision to do all 32 bit VxD work
is looking better everyday. I bet that’s why Adrian wants to re-ignite
this merger (because he knows that Artisoft probably can’t do it on
their own), and it will also give us an advantage against whatever peer
product Novell comme up with (I assume they are not ding VxD work
since they have not come to us for help.
| >From bradsi Wed Jul 17 11:07:00 1991
| To: russs
| Subject: Novell/Digital Research
|
| Date: Wed, 17 Jul 91 11:04:49 PDT
|
| fyi but not for forwarding or discussion with others.
|
| | >From mikemur Wed Jul 17 09:20:55 1991
| | To: billg steveb
| | Cc: bradsi jimll paulme
| | Subject: Novell/Digital Research
| | Date: Wed Jul 17 08:20:48 PDT 1991
| |
| | Adrian King called this morning from his new office at Artisoft.
| | He said that Jack Schoof is “very” interested in re-opening
| | discussions with us regarding MS acquiring Artisoft. Jack
| | believes that Novell is gunning for us. While he understands
| | our decision to do Kate (Winbell) ourselves, he thinks we’re
| | at risk on the low-end DOS peer networking market. He feels
| | that Artisoft can plug that hole instantly for us and can then
| | share with us their sound and windows knowledge.
| |
| | They (Jack and Adrian) would like us to take this as a real
| | “offer” to re-open discussions.
| |
|
|
######################################################## 7
>From russs Wed Jul 17 12:08:14 1991
To: bradsi
Subject; REl Novell/Digital research
Date Wed Jul 17 12:07:04 PDT 1991
What I meant by the VxD comment is the following. Today Artisoft has
only a DOS real mode product. I am reading into the new merger
proposition from Artisoft that the first thing Adrian talked about with
Jack was “how do we get a better Windows product, ie. better integrated
UI with Win, prot mode support” etc. And the ease answer of course is,
have MS buy us. I think a big piece of this decision, if I was Adrian,
would be the 32 bit prot mode work, which I know MS is doingm and I
know it is market critical, and I know it will be hard to get it
developed at Artisoft.
I am also reading into the Novell picture. Given that there plans to
do a peer product are serious, they are most likely giong to follow the
LANtastic model (the CNN article even said something like they were out
to get Artisoft), ie. a DOS real mode peer product that runs under
Windows with the UI being an app.
In both these cases we have 2 significant advantages 1) better
memory
solution since runs in Win prot mode 2) better integration with Win,
since we can hack on file and prt mgr
So where we have an advantage is windows – we will have a
significantly
better windows product. Meanwhile, Novell, Artisoft and the rest will
fight it out for the DOS real mode running under WIN market – good
decision by us to stay out of that dogfight and focus on where we add
value and gain competitive advantage – Windows.
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 986 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 986 Page 1 of 1]
####################################################### 346
>From philta(?) Mon Sep 30 09:03:27 1991
To: chuckst(?) mikedr scottq
Cc: bradsi davidcol(?) mackm tomle
Subject: Re: Bambi on DR-DOS 6.0
Date: Sat 28 Sep 91 08:46:59 PDT
The approach we will take is to detect dr 6 and refuse to load. The
error message should be something like `Invalid device driver
interface’.
mike, tom? make – do you have a reliable dr6 detection mechanism?
>From chuckst(?) Sun Sep 29 17:16:46
1991
To: mikedr philba scottq
Subject: Bambi on DR-DOS 6.0
Date: Sun Sep 29 17:16:39 1991
I tracked down a serious incompatibility with DR-DOS 6 — They don’t
use the ‘normal’ device driver interface for >32M partitions.
Instead of setting(?) the regular START SECTOR field to 0ffffh and then
using a
brand new 32-bit field the way MS-DOS has always done, they simply
extended the start sector field by 16 bits.
This seems like a foolish oversight on their part and will likely
result in extensive incompatibilities when they try to run with 3rd
part
device drivers.
I’ve patched a version of Bambi to work with DRD6 ad it seems to run
Win 3.1 without difficulty. This same problem may have caused other
problems with Win 3.1 and the swapfile under DRD6.
It is possible to make Bambi work, assuming we can come up with a
reasonably safe method for detecting DRD6. The runtime hit would be
minimal in time and space, although we wuld have a couple of
instructions in the main code path for checking the ‘special’ DRD6 flag.
What do we think? Should we test further with the patched Bambi to see
if there are any more incompatibilities????
####################################################### 347
>From bradc Mon Sep 30 09:08:07 1991
To: lorisi(?) sharonh
Cc: bradsi
Subject: steveb meeting
Date: Mon Sep 30 09:09:00 PDT 1991
i have a meeting with steveb tommorrow[sic] at 1pm to go over the dr
dos stuff. i’d like brad to attend with me. if he can’t see if we can
rechedule for another time tommorrow[sic] when he can.
[STAMPED] EXH 12 DATE 5/17/[20]02 WITNESS Barrett MARY W. MILLER
[STAMPED] MS 5054017 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1112238 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT 5557
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT
4407 Gordon
v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4407 p. 1 of 3
Win 3.1 Beta Plan
Draft
17 December 1990
[STAMPED] 1103 DEPOSITION EXHIBIT
[STAMPED] X 548717 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] EXH 6 DATE 5/17/[20]02 WITNESS Barrett MARY W. MILLER
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1148389 CONFIDENTIAL
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4407 p. 2 of 3
Types of Beta
Programs:
There are three concurrent Beta Programs planned for Windows 3.1.
- Technical Beta
- Pre-Release
- Preview
Technical Beta is defined as those actively testing the Retail
Windows product as part of a Beta
Test. Pre-Release is to give customers, primary ISVs, early access to
Retail, the SDK and the
DDK as appropriate. The Preview program is for those who will not be
actively doining testing, but
who wish to preview the Retail product (ie. Corporate Accounts).
There are four other groups which will be receiving the Windows 3.1
software early. They are
Windows Development Partners, ESP (Early ship program) OEMs (Original
equipment
manufacturers), general OEMs and some Press/Authors. There may be some
general OEMs
who are also Technical Beta testers, but it is important to note that
they will be receiving
additional software besides the retail product
Objectives:
The purpose of the Beta programs is to:
- Get feedback from external sites on the stability of the product
- Test the product on a variety of machine configurations provided
by the beta test sites
- Allow early accoss to the software and tools so ISVs gain a
*head-start” on updating their applications
- Provide early exposure for the product
Number of
Sites:
There will be approximately 360 sites involved with Iha Technical
Beta. This groop will consist of
Corporate accounts. ISVs, and End users. The Pre-Release program will
have have upwards ot 2500
ISV participants. Approximately 500 retail copies will be given out as
part of the Preview
program. There are approximately 12 Development partners, 15 ESP OEMs
and 300 general
OEMs who will be receiving Windows 3.1 software.
Software and
Frequency of Shipments:
| Program |
Software |
Frequency |
| |
| Technical Beta |
Retail |
3x (1/21,3/15,5/10) |
| Pre-Release |
Retail/SDK/DDK |
3x (2/15,3/29,5/10,6/10) |
| Pre-Release (Strategic) |
Retail/SDK/DDK |
every 4 wks plus 2/15,3/29,5/10,6/10 |
| Preview |
Retail |
2x (1/21,3/15) |
| ESP OEMs |
OAK |
every 4 wks plus 2/15,3/29,5/10 |
| Development Partners |
Retail/SDK/DDK |
every 2 wks plus 2/15,3/29,5/10 |
| General OEMs |
OAK |
3x (2/15,3/29,5/10) |
| Press/Authors/etc. |
Retail |
1x (3/15) |
Windows 3.1 Beta Plan
[STAMPED]X 548718 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1148390 CONFIDENTIAL
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4407 Page 3 of 3
Length of
Beta:
The Technical Beta is scheduled to start on 1/21. The Pre-Release
program oficially starts on
2/15. Primarily he difference between 1/21 abd 2/15 is to allow time to
create the SDK, DDK
and OAK kits and also for some additional testing time. The next major
updata will be on 3/15.
Some hardcopy docs (updated File Manger/Control panel and release
notes) will be included in
the 1/21 and 2/15 shipments with the possibility d of an updated
version being sent with the 3/15
version. 5/i0 is theapproximate Retail ship date and 6/10 is the
appoximate SDK ship date.
See table below far dates and approximate numbers shipped.
| Key ISVs |
ISVs |
Others |
Total Number |
| |
| 2/15 |
2/15 |
2/15 |
~1500 |
| 3/29 |
3/29 |
3/29 |
~2000 |
| 5/10 |
5/10 |
5/10 |
~2500 (Retail) |
| 6/10 |
6/10 |
? |
~3000 |
| |
| ~200 |
500-2500 |
~500 |
~9300 |
Beta
Coordinator;
The DOS/Windows Beta Coordinator will assist Program Management by
providing information
on how to start and run a beta program with specific duties in the
following areas:
1) With initial input from Program manager, define fields and write
database tables using
Superbase as startup database.
2) Make recommendations on staffing levels of temporary staff including
start date and duration
of assignment.
3) Hire and manage temporary staff.
4) Disseminate flow of incoming information, to the admin and tech
staff.
5) Coordinate mailings and other projects
6) Maintain inventory of Beta equipment, including printer to do labels
(most of this equipment
is currentiy in use by the DOS 5.0 beta program).
7) Special projects as requested and time permits.
Support:
Up to two people from PSS (DSBU) will be providing support for the
Technical Beta testers. One
person from PSS (SSBU) will be answering SDK-type questions from the
ISVs (Ie. Pre-Release
participants). These dedicated PSS members will be resident in bldg 3
during the Bets
Programs. There, will be a dedicated FAX. and answering machine to
report bugs. Use of Online
2 will be required by the Pre-Release members. Those customers who are
previewing the retail
product can Fax or phone in their bugs, but will not be given support
unless they buy Online.
A bug report sent to Online will not be counted as an SR.
Note: The use of CompuServe has been suggested. I am waiting to see
how well CompuServe
works for DOS 5 beiore deciding whether it will be used in the Windows
3.1 Beta programs.
Windows 3.1 Beta Plan
[STAMPED]X 548719 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1148391 CONFIDENTIAL
PLAINTIFF’S
EXHIBIT 4546A Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4546A p. 1 of 3
Bruce Neiminen
From: bradc
To: galld; mmerker; rond
Cc: bradc; dosmktg
Subject: Key Competitive Info
Date: Thursday, May 09, 1991 11:47AM
Date: Thu May 09 11:42:49 PDT 1991
As an FYI/reminder, there are two key competitive Info docs that
need to go to the field/onto SmartPages. Both of these docs are on
\pyrexpublic. They are in dosmktgsales.inf.
Document #1 – OEM.DOC
————
Explains how to sell the MS-DOS 5 Upgrade when you encounter an OEM
also selling a DOS Upgrade. It focuses alot on the advantages of our
product over the IBM product
Document #2 – Drdos.doc
————–
Summarizes the key advantages of MS-DOS 5 and the MS-DOS 5 Upgrade
versus Dr.DOS. We are doing further research on this and will have even
more data soon.
Please work with richf to get these to the people out there that need
them…
thanks for all your help
Bruce Neiminen
From: bradc
To: bradsl (bradsi?); steveb
Cc: bradc; joachimk; sergiop
Subject: RE: DRI
Date: Sunday, May 12, 1991 10:38AM
Date: Sat May 11 22:45:38 PDT 1991
consider it done.
>From steveb Tue May 14 19:02:58 1991
To: bradc bradsl (bradsi?)
Cc: joadhimk
Subject: DRI
Page 43
[STAMPED] X 567195 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]
EXH 8 DATE 5/17/[20]02 WITNESS Barrett MARY W. MILLER
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4546A Page 2 of 3
a customer can buy a network operating system
from Novell without buying anything from
Microsoft.
Ray Noorda, Novells chief executive,
downplayed his company’s rivalry with Microsoft,
saying he was attracted to Digital Research
because its version of DOS is superior to
Microsoft’s in some ways.
“Now we can add capabilities (to DOS) in
advance of Microsoft doing it” Noorda said in
a telephone conference.
The deal, which the companies expect will
be completed by October, calls for Novell
to issue 1.5 million in new shares in return for
Digital Research’s private stock. Digital
Research said it had revenues of $40.9 million
for its fiscal year ended last September.
-O- 5 18 pm edt 07-1 $-91 \023
Copyright (c) 1991 Dow Jones and Company, Inc.
Received by NewsEDGE/LAN: O7/16/S1|14:2O
Bruce Neimlnen
From: bradc
To: bradsi; davidcol; greglo; philba; richt; russs; tomle
Cc; bradc; rtcht; sergjop
Subject: RE: novell
Date: Tuesday, July 30,1991 1:41 PM
Date: Thu Jul 18 14:15:35 PDT 1991
One of my thoughts is that we have to thlink about how to short
circuit
Novell DOS before it gets off the ground. If we can put a daggar in
Dr. DOS (or perhaps we should call it Novelal DOS) now then it will put
them on the defensive and have customer worried
Now that we have the NSTL data back and some reasonable data on
where
Dr. DOS is problematic, I’d like to start a ‘slow leak’ program – every
other week or month we try to get the word out on some major dr. dos
compatibility problems. At the same time we should be prepared to
invest in more third party testing to look for other holes – for
example with netware and dr. dos. I’d have to work with PR to develop
the specifics of the plan, but if we can get the world to understand
that dr. dos has a kit of incompatibities with apps, windows and
networks then it will put Novell on the defensive and make it hard for
customers or oems (ibm???) to consider dr. dos seriously.
Page 57
[STAMPED]X 567209 CONFIDENTIAL
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4546A Page 3 of 3
> From davidcol Wed Jul 17 08:47:01 1991
To: bradc bradsl greglo phlba richt russs tomle
Subject: novell
Date: Wed Jul 17 06:46:14 1991
I think we shoud use Windows to get a Microsoft OS back onto
the Netware clients which will bundle or require DR. DOS. We
should alter our plans a bit and move all the DOS 6.0 improvements
directly into Windows. When the user start Windows, they get
the Microsoft OS (Including networking) and all the other cool
features that go with that. When they quit, they get Netware
and DR DOS and no Windows apps. The key is getting a piece of
MS system software on that client so we can deliver our strategy
and vision, We can leverage Windows and Windows apps to to this.
We should not consider things that stop Windows from working on
Netware. (Netware here = netware + DR DOS.) if it was
just DR DOS alone, then we should prevent Windows from working
there. Netware has too much market share and too many customers
are loyal to it for us to exclude windows from that market.
I think this dictates that we maintain good relationships with
Novell so we can stay abreast wjth what they are doing at the
detailed technical level. However, I do think that we should
do our own winnet drivers and other Novell provider components.
If we are going to take over the desktop when Windows starts,
it MUST be all Microsoft written software since Novell won’t
help us do that.
Bruce Neimlnen
From: russs
To: bradc
Subject FW: more on DR DOS. Artisoft, and Novell from Jonathon Schmidt
Date: Thursday, August 08,1991 1:53PM
Date: Thu Jul 18 17:24:07 PDT1991
Here Is the mail I sent that BradSI and I werfe telling you about If
you want to talk to Jonathon Schimdt his # at Performance Technology is
XXX-XXX-XXXX. Tell him I sent you.
>From russs Thu Jul 18 1423:27 1991
To: steveb bradsl mikemur jilmall
Cc: davidl johnlu
Subject: more on DR DOS, Artisoft, and Noj/ell from Jonatbon Schmidt
Page 58
[STAMPED] X567210 CONFIDENTIAL
Exhibits
Published in the Gordon v. Microsoft Trial on March 19, 2004
Transcription Complete. 29 Exhibits 127 pp.
Last revised 4/28/2004
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 373 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 373 Page 1 of 12]
[STAMPED] SIGNED ORIGINAL
203.25
AMENDMENT NUMBER 1
Dated September 1, 1990
TO THE LICENSE AGREEMENT
Dated September 1, 1990
Numbered G150-0271
for
Microsoft [reg] MS-DOS [reg], Version 4.01
Microsoft [reg] Works, Version 2.0
Between
MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
a Delaware Corporation
and
VOBIS DATA COMPUTER GMBH,
A German Corporation
[HANDWRITTEN] .G150-0271
14.2.91/rc
AMENDMENT
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X 222270 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO 608 FOR IDENTIFICATION DATE:
5-4-[19]98 RPTR [initials]
[STAMPED] MS98 0186787 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 373 Page 2 of 12]
Effective September 1, 1990, the below signed parties agree that the
indicated portions of the above referenced License Agreement
(hereinafter the “Agreement”) are hereby amended by this instrument
(hereinafter the “Amendment”), as follows:
1. Exhibit B is hereby amended and as amended shall be read as set
forth in the attached Exhibit B.
2. In Exhibit C3 the following paragraph is added in the section
ROYALTY PAYMENTS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
As between the Products set forth in Exhibit C3 and C5, COMPANY agrees
that for each applicable CUSTOMER SYSTEM shipped or placed in use by or
for COMPANY during the term of this Agreement, COMPANY shall license,
at most either the Exhibit C3 or the Exhibit C5 Product, but no
combination thereof, i.e. no more than one such Product, for use on
that CUSTOMER SYSTEM. COMPANY shall still make royalty reports on a
Product by Product basis.
3. In Exhibit C3, the table in subsection (a) of the ROYALTY PAYMENTS
AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS section is hereby amended and as amended
shall read as follows:
Customer System / Royalty Rate ($US)
Exhibit M2 / $13.05
4. New Exhibits C5, C6, C7, and C8 are hereby added and as added shall
read as set forth in the attached Exhibits C5, C6, C7 and C8.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment as of
September 1, 1990. All signed copies of this Amendment shall be deemed
to be originals.
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
By [Signature of Michael R. Hallman]
Name(Print) Michael R. Hallman
Title President
Date 4/22/[19]91
VOBIS DATA COMPUTER GMBH
By [Signature of Theo Lieven]
Name(Print) Theo Lieven
Title General Manager
Date March 28, 1991
[Page Number] 2
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X222271 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0186788 CONFIDENTIAL
[HANDWRITTEN] 608-2
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 373 Page 3 of 12]
EXHIBIT B
PAYMENT SCHEDULES
MINIMUM COMMITMENT
First Period of This Agreement
COMPANY agrees to pay a minimum of Three Million Dollars (US$
3,000,000.00) for Product(s) licensed under this Agreement within the
first period of this Agreement as described below. The Minimum
Commitment Schedule listed below sets forth the minimum cumulative
amounts of payments which COMPANY shall make to MS during the first
period of this Agreement. To the extent that actual earned royalties
exceed the cumulative minimum commitment payments, COMPANY shall pay MS
for actual earned royalties. To the extent that cumulative minimum
commitment payments exceed actual earned royalties, such excess shall
be known as prepaid royalties and shall be recoupable against future
earned royalties during the term of this Agreement. The minumum
commitment amount payable upon signing of this Agreement as set forth
below is recoupable and refundable puruant to Section 4(b) of this
Agreement. All other minimum commitment payments are recoupable but not
refundable.
Commencing with the first complete calendar quarter subsequent to
COMPANY’s shipment to a customer for revenue of Product MS-DOS(R)
Version 5.0, German language version, in Exhibit C7, but no later than
four (4) months after MS delivers this Product to COMPANY, minimum
commitment amounts for royalty periods during the remaining term of
this Agreement shall increase an additional Four Hundred Thousand Fifty
Dollars ($450,000.00) over the amounts shown in this Exhibit B. COMPANY
shall give MS written notice of the first date of shipment of this
Product by COMPANY to a customer for revenue within ten (10) days of
shipment.
MINIMUM COMMITMENT SCHEDULE (FIRST PERIOD)
Date
|
Payment
Amount ($US)
|
Cumulative
Amount of Payments for Period ($US) |
| Signing of this Agreement
(payment due upon signing) |
$ 300,000.00 |
$300,000.00 |
End of the calendar quarter
(“FIRST PAYMENT DATE”) during which the
first of the following occurs: the date of first COMPANY shipment of
any Product to a customer for revenue, or six (6) months after the
EFFECTIVE DATE of this Agreement
|
[HANDWRITTEN
“525,000”]
$600,000.00
|
$900.000.00
|
3 months after the FIRST PAYMENT
DATE
|
$700,000.00 |
$1,600,000.00
|
| 6 months after the FIRST PAYMENT
DATE |
$700,000.00 |
$2,300,00.00
|
| 9 months after the FIRST PAYMENT
DATE |
$700,000.00 |
$3,000,000.00 |
Total First Period Minimum
Commitment
|
$3,000,000.00
|
$3,000,000.00 |
[Page Number] 3
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X 222272 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0186789 CONFIDENTIAL
[HANDWRITTEN] 608-3
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 373 Page 4 of 12]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X 222273 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0186790 CONFIDENTIAL
[HANDWRITTEN] 608-4
Except for the amount due on signing, the date of payment for the above
calendar quarter amounts shall be as provided in Section 3.
MINIMUM COMMITMENT
Second Period of This
Agreement
COMPANY agrees to pay a minimum of Three Million Dollars (US$
3,000,000.00) for Product(s) licensed under this Agreement within the
second period of this Agreement as described below. The Minimum
Commitment Schedule listed below sets forth the minimum cumulative
amounts of payments which COMPANY shall make to MS during the second
period of this Agreement. Payments made during the first period of this
Agreement shall not be credited towards the minimum commitment
requirement in the second period. To the extent that actual earned
royalties exceed the cumulative
minimum commitment payments, COMPANY shall pay MS for actual earned
royalties. To the extent that cumulative minimum commitment payments
exceed actual earned royalties, such excess shall be known as prepaid
royalties and shall be recoupable against future earned royalties
during the term of this Agreement. The minumum commitment amount
payable upon signing of this Agreement as set forth below is recoupable
and refundable puruant to Section 4(b) of this Agreement. All other
minimum commitment payments are recoupable but not refundable.
Commencing with the first complete calendar quarter subsequent to
COMPANY’s shipment to a customer for revenue of Product MS-DOS(R)
Version 5.0, German language version, in Exhibit C7, but no later than
four (4) months after MS delivers this Product to COMPANY, minimum
commitment amounts for royalty periods during the remaining term of
this Agreement shall increase an additional Four Hundred Thousand Fifty
Dollars ($450,000.00) over the amounts shown in this Exhibit B. COMPANY
shall give MS written notice of the first date of shipment of this
Product by COMPANY to a customer for revenue within ten (10) days of
shipment.
MINIMUM COMMITMENT SCHEDULE (SECOND PERIOD)
Date
End of the:
|
Payment
Amount ($US)
|
Cumulative
Amount of Payments for Period ($US) |
| 12 months after the FIRST
PAYMENT DATE |
$ 750,000.00 |
$ 750,000.00 |
| 15 months after the FIRST
PAYMENT DATE |
$ 750,000.00 |
$
1,500,000.00 |
18 months after the FIRST
PAYMENT DATE
|
$ 750,000.00 |
$2,250,000.00
|
| 21 months after the FIRST
PAYMENT DATE |
$ 750,000.00 |
$3,000,000.00
|
Total Second Period Minimum
Commitment
|
$3,000,000.00 |
$3,000,000.00 |
The date of payment for the above calendar quarter amounts shall be as
provided in Section 3.
Exhibit to the License Agreement dated September 1, 1990, between
MICROSOFT CORPORATION and VOBIS DATA COMPUTER GMBH.
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 373 Page 5 of 12]
EXHIBIT C5 (SYSTEM COMMITMENT)
PRODUCT: Microsoft
[REG] Windows [TM]
VERSION NO: 3.0
LANGUAGE VERSION: (Do
not fill in if Domestic USA Version)
PRODUCT DELIVERABLES:
(a) Product in Object Code form.
(b) Standard Documentation in Series Number W770-3Z that MS delivers
with the Product.
PRODUCT SPECIFICATIONS:
The Product will have features as specified in the above-referenced
Product documentation.
ROYALTY PAYMENTS AND
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
COMPANY agrees to pay MS, according to, and comply with Exhibit C3.
ROYALTIES FOR NEW VERSION
RELEASES:
MS may elect to increase the per system royalty applicable to new
Version Releases, which royalty shall apply to succeeding releases
until changed hereunder or by agreement of the parties. The maximum per
system royalty for a new Version Release shall be determined as follows:
Maximum royalty = R + (R*N*1.5%)
where R is the initial per system royalty described above and N is the
number of months (rounded to the nearest whole number) that have
elapsed from the Effective Date until MS delivers the new Version
Release.
ROYALTIES FOR UPGRADES:
COMPANY may elect to pay MS a royalty of fifty percent (50%) of the
highest applicable royalty stated in this Exhibit C (i.e., the initial
royalty stated above plus increases, if any, for new Version Releases)
for each full or partial copy of the Product, including Update Releases
and Version Releases, licensed or otherwise disposed of by COMPANY as
an Upgrade during the term of this Agreement. Upgrade Product shall
conform to the definition contained in Section 1 of the Agreement.
ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS:
The Product Microsoft Windows described in this Exhibit contains
Version 7.0 of the Microsoft mouse driver (“MS Driver
“) (files designated as MOUSE.COM and MOUSE.SYS), which is MS
proprietary software designed for use with the Microsoft Mouse. In the
event COMPANY ships a non-MS mouse or pointing device with the MS
Driver to end user purchasers of COMPANY’s Computer Systems, COMPANY
agrees to pay MS an additional royalty of Five Dollars (US $5.00) for
each copy of the Driver so shipped by COMPANY. Reporting and payment of
such Driver royalties shall be in accordance with this Exhibit and
Section 3 (“Price and Payment”) of this Agreement.
[PAGE NUMBER] 5
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X222274 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0186791 CONFIDENTIAL
[HANDWRITTEN] 608-5
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 373 Page 6 of 12]
COPYIGHT NOTICE:
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1985-1989. All rights reserved.
PRODUCT NAME AND ASSOCIATED
TRADEMARK: Microsoft [REG] Windows [TM]
OTHER ASSOCIATED TRADEMARKS
AND DESCRIPTOR:
Exhibit to the License Agreement dated September 1, 1990, between
MICROSOFT CORPORATION and VOBIS DATA COMPUTER GMBH
02/07/[19]90 0876L
[PAGE NUMBER] 6
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X 222275 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0186792 CONFIDENTIAL
[HANDWRITTEN] 608-6
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 373 Page 7 of 12]
EXHIBIT CE
ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE VERSIONS
The Product described in Exhibit C5 (“Reference Exhibit”) shall include
the additional language versions identified below. COMPANY shall
license at most one language version of the Product for use on each
applicable CUSTOMER SYSTEM. COMPANY’S royalty obligations shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit regardless of the language version
licensed with each applicable CUSTOMER SYSTEM. Nothwithstanding the
preceding sentence, COMPANY shall pay MS an additional language version
royalty equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the royalty otherwise payable
to MS for each full or partial copy of each language version of the
Product identified below which is licensed or otherwise disposed of by
COMPANY during the term of this Agreement. COMPANY shall report, on a
language version by language version basis, and pay such language
version royalties pursuant to and as part of its royalty payment and
reporting obligations under the Royalty Payments and Reporting
Requirements section of the Reference Exhibit. The Product Name and
Associated Trademark are, in all Language Versions listed below, the
same as in the Reference Exhibit.
1. Language Version: French
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number W770-3F that MS delivers with
the Product.
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1985 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
2. Language Version: German
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number W770-3D that MS delivers with
the Product.
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT
CORPORATION, 1985 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
3. Language Version: Portuguese
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number W770-3P that MS delivers with
the Product.
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT
CORPORATION, 1985 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
[PAGE NUMBER] 7
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X 222276 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0186793 CONFIDENTIAL
[HANDWRITTEN] 608-7
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 373 Page 8 of 12]
4. Language Version: Spanish
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number W770-3E that MS delivers with
the Product.
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT
CORPORATION, 1985 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
5. Language Version: Swedish
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number W770-3S that MS delivers with
the Product.
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT
CORPORATION, 1985 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
Exhibit to the License Agreement dated September 1, 1990, between
MICROSOFT CORPORATION and VOBIS DATA COMPUTER GMBH.
03/14/[19]90 0975L
[PAGE NUMBER] 8
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X 222277 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0186794 CONFIDENTIAL
[HANDWRITTEN] 608-8
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 373 Page 9 of 12]
EXHIBIT C7 (SYSTEM COMMITMENT)
PRODUCT: Microsoft
[REG] MS-DOS [REG]
VERSION NO: 5.0
(Includes QBasic Interpreter)
VERSION NO: 5.0
LANGUAGE VERSION: ____
(Do not fill in if Domestic USA Version)
PRODUCT DELIVERABLES:
(a) Product in Object Code form.
(b) Standard Documentation in Series Number D781-5Z and D707-5Z that MS
delivers with the Product.
PRODUCT SPECIFICATIONS:
The Product will have features as specified in the above-referenced
Product documentation.
ROYALTY PAYMENTS AND
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
(a) For purposes of royalty payments, this Exhibit shall become
effective as follows: If COMPANY prompty provides written notice to MS
of the date on which COMPANY first ships this Product to any customer,
then this Exhibit shall become effective on the shipment date specified
in the notice; otherwise, this Exhibit shall become effective on the
first day of the calendar quarter for which COMPANY files a royalty
report indicating shipment of this Product.
(b) For each Customer System identified below, COMPANY agrees to pay MS
a royalty, at the applicable rate set forth below, multiplied by the
greater of (i) the number of full or partial Customer System(s) shipped
or placed in use by or for COMPANY during the term of this Agreement,
or (ii) the number of full or parital copies of Product, including
Update Releases and Version Releases, licensed or otherwise disposed of
by COMPANY during the term of this Agreement for use with such Customer
System, but excluding copies of the Product for which COMPANY pays
royalties at the Upgrade Royalty Rate (see below).
Customer System Royalty Rate ($US)
Exhibit M1 $7.82
(c) COMPANY’s report shall specify the number of Customer
System(s) shipped or placed in use by or for COMPANY during that
calendar quarter and the number of copies of Product, including Update
Releases, Version Releases, and Upgrades licensed or otherwise disposed
of by COMPANY during that calendar quarter. COMPANY shall furnish this
statement for each Customer System identified in the Exhibit M9s) and
shall report for each Customer System separately by processor. In the
event that no Customer System(s) are shipped or placed in use by or for
COMPANY during a calendar quarter and no copies of Product are licensed
or otherwise disposed of by COMPANY during such calendar quarter,
COMPANY shall indicate this on the royalty report.
[PAGE NUMBER] 9
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X 222278 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0186795 CONFIDENTIAL
[HANDWRITTEN] 608-9
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 373 Page 10 of 12]
ROYALTIES FOR NEW VERSION
RELEASES:
MS may elect to increase the per system royalty applicable to new
Version Releases, which royalty shall apply to succeeding releases
until changed hereunder or by agreement of the parties. The maximum per
system royalty for a new Version Release shall be determined as follows:
Maximum royalty = R + (R*N*1.5%).
where R is the initial per system royalty described above and N is the
number of months (rounded to the nearest whole number) that have
elapsed from the Effective Date until MS delivers the new Version
Release.
ROYALTIES FOR UPGRADES:
COMPANY may elect to pay MS a royalty of fifty percent (50%) of the
highest applicable royalty stated in this Exhibit C (i.e., the initial
royalty stated above plus increase, if any, for new Version Releases)
for each full or partial copy of the Product, including Update Releases
and Version Releases, licensed or otherwise disposed of by COMPANY as
an Upgrade during the term of this Agreement. Upgrade Product shall
conform to the definitiion contained in Section 1 of the Agreement.
ADDITIONAL PROVISION:
Prior to distribution of product by COMPANY, COMPANY shall implement a
tracking procedure (e.g., bar coding, serialization) that has been
approved in writing by MS. COMPANY’s tracking system shall enable
COMPANY to identify its customer (i.e. distributor, dealer, end user)
for ecah unit of the Product distributed. COMPANY shall not license or
otherwise dispose of the Product unless and until such tracking system
has been approved by MS and implemented by COMPANY.
COPYRIGHT NOTICE:
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT CORPORATIO, 1981-1991. All rights reserved.
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT CORPORATIO, 1982-1991. All rights reserved.
PRODUCT NAME AND ASSOCIATED
TRADEMARK:
Microsoft [REG] MS-DOS [REG]
QBasic [TM] Interpreter
Exhibit to the License Agreement dated September 1, 1990, between
MICROSOFT CORPORATION and VOBIS DATA COMPUTER GMBH.
11/29/[19]90 dos5djj
[PAGE NUMBER] 10
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X 222279 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0186796 CONFIDENTIAL
[HANDWRITTEN] 608-10
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 373 Page 11 of 12]
EXHIBIT C8
ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE VERSIONS
The Product described in Exhibit C7 (“Reference Exhibit”) shall include
the additional language versions identified below. COMPANY shall
license at most one language version of the Product for use on each
applicable CUSTOMER SYSTEM. COMPANY’s royalty obligations shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit regardless of the language version
licensed with each applicable CUSTOMER SYSTEM. Notwithstanding the
preceding sentence, COMPANY shall pay MS an additional language version
royalty equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the royalty otherwise payable
to MS for each full or partial copy of each language version of the
Product identified below which is licensed or otherwise disposed of by
COMPANY during the term of this Agreement. COMPANY shall report, on a a
language version by language version basis, and pay such language
version royalties pursuant to and as part of its royalty payment and
reporting obligations under the Royalty Payments and Reporting
Requirements section of the Reference Exhibit. The Product Name and
Associated Trademark are, in all Language Versions listed below, the
same as in the Reference Exhibit.
1. Language Version: French
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D781-5F and D707-5F that MS
delivers with the Product.
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1981 – 1991 . All rights reserved.
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1982 – 1991 . All rights reserved.
2. Language Version: German
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D781-5D and D707-5D that MS
delivers with the Product.
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1981 – 1991 . All rights reserved.
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1982 – 1991 . All rights reserved.
3. Language Version: Portuguese
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D781-5P and D707-5P that MS
delivers with the Product.
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1981 – 1991 . All rights reserved.
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1982 – 1991 . All rights reserved.
[PAGE NUMBER] 11
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X 222280 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0186797 CONFIDENTIAL
[HANDWRITTEN] 608-11
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 373 Page 12 of 12]
4. Language Version: Spanish
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D781-5E and D707-5E that MS
delivers with the Product.
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1981 – 1991 . All rights reserved.
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1982 – 1991 . All rights reserved.
5. Language Version: Swedish
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D781-5S and D707-5S that MS
delivers with the Product.
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1981 – 1991 . All rights reserved.
COPYRIGHT (C) MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1982 – 1991 . All rights reserved.
Exhibit to the License Agreement dated September 1, 1990, between
MICROSOFT CORPORATION and VOBIS DATA COMPUTER GMBH.
03/14/[19]90 0975L
[PAGE NUMBER] 12
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X 222281 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0186798 CONFIDENTIAL
[HANDWRITTEN] 608-12
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 461 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 461 p. 1 of 3]
I doubt that’s the problem. When I dial MCI on the same machine, I
never have a problem. Only dialing into 867-1681. I get a connect
message, but then after hitting enter a number of times, nothing
happens. So 1 hang up, redial, and repeat 5-10 times until I get the
login message.
No problems at all calling other services.
| >From corpop Mon Nov 26 08:18:44 1990
| To: bradsa
| Subject linelock
| Cc: tomh
| Date: Mon Nov 26 08:05:33 1990
|
|
| It’s possible you are running into a hung modem. Please call us
| at 936-3367 when it happens so we can have a closer look.
|
| Thanks, Corpop.
|
|——————————————–
|
| >From joero Sun Nov 25 09:33:02 1990
| To: AllenY GregP corpop
| Subject: linelock
| Date: Sun Nov 25 09:27:59 1990
|
| From bradsi Sat Nov 24 18:50:33 1990
| To: joern
| Subject: linelock
| Date: Sat Nov 24 18:48:07 1990
| Why do I have so much trouble getting through linelock
| to get a login message? I typically have to dial 867-1681
| 5-10 times before I get login.
|
|
################################################################### 101
>From bens Mon Nov 26 12:21:28 1990
To: bradsi
Cc: camcromn davidw pauima philba richab
Subject to share or not to share, that is the question
Date: Mon Nov 26 12:1934 1990
Issue:
– Should MS Apps (and other ISVs) have access to Windows source code?
Complications:
1) If MS Apps have
access to the Windows sources, then all ISVs should have access, else
we are subject to restraint-of-tradc complaints (to say nothing of the
morality of the situation).
[Some exhibit labelling is missing from this transcript page.]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 461 p. 2 of 3]
2) If outside ISVs
have access to our sources, then we make it much easier for another
company to come along and clone Windows.
I talked to some apps guys on a recent recruiting trip, and they
made
the following very good point;
Windows is poorly
documented
The state machine that is USER.EXE is barely documented in the
SDK. Any ISV that wants to write a great Windows app ends up
looking at the source code (like our Apps group), unassembling
the DLLs, or writing experiment code to divine the actual behavior
of the system.
Arguments against giving ISVs access to Windows source code usually
boil
down to:
An ISV will use some
undocumented feature of Windows, or directly access internal data, in
such a way that future versions of Windows will be forced to support
this bad behavior, restricting MS ability to innovate in Windows.
I claim that letting an ISV looking at the source code is the *best*
way
to avoid this problem:
1) An ISV that
unassembles Windows to figure out its behavior is effectively looking
at source code, but without the benefits of source comments. This
approach is more work for the ISV, and gives MS no opportunity to guide
the ISV. With source code, there are generally comments discussing
rationale for the behavior of the system.
2) An ISV that writes
test apps to divine Windows behavior is really on thin ice. Either the
ISV spends a great deal of effort writing test code to be certain
Windows is fully understood, or the ISV may end up making assumptions
which are not correct Since tbe former approach is a great deal of
work, and the ISV is never sure when to stop (“do I really understand
how this works now?”), most ISVs will end up in the latter situation.
These are the most dangerous apps, since they are most dependant upon
the exact behavior of a specific release of Windows.
The key problem is that our documentation docs not provide
sufficient
depth of coverage. The key question is:
How much would it cost
to provide sufficient documentation, and is that any different, really,
from providing source code?
The key difficulty in writing really great documentation is
anticipating
all the questions an ISV might have about the behavior of the system.
Presumably,
there is a level of documentation which is great enough that an ISV
would have
to perform only a small amount of experimentation.
Solutions:
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 461 p. 3 of 3]
A. Status Quo
+ Simple
– MS Apps have (unfair) advantage over other ISVs.
B. Make Windows
sources available for a fee, with a restrictive licensing agreement
(only available to N trusted employees, must be kept on a secure
server, no derivative of these sources may be shipped, etc.)
+ All ISVs are equal
– Cloning risk
C. Disallow all ISVs,
including MS Apps, from looking at Windows sources (in practice, this
would be a very hard thing to do, and certainly runs counter to the
spirit of MS).
+ All ISVs are equal
– Difficult to make happen at MS
– Reduces information flow on Windows to ISVs
D. Write great
documentation.
+ All ISVs are equal
+ Avoids cloning risk
Conclusion
Given that we want to make Windows programming as attractive as
possible,
I vote for (B) making the sources available. This gives us a little
extra incentive to keep enhancing Windows, so that it does not become
a stationary target for doners, but otherwise benefits the Windows
ISV community.
– bens
################################################################### 102
>From ericbo Mon Nov 26 12:25:51 1990
To: jamesm
Cc: dos5beta
Subject: Re: Where is DOS 5.0???
Date: Mon Nov 26 12.24:51 1990
We do not have a current release that has been tested well enough to
be
used in an internal beta. We are in the process of testing a new
version
and it should be ready later this week. Mail will be going out when it
is
ready.
If you wish to be a “guinea pig” and install the build we are
currently
testing for an internal release, email dos5beta and we will add you to
our
list If you need disk images though, you will probably have to wait
until
the internal beta version is ready.
-Eric Hough
Dos 5 Beta Support
>From jamesm Mon Nov 26 12:11:32 1990
To: dos5beta
Subject Where is DOS 5.0???
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 462 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 462 p. 1 of 3]
Cc: bradsi gcnfac janfac
Date: Mon Nov 26 14.4X.39 1990
The Facilities Department can be contacted via e-mail on the
“genfac”
aliasis. The “facman” alais is no longer in use.
In regards to your request concerning the Bldg 3 2nd floor mens
room,
I am having a plumber out to correct a clog in the urinal. It looks
like
it will need to be pulled off the wall to repair correctly. For
the urinal to be clogged this bad, something has physically been put
down the urinal path. Please be patient for one more day while repairs
are effected.
“janfac” will ensure that the area is cleaned up in a sanitary
manner.
Thank you for your patience!
################################################################### 127
>From philba Mon Nov 26 14:53:50 1990
To: bens bradsi
Cc. camcronm davidw paulma richab
Subject Re: to share or not to share, that is the question
Date: Mon Nov 26 15:50:19 1990
You bring up some valid points however there is one other point that
needs to be understood: ISVs that have access to our code often
take advantage of internal data-structures, bugs or other quirks of
the implementation. This prevents us from changing the code and adds
a serious burden of compatibility beyond the API.
I favor simply doing a better job of documenting.
| From bens Mon Nov 26 12:21:28 1990
| To: bradsi
| Cc: camcromn davidw pauima philba richab
| Subject to share or not to share, that is the question
| Date: Mon Nov 26 12:1934 1990
|
| Issue:
| – Should MS Apps (and other ISVs) have access to Windows source code?
|
| Complications:
| 1) If MS Apps have access to the Windows sources,
then all ISVs should
| have access, else we are subject
to restraint-of-tradc complaints
| (to say nothing of the morality
of the situation).
|
| 2) If outside ISVs have access to our sources, then
we make it much easier
| for another company to come along
and clone Windows.
|
| I talked to some apps guys on a recent recruiting trip, and they made
| the following very good point;
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 462 p. 2 of 3]
|
| Windows is poorly documented
|
| The state machine that is USER.EXE is barely documented in the
| SDK. Any ISV that wants to write a great Windows app ends up
| looking at the source code (like our Apps group), unassembling
| the DLLs, or writing experiment code to divine the actual behavior
| of the system.
|
| Arguments against giving ISVs access to Windows source code usually
boil
| down to:
|
| An ISV will use some undocumented feature of
Windows, or directly
| access internal data, in such a way that future
versions of Windows
| will be forced to support this bad behavior,
restricting MS ability
| to innovate in Windows.
|
| I claim that letting an ISV looking at the source code is the *best*
way
| to avoid this problem:
|
| 1) An ISV that unassembles Windows to figure out
its behavior is
| effectively looking at
source code, but without the benefits of
| source comments. This
approach is more work for the ISV, and
| gives MS no opportunity to
guide the ISV. With source code,
| there are generally
comments discussing rationale for the behavior
| of the system.
|
| 2) An ISV that writes test apps to divine Windows
behavior is really
| on thin ice. Either the ISV
spends a great deal of effort writing
| test code to be certain
Windows is fully understood, or the ISV
| may end up making
assumptions which are not correct Since tbe
| former approach is a great
deal of work, and the ISV is never sure
| when to stop (“do I really
understand how this works now?”), most
| ISVs will end up in the
latter situation. These are the most
| dangerous apps, since they
are most dependant upon the exact behavior
| of a specific release of
Windows.
|
| The key problem is that our documentation docs not provide sufficient
| depth of coverage. The key question is:
|
| How much would it cost to provide sufficient
documentation,
| and is that any different, really, from providing
source code?
|
| The key difficulty in writing really great documentation is
anticipating
| all the questions an ISV might have about the behavior of the system.
Presumably,
| there is a level of documentation which is great enough that an ISV
would have
| to perform only a small amount of experimentation.
|
| Solutions:
|
| A. Status Quo
| + Simple
| – MS Apps have (unfair) advantage
over other ISVs.
|
| B. Make Windows sources available for a fee, with a
restrictive licensing
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 462 p. 3 of 3]
| agreement (only
available
to N trusted employees, must be kept on
| a secure server, no
derivative of these sources may be shipped, etc.)
| + All ISVs are equal
| – Cloning risk
|
| C. Disallow all ISVs, including MS Apps, from
looking at Windows sources
| (in practice, this would be
a very hard thing to do, and certainly
| runs counter to the spirit
of MS).
| + All ISVs are equal
| – Difficult to make happen at MS
| – Reduces information flow on
Windows to ISVs
|
| D. Write great documentation.
| + All ISVs are equal
| + Avoids cloning risk
|
|
| Conclusion
| Given that we want to make Windows programming as attractive as
possible,
| I vote for (B) making the sources available. This gives us a little
| extra incentive to keep enhancing Windows, so that it does not become
| a stationary target for doners, but otherwise benefits the Windows
| ISV community.
|
| – bens
|
################################################################### 128
>From cliffw Mon Nov 26 14:57:51 1990
To: bradsi
Subject: XL Bugs
Date: Mon Nov 26 14:55:23 1990
The PREVIEW bugs have been forwarded to the appropriate people.
The Style Combo box display problem is probably a WIN 3 installation
bug.
I think this is the problem because I just checked a the beta version
on a 386/25 in the configuration lab, and there were mo problems.
If you re-install Win 3 (or I will do it if you wish) the problem
should
go away. If it doesnt go away, please contact me.
################################################################### 129
>From korys Mon Nov 26 15:03:58 1990
To: dwgroup
Subject: Printers in 3/2165
Date: Mon Nov 26 15:01:16 1990
\\prntsrv\aplw – Apple LaserWriter plus
\\prntsrv\ljiii – HP Usenet III
[PE462 END]
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 638 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 638 p. 1 of 6]
[STAMPED] Depo. Ex. 33
[STAMPED] Depo. Ex. 607
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X0599970
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 291 C.A. No. 2:96CV645B
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1177233 CONFIDENTIAL
Microsoft Memo
To: Jeremy Butler
From: Joachim Kempin
Date: March 26, 1991
Subject: Europe Trip Report
cc: Bill Gates, Mice Hallman. Bernard Vergnes. Chris Smith, Richard
Fade, Ron Hosog, Jeff Lum. Tim Beard
ADI Software (Windows ISV) – Karlsruhe. Germany
Received a very positive update on the German Win and Win apps
market ADI is the exclusive
distributor for the Asymmetrix Toolbox and is localizing it. In
addition, they used it to write
multimedia apps and combined it with their own database technology.
It’s amazing how this
improved speed. Paul Allen should look at this. On a side note – my old
friend Mark Ursino, now
Asymmetrix Marketing Manager, seems to be as unpopular as ever
according to ADI and Internal
Asymmetrix feedback.
CeBIT- Hanover. Germany
The show now consists of 20 halls and next year will be expanded to
24 halls. They had a new
record this year with 570,00 visitors in attendance. MS had four
well-organized booths. Most
impressive was the ISV booth. The main booth, MAC and LAN Man booths
were well attended.
Business climate was upbeat: 12-16% unit growth to be expected, but a
lot of disappointment in
Eastern European business opportunities. It will take 5-6 years to see
the fruits of any
investments. The USSR might not be in for good business for another
10 years. East Germany will be healthy in 2-3 years. (It takes one day
to make a scheduled
phone call into the Eastern part of Germany, meaning no communication
infrastructure). At the
same time, skilled and motivated labor does not exist. Fifty years of
communist government took
the desire to perform out of the country. Do we need to revisit our
localization strategy?
Most impressive: TFT color laptops from Sharp, Toshiba. Amstrad
(7.5K$), and Aquarius.
Ultra-thin Notebook as well as Amstrad’s “Mac-killer”
KEY CUSTOMER VISITS
I missed Schneider and Compass due to a delay in Frankfurt. Manfred
needs to follow up with
Koester (ex Schneider now part of Compass), a dealer chain association
which is planning to
build their own PCs.
Tandon
Tandon is still growing 20% per year, very professional and healthy.
Doing 30% of all Tandon
sales. The bad news: they signed up to distribute Solborn SPARC
stations in Germany and if
successful, they will do so in other European countries. We need to
change their thinking after
the MIPS announcement. They would switch if told by their US
headquarters.
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 638 p. 2 of 6]
Zenith
Zenith has completely reorganized and changed all sales &
marketing management in Germany.
They are fighting to come back, and still being profitable, the local
VP was able to survive. More
important was the message that they are happy with the management
changes at HQ and that
they now have more input on product directions. 70% of Zenith’s total
business is now done in
Europe.
DRI
Germany Is their best county worldwide. Lots of Taiwanese clone
manufacturers and Vobis are
present with DRI bundles. We will have to target them one by one.
Interviewed a DRI person
who wants to switch sides, will follow up with JoachenH.
Interview with Rainerk
CWedell asked for my opinion of whether he could do the German PSS
manager job. I
supported his recommendation after talking to him. From the interview
and some discussion with
the OEM managers. It was obvious that we need a unified European PSS
concept. This is
particularly true for large account customers when supporting
mission-critical apps. These guys
shop for the best prices and have started laughing at our European
inconsistencies.
WORKS
Still complaints from Juttad that C8M and Schneider are violating
distribution agreements. I
confronted the CBM GM and he admitted that this had happened but had
been corrected In
Schneider’s case. I asked GmbH to buy packages without hardware to give
us some proof. We
should terminate their WORKS license if true – being the second
offense. Jochenh told me that
al these OEM bundles in Germany are generally helping his WORKS sales.
Aquarius
Aquarius sold 40K units in their first year of existence. Confirmed
that 386SX is the best selling
PC type in Germany. They upped their commit to 60K and shook hands over
a new 2.5M/per
year deal giving us $40+ per system. I committed to pay for 20K of
advertisements in local
catalogs for making DOS 5.0 popular and fighting DRI. Because they had
bought FG DOS and
WIN before they started shipping royalty based products we forgave them
150K of min commits.
Their ultra-thin notebooks is interesting. It contains DRI ROM-DOS from
Taiwan, but they will
force their vendor to change to MS-DOS.
Ronh please make sure that Taiwan OEM follows up.
Pretty bad if true:
They are working closely with Suja in the USSR and claim they have sold
them 65K PCs in
components to be assembled locally. The Russian company Informed them
that they had signed
a deal for $2 for DOS equivalent in Rubles. We denied that such a
contract existed asked
for a copy. I will follow up with Dalech.
Peacock
The usual “you do not love us” complaint. I promised to visit them
in Paderborn in May. They
are interested in partnering with us on some integration projects. Key
point: IBM is hurling us.
Novell is being positioned by the IBM sales force as being “it”. (This
was confirmed by 3-4 other
OEMs). OS/2 is an IBM proprietary system etc., etc. They and others
asked us to do a better
PR job in the US and locally to make our story more believable. They
told us we as a software
company are missing the boat by not having a NOTES type product today
and a low-end
LAN Man solution.
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 638 p. 3 of 6]
Vobis
This is a company owned 20% by Kauhof which in turn is owned by
METRO. There was talk
in Hanover that an additional 20% might be sold to Kaunof by Theo
Liefen, their founder. We met
him twice to discuss the new contract. It contains a WIN and WORKS
license for all their
systems to be expected to exceed 200K units this CY making them number
2 after IBM. And it
includes a DOS 5.0 “trigger” license which makes them pay for MS DOS
three months after they
receive the OAK. Liefen denied that he ever agreed to this. (From my
DRI contact, I knew that
he had extended his current deal by 50K units- thus putting him under
pressure). With Manfred
not being present because of his leg surgery, we agreed to meet again
the next day to resolve
the issue.
Interesting enough, Amstrad and other German companies have been
noticing Vobis’ success
and its’ DRI bundling. Liefen himself mentioned to us that he could
influence DRI in their
product development, etc. After talking to Manfred, it was obvious that
Liefen was reneging on the deal.
Round two: I took the opportunity to negotiate in German, sign our
offer as is – this is an agreed
upon package deal or if you change any component, we will too. Second
option: scratch the
DOS clause, pay $35 for Windows instead of $15. You have untill
04/01/91 to consider. If no
contract is signed, seize shipping Windows by 05/01/91. They are
shipping without a license (!)
submit royalty reports for WIN and WORKS and pay up. (They have a valid
WORKS license at
$25). The proposal showed impact. They threatened with GeoWorks. Lotus,
etc We asked if
the DOS price was an issue – he answered no. We parted as friends –
believe it or not, Manfred
will follow up with a letter and a phone call and I have a bet with
Jeff that they win sign as is.
In my judgement they will hurt if they do not ship WIN and paying $35
for it is out of the question.
IPC
Very amiable meeting regarding marketing plans. They are departing
from ESSEX their parent
company. Told us that IPC Spain is in financial trouble, I informed
Ignacio.
Compaq, Gmbh
Got to know two new GMs and confirmed the European MIPS
announcement. Great response
so far to their Ballpoint promo. Healthy business outlook based on top
management meetings
with large accounts at Hanover.
Schneider and Koch
A true disaster meeting. They are one of the leading network
software sellers in Germany with a
30% market share. They still are without a 2.0 German LAN Man OAK. One
reason was the
delaying of the 2.0 amendment by them and second the amendment being
held up in legal
because of sloppy preparation by Gmbh. They did praise K.H. Breitenbach
and his support, but
GmbH management – having closed an exclusive distribution agreement for
LAN Man (would not
have happened at my time) – refused to authorize their dealers for 6
months. Meanwhile, they
are selling Novell – now stupid and arrogant can we get? I promised
them help by sending an
OAK asap and told the German guys to allow them to ship product from
their warehouse included
in their box in the interim. I hope they can work this out They asked
for a distribution agreement
and I told them to work with Gmbh. This might not be possible locally
until the exclusive deals
runs out by year end.
Amstrad
We took them out for a nice lunch in a truly nice place. After the
usual “lower your prices” and
how well they did their WIN shell without paying 1M$ to MS development,
we were able to break
the ice. Again, not enough resources to serve and nurture them, let
them believe we do not care.
They are seriously thinking of shipping DR DOS 5.0 for their German
8086 PCs starting in
October – because Vobis does it. They are designing a new low-end and
high-end product line
and are asking for our help. This time they will get it. We exchanged
some market info and they
were impressed by how well informed we were. We succeeded in
interesting them in Pen-WIN
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 638 p. 4 of 6]
based PC design and recommended doing this before they start a MM
PC.
Tney agreed –
Malcolm was actually really excited about it
I believe the DRI Issue can be put to rest if they see a true effort
Malcolm and myself
established a good rapport. I am going to make them my European “pet”
account.
CBM
Met with their new GM. This was the third time he has worked tor
CBM. Lots of energy and
drive. He is turning things around 35% of total CBM sales is in
Germany. They are still selling
300K 64’s and more than 200K Amigas. Their CD-ROM video is catching on.
It is based on an
Amiga 500 chip residing in a remote control – a great player as most
customers believe and very
easy to operate. Tandy, you might get killed! GmbH will follow up with
some educational sales
opponunities.
Siemens
Feldman and Dewltd asked a lot of questions regarding OS/2, WIN
positioning, why MIPS, and
how real is LAN Man? I confirmed our MIPS plans and answered their
questions. Again they
raised the issue of a completely confused market and IBM going around
trashing us. We invited
them to the planned May briefing. Their first R3000 based MIPS machine
will be a WS followed
by a MP machine – incompatible for us. They will do a R4000 machine
asap. Interesting enough
they feel pretty sure that MIPS win ship “error free” CPUs in Q1 CY92
at the earliest. One year
too late – by then SPARC 3, a better PA chip, and the next RS 6000 will
be out. This means no
free lunch for the MIPS consortium. We might have to fight harder than
expected. They are
developing banking apps by using the PM interface. I confirmed that
OS/2 3.0 will conserve the
PM interface but I think they understood clearly to move to WIN 32-bit
asap to have their
investment secured in the future.
They were disappointed about our dying mailserver cooperation but
want to do development
project with us. I said pick a small one and we can start, build trust
and get it done. I will make
this somebodies project. All in all a very amiable and constructive
meeting.
EUROPEAN OEM REVIEWS
General Issues
European OEM sales are complaining about our LAN sales force taking
the business direct.
Some countries seem to have a hit list to replace OEM sales and not
Novell sales, Schneider &
Koch in Germany is miffed, so is Siemens. Looks like the sales force is
not always following the
rules of engagement – no surprise to me! Time to reinforce?
Sweden
No surprises. Victor wants to extend contract locally to secure
support. Tandy will have to make
a decision. Nokia had a bad quarter and the outlook is flat. Nokia is
another miffed LAN Man
OEM who has expressed shipping FG instead of OEM product. This could be
complicated if
European distribution agreements are not welcome and subs do not
cooperate when small units
are being purchased.
We need a cheaper 400 BPI OEM Mouse to stop Logitech gaining market
share (and reduce
retail pricing).
UK
Seeing more Notebooks designed/imported with DRI ROM-DOS. DRI’s main
thrust in the UK is
to sell Flex-DOS and CP/M to imbedded system vendors. Business outlook
is solid, only UPB
problem with Torus and Apricot – both are being addressed. Biggest
issues – resources: we
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 638 p. 5 of 6]
need dedicated administrative support for SandyO’s group and should
add
al least one additional
AM for FG & DOS. We are missing opportunities. Ideally we hire a
Pakistani or Indian person.
France
Rumor has it that ailing Goupil is being bought by Siemens/Nixdorf
and Fujitsu is interested in
Siemens/Nixdorf who is hurting financially. Expect Goupil to ask for
min commit relief. ChrisA is
leaving the group to work for PascalM. He’s frustrated with running a
shrinking business. More
about this later.
Spain
Ignacio asked for resources to service Investronica who is getting
PCs through Chi Leog. I would
not recommend this. 30 OEM people are enough for his royalty business.
Holland
Tulip did not do a LAN Man deal because of our retail distribution.
They are considering dropping
OS/2 as well. (Want to buy FG instead). This would mean they can buy
LAN Man for direct
sales only according to our local policy. But Tulip sells through
resellers. Bernard, make sure we
do not cut a local deal which violates your policy.
Italy
Business is within expectations. Olivetti needs more attention as
you can see from their recent
letter. Maurb is going to get a fulltime AM in July – finally! He
should quit dealing in MSU issues
as well and I am unsure why he spends so much tone with BSA activities.
Their FG-DOS volume
is extremely low and time spent here might increase sales. We should
move Lorip into the
Redmond OEM group. 95% of her time is spent on Olivetti support.
Germany
Worse than Japan is my only comment:
In talking to CWedell and JoachenH, it is clear that they want to
replace Manfred, but this is not
enough. They just do not and cannot take on the number of customers
they need to serve. The
group’s admin sells FG-DOS over the phone and does not give sufficient
admin support to the rest
of the group which delays contracts by 3-6 months (no kidding!) and/or
delivers sloppy work.
With 20M$ business, they need one fulltime manager, four people plus a
dedicated admin. They
have 1/2 manager for OEM royalty business. 2 AMs and .25 of an Admin at
the most. During
mid-year review and additional HC was rejected – why? The same resource
shortage exists in
the FG-DOS sales team. They cannot serve 250 (going to 350) customers
with 2-3 people. It
takes at least 5-6 to serve and nurture them. This is a 20M$ business
on its own, why can’t
anybody else see this? The result is a demoralized sales force being
swamped with customer
request who are unable to respond timely and as a result only in
Germany does DRI has a
stronghold! Bernard please take note and decisive action!
OEM in Europe
A. Communication with customers needs to be improved by direct mail and
an installation of a FAX server service. At the same time. I see a need
for a semi-annual OEM briefing. We will start 05/31/91 – 12 months
between the US meeting and a stretched sales force just does not get
the job done.
B. OEM is seen as being a non-attractive group. Stock options are not
used properly to attract talent and keep it. Some people complained
that their increases and options were decided by local management who
does not understand or appreciate what the OEM sales people are doing.
Great input. I will insist for the next review not only to send you my
evaluation but close the loop to review what local management proposes.
Some people even thought that
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 638 p. 6 of 6]
reporting directly to Jeff would be the
best solution. I tend to agree, why not follow the ITIS/MSU model?
C. Because of our resource shortage we dont stand a chance to support
customers in special/key project situations. I will dedicate some HQ
marketing headcount immediately to work on some key project with
European customer and the product groups.
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 709 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 709 p. 1 of 4]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 709 p. 2 of 4]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 709 p. 3 of 4]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 709 p. 4 of 4]
[STAMPED] MS 0084769 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] EXH 47 DATE 5/17/[20]02 WITNESS Barrett MARY W. MILLER
>From bradsi Mon Apr 29 11:05:50 1991
To: bobgu davidcol philba tunbr
Subject: Re More Undocumented Windows
Date: Mon Apr 29 11:05:46 1991
totally agree, bob!
| > From bobgu Mon Apr 29 09:23:45 1991
| To: bradsi davidcol philba timbr
| Subject: Re: More Undocumented Windows
| Date: Mon Apr 29 09:18:35 1991
|
|
|
| | | Brad, one very major item I forgot in my previous list:
| | |
| | | Microsoft really need to publish the source code for all the
| | | built-in controls (EDIT, etc.), just like the source for
DefWindowProc
| | | was made available. It’s nearly impossible to subclass things in a
| | | rational way, because it’s difficult to tell how they implement
their
| | | behavior in tbe first place. This of course has been a common
complaint
| | | for years
|
| Call me paranoid, but the day we publish sources to the controls is
tbe day
| we can no longer enhance them. This isn’t just speculation. We have
has
| to add numerous work-arounds in our code to satisfy some app that has
| reverse-engineered some internal feature of a control and assumed
that it
| would never change.
|
| The basic question is how hard we want to push for a common user
interface
| vs the desire of ISV’s to create custom controls by hacking ours.
Hopefully,
| tbe AFX project will eliminate this problem.
|
|
| | | Frankly, I also think it would be useful to release in some wau
| | | the source code for various system utilities, such as Program
Manager,
| | | File Manager, Task Manager, etc. Perhaps Microsoft already does
this
| | | through “Microsoft University” courses? Actually, that would make
a very
| | | interesting and useful book, by tbe way, sort of along the lines
of tbe
| | | ‘Inside Windows* book you were discussing: a detailed walkthrough
of the
| | | source code for several key Windows components. Would be very
enlightening.
|
| The question here is when are we going to publish our shell API’s? To
date,
| all tbe “juicy” API’s needed to write a shell have been undocumented.
|
| Soap Box Statement
| ——————
| This group has been MUCH to lax when it comes to adding API in the
product.
| Both external and internal. We don’t do any sort of API policing
within
| the Group. ISV usability issues are rarely considered. For example,
the
| palette support API is a total mess because the developers doing the
work
| decided what the API would look like without regard to how the ISV
would use
| it. For undocumented API’s we add them at will without thinking about
| whether or not they should be documented. They are hacked in ugly
things
| that often eventually get documented. PrestoChangoSelector is one of
these.
| We need to do l better job at this.
|
################################################################### 6
>From bradsi Mon Apr 29 11:10:21 1991
To: jimall
Subject: Re: FW: Re: change in Win3.1
Date: Mon Apr 29 11:10:20 1991
thanks, i agree with ericr’s viewpoint. we should do it
right, if we can.
schedules for 3.1: will ship the same time, but we do have to fix
some additional things we hadn’t planned on.
################################################################### 7
>From bradsi Mon Apr 29 11:56:04 1991
To: bradc
Subject: Re: dos announce
Date: Mon Apr 29 11:56:03 1991
what do you think? i’d rather not send the whole development team.
but if they’d be very bummed then I’d reconsider, did the whole
developement
team go to the win announce?
################################################################### 8
>From bradsi Mon Apr 29 11:58:47 1991
To: pattys
Cc: jodys
Subject: ISV support issues
Date: Mon Apr 29 11:58:44 1991
good ideas!
| >From bobgu Mon Apr 29 11:20:34 1991
| To: bradsi
| Subject: ISV support issues
| Date: Mon Apr 29 11:16:03 1991
|
| There needs to be SENIOR developers/program managers in the Windows
group
| whose job it is to:
|
| – Act as PSS-Development intermediaries
| – Reduct the support overhead from developers
| – Feedback product weaknesses to development based
on ISV feedback
| – Work closely with User-Ed to create usefull manuals
| – Create real-world sample apps that do real things.
| – Monitor CompuServe and other popular BB’s to gleen
usefull information
|
| These people need to be free from any product responsibilities and be
100%
| totally focused on driving User-Ed and PSS to provide quality ISV
support.
| The reporting structure of these people has to be free and clear of
the
| groups that have product responsibilities. Take the past SDK groups as
| an example of what happens when ISV support people are a sub-group of
the
| retail product development group.
|
| It’s great to hear that you get 5 new heads to do things like this. I
hope
| they don’t get mired down in the political muck of getting a product
out
| the door.
|
| = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
|
| Now, here’s the real kicker – wouldn’t it be a good idea to have all
| of this in place and available for Win 4 by the time ISV’s started
using
| the product???!!!
|
| = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
|
|
| That’s all for now….
|
| -BobGu
|
################################################################### 9
>From bradsi Moo Apr 29 11:59:31 1991
To: bobgu
Subject: Re: ISV support issue
Date: Mon Apr 29 11:59:30 1991
great ideas. I’ve talked to pattys (gm pss) about having you
on the developers support strike team, and she agreed,
you should hear from her shortly (maybe today).
###################################################################
10
>From bradsi Moo Apr 29 12:00:30 1991
To: davidcol
Subject: some ideas
Date: Mon Apr 29 12:00:29 1991
| >From stewlc Mon Apr 29 11:29:41 1991
| To: bradsi steveb
| Subject: some ideas
| Date: Sun Apr 28 11:26:36 1991
|
| 1. To Improve Win3.1 Robustness:
|
| * Buy “Robustness” Tools
| Purchase a suite of Win backup/recovery tools from
Symantec
| or some other vendor and bundle with Win3.1.
|
| * Completely Eliminate the UAE Message.
| Replace it with a “Global Protection Fault” message
ala OS/2 2.0 so that we
| appear no worse than OS/2 2.0. Plus make attempts
it diagnosing
| the problem with a help dialog box. We will still
be inferior in that
| we require rebooting. But we will signal to users
that we’ve revamped our
| error handling, that the scheme is similar to OS/2
2.0’s, and
| that it is in some ways better because of our help
dialog.
|
|
| 2. To Discount the Better-Windows-than-Windows Claim:
|
| * Put in OS/2 2.0 and WLO-detection into Win3.1.
| If an app is WLO, then run it. If OS/2 2.0 exists
and the app is not
| a WLO app, then put up an error message indicating
that:
| – the app is not certified by MS
| – that it can be run at one’s own risk.
| Hard for IBM to make a Better Windows claim with
such a scheme in place.
|
| Once we detect the existence of OS/2 2.0, there may be other special
| warnings we can emit that highlight legitimate problems with Windows
apps
| running on top of OS/2 2.0. For example, a message, each time one
| prints, that says the the Windows and OS/2 printer models are
different
| and that output will be different between the two systems.
|
###################################################################
11
>From bradsi Mon Apr 29 12:04:17 1991
To: tunya
Subject: Re: DOS/Win and IBM
Date: Mon Apr 29 12:04:13 1991
a good sign
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 805 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 805 Page 1 of 8]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 805 Page 2 of 8]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 805 Page 3 of 8]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 805 Page 4 of 8]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 805 Page 5 of 8]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 805 Page 6 of 8]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 805 Page 7 of 8]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 805 Page 8 of 8]
[STAMPED] SIGNED ORIGINAL
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] AMENDMENT
[STAMPED] X 222282 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT NO 609 FOR IDENTIFICATION DATE: 5-4-98
RPTR: [initials]
[STAMPED] MS98 0186799 CONFIDENTIAL
AMENDMENT NUMBER 2
Dated July 1.1991
TO THE LICENSE AGREEMENT
Dated September 1,1990
Numbered G15-04271
for
Microsoft MS-DOS, Version 4.01
Microsoft Works, Version 2.O
Between
MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
a Delaware Corporation,
and
VOBIS DATA COMPUTER GMBH,
a German Corporation
Effective July 1.1991. the below signed parties agree that the
indicated portions of the above referenced License Agreement
(hereinafter the “Agreement”) are hereby amended by this instrurnent
(hereinafter the “Amendment”), as follows
1. Section 9, entitled
“TERM OF AGREEMENT”, is hereby amended and as amended shall read as
follows:
9. TERM OF AGREEMENT
Provided this Agreement has been
properly executed by COMPANY and by an officer of MS. the initial term
of this Agreement (“Initial Term”) shall run from the EFFECTIVE DATE
until the earlier of: (i) two (2) years from the end of the calendar
quarter in which COMPANY’s first shipment to a customer of any Product
for revenue occurs; or (ii) two (2) years and six (6) months from the
end of the calendar quarter during when the EFFECTIVE DATE occurs.
COMPANY shall give MS written notice of the first date of shipment of
any Product by COMPANY to a customer for revenue.
2. Section 20. entitled “PRIOR AGREEMENT”, is hereby added and as
added shall read as follows:
20. PRIOR AGREEMENT
Provided that, as of the EFFECTIVE
DATE of this Amendment. COMPANY has paid MS all amounts due under
G150-9325 dated December 1, 1989 between COMPANY and MS (hereinafter
the “PRIOR AGREEMENT”), and COMPANY has complied with all the terms and
conditions of PRIOR AGREEMENT:
a) COMPANY
shall receive a credit equal to: i) the minimum commitment payments
made by COMPANY pursuant to Exhibit B of the PRIOR AGREEMENT, minus ii)
the amount of said minimum commitment payments determined to represent
earned royalties in accordance with the PRIOR AGREEMENT. If earned
royalties exceed such minimum commitment payments there shallbe no
credit. If such minimum commitment payments exceed earned royalties,
the excess prepaid royalties shall be transferred to this Agreement and
shall be recoupable against earned royalties.
b) The PRIOR AGREEMENT
shal lbe deemed to be terminated as of the EFFECTIVE DATE hereof.
3. In Exhibit C3, the
table in subsection (a) of the ROYALTY PAYMENTS
AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS section is hereby amended and as amended
shall read as follows:
Customer
System Royalty
Rate ($US)
Exhibit
Ml $13.05
4. Exhibit C4 and C8 is
hereby amended and as amended shall read as set forth in the attached
Exhibit C4 and C8.
IN WITNESS THEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment as
of July ., 1991.All signed copies of theis Amendment shall deemed to be
originals.
| MICROSOFT CORPORATION |
VOBIS DATA COMPUTER GMBH |
|
| [signature]Joachim Kempin |
[signature] Theo Lieven |
|
|
| By |
By |
|
| Joachim Kempin |
Theo Lieven |
| Name (Print) |
Name (Print) |
|
| Vice President, OEM Sales |
General Manager |
| Title |
Title |
|
| 3/9/92 |
Dec. 27, 1991 |
| Date |
Date |
EXHIBIT C4
ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE VERSIONS
The Product described in Exhibit C3 (“Reference Exhibit”) shall
include the additional language versions identified below. COMPANY
shall license at most one language version of the Product for use on
each applicable CUSTOMER SYSTEM. COMPANY’S royalty obligations shall be
as set forth in the Reference Exhibit regardless of the language
version licensed with each applicable CUSTOMER SYSTEM. Notwithstanding
the preceding sentence, COMPANY shall pay MS an additional language
version royalty equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the royalty otherwise
payable to MS for each full or partial copy of each language version of
the Product identified below which is licensed or otherwise disposed of
by COMPANY
during the term of this Agreement. COMPANY thai report, on a language
version by language version basis, and pay such language version
royalties pursuant to and as part of its royalty payment and reporting
obligations under the Royalty Payments and Reporting Requirements
section of the Reference Exhibit. The Product Name and Associated
Trademark are, in all Language Versions listed below, the same as in
the Reference Exhibit
1. Language Version: Danish
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D701-2DK that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
2. Language Version: Dutch
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D701-2NL that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
3. Language Version: Finnish
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D701-2SF that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
4. Language Version: FRENCH
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D701-2F that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
5. Language Version: German
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D701-2D that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
6. Language Version: Italian
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D701-2I that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
7. Language Version: Norwegian
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D701-2N that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
8. Language Version: Portuguese
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D701-2P that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
9. Language Version: Russian
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D701-2SU that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
10. Language Version: Spanish
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D701-2E that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
11. Language Version: Swedish
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D701-2S that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
12. Language Version: Turkish
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D701-2TR that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
Exhibit to the License Agreement dated September 1,1990, between
MICROSOFT CORPORATION and
VOBIS DATA COMPUTER GMBH
02/26/91 0975L
EXHIBIT C8
ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE VERSIONS
The Product described in Exhibit C7 (“Reference Exhibit”) shall
include the addffioral language versions
identified below. COMPANY shall license at most one language version of
the Product for use on each
applicable CUSTOMER SYSTEM. COMPANY’S royalty obligations shall be as
set forth in the Reference
Exhibit regardless of the language version licensed with each
applicable CUSTOMER SYSTEM.
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, COMPANY shall pay MS an
additional language version royalty
equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the royalty otherwise payable to MS
for each full or partial copy of each
language version of the Product identified below which is licensed or
otherwise disposed of by COMPANY
during the term of this Agreement. COMPANY shall report, on a language
version by language version
basis, and pay such language version royalties pursuant to and as part
of its royalty payment and
reporting obligations under the Royalty Payments and Reporting
Requirements section of the Reference
Exhibit. The Product Name and Associated Trademark are, in all Language
Versions listed below, the
same as in the Reference Exhibit.
1. Language Version: Dutch
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D781-5NL that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
2. Language Version: French
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D781-5F that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
3. Language Version: German
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D781-5D that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
4. Language Version: Italian
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D781-5I that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
5. Language Version: Portuguese
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D781-5P that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
6. Language Version: Russian
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D781-5SU that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
7. Language Version: Spanish
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D781-5E that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
8. Language Version: Swedish
Product Deliverables:
(a) Product in Object Code Form
(b) Standard document in Series Number D781-5S that MS delivers with
the Product
Copyright Notice (if not completed, the Copyright Notice shall be as
set forth in the Reference Exhibit):
COPYRIGHT MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 1987 – 1990 . All rights reserved.
Exhibit to the License Agreement dated September 1,1990. between
MICROSOFT CORPORATION and
VOBIS DATA COMPUTER GMBH.
03/01/90 0975L
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 869 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 869 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 1 of 2
[STAMPED] Depo. Ex. 97
>From stevetho Fri Jul 26 13:48:24 1991
To: bradsi jancl janinah theresa
Cc: dand danq davidcol karlst philba ralphl
Subject: RE: FW: Re: Digital Research
Date: Fri Jul 26 14:47:37 PDT 1991
To say that we don’t support EMM for Win31 is one thing. To say that we
don’t support DR is quite another. They are OnLine customers. My job is
to support our customers to the best of my ability.
This is the same situation we were in when IBM sent in certain
unfavorable questions. We better start drawing the line as to WHAT we
support, not who. As long as these companies are our customer we owe
them the best support possible. If we’re not going to support them,
somebody ought to tell them that.
Telling DR that we won’t support them because they’re not an offical
[sic] beta site buys us some time but when 3.1 is released we’ll have
to come up with another excuse. I’d like to be prepared when that time
comes. Can we get a decision on this soon — please!
Steve
>From janineh Fri Jul 26 13:53:34
1991
To: bradsi
Cc: dand danq daavidcol karlst philba ralph1 stevetho
Subject: FW: Re: Digital Research
Date: Fri Jul 26 14:01:26 1991
I’ve talked w/ Steve Thompson. DRI was notified by a Win 3.1 Beta
tester that it wasn’t working w/ DR-DOS. Steve will tell them that he
can’t help them because they aren’t in the beta program and because we
don’t answer beta questions via regular Online accts. This is a
consistent message we have been telling anyone asking 3.1 questions via
regular online. If they ask to be in the beta, we will just tell them
the standard answer, write or fax Windows Beta.
As a follow-up I’m going to work w/ both Dand and Danq about people on
the black list.
Janine
>From bradsi Fri Jul 26 11:49:39 1991
To: davidcol karlst philba ralph1
Cc: Kalak [indistinct]
Subject: Re: Digital Research
Date: Fri, 26 Jul 91 11:47:21 PDT
How does DRI have Win 3.1 in the FIRST PLACE?????????????? They are on
the beta blacklist!!
Is the report from DR or a customer who is a beta tester of 3.1 who
also uses dr dos?
>From ralphl Fri Jul 26 10:26:22 1991
To: bradsi
Subject: Digital Research
Date: Fri Jul 26 10:25:45 1991
What is our position wrt helping DR with problems?
>From danq Fri Jul 26 08:48:26 1991
To: greglo ralph1
Cc: marthawb [indistinct] neilsa stevetho
Subject: Re: Loadhi.VxD – Digital Research
Date: Fri Jul 26 08:46:47 PDT 1991
Greg or Ralph,
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1178475 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X 584927 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] EXH 38 DATE 5/17/[20]02 WITNESS Barrett MARY W. MILLER
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 401 C. A. No 2:96CV645E
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 869 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 2 of 2
Didn’t I hear a comment one day in
either of your offices re this. What should we tell DR
Thanks,
Dan
>From stevetho Thu Jul 25 11:20:41 1991
To: danq neilsa
Cc: marthawb
Subject: Re: Loadhi.VxD – Digital Research
Date: Thu Jul 25 11:17:03 PDT 1991
These guys need to know what they need to do to get their memory
manager to work in 3.1
Dan- Do you know where we can get this info?
Thanks,
Steve
>From neilsa Mon Jul 22 12:56:59 1991
To: danq stevetho
Cc: marthawb
Subject: Re: Loadhi.VxD – Digital Research
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 91 12:55:56 SPD
There is no loadhi VxD available for Win31 because that functionality
has been built directly into VMM. The old VxD should detect this and
not load on a 3.1 system, which is how it should be. So it’s hard to
say what problem they are having…
I do know that there were problems with OEMM in this area, but I’m not
privy to that information…
>From stevetho Mon Jul 22 11:25:51
1991
To: danq
Cc: marthawb neilsa
Subject: Loadhi.VxD – Digital Research
Date: Mon Jul 22 11:25:09 PDT 1991
Hey dude,
A few months ago Neil helped DR with a Loadhi problem with Windows.
Well, they got everything working for 3.0 but now they say they break
in 3.1. Can you find out if there’s a new Loadhi we can ship?
Thanks,
Steve
[STAMPED] X 584928 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1178476 CONFIDENTIAL
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 874 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 874 Page 1 of 1]
######################################################## 240
>From bradsi Mon Jul 29 07:29:48 1991
To: karlst philba ralphl steveb
Subject: Re: Digital Research
Date: Mon 29 Jul [19]91 07:29:40 PDT
you bet. dri is in on the dos/win blacklist. nothing gets shipped
from this BU without the blacklist being checked.
i made it clear to the online guys that windows supports ms dos 3.1 and
above. we are not to help dri. I will also talk to pattys
about this.
in this case, a 3.1 beta tester discovered that drdos doesn’t work with
win 3.1 so called dr for help. dr called us for help on online.
the online guys wanted to help, because “dr is a paying customer”. i
told them no.
From steveb Sun Jul 28 21:35:21 1991
To: bradsi karlst philba ralphl
Subject: Digital Research
Date: Sun Jul 28 21:35:18 1991
bard [sic, “brad”] pls make sure we are not supporting DRI anywhere in
the company with this stuff thx
######################################################## 241
>From bradsi Mon Jul 29 07:35:30 1991
To: jancl pattys
Subject: Digital Research
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 91 07:35:27 PDT
We should not be providing Digital Research any assistance getting
their os to work with our software. Our software supports ms dos, not
dr dos. It’s completely up to them to figure out and resolve any
problems that may occur.
Just recently, a situation came up where a win 3.1 beta tester
discovered that dr dos doesn’t work with win 3.1 and called dr for
help. DR submitted an SR to their online account, and the techs were
dutifully following up very conscientiously. We are not to help them,
paying customer or not. Windows supports MS-DOS and PC-DOS 3.1 and
above.
Thanks.
######################################################## 242
>From bradsi Mon Jul 29 07:36:48 1991
To: philba tomle
Subject: nigelt
Date: Mon 29 Jul [19]91 07:36:45 PDT
the nt guys had big problems with nigel. please talk to paulma to
understand what happened. I will do the same when I get back.
######################################################## 243
>From bradsi Mon Jul 29 07:43:15 1991
To: russs
Subject: Re: FW: Intelligence on Novell-DR DOS deal
Date: Mon, 29 Jul [19]91 07:43:13 PDT
thanks
the tough question in all this is whether novell’s intentions are
offensive or defensive. there are signs of both. some
novell people (and market watchers) are saying defensive. other
statements by novell, including darrell miller, clearly are offensive
(control of the desktop).
[STAMPED] EXH 8 DATE 2/13/[20]02 WITNESS Silverberg MARY W. MILLER
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1178530 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS 5050789 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 407 C.A. No. 2:96CV645B
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 959A Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 959A Gordon v. Microsoft p. 1 of 2
To: winbug
Cc: bambi scottq lawren
Subject: Bambi:&DR DOS 6.0, many files turned into crosslinked mess
Windows Bug Report
Title:
Bambi:&DR DOS 6.0, many files turned into crosslinked mess
Opened By: lawren
Sev: 1
WinVer: 3.10 47
Product: Drivers
Area: Bambi
Origin: Internal
Sugg. Assign: scottq
DOSVer: 6.00
Mode: high
Name: Phone:
Problem Statement:
Had run fine other times. Did a “DIR” and I got garbage characters.
Chkdsk found well over 100 files with crosslinked files, invalid
clusters, and invaild [sic] & incorrect lengths.
Machine Configuration:
Cumulus 386 2M VGA
Config.Sys:
Autoexec.Bat:
Form #; SYS003 Version #:
2.00 Revision Date: 08/22/[19]91
################################################################## 476
>From karlst Thu Sep 19 11:55:06 1991
To: steveti
Cc: bradsi philba
Subject: jeanp/vacation
Date: Thu Sep 19 11:34:54 1991
I believe we’ve settled the issue with jeanp regarding his vacation.
Don’t call him. Kudos to bradsi for making this happen
################################################################## 477
>From philba Thu Sep 19 11:58:17 1991
To: lawren
Cc: bambi bradsi lawren scottq
Subject: Re: Bambi:&DR DOS 6.0, many files turned into crosslinked
mess
Date: Thu, 19 Sep [19]91 11:34:11 PDT
[STAMPED] MS 5055905 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 479A C.A. No. 2:96CV645B
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1195217 CONFIDENTIAL
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 959A Gordon v. Microsoft p. 2 of 2
tee hee hee…thats [sic] what you get for running an incompatible OS
sorry, I couldnt’ resist. Scott, let’s figure this out asap – could be
a problem thats [sic] lurking for real DOS.
>From lawren Thu Sep 19 11:34:15 1991
To: winbug
Cc: bambi scottq lawren
Subject: Bambi:&DR DOS 6.0, many files turned into crosslinked mess
Windows Bug Report
Title: Bambi:&DR DOS 6.0, many files turned into crosslinked mess
Opened By: lawren
Sev: 1
WinVer 3.10 47
Product: Drivers
Area: Bambi
Origin: Internal
Sugg.Assign: scottq
DOSVer: 6.00
Mode: high
Name: Phone:
Problem Statement: Had run fine other times. Did a “DIR” and I
got garbage characters. Chkdsk found well over 100 files with
crosslinked files, invalid clusters, and invalid & incorrect
lengths.
Machine Configuration: Cumulus 386 2M VGA
Config.Sys:
Autoexec.Bat:
Form #: SYS 003 Version #: 2.00 Revision Date: 08/22/[19]91
####################################################### 478
>From greglo Thu Sep 19 12:10:11 1991
To: bradsi
Subject: Re: bambi
Date: Thu, 19 Sep [19]91 12:05:40 PDT
The new WzMail version (which uses the WinMail document handling
routines rather than the ancient DH library) also gives you a huge perf
boost. If you use WzMail you want it.
[STAMPED] MS 5055906 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1195218 CONFIDENTIAL
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 979 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 979 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 1 of 2
[HANDWRITTEN] Non-responsive material redacted
######################################################## 603
>From bradsi Sat Sep 28 10:54:53 1991
To: joachimk peterbra steveb
Cc: alexn jeffl jonro markbu richab richardf ronh teresach
Subject: Re: Compaq Windows status
Date: Sat, 28 Sep [19]91 10:54:43 PDT
you’re asying [sic, prob. “saying”] that when someone buys compaq dos
for $99, they also get windows for free. but if you want windows
alone, it cost you $150
and compaq wants windows for free
am I missing something why this is good for us?
don’t forget that today, retail is still 61% of windows revenue.
######################################################## 604
>From bradsi Sat Sep 28 11:23:54 1991
To: philba
Subject: Re: dr
Date: Sat, 28 Sep [19]91 11:23:53 PDT
let’s talk.
>From philba Sat Sep 28 10:59:13 1991
To: bradsi
Cc: karlst
Subject: Re: dr
Date: Thu 26 Sep [19]91 10:45:39 PDT
Sorry for the silence — dont [sic] interpret it as ignoring you.
The approach that ralph and I have discussed is to use a vxd to extend’
dos by patching it. In this case, we would create a subfunction in the
findfirst/findnext family — findabunch to allow filemanager to make a
single call to get directory information. We would not patch unknown
OSs and most likely would only patch MS DOS 5.x. The big advantage here
is that it provides a legitimate performance improvement.
However, it won’t prevent us from running on foriegn [sic] OSs (unless
we explicitly decide to refuse to run) — they just wont [sic] run as
fast.
This hasn’t been implemented yet and to be honest it sends a mixed
message about project team focus. The work necessary would be 3 days of
ralphl’s time to implement and then a somewhat open-ended use of it by
various components. We definitely want to do winfile and user file list
box. Neither of which is a huge amount of time (1-2 days each to
implement and thoroughly test). The network guys may want to implement
this in their redir.
[STAMPED] DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 1114
[STAMPED] MS 0098698 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0181665 CONFIDENTIAL
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 979 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 2 of 2
Is this the approach you want to take?
Or would you prefer a simple check and refuse to run? That’s a lot
easier but clearly quite defeatable. I’ll come and talk to you about it.
>From bradsi Fri Sep 27 22:44:35 1991
To: philba
Subject: dr
Date: Fri Sep 27 22:44:10 1991
can you tell me specifically what we’re going to do to bind ourselves
closer to ms dos? since you haven’t been replying to my messages,
I do n’t [sic] know how to interprety [sic] your silence. Let me
emphasize the importance: ibm is going to annoucne [sic] the drdos deal
at comdex (almost 100% certain).
OK?
####################################################### 605
>From bradsi Sat Sep 28 11:35:49 1991
To: joachimk peterbra steveb
Cc: alexn jeffl jonro markbu richab richardf ronh teresach
Date: Sat, 28 Sep [19]91 11:35:40 PDT
we cannot have compaq sell Win+OS product that is cheaper than what we
sell windows alone for. even if it’s [sic] works just on compaq
machines, we thus tell the market that we are dramatically overcharging
for windows. and our retail business goes down the tubes.
if they want to offer their dos, which includes windows,
for $200, then we’re talking.
yes, I want the compaq business but not to give to them for nothing and
kill my retail business, too.
they realize they are falling behind and they have to do something to
fix it.
####################################################### 606
>From bradsi Sat Sep 28 11:40:25 1991
To: karlst lisacr
Subject: Re: file open/save as changing dir behavior
Date: Sat, 28 Sep [19]91 11:40:23 PDT
ok. include 123/w. let us know.
####################################################### 607
>From bradsi Sat Sep 28 11:42:13 1991
To: jimall paulma
Subject: RE sys mgt
Date: Sat, 28 Sep [19]91 11:42:11 PDT
ok they are yours.
the winlogin schedule has always been dec-jan. should finish dec
but if it stretches into jan, you shouldn’t count on them jan 1.
>From jimall Sat Sep 28 11:39:04 1991
To: bradsi paulma
Subject: RE: sys mgt
Date: Sat Sep28 11:38:38 PDT 1991
I have been assuming ericpe was coming to win4 by year end. It
sounds like this winlogin is slipping. I will be happy to take
tedst too.
jim
>From bradsi Fri Sep 27 10:10:57 1991
To: jimall paulma
Subject: sys mgt
Date: Fri, 27 Sep [19]91 10:08:19 PDT
[STAMPED] MS 0098699 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0181666 CONFIDENTIAL
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 981 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 981 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 1 of 2
* Do we want to do a [sic] IBM only
Slick for new HW? Makes sense to me. This is straight forwared using
approach I’ve outlines [sic] for our OEM Packaged Product (and the work
to do this is only a minor increment over what we’re already planning
on doing for the generic packaged product).
Lest there be objections, I intend to have Davebe start on OEM DOS
Setup changed to support OEM Packaged Slick product as soon as some
cycles free up (but lower priority than DOS 5.0a).
Comments?
Eric.
######################################################## 323
>From mackm Mon Sep 30 08:10:33 1991
To: bens raype
Cc: bradsi
Subject: FW: david bernard
Date: Mon Sep 30 08:13:27 PDT 1991
Good News! Thanks Brad.
>From bradsi Fri Sep 27 13:59:53 1991
To: lynner mackm
Subject: david bernard
Date: Fri, 27 Sep [19]91 13:58:11 PDT
finally talked to him. he’s going to try to come out end of next week.
We are still a bit apart on salary, I didn’t up it. I only want to do
that once and close him on the spot. Hopefully that can happen next
week.
######################################################## 324
>From alexn Mon Sep 30 08:11:16 1991
To: ericst
Cc: bradsi jonro
Subject: FW: oem weekly
Date: Sun Sep 29 08:10:02 PDT 1991
Can we meet this week to get the first issue defined and initiated? I
am out of town tomorrow, but back in for the rest of the week.
How does Wednesday look?
>From bradsi Sat Sep 28 13:08:11 1991
To: alexn ericst
Cc: davidcol richt tomle
Subject: oem weekly
Date: Sat, 28 Sep [19]91 13:05:57 PDT
would be nice to get this started and keep it going on a weekly basis.
thanks.
######################################################## 325
>From philba Mon Sep 30 08:15:02 1991
To: bradsi
Cc: davidcol
Subject: Bambi on DR-DOS 6.0
Date: Sat, 28 Sep [19]91 07:57:50 PDT
heh, heh, heh….
my proposal is to have bambi refuse on this alien OS. comments?
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1179289 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS 0098785
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 504 C.A. No. 2:96CV645B
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 981 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 2 of 2
>From chuckst Sun Sep 29 17:16:46 1991
To: mikedr philba scottq
Subject: Bambi on DR-DOS 6.0
Date: Sun Sep 29 17:16:39 1991
I tracked down a serious incompatibility with DR-DOS 6 — They don’t
use the ‘normal’ device driver interface for >32M partitions.
Instead of setting the regular START SECTOR field to 0ffffh and then
using a brand new 32-bit field the way MS-DOS has always done, they
simply extended the start sector field by 16 bits.
This seems like a foolish oversight on their part and will likely
result in extensive incompatibilities when they try to run with 3rd
part[y] device drivers.
I’ve patched a version of Bambi to work with DRD6, and it seems to run
Win 3.1 without difficulty. This same problem may have caused other
problems with Win 3.1 and the swapfile under DRD6.
It is possible to make Bambi work, assuming we can come up with a
reasonably safe method for detecting DRD6. The runtime hit would be
minimal in time and space, although we would have a couple of
instructions in the main code path for checking the ‘special’ DRD6 flag.
What do we think? Should we test further with the patched Bambi to see
if there are any more incompatibilities????
####################################################### 326
>From philba Mon Sep 30 08:16:27 1991
To: bradsi davidw
Subject: Re: Intel/Dell Frame Buffer Windows Video Driver
Date: Sat, 28 Sep [19]91 08:02:47 PDT
hmm, putting 2 and 2 together. He has been around a lot lately.
Brad, FredE is Fred Einstein who wrote the original (and highly buggy)
8514 driver and is not held [in] high regard by many windows developers.
>From davidw Sun Sep 29 21:20:00 1991
To: bradsi philba
Subject: Intel/Dell Frame Buffer Windows Video Driver
Date: Sun 29 Sep [19]91 21:19:55 PDT
(i haven’t gone through all of my email yet, but …)
why does this have frede written all over it?
david
>From philba Fri Sep 27 09:47:43 191
never heard of it.
>From bradsi Fri Sep 27 09:33:22
1991
know anything about this?
>From carls Fri Sep 27 09:26:40 1991
I just saw some email that Intel is having some problems with a Windows
driver for the joint Intel/Dell video frame buffer. I don’t know if
this is for Windows generally or just for the Multi-media extensions.
This is where Intel/Dell hired MCS to do the driver.
We are having an exec meeting at 11am. It would be best if Billg and
Bradsi understood the issues prior to 11am so that we can respond to
either complaints or requests for help. Please send mail on the status
of this.
####################################################### 327
[STAMPED] MS 0098786 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1179290 CONFIDENTIAL
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 984 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 984 Page 1 of 1]
buggy) 8514 driver and is not held high regard by many windows
developers.
> From davidw Sun Sep 29 21:20:00 1991
To: bradsi philba
Subject: Intel/Dell Frame Buffer Windows Video Driver
Date: Sun 29 Sep [19]91 21:19:55 PDT
(i haven’t gone through all of my email yet, but …)
why does this have [indistinct. “freda”?] written all over it?
david
>From philba Fri Sep 27 09:47:43 1991
never heard of it.
>From bradsi Fri Sep 27 09:33:22 1991
know anything about this?
>From carts Fri Sep 27 09:26:40 1991
I just saw some email that Intel [indistinct] is having some problems
with a Windows driver for the joint Intel [indistinct]/Dell video frame
buffer. I don’t know if this is for Windows generally or just for the
Multi-media extensions. This is where Intel/Dell hired MCS to do the
driver.
We are having an exec meeting at 11 am. I twould be best if Billg and
Bradsi understood the Issues prior to 11 am so that we can respond to
either complaints or requests for help. Please send mail on the status
of this.
######################################################## 327
>From davidcol Mon Sep 30 08:16:28 1991
To: bradsi philba
Subject: Bambi on DR-DOS 6.0
Date: Mon Sep 30 08:15:57 1991
It should say unsupported version of DOS.
######################################################## 328
From: karlst Mon Sep 30 08:20:17 1991 [Hour of day is indistinct, might
be 06 instead of 08]
To: win31dev winprog
Cc: bradsi jobren [indistinct] philba
Subject: HOTLIST SUSPENDED
Date: Mon Sep 30 08:18:03 1991 [Hour of day is indistinct, might be 06
instead of 08]
[STAMPED] MS 5054012 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1143027 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] EXH 13 DATE 5/17/[20]02 WITNESS Barrett MARY W. MILLER
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 985 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 985 Page 1 of 1]
[Printed text.]
“We are suppose[d] to give the user the option of continuing after the
warning. However, we should surely crash at some
point shortly later.” – and yet Opera continues to spread their FUD
about MSN sending bad data to Opera browsers…
————————————
Depo. Ex. 1722
message during copy files marcw, andyhi
swapfile rework
craigc
machine config. tuning paulke
lim compatibility work mikecole
dlg for setup from windows marcw
USER work:
SendMessage revalidation mikesch
Log error conditions sankar
gp fault cleanup
neilk
layer size, speed opts neilk
Fix edit ctrl msgs
sankar
change api’s – hInst/hMod jeffbog
Local memory validation jont
GDI/T2 work
VDMX support
gunterz, jeanp
Font file preload
amitc
Cleanup font cache code gunterz
Finish remove glbl lock kensy, davidw,
amitc
Complete Fontmapper work davidw
Other Critical Work
Bambi in build 50
philba
p.s. By now, everyone should have seen rickem’s mail regarding
PUCUS. We’ll need to spend some time today fixing our source tree
after Friday’s
crash.
####################################################### 329
>From davidcol Mon Sep 30 08:24:05 1991
To: karlst philba
Subject: supported DOSes
Cc: bradsi
Date: Mon Sep 30 06:23:47 1991
It’s pretty clear we need to make sure Windows 3.1 only runs on top of
MS DOS or an OEM version of it. I checked with legal, and they
are working up some text we are suppose[sic] to display if someone
tries to setup or run Windows on a[sic] alien operating system.
We are suppose[sic] to give the user the option of continuing after the
warning. However, we should surely crash at some point shortly
later.
Now to the point of this mail. How shall we proceed on the issue of
making sure Win 3.1 requires MS DOS. We need to have some pretty
fancy internal checks to make sure we are on the right one. Maybe
there are several very sophisticated checks so the competitors get put
on a treadmill. Aaronr had
some pretty wild ideas after 3 or so beers, earleh has some too.
We need to make sure this doesn’t distract the team for a couple of
reasons 1) the pure distraction factor 2) the less people know
about exactly what gets done, the better.
Please advise.
####################################################### 330
>From paulma Mon Sep 30 08:29:45 1991
To: carriet
Subject: Harel Kodesh
Cc: andyp bradsi daveth, karenh(?) nathanm(?)
Date: Mon Sep 30 08:29:22 1991
This is a good guy whom I know who works at Motorola Mobile Data in
Bothell. He is a D12/D13 developer/development manager – smart and
lots of energy.
He is tired of “six sigma” bureaucracy at Motorola, and [sic:in] fact
that Moto as a company is strapped for cash to invest in its[sic]
products – so he is looking at offers from Slate and Rational in the
Bay Area. He
_Gates_
[STAMPED] DEPOSITION EXHIBIT _84_ 2/28/02
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1179299 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS 0098788 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 510 C.A. No. 2:96CV645B
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 990 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 990 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 1 of 2
time and effort needed to become productive with their computers.
“Microsoft is committed to supporting our
users who choose the Macintosh and CD-ROM as part of their computing
environment,” said Mike Maples, senior vice president of applications
for Microsoft. “With this updated CD-ROM version of The Microsoft
Office, we are providing users with an efficient way of getting the
applications they need for professional and personal use.”
CD-ROM Version Provides Extra Benefits for Users
Because these four applications are
included on one compact disc, installing them on the machines becomes a
very easy task — simply run the installation programs right from the
CD; no more switching floppy disks in and out.
In addition, the storage capabilities of
CD-ROM allow the documentation to be included on the disc. This means
users do not have to take the time to search their offices for product
manuals, then scan through the manuals looking for the answers. They
can access all of the information online — as they need it. (Hard
copies of all documentation are available from Microsoft upon request
for $15.50 plus tax.) Another benefit of CD-ROM is the audio segments
that are included throughout the online documentation. These spoken
tutorials talk users through a process while they watch what is
happening on the computer screen.
System Requirements, Pricing and Availability
The Microsoft Office on CD-ROM will be
available in early October 1991. Version 1.5 has a suggested retail
price of $750 from now until December 31, 1991. Registered users of
version 1.0 may upgrade to version 1.5 for $129. (All prices listed are
U.S. suggested retail prices.)
The CD-ROM version of The Microsoft Office
for the Macintosh requires a Macintosh Plus, Classic, LC, SE, or
II-family with an Apple or compatible CD-ROM drive; at least 2 MB of
RAM; and System 6.0.4 or higher. Microsoft Mail is compatible with
AppleShareR and EtherTalkR, and requires an AppleTalk or compatible
local area network. Additional Microsoft Mail server software must be
purchased seperately to use the workstation version included on the CD.
Microsoft Corporation (NASDAQ “MSFT”)
develops, markets and supports a wide range of microcomputer software
for business and professional use, including operating systems, network
products, languages and applications, as well as books, hardware and
CD-ROM products for the microcomputer marketplace.
########
Microsoft and PowerPoint are registered trademarks of Microsoft
Corporation. Apple, AppleTalk, AppleShare, EtherTalk and Macintosh are
registered
trademarks of Apple Computer, Inc.
####################################################### 441
>From scottq Mon Sep 30 17:48:06 1991
To: bradsi
Subject: bambi
Date: Mon Sep 30 17:48:00 1991
How do you power-down your machine at
night? If you are running windows and you power down, you will probably
get lost clusters with or without bambi loaded.
Also, you will get lost clusters if you use
local reboot.
Scott
####################################################### 442
>From markp Mon Sep 30 17:53:55 1991
To: a-long bradsi brentk chrisg davidds davidtry jodyg johnen jont
neilk richp richsa sandeeps(?) steveja terrib(?)
Cc: a-janj georga(?)
Subject: Re: bambi v.35
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 91 17:53:27 PDT
Where is it, Jody?
[STAMPED] MS 5049397 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1143037 CONFIDENTIAL
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 990 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 2 of 2
>From jodyg Mon Sep 30 17:39:11 1991
To: a-long bradsi brentk chrisg davidds davidtry johnen jontmarkp neilk
richp richsa sandeeps steveja terrib
Cc: a-janj georga
Subject: bambi v.35
Date: Mon Sep 30 17:38:53 1991
You should update to the new version.
>From scottq Mon Sep 30 17:27:56 1991
To: bambi georgef
Subject: bambi v.35
Date: Mon Sep 30 17:27:02 1991
Bambi v.35 has passed developer testing. The primary change fixes a
major problem with accessing logical units on external hard disks.
Also, DR DOS is detected (needs testing!) and bambi refuses to load.
Finally, ignore was removed from the pop-up dialog box.
Scott
[handwritten:] Privileged material redacted
[STAMPED] MS 5049398 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1143038 CONFIDENTIAL
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 1048 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1048 Gordon v. Microsoft p. 1 of 1
>From bradsi Tue Oct 29 13:40:01 1991
To: davidcol(?) philba
Subject: DR and Win 3.1
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 91 13:40:01 PST
looks like dr-dos works with win 3.1.
>From richf Tue Oct 29 12:21:15 1991
To: bradc bradsi
Subject: DR and Win 3.1
Date: Tue Oct 29 13:20:30 PDT 1991
I loaded DR 6 on my own system about a week ago and have been using it
since. Although I was unable to get Windows to run in enhanced mode
using DR’s EMM386.SYS, I do run it using HIDOS.SYS, their equivalent
to himem. So while I have no UMB support, it doesn’t matter much since
I use all Win apps. I was also able to run standard mode using
HIDOS.SYS.
I haven’t had any UAE or crashing problems of note. The only
difference, which I haven’t tested so I can’t confirm, seems to be
that printing from Winword 2 is much slower than it was under MS-DOS 5.
In short, I haven’t seen any basic kernel incompatibilities.
####################################################### 49
>From bradsi Tue Oct 29 13:40:21 1991
To: bradc richf
Subject: Re: DR and Win 3.1
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 91 13:40:21 PST
which version of win 3.1?
>From richf Tue Oct 29 12:21:15 1991
To: bradc bradsi
Subject: DR and Win 3.1
Date: Tue Oct 29 13:20:30 PDT 1991
I loaded DR 6 on my own system about a week ago and have been using it
since. Although I was unable to get Windows to run in enhanced mode
using DR’s EMM386.SYS, I do run it using HIDOS.SYS, their equivalent
to himem. So while I have no UMB support, it doesn’t matter much since
I use all Win apps. I was also able to run standard mode using
HIDOS.SYS.
I haven’t had any UAE or crashing problems of note. The only
difference, which I haven’t tested so I can’t confirm, seems to be
that
printing from Winword 2 is much slower than it was under MS-DOS 5.
In short, I haven’t seen any basic kernel incompatibilities.
####################################################### 50
>From bradsi Tue Oct 29 13:45:26 1991
To: steveb
Subject: 6.167
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 91 13:45:26 PST
i played with it for about 45 min this morning. it’s quite easy to
crash, even hard hang that requires a power cycle. lots of “uae”s.
still has a long way to go stability wise. though they have clearly
made a lot of progress since the last drop we had. the workplace shell
is useble[sic] and win apps do run, mostly. easy to run out of memory
doing simple things, and it was on a 9M machine.
one nice thing is that way to config a dos vm. i’ll make sure the dos
guys have a look.
####################################################### 50
>From bradsi Tue Oct 29 13:46:48 1991
To: bradc mackm(?) mikedr tomle
Subject: os2 2.0 6.167
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 91 13:46:47 PST
it’s running in chrissh’s perf lab. check it out. the nice thing is the
way the[sic] let you config a dos vm, essentially managing the
config.sys in a dialog box.
[STAMPED] Depo. Ex. 970
[STAMPED] EXH 26 DATE 5/17/[20]02 WITNESS Barrett MARY W. MILLER
[STAMPED] MS 5065665 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1179419 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 543 C.A. No. 2:96CV645B
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 1077 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1077 Page 1 of 3]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1077 Page 2 of 3]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1077 Page 3 of 3]
[STAMPED] CONFIDENTIAL
[hand-written] Non-responsive Material Redacted
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 563 CA. No. 2:96CV645B
[STAMPED] X0592196
[Page Footer] WinMail 1.21 philba
Tue Feb 23 16:49:36 1993 Page:
160
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1179462 CONFIDENTIAL
>From chuckst Wed Nov 6 18:38:46 1991
To: philba
Cc: scottq
Subject: Scott’s 9/30/31 mail re: DRDOS
Date: Tue Feb 23 17:07:06 PDT 1993
| >From scottq Mon Sep 30 13:57:38 1991
| To: dosdev
| Subject: detect dr dos 6.0
| Date: Mon Sep 30 13:50:35 1991
|
| Does anybody know bow to detect dr dos 6.0? Bambi will not
| run properly on dr dos 6.0 because of a quirk in their device driver
| handling, so we need to detect them.
|
| Scott
|
Prom chuckst Wed Nov 6 18:40:05 1991
To: philba
Cc: scottq
Subject: More Bambi/DR-DOS mail
Date: Tue Feb 23 17:07:11 PDT 1993
| >From chuckst Sun Sep 29 17:IS:46 1991
| To: mikedr philba scottq
| Subject: Bambi on DR-DOS 6.0
| Date: Sun Sep 29 17:16:39 1991
|
| I tracked down a serious incompatibility with DR-DOS 6 — They don’t
use
| the “normal” device driver interface for >32M partitions. Instead
of
| setting the regular START SECTOR field to Offffh and then using a
brand
| new 32-bit field the way MS-DOS has always done, they simply extended
| the start sector field by 16 bits.
|
| This seems like a foolish oversight on their part and will likely
result
| in extensive incompatibilities when they try to run with 3rd part
device
| drivers.
|
| I’ve patched a version of Bambi to work with DRD6, and it seems to run
| Win 3.1 without difficulty. This same problem may have caused other
| problems with Win 3.1 and the swapfile under DRD6.
|
| It is possible to make Bambi work, assuming we can come up with a
| reasonably Bafe method for detecting DRD6. The runtime hit would
| be minimal in time and space, although we would have a couple of
| instructions in the main code path for checking the ‘special’ DRD6
| flag.
|
| What do we think? Should we test further with the patched Bambi to
| see if there are any more incompatibilities????
|
>From cfauckst Wed Nov 6 18:55:00 1391
To: philba scottq
Subject.: Bambi/DRDS mail from 10/16/91
Date: Tue Feb 23 17:07:22 PDT 1993
This is the mail which announced the fixing of the ‘bug’
which had previously prevented DRD6 form working, As of this
point, the DRD6 check could have been removed.
I recall pointing this out, but can’t seem to find any
email to that effect. I’m sure I pointed it out verbally,
and also made a notation in the RAID entry on the 3.31 bug.
It is still possible that there was a piece of email which
I sent through. XENIX and failed to cc myself on.
| >From scrottq Wed Oct 15 19:47:12 1991
| To: bambi georgef sankaz
| Subject: smartdrv 4.0.052
| Date: Wed Oct 16 16:54:23 1991
|
|
| Smartdrv 4.0.052 has passed developer resting and can be found on
| \\triskal\scratch\bamabi\smartdrv.exe
|
| Changes include fixes for dos 3.1 floppy handling, big foot packets
| on dos 3.x, and various and sundry bug fixes.
|
| Scott
|
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 1130 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1130 Page 1 of 1]
To: winwar
Subject: 286
Date: Mon Dec 2 22:36:29 1991
?: 20434 512/Comments, etc.
30-Nov-91 10:38:12
Sb: Build 58 is RAM-hungry !
Fm: Tanj Bennett 70642,1211
To: sysop (X)
I fired up build 58 on a 286 and noticed that it eats a lot more
RAM than 3.0 used to. 3.0 gave around 1.5M available memory on a 2M
machine,
while build 58 is down to 1.07M. How representative is this of the
final shipping
version? Your docs indicate this build is supposed to be a trial run at
the
real thing.
I`m surprised to see a 400kb hit, roughly 100% growth when you consider
DOS accounts for some of the memory. What features of 3.1 caused the
growth in RAM usage ?
####################################################### 220
>From bradsi Tue Dec 3 10:25:49 1991
To: donc winwar
Cc: bobgu bobt jont timbr
Subject: Re: Borland and Toolhelp
Date: Tue, 03 Dec 91 10:25:55 PST
if we break their apps when we install, it will serve them right. guess
they took the approach of shoot first, explain later.
####################################################### 221
>From philba Tue Dec 3 10:28:29 1991
To: bradsi tomle(?)
Cc: mackm(?)
Subject: Re: slick
Date: Tue, 03 Dec 91 10:25:26 PST
Current plan shows development in Jan/Feb, testing in Feb/Mar and beta
test in Mar/Apr so its[sic] got to be available before mid feb for the
beta test.
Davebe is looking into the resource issue now. I told him that he can
evaluate the schedule and tell me what makes sense. It may make sense
to add another body and do some preliminary work for 6.0 to be more
efficient.
Diversion or intermediate point? Probably a little of both.
The objective of msdos/windows merge is to combine win 3.1 and msdos
5.0(b?) into a single package with a seamless install. I believe that
(“(b?)” is part of actual text.) there will be a fair amount of code
that could be reused and certainly the team will learn a lot that will
transfer to 6.0. Come on up and I’ll be glad to further expound on
these topics.
>From tomle Tue Dec 3 08:26:40 1991
To: bradsi philba
Subject: Re: slick
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 91 08:27:46 PST
Eric is evaluating one for me but I don’t feel we have
our hands on a great one yet. I really need to be clear on what
the expectations for slick completion is. Depending on the time frame I
am not as confident that slick is a technology on the path to
MS-Dos 6 as much as it is a diversion. Phil, can you help me understand
what the objectives for your project are?
Tom
>From bradsi Mon Dec 2 20:53:54 1991
To: philba
Subject: slick
Cc: tomle
Date: Mon Dec 2 20:53:40 1991
[STAMPED] EXH 60 DATE 5/17/[20]02 WITNESS Barrett MARY W. MILLER
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1112804 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MSC 00730268
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT 5614
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 1133 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1133 Page 1 of 2]
[STAMPED] EXHIBIT 133
[STAMPED] CONFIDENTIAL
[handwritten] Non-responsive Material Redacted
[PAGE FOOTER]WinMail
1.21 philba
Wed
Feb 24 08:11:14
1993
Page:
4
[STAMPED] X0592177
[STAMPED] Gates DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 85 2/28/[20]02
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1164868 CONFIDENTIAL
>From aaronr Fri Dec 6 10:25:45 1991
To: karlst philba sandeeps
Cc: marcw
Subject: Re: msdos detection – hot job for you
Data: Wed Feb 24 08:ll:30 PDT 1991
Yesterday it was decided to do this
detection and display the message if appropriate we run windows. Aaron
has some code that you add to win.com
One question that you need to answer for sandeeps:
Is this a Prompt message or a Banner
message?
In HIMEM and SMARTDRV the message is a banner message, they don’t
stop,
they just display the message and go on.
In SETUP and MSD the message is a prompt message:
Non-fatal error detected: error xxxx
(Please contact Windows 3.l beta aupport)
Press Enter to exit or C to continue …
<<<<<*************
Which form for WIN.COM? Also, what is the exact message test?
For MSD the exact message is:
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1133 Page 2 of 2]
Non-fatal error detected* error 5278
(Please contact Windows 3.1 beta support) Press ENTER to exit or C to
continue …
Sandeeps here is the “spec”
This is a NEAR proc that you call, so inside your code segment you
do:
Extrn IsMsDos:near
This routine takes no arguments, it modifies flags and ONE BIT of
the
AX register:
call IsMsDos test ax,2000h jnx This_Is_MSD0S
NOTES:
Do not try and trace into this routine,
you will die.
Try to obscure as much as possible!
The code that makes this call and the
code which prints the message based en the result are ‘well separated’.
The bit that is set, and the bit that is
looked at by the message guy are different bits.
The bit that controls the nessage is
stored in a variable that is touched, read written, ALL OVER THE PLACE.
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 1146 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 1 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 2 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 3 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 4 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 5 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 6 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 7 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 8 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 9 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 10 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 11 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 12 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 13 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 14 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 15 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 16 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 17 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 18 of 19]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1146 Page 19 of 19]
[STAMPED] EXH 77 DATE 5/31/[20]02 WITNESS Barrett MARY W. MILLER
[STAMPED] MS 5055650 CONFIDENTIAL
###################################################### 532
>From peterhey Tue Dec 17 16:43:09 1991
To: bradsi
Subject:
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 91 17:41:19 PST
this is the letter referred to in my other mail requesting
OK of advance release of Win 3.1 launch date to OEMs.
| >From peterhey Tue Dec 17 15:05:45 1991
| To: alexn billmi jonro josephk oemman richt
| cc: jonl peterhey wddirect
| Subject: 1st Win 3.1 Launch Letter to OEMs
| Date: Tue, 17 Dec 91 16:03:20 PST
|
|
| Below is the letter created for mailing to our OEM Windows
| licensees–the first in a series to build support for the
| Win 3.1 launch. Thank you for submitting your conments
| asap. We aim to drop later this week.
| ***********************************************************
| \024December 18, 1991
| Dear Windows Hardware Vendor,
|
| Windows 3.1 will be launched at Windows World on April 6.
| Microsoft is pouring unprecented resources into the Windows
| 3.1 launch to make it an unqualified success. The main
| focus of this letter is to help you leverage Microsoft’s
| enormous investment.
|
| FACT: We will be investing more promotional,
| marketing, and support dollars in the Win 3.1
| launch than any other product launch in Microsoft
| history.
|
| In many respects, Windows World 1992 vill be the 3.1 Launch
| Event. This Windows release will be the most comprehensive
| and best supported ever. We believe all the conditions are
| right for a massive shift to Windows. A complete foundation
| of Windows Applications is in place, 70% of all PCs sold are
| Windows capable, and Windows 3.1 is the right product.
|
| FACT: The Windows 3.1 beta program is the largest and
| most exhaustive ever in the PC industry.
|
| Feedback from our 15,000 beta testers has been
| overwhelmingly positive. The product’s improved fit and
| finish, substantial ease of use, reliability, and
| performance improvements deliver on the Windows promise to
| make using PCs easier for everyone.
|
| FACT: In developing Windows 3.1, over 1,100
| modifications were made to Windows 3.0. These
| changes were focused in four general areas:
| improved usability, greater reliability, enhanced
| applications support and new technologies (such as
| Windows for Pen Computing).
|
| Windows 3.1 represents a dramatic evolution to an already
| highly successful product. We are committed to working
| closely with you to make the Windows 3.1 launch a very
| successful launch for you as well as Microsoft.
| Specifically, we would like to work with you on the
| following:
|
| o Windows 3.1 Compatibility
| o Windows logo Program
| o Pre-launch Technical Training
| o Windows World Participation
| o Windows Upgrade Program
| o Windows hardware design optimization
|
| Below you will find descriptions of our activities in these
| areas and how you can benefit by participating. Details on
| how to reach us via the 3.1 Launch Hotline will be in our
| next letter to you. In the interim, your Microsoft Account
| Representative, or his/her designee, will be contacting you
| soon to help answer any questions you have as well as learn
| more about your plans for this important event.
|
|
| Sincerely,
|
|
| OEM Launch Conmunications
|
|
|
| Windows 3.1 Launch Programs
|
|
| Windows 3.1 Compatibility
| We strongly encourage you to test all of your PC lines for
| Windows compatibility. Clearly communicating compatibility
| in marketing communications and collaterals will enhance the
| appeal of your systems to purchasers of Windows
| applications. Microsoft developed the Hardware
| Compatibility Test (HCT) to measure and certify a PC’s
| ability to compatibly run Windows. With only minimal manual
| intervention, an OEM can execute the HCT on all models
| suitable to run Windows and submit the results (which are
| automatically compiled onto a floppy) to Microsoft for
| analysis.
|
| FACT: In the first nine months of 1991, sales of
| Windows applications by the top vendors totalled
| $711 million, an increase of 85% over the full-
| year 1990 sales total of $385 million.
|
| If the results indicate compatibility, we will provide to
| you the new Microsoft Windows logo to use freely in your
| marketing and manufacturing efforts.
|
| FACT: The name of each PC model that successfully
| passes the test will be entered on the Hardware
| Compatibility List (HCL) distributed with each
| copy of Windows 3.1.
|
| The HCT is part of the beta OAK and ODK products. It can
| also be obtained by contacting your Microsoft Account
| Representative. A application to license the Windows Logo
| will be sent automatically to all OEMs submitting successful
| HCT results.
|
|
| Windows Logo Program
|
| Microsoft has created a new logo for Windows to provide
| useful information to customers shopping for Windows
| hardware like your own. Customers will look for the logo as
| a statement that the product on which it appears supports or
| in some way explicitly contributes to the Microsoft Windows
| Operating System.
|
| FACT: Sales of Windows applications in 1991 will
| approximate $1 billion.
|
| This logo was prominently displayed at Fall COMDEX ’91 and
| will be an integral part of the packaging for Windows
| beginning with the 3.1 release. A black-and-white rendition
| is pictured below:
|
| (graphic of logo inserted here)
|
| We strongly encourage you to license use of this new logo
| (at no charge) and include it on your product packaging and
| in your promotional materials.
|
| FACT: Microsoft is encouraging independent software
| vendors to assimilate the new Windows logo into
| their packaging and promotional materials.
|
| Given the importance of compatibility between personal
| computers and the new 3.1 Windows release, we are
| requesting all hardware system vendors to complete the HCT
| before receiving rights to use the logo.
|
|
| Pre-Launch Technical Training
|
| As vendors of Windows products, we know that the 3.1 upgrade
| will trigger calls to your support lines as well as
| Microsoft’s. We want to help you prepare for these calls.
| Accordingly, we are planning Windows 3.1 Product Support
| Training Seminars to be held around the U.S. in the month
| before the launch.
|
| Please note that because of capacity constraints attendance
| at these seminars will be restricted to Product Support
| professionals only. Pre-registration will be requested to
| guarantee a spot. Cities, dates and times are still being
| determined and will be cannunicated to you in our next
| mailing.
|
|
| Windows World Participation
|
| As the largest Windows-focused tradeshow in the country,
| Windows World is a major marketing opportunity for any
| vendor of Windows-related products.
|
| FACT: This year Interface expects between 60,000 and
| 65,000 attendees to the combined Windows World and
| Spring COMDEX shows in Chicago.
|
| FACT: Over 55% of last year’s attendees were Corporate
| End Users and Buyers.
|
| Enclosed you should find an exhibitor brochure for the 1992
| edition of the Windows World Show. Interface expects around
| 1,000 exhibitors to sign up for the combined Windows World
| and COMDEX shows, making Chicago the second largest computer
| industry gathering in the U.S.
|
| FACT: By this past November, exhibitor registrations
| for Windows World ’92 had already passed the total
| number of exhibitors that appeared at Windows
| World ’91.
|
| Our plans to launch. Windows 3.1 at the show only add to an
| already exciting event. We expect Windows World to be a
| forum for the launch of a number of other important hardware
| and software products from a range of vendors. Don’t miss
| the chance to be there and demonstrate the strengths of your
| Windows PCs. Contact The Interface Group at (XXX) XXX-XXXX
| Ext 4023 to sign up as an exhibitor.
|
|
| Windows 3.1 Upgrade Offer
|
| We strongly encourage you to address your users’ upgrade
| needs. We expect most Windows 3.0 users will upgrade to
| Windows 3.1 because it offers dramatic improvements over 3.0
| in a number of areas, including performance, reliability,
| and usabilility. Upgrading end-users represents a
| substantial revenue opportunity for OEMs, particularly those
| that have bundled Windows in the past and thereby possess a
| large end-user registration database.
|
| As a service to OEMs who wish to make the Windows 3.1
| upgrade available to customers without assuming
| responsibility for fulfillment, we would like to provide
| you, at our expense, upgrade coupons that Microsoft will
| fulfill directly through the mail. These coupons will be
| Business Reply Cards that should fit in most mailings and
| provide your customers the convenience of ordering the new
| release through the mail. Coupons will be delivered to OEMs
| requesting them by March 15. You can request these coupons
| through our Launch Hotline, or through .your Microsoft
| Account Representative.
|
|
| Windows Hardware Engineering Conference
|
| On March 1-3 at the San Francisco Harriot, Microsoft will
| host a conference and mini-exhibition aimed at helping your
| best engineers build better Windows PCs.
|
| Why focus on building Windows PCs?
|
| FACT- The Windows software standard virtualizes the
| hardware interface for application vendors,
| thereby liberating PC vendors from the need to
| conform to a rigid hardware standard–providing
| room for greater differentiation and
| profitability.
|
| The Windows Hardware Engineering Conference (WinHEC) will
| brinq OEMs together vith Microsoft’s Windows device driver
| engineers and a wide range of independent hardware vendors
| active in display, audio, networking, storage, processor and
| other technologies. The object; three days of technical
| discussions reviewing the widening range of creative
| alternatives for PC engineering.
|
| WinHEC’s general sessions will consider current and upcoming
| evolutions in the Windows device driver interfaces
| (including updates on Windows NT and multimedia), flesh out
| the new technical directions disclosed at the OEM briefing
| and provide detailed insights into the function of the
| Windows execution performance tests now being developed by
| leading industry analysts. Participants in the session on
| upcoming Windows products will be required to sign non-
| disclosure agreements prior to entry.
|
| WinHEC is being timed to allow you to begin to formulate
| Windows product plans prior to WinWorld so that you can
| address customer needs and top-of-mind concerns at that
| forum.
|
| For more information on the Windows Hardware Engineering
| Conference, contact your Microsoft Account Representative.
| After January 5, you may call directly for an invitation and
| conference brochure (7:30a.m. – 5:30p.m. PST, Mon. – Fri.):
|
| XXX-XXX-XXXX in US/Canada.
| XXX_XXX_XXXX other International
| XXX_XXX_XXXX FAX
|
| Summary
|
| Windows is becoming huge–bigger than we ever anticipated.
| We strongly encourage you to leverage Microsoft’s revised
| and expanding investment plans by:
|
| o Executing the HCT on all appropriate PCs and
| returning results to Microsoft for analysis
| o Licensing and leveraging the new Windows logo.
| o Preparing for the Windows 3.1 Launch by attending
| pre-launch training and contracting for a booth at Windows World
| o Aggressively exploiting Windows 3.1 upgrade opportunities
| o Attending the Windows Hardware Engineering Conference
| in San Francisco on March 1-3, 1992 to obtain
| ideas for new, creative hardware designs.
|
| Catch the wave.
|
| You’ll be hearing from us again in January. Until then,
| have a happy holiday.
|
###################################################### 533
Fran adamt Tue Dec 17 16:43:31 1991
To: richt timbre
Cc: adamt bradsi chriswo davesm deniser gerardz gregg leighj maroc
marked
Subject: PSS Text Issue
Standard Mode: Bad Fault in MS-DOS Extender.
Fault: 000D Stack Dump: 0000 0000 0070
Raw fault frame: EC=0000 IP=5DlD CS=0397 FL=3006 SP=000A SS=02F7
if I installed HIMEM.SYS instead of 386MAX CS=037F was the only
change
this always happend after windows copied WIN386.PS2
I tryes this about 12 times
I had NO autoexec.bat my config only had what STACKER needed
| dsk# |
#fil |
SIZE Build 61b |
| 1 |
39 |
1,195,812 |
| 2 |
46 |
1,202,566 |
| 3 |
129 |
1,182,728 |
| 4 |
72 |
1,195,448 |
| 5 |
43 |
1,204,718 |
| 6 |
68 |
1,173,026 |
| 7 |
80 |
1,192,092 |
###################################################### 223
>From andyhi Mon Dec 16 09:30:31 1991
To: kalak winbeta
Cc: bradsi
Subject: HOT: please sign up
Date: Mon Dec 16 09:27:33 PDT 1991
Please sign up and see if we can get on the first wave of final beta
shipments.
Thanks
Andy
>From bradsi Mon Dec 16 08:28:38 1991
To: andyhi
Subject: please sign up
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 91 08:27:59 PST
Ken Ashbaugh
Network Systems and Services
[address]
[phone number] FAX [phone number]
as a beta tester, he’s running a panel at winworld on “msdos apps
under win 3.0”. i’ve been telling him how much better win 3.1 is
than win3, and I’m trying to get him to change the focus of the panel
to more win3.1. but he said he was previously closed out of the beta,
thanks.
###################################################### 224
>From davidcol Mon Dec 16 09:44:29 1991
To: davidw dennisad tiamcc winwar
Subject: Re: bug 8847
Cc: rickem
Date: Man Dec 16 09:43:11 1991
Sorry for the back seat driving here dennis, but has this
been thought through very well. For example, 1 assume
there’s some hack in the font mapper to map courier new 8pt
on EGA to Courier 8pt bitmap. What happens if it’s not
there?
What about other testing implications? What’s gonna break
without that 8pt font that’s been there since June
and been through all our testing?
let’s get together and chat about this stuff, I haven’t
seen any email that makes me feel good about the thought
we’ve put into this one way or the other.
###################################################### 225
>From georgem Mon Dec 16 09:45:13 1991
To: bradsi
This sounds familiar doesn’t it? If you think we already
know about this, I won’t follow up.
15-Dec-91 16-.21:05
Sb: Build 61b problems
Em: Mark Aronson 71167,2470
To: Andy Thomas (V3.l Sysop) 73650,50
I upgrading fran build 58 (that worked great) to build 61b I would
always
get:
‘Win Setup caused a general Protection fault in module setup.exe at
0015:096b’
then windows would force me to close at the DOS prompt I saw
Standard Mode: Bad Fault in MS-DOS Extender.
Fault: 000D Stack Dump: 0000 0000 0070
Raw fault frame: EC=0000 IP=5DlD CS=0397 FL=3006 SP=000A SS=02F7
if I installed HIMEM.SYS instead of 386MAX CS=037F was the only
change
this always happend after windows copied WIN386.PS2
I tryes this about 12 times
I had NO autoexec.bat my config only had what STACKER needed
| dsk# |
#fil |
SIZE Build 61b |
| 1 |
39 |
1,195,812 |
| 2 |
46 |
1,202,566 |
| 3 |
129 |
1,182,728 |
| 4 |
72 |
1,195,448 |
| 5 |
43 |
1,204,718 |
| 6 |
68 |
1,173,026 |
| 7 |
80 |
1,192,092 |
###################################################### 228
>From andyhi Mon Dec 16 09:47:43 1991
To: bradsi davidcol
Cc: a-andyt a-stevef
Subject; winbtb update
Date: Man Dec 16 09:45:28 PDT 1991
CIS has found and fixed the problem.
They will also be able to credit the accounts of people that got
charged.
They think they’ll be able to have this done by mid-week.
I’m still working on a solution so people can use CIM and TAPCIS to
automate the download process.
Andy
###################################################### 229
Fron bradc Mon Dec 16 09:48:04 1991
To: lizsi martyta w-carrin w-clairl w-pamed
Cc: bradc bradsi
Subject: MS-DOS 5 On-going PR plan
Date: Mon Dec 16 09:48:01 PDT 1991
I just read this thank you for getting it to me – lots of good ideas
but we are not there yet. I have the following comments:
Situation Analysis
In the DR DOS section i think you are close but do not have the right
spin. The editorial comnunity perceives DR DOS 6 as having lots of
momentum and as the underdog and they go out of their way to give dr
the benefit of the doubt, this happens with even the best mags like
pc mag. for example, pc mag two weeks ago mentioned in the comment
part of their best seller list that dr was moving up -even though
they had not even reached the top 15. this month they mention again
that dr is number 14 when one might argue that the more interesting
item with at ProGomm Plus moved up to #3! the implications is that
we need to target the dr lovers as much as the ms-dos 5 lovers as you
suggest later on
you also need to point out that most Of the press incorrectly
perceives dr dos to be technically superior
note that though inertia is slowing down Upgrade sales it is still
one of the top 5 best sellers in the industry and has been one or two
almost every month since ship
Key Messages
I would phrase these differently
1) MS-DOS is the standard – Only MS-DOS is DOS
2 MS-DOS defines the compatibility standard – we care alot about
compatibility and are religous about it b/c our users are
3) MS-DOS 5 is technically superior
4) We are driving the MS-DOS standard forward – portable computing
initiative and later ms-dos 6
another message is that dr dos 6 is incompatible and buggy, as i
said in an earliex mail i bet it ranks with 123 for windows and
probably pc tools as the buggiest products to be released this year.
Objectives
Please do not say we are spreading DR DOS FUD. that implies that the
data we provide people who ask, like the press is tmtcue – it isn’t.
the top two pr objectives are to 1) Ensure the press gets the true
story on our superiority and dr’s inferiority – we have the better
product; 2) derail the dr dos train – as discussed in the situation
analysis the press is generally very kind to dr and the press is
helping to create momentum for the product even though it is lousy.
communicating our momentum is a good objective as is cammunicating
our technical leadership and how we are moving the standard forward
aggressively.
Tactics
use third parties
i like the idea alot but i’m not sure about implementation, building
ms-dos 5 user/company profiles is good, who are those third parties
you want to solicit? i need more details.
ibm could still go with dr so i want to hold the oem release for
now. it is much more powerful if ibm announces anything with dr. it
might be interesting to consider a release that indicates that the
top x oems (100, 200?) are now shipping ms-dos 5 with their systems,
but if our only coverage is page 108 of pc week (like the last
release) then there is not enough value in releasing now.
influence coverage
aggressively following reviews is great, but is not enough – i have
learned this mistake and will not make it again, we need to
proactively provide information to key people in the press as an
ongoing part of our business.
we need to track the people positive towards dr just as much as
those
who are negative, we have a legitmate goal to provide these people
our side of the story.
the backgrounder on what people should look for when evaluating an
os
is a good idea but don’t you think it is too late for ms-dos/dr dos.
who will read it now? you need one for windows
dr dos comparison doc if you mean feature comparison, NO! this
misses the point, we do not want to get into a feature war or
legitimize dr’s efforts to say the two products are equal with dr
having more features, we need to take a step above and win the
battle on compatibility, technical superiority and our vision.
ms-dos resource kit is done, see randym
share data with folks that shows we are better – good
editor buddy program – excellent how do educate the “buddies” on
ms-dos?
leverage upcoming news – much more than ms-dos 5 ran or apm; as i
have discussed this is the portable computing iniative – a
commitment, a position of leadership.
ms-dos terminology reminder – how will we implement so that we don’t
just legitimize dr? ya know when people say pc-compatible they
really mean ms-dos compatible
i’ll let bradsi make the call on using gordon letwin more. i’m not
sure.
leverage ms-dos marketing
i like on-going direct mail/postcards etc.
ms-dos tech workshops are done for now.
we need to discuss the upcoming marketing efforts and see where pr
can help.
whatever happen to the local columnists list?
we should sit down and discuss – pis set-up. i’m sure that you will
have additional ideas with my revised objectives. what is the status
of getting more resources on ms-dos?
###################################################### 230
>From stephl Mon Dec 16 09:48:35 1991
To: bradsi
Cc: nataliey
Subject: Yogen Dalai
Date: Mon, Dec 16, 1991 9:46 AM
Yogen will be checking into the Woodmark Hotel
(in Kirkland) this evening. You can meet him there
or leave him a message and be will ccme to you.
Thanks,
Stephanie
###################################################### 231
>From greglo Mon Dec 16 09:53:41 1991
To: bradsi davidcol tomle
Cc: mackm
Subject: Re: Novell
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 91 09:52:50 PST
1. the purpose is to
map Fail into a reasonable error code that will be correctly handled by
windows apps
2. it would ship only
with Win31 retail; no one could distribute separately (although we’ll
probably make it available earlier to a few key accounts such as
American Airlines)
3. testing will be done
by our test group as well as Novell and a few corporate accounts such
as American Airlines.
4. maintenance could
potentially be done by our group (AaronR; he could do the initial work
except that he is booked solid). I don’t know if MSDOS6 will make such
changes as to require major changes (like lots of new functions) which
could require some help from your group.
| >From tomle Sat Dec 14 10:58:32 1991
| To: bradsi davidcol greglo
| Cc: mackm
| Subject: Re: Novell
| Date: Sat, 14 Dec 91 10:58:03 PST
|
|
| I am still confused about the solution. How do we use this library.
| How will this be used to circumvent Novell’s panic on a return from
| retry,fail. Who uses the library. Is this something your sending in
| the SDK for use with Windows apps? Once we get past undestanding how
this
| solution works then I need to know vho is going to test this library
| and who will support it in the future? Do I have to update it every
time
| I rev the Dos?
|
| I am not against helping out here, this is a serious problem, I just
| want to understand what I am getting myself into.
|
| Tom
|
| | Here is a summary:
| |
| | This measure is to address the critical-error problem that American
| | Airlines is up in arms about. Today, users think they’ve hung their
| | machines when a server goes down. Novell wants us to crash
individual
| | apps instead, but we can do better.
| | It would take about 3-4 days for one of the MS-DOS developers to
take
| | the code out of the MS-DOS Kernel and build it into an independent
| | library routine. We could turn that into an installable driver which
| | would allow apps to continue after encountering such an error.
| |
| | We would then ship this driver with Win31: we need not give this
code
| | to Novell/DR nor give them permission to redistribute it.
| |
| | FYI: Here are the gory technical details of the problem:
| |
| | A typical scenario would be where WinWord is saving a file out to a
| | NetWare server when the server goes down or the net cable gets
| | pulled, etc. You get a Window critical-error dialog giving you the
| | choices of Retry or Fail. Retry will always just give the same error
| | again, so you can’t escape that way. Fail will also bring up the
| | same error, but if you keep hitting it again and again long enough,
| | eventually you should get back to the application and be able to
save
| | your work. Most of the time, however, the user will give up and
| | reboot before then. Also, end users won’t have any way of knowing
| | which seemingly endless chain will end and which will not.
| |
| | The problem is a result of two “design deficiencies”, one for Novell
| | and one for Windows. What NetWare is trying to do is have MS-DOS
abort
| | the application: bango, no chance to save your work. That is what
they
| | do for non-Windows apps. Windows won’t let them, because Kernel
| | can’t survive having MS-DOS terminate an app behind its back.
| |
| | NetWare generates an int24 (critical-error) with Retry and Abort
being
| | the only available choices: it never expects that to return. Windows
| | won’t allow Abort, we offer the user Retry and Fail. When the user
| | chooses Fail we return to NetWare. They say “Whoa! Someone actually
| | returned, this is not kosher!” but they try to handle it as best
they
| | can without, you know, really getting involved. They return an error
| | code of -1 to the original calling application. That sounds
reasonable,
| | but it turns out that, since -1 is not a valid error return from
most
| | MS-DOS functions, apps aren’t checking for it or handling it
reasonably.
| | For apps like WinWord, they will just go on writing out more and
more
| | file, generating more and more errors which they ignore. It can go
on
| | a long time.
| |
| | Novell’s idea of the correct solution is for us to modify Kernel so
that
| | they can Abort a Windows app. This would take two weeks of design
and
| | coding before it could be testable, followed by goodness knows how
much
| | debugging and fixing. These are potentially very destabilizing
changes.
| | It is far too late to make these changes now.
| |
| | Our idea of the correct solution is for NetWare to handle these
| | critical errors the same way MS-DOS does: when the user chooses the
| | Fail option, MS-DOS figures out a reasonable error code to return to
| | the app, based upon the actual internal error and the MS-DOS
function
| | being called by the application. This is very complicated mapping,
| | involving eight tables and lots of code in the MS-DOS kernel. It
| | would take Novell about three months to reverse engineer this and
| | implement it themselves.
| |
| | But again, it would only take about 3-4 days for one of the MS-DOS
| | developers to take the code out of the MS-DOS Kernel and build it
| | into an independent library routine. We could turn that into an
| | installable driver and ship it with Win31. We need not give this
| | code to Novell/DR nor give them permission to redistribute it.
|
|
###################################################### 232
Fran bradc Mon Dec 16 10:07:48 1991
To: bradsi
Subject: FW: Stacker Update
Date: Mon Dec 16 10:08:06 PDT 1991
any comments?
>From bradc Thu Dec 12 17:57:30 1991
To: bradsi mackm richf
Cc: bradc
Subject: Stacker Update
Date: Thu Dec 12 17:57:47 PDT 1991
Subject: EMAIL auto_notify
Re: RE: FW: Windows 3.10.060 Problems & Updates
Received OK on Mon Dec 16 11:43
User Message follows
Thank you for submitting your bug report to the Windows Beta
Program.
Because of the large number of beta sites, and the complexity
of the program itself, we will be unable to respond to each of
your reports, though we review each one, and will be contacting
you in the event that we need more information to narrow down
the bug for our development staff.
If you experience critical problems, such as difficulty reading
or writing to your hard drive, please notify us as soon as
possible, so that we may respond immediately.
In your reports, please make sure to use the Systems EFORM
template called “Windows 3.1 Bug Report” and include a copy of
your AUTOEXEC.BAT, CONFIG.SYS, SYSTEM.INI, and WIN.INI (when
necessary) files, in addition to the steps that must be followed
to reproduce the problem.
Your participation in the Beta program is important to us, and
we appreciate your efforts in helping us make Windows 3.1 an
excellent product.
###################################################### 271
Fran lauraeu Mon Dec 16 11:48:02 1991
To: bradsi jonl sallyn
Subject: MSJ Jan Ed note
Cc: ericm joannes
Date: Mon Dec 16 14:47;21 1991
Please read and OK ASAP. It needs to go out tonight. Thanks.
Windows is stronger than ever. Near the end of 1991, the installed
base of
Windows had grown to 7.9 million copies. Windows is now the world’s
most
popular graphical computer environment, with about half (46 percent) of
those
users outside the United States. The forecast for 1992 is even
brighter; sales
of 9.2 million copies are predicted. Preinstalled or bundled copies of
Windows
are new standard with many brands of PCs, including AST, Dell, Everex,
Grid and
Zenith.
Windows not only sells extremely well, it gets high marks from
purchasers. In a
survey conducted by Field Research Corporation, randomly selected users
gave
Windows an average rating of 7.6 on a scale from 1 to 10. The survey
also found
that users like Windows better the longer they work with it.
Users aren’t skimping on the hardware they use with Windows. 70 percent
are
running on at least a 386SX, and 80 percent work with a display of VGA
resolution or better. More than three quarters of the users ran Windows
on
machines equipped with between 2MB and 4MB of RAM.
Microsoft is going to great lengths to ensure that Windows version
3.1 will
enhance Windows acceptance still further. A beta test program with over
15,000
sites is underway to guarantee that 3.1 is very compatible with 3.0
vhile
delivering significant new benefits.
The most important improvement of 3.1 is speed: faster printing,
faster
application startup, faster screen updates, faster disk I/O, and a
faster
MS-DOS box. Comparing Windows 3.1 beta 1.55 and OS/2 2.0 beta 6.167,
testers at
Microsoft found that Windows applications load twice as fast under 3.1
than do
PM apps load under OS/2 2.0. Perhaps more importantly, they determined
that
Windows applications running native under Windows 3.1 loaded 30 to 50
percent
faster and painted their displays 20 to 60 percent faster than they did
running
in OS/2 2.0’s “Windows box.” So much for cockamamie slogans like Ra
better
Windows than Windows.S
The retail release of Windows 3.1 is being augmented in a number of
ways. It
will support the Multimedia Windows API, and include MIDI and waveform
drivers
as well as several sound applets. The TrueType APIs will be improved to
support
font rotation. Drivers for printing high quality Truetype documents,
along with
a supplementary font library, will be bundled with the retail product.
Robustness is also improved with 3.1. Systems developers in Redmond
have
declared war on UAEs caused by Windows and by misbehaving applications
as well.
A strongly typed WINDOWS.H, parameter validation for every function
call to
Windows, and improved error reporting all help in exorcising these
demons from
your code.
As developers ready their applications for Windows 3.1, their most
important
job is to test for compatibility. The next issue of MSJ will include a
comprehensive checklist for ensuring that your application will run
better than
ever under Windows 3.1.
###################################################### 272
Frcm torahe Mon Dec 16 11:50:37 1991
To: bobt theresas
Cc: bradsi drg tomhe
Subject: Windows User Survey
Date: Mon Dec 16 11:47:26 pdt 1991
BradSi mentioned something about the Windows User Survey info we
have possibly being available for distribution (maybe in summary
form?),
so Symantec is now excited and wants it ASAP. They also want
the customer support tools SteveB mentioned in his speech (not sure
what this is exactly).
Any help would be appreciated.
###################################################### 273
Fran andyhi Mon Dec 16 11:57:20 1991
To: marcw winwar
Cc: a-richh korys vlads
Subject: RE: Upgrading OEM display drivers bug
Date: Mon Dec 16 11:54:58 PDT 1991
I think that this is going to generate a lot of calls to the tech
team.
A good number of internal and external users have OEM displays.
But I haven’t heard many complaints yet, is this a fairly new bug?
What happens if we upgrade over a prev. version of 3.1?
>From marcw Mon Dec 16 11:15:38 1991
To: winvrar
Cc: a-richh korys vlads
Subject: Upgrading OEM display drivers bug
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 91 11:08:49 PST
After upgrading an OEM display that uses the 3.0 internal VGA
VDD (most OEM VGA displays do), the user will get an error whenever
they try to run and non-windows application, telling them to
run Setup again.
The problem is that whenever we upgrade an OEM device over 3.0
Windows,
we do not do the correct translation. For displays, we do not change
the
WIN386 VDD from *VDDVGA to VDDVGA30.386. The change is very
straightforward:
if we are upgrading an OEM device, we always put the file installation
through our existing translation code.
Work around: specify OTHER for display and use the OEM setup disks
to specifically install the display.
I am sitting on the fence on this one. The change will ONLY AFFECT
OEM DEVICE UPGRADES. Other upgrades or new installs are not affected,
so this seems pretty safe. However, there is a simple work around and
this change has not been thoroughly tested on all the various OEM
device drivers (it affects not just OEM displays, but all OEM devices).
###################################################### 274
>From jeffpar Mon Dec 16 12:04:12 1991
To: bens mikem raype
Cc: bradsi macKm tomle
Subject: Re: cougar command.com
Date: Mon Dec 16 12:03:41 1991
Negative, it is not true.
| >From raype Mon Dec 16 09:05:03 1991
| To: bens jeffpar mikem
| Cc: bradsi mackm tomle
| Subject: Re: cougar command.oom
| installation, I restarted windows, i no longer have net access
from
| the file manager, no net menus under Disk, apparently my winnet
| driver is no longer loader, it was fine in build 61b. I exited
| windows and rebooted the machine, same problem — no net access from
| file manager.
|
| running maintenance mode install shows that it detected my
| net correctly : lan man 2.1 basic.
###################################################### 285
Fran nathanm Mon Dec 16 12:51:50 1991
To: billg bottnu bradsi cameronm carls darrylr davec davidcol davidw
dennisad edwardj gaben jimall jonl karenh mikeraur paulma paulo philba
raleighr rashid robg steveb stevesh tonyw w-pamed
Subject: Winstone suggestions
Date: Tue Dec 17 12:50:30 PDT 1991
JonL had a meeting a month or so ago on the “new world” we face with
OEMs.
One idea which came out of that meeting is the idea of having a
benchmark
suite which we called “Winstones”. There hasn’t been a lot of general
discussion since then, so I thought I would send some ideas on the
topic, both
to people in the original meeting and to others that may be effected.
I think that Winstones are an INCREDIBLY important marketing move
for us,
which can benefit just about every aspect of our systems strategy.
The basic idea is simple:
– Create a benchmark suite analagous to SPECmarks, but specialized
to Windows
based systems (both Win 32 and Win 16, and on x86 and MIPS).
– The suite will include measurments of a set of different
activities –
screen graphics, printing, text, disk I/O, CPU etc.
– We would create the suite, get it out to magazines and others, and
generally publicize the hell out of it.
The general motivation to do this is to provide a focal point for
activity to
improve the hardware that Windows runs on (accelerator boards, , and at
the
same time give a firm quantitative basis for many of our present
challenges –
improving value for our customers, selling Windows vs OS/2a selling
Windows
NT, promoting Jumbo, promoting TrueType, showing the value of Win32,
showing
the value of scalability, demonstrating the value of MIPS… There are
a LOT
of potential benefits.
Note that this is a MARKETING activity. There are a number of
technical
aspects, but this is first and formost a technical marketing activity.
The Winstone suite would contain a number of different test suites.
This is
not a small joke benchmark like Dhrystone – it is more like SPEC, but
probably
even bigger.
There are several requirements placed on Winstones by marketing
factors:
– There must be between 5 and 15 different tests. This way you can
make a
nice graph of system performance.
– We want to have one focussed test in each area that is going to be
important for somebody to improve. As an example, if we want to
encourage
graphics accelerators, then there must be a separate graphics test.
– There should be an overall number – the “WINmark” which is a
harmonic or
geometric average of the separate tests. We should also define the
particular
subsets – “Graphics WINmark”, “I/O WINmark” etc.
– We must be able to give the source code of the test away. This is
probably
not “public domain” in a strict sense (see below) but close to it.
– We want some of the tests to measure the entire machine
configuration
specific. As an example, some tests will run faster if you have more
RAM, so
that you can do more cacheing. Although that may not seem fair, it
actually
is JUST what we want. This is discussed more below.
– The tests must be able to run automatically and then return an answer
without human intervention.
There would be two categories – system level benchmarks and
application level
benchmarks. The system benchmarks would primarily exercise Windows and
the
underlying hardware. The application benchmarks would measure what kind
of
performance people oould expect in their apps. Note that SPECmarks are
purely
an application benchmark in this terminology.
The system benchmarks would be created largely by using the
“artificial app”
technology that has been in use in the NT group. Basically this lets
you run
a real app, trap all of its calls and arguments, and then be able to
replay
them in a script. This is a terrific way to get “real” tests easily. We
can
append the scripts from several different runs of an app or different
apps to
make a single test for each sub category.
Here is a sample list of the system benchmarks:
- Screen graphics & Text
- Fonts and rich text
- General GUI
- Presentation
- Draw programs
- Paint programs
- CAD programs
- Printing
- Rich Text
- Graphics
- Bitmaps
- Disk I/O
- General file read/write
- Database access
- Multitasking disk access
- Virtual memory
- Memory allocation/freeing
- Large memory access
- Multitasking
- Running many of these tests in parallel
- Background communications at 9600 baud
- Multiprocessor/thread test
- CPU bound process with threads suitable for MP
- CPU and I/O ” ” ” ” ” ” ”
- Messaging
- Windows message passing
- OLE performance???
- Multimedia
- CD ROM input speed ?
- Animation test?
- Sound card performance?
In most cases the “artificial app* will give us a very good
benchmark pretty
easily. To give an example in more detail, here is one way to break
down
screen graphics and text.
Screen graphics & Text
- Rich text & fonts – combined script from:
- Word for Windows
- WordPerfect far Windows
- Aldus Pagemaker
- General GUI – combined script of dialog/menus from many Window
apps
- Draw programs – combined script from
- Corel Draw
- Micxografix
- Aldus Freehand
- Presentation – combined script from
- PowerPoint
- Persuasion
- Freelance
- CAD programs – combined script from
- AutoCAD
- AutoSHADE
- Alias Upfront
- other’ windows CAD program
- Paint programs – combined script from
- Aldus PhotoStyler
- other serious 24 bit paint program
There are thus 6 separate tests done within the screen graphics
& test
section. Each one should have a running time of between 2-5 minutes so
we can
get good accuracy, and so that we are future proofing ourselves for a
factor
of 4X or so speed improvement in the next several years.
Note that we would want to use both ISV apps AND Microsoft apps. I
do NOT
think that we need to spend a lot of time or effort actually creating
the
benchmarks “with” the ISVs in a serious way. We don’t want this bogged
down
with politics, and there is no reason to do so. We probably should get
permission from them and should sanity check the data file that we use.
If
this is done properly the ISVs should love this.
Some of the tests would need to be created by hand, or substantial
modifications must be done to the recorded scripts. In the case of
virtual
memory performance we would want to allocate a ton of memory (say 16
meg) and
then touch it to test paging performance. This may be better done with
a
synthetic program than a recorded script. The multitasking test and
Windows
messaging tests are other examples which may have to be written largely
by
hand.
This is almost certainly true of the multiprocessor/threading test.
This will
have to be some quasi-real example of a parallel algorithm with good
scalability out to at least 16 processors. It must be able to run on a
uniprocessor. There are many examples we colud use for this.
The goal is that almost all tests must run on Win 3.1 and on Windows
NT (in
BOTH x86 and MIPS) and on Win32s. This will not be true of a couple of
the
tests, but in general it must be the case.
Note that we will have to review each of the benchmarks to make sure
that it
says something reasonable. The existing state of benchmarks in the PC
industry
is so poor that nearly anything we do will be better than what exists
today.
Nevertheless we should try to do as good a job as we can.
The application benchmarks are similar in spirit to the SPEC
benchmarks, or
the larger set of programs which MIPS uses for their benchmarks. The
goal is
to get sane real programs which truly exercise the cache, memory
system, CPU
etc.
The ideal thing would be code samples from real products. The
obvious problem
with this is that we really need to distribute source code to the
tests.
Another idea would be to use the SPEC set. Unfortunately the SPEC
benchmarks
run on UNIX systems, and they have a number of problems. SPEC is the
best set
of benchmarks available, but even so there are a couple of bad programs
(particularly matrix3OO) and the set is too oriented toward FORTRAN and
numerical stuff.
The best solution from a practical standpoint is to get some public
domain
code (which may need to be ported to our OS) to create the benchmark.
There
should be a set of 5-10 different integer programs and again as many
floating
point programs. We should make sure that the programs are quite
different in
their composition. There is a place called the Austin Code Works which
sells
tons of PD software, and that is a good place to look first.
————————————
The goal in creating the benchmark suite is to provide a cannon
standard of
reference for the Windows computing community to use. The idea of doing
benchmarks in each of these areas is not exactly new – PC magazine and
other
reviewers regularly run ad hoc benchmarks. The problem is that these
are of
uneven quality, and no single one of them has enough of a following
that
people use it as a common reference point.
The “brand identity” of the benchmark is just as important as its
contents for
this particular purpose. We want people to have a universal metric
which can
be used in advertising, product reviews etc. We want to get this to be
a very
common way to describe a system. The SPECmark rating has become a very
sucessful effort in the UNIX workstation world because it is famous
enough for
everybody to quote. We want a similar phenonema to occur in the Windows
world. The concept of how many “Winstones per dollar” and other direct
comparisons will directly follow.
Microsoft should be the direct sponser of Winstones, and we should
support
that with an active promotional campaign. It may also help to have some
publications champion them in their reviews, but we would like this to
be
“neutral” enough that they become quoted in ALL major reviews, and not
just in
those of a single magazine. We probably want to announce the benchmark
with
one or a couple of magazines, but then have them spread to other areas
as well.
————————————-
There are many uses of Winstones in our marketing strategy, each of
which may
have a special implication for our system strategy. In general,
winstones can
be used in the following ways:
Supporting our product line strategy
We will have a number of different Windows implemenations – Win 3.1,
Win32s on
Win 3.1, Win NT on x86, Win NT on MIPS. Which one should people buy?
Winstones should help explain this. The reason is that many of the
tests are
designed to test advanced features of wirxiaws, and to scale with the
available
memory on the machine.
We would like to be able to make a chart like the following.
System | Win 3.1/16 Win32s Win NT --------------------------------------------------- 386SX/20, 2 meg | 386DX/33, 4 meg | 486/25, 8 meg | 486/33, 16 meg | R4000, 8 meg | ...
Ideally speaking, this would allow us to directly DERIVE our system
strategy
from “objective” empirical results. Of course, I would not leave this
to
chance – we would adjust the benchmarks to make sure this is the case.
This
should not really require any cheating – the fundamental truth is that
if we
have reasonable benchmarks, we should be able to demonstrate precisely
this
effect. Win NT might be slower at graphics than Win 3.1 on a small
display
because the Win 3.1 code will be tuned assembler, but NT should make
better
use of large memory (8 meg and above), multitasking and it can do some
of the
advanced tests (multithreading etc). Win32s will be slower that Win
3.1/16 on
the system benchmarks because of the overhead of the thunk layer, but
it
should show an improvement in the application benchmarks which will
exercise
large memory in 32 bit mode.
Note that one powerful reason for us to take a leadership position
in creating
the Winstone benchmarks is that we want to have a BALANCED and COMPLETE
set of
benchmarks out there otherwise the opposite will happen – people will
TRASH
our systems strategy. If you just measure a single niche, such as
graphics
performance, then you could possibly find that our higher end systems
do not
do as well. The default way that people approach benchmarking is rather
naieve and this will HURT us. If this occurs, then we will be fighting
a
rearguard action in a defensive posture. Coming out FIRST with a
benchmark
which does support our systems strategy avoids all of this.
Note also that this issue becomes critical to the MIPS platform. Its
primary
reason for existence is performance, and the Winstone figures for it
will be
essential for making a case for MIPS. The central marketing message for
the
companies producing MIPS based Windows machines is that they can
deliver more
absolute Winstones than any other platform, and hopefully more
Winstones per
dollar too.
Selling against OS/2
The claim that they will be a “better Windows than Windows” is put
directly to
the test by comparing the Winstone rating for a given machine
configuration.
I believe that this can be a very powerful tool for embarrasing them.
This
can occur in two ways.
First, many of the scripts would be fully Win 3.1 exploitive. It is
entirely
possible that the suite will not run under OS/2.0. Even if they support
the
correct feature set, the tests which allocate large amounts of memory
will not
operate in real mode, and will be at a strong disadvantage in standard
mode,
so any attempt to run Windows in a restricted mode will be exposed.
Second, even if they can run the scripts, it will be hard to look
good.
General performance problems will crop up in many ways. Having OS/2 in
memory
will consume several megabytes, even if there are no other problems.
Windows accelerators
Dozens of companies are creating add on graphics boards to accelerate
Windows. They have little technical guidance, and little way of
comparing their
efforts. Winstones are ideal because manufacturers can directly
advertise how
their boards effect the “Graphics WINmark”, “Disk I/O WINmark” etc. The
existence of a standard metric for this will will help to focus their
activities. Competition will increase, and end users will have a better
way
to judge what they’re getting.
To date, most of the “accelerator” performance story has centered on
display
cards, but we also would like to encourage low cost RAID disks, better
system
caches, better printing solutions and a variety of other hardware
improvements.
PC price/performance
The emphasis on “Winstones per dollar” highlights the price performance
aspects of a system, and it is an excellent way to demonstrate the
value
delivered to the customer. This does not directly help Microsoft, but
it does
help get the Windows computing world focussed on deliering the maximum
bang
for the buck to our customers, so it is useful in that context.
Selling Jumbo
The printing benchmark focusses attention on the best Windows printing
solution. This is an excellent opporunity to highlight Jumbo and the
advantages it brings.
Selling TrueType
The font and text benchmarks are a good opportunity to highlight the
benefits
that TrueType brings to Windows customers. Alternative approaches would
look
pretty silly if the decrease the over all Winstone rating of a system.
Taking the technical high ground
Finally, this is an opportunity for Microsoft to take a strong
leadership
position in nurturing the community of suppliers to the world of
Windows
computing. Establishing a standard benchmark of this sort is a good
move – it
helps both customers and IHVs develop better products.
———————————————————-
My take on this is that it is a very important opportunity which we
should
captialize on ASAP. Comments are welcolm.
Nathan
###################################################### 286
>From georgem Mon Dec 16 12:51:55 1991
To: bradsi
Subject: Re: bullet
Cc: dennisad, elik
I talked to Chuck Bigelow about this so that I could get the
story from the horse’s mouth, so to speak.
His answer was that bullets really aren’t standardized by various
typographers, and so it is really left up to the “random tastes
of the artist”. They had always hated the large bullets that
seem to go with every other font on the planet. He said it
seemed to them that those bullets were almost too big and that
they seemed to jump out of the page when you were trying to read
it, thereby distracting you. They brought too much attention to
themselves, in other words.
Since Lucida Bright and Sans were designed as text faces to be
used in books, they wanted a more discreet looking bullet that
would blend in better. Since they already had a zillion bullets
in the Lucida Stars font, and they knew you could always use one
of them if you were unhappy, they did the smaller bullet.
For presentations and such, it would probably be better to use
something from Lucida Stars. If you were writing a book, on the
other hand, he likes the smaller bullets since they aren’t as
garish.
###################################################### 287
Fran greglo Mon Dec 16 12:54:00 1991
To: bradsi davidcol tomle
Cc: mackm
Subject: Re: Novell
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 91 12:52:58 PST
It is an installable driver which is loaded at boot time
by the a system.ini entry. It hooks Kernel’s MS-DOS function
handler and critical error and munges the registers on the critical
error based on the current dos call. (It could also be a simple
DLL loaded by load= rather them an installable driver; doesn’t really
matter.)
As for Mack’s suggestion I don’t think it is reasonable for us to
provide the workaround and not make it available to customers. If
we relegate it to a PSS fix we’d still be sending it out: it’s just
that more users will crash and not report it and not realize that a
solution exists. It would make no sense to make Novell reimplement
it-over again, either. The testing is an additional burden but we
are already required to do fairly massive post-beta3 distribution of
what is the msdos 5 experience been like?
###################################################### 345
>From jnetter Mon Dec 16 15:42:40 1991
To: lorisi winsquad
Cc: debbieh
Subject: RE: Windows Focus Squad Meeting Reminder
Date: Mon Dec 16 16:41:52 POT 1991
RussW is in Zurich and will not be available to attend…
>From lorisi Mon Dec 16 14:36:58 1991
To: wingguad
Cc: debbieh
Subject: Windows Focus Squad Meeting Reminder
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 91 14:34:45 PST
Next meeting is scheduled for tomorrow, 12/17 at 8:30 am in 2/2103.
###################################################### 346
>From joachimk Mon Dec 16 15:43:46 1991
To: billg bradsi steveb
Subject: EMI
Date: Mon Dec 16 16:20:06 PDT 1991
Mike signed a 20 M$ commit license today for all their 386 sx and
higher end
systems/per pocessor for WIN and DOS. This was a tough one against DRI.
THey
will continue to ship DRI on 286 and 8086 systems honoring an old
license
agreement. DR was at $3-4 with DOS, ve are getting more than $35 for
WIN and
DOS. The slim pack DOS helped to close the deal.
###################################################### 347
>From debbieh Mon Dec 16 15:53:16 1991
To: jnetter lorisi winsquad
Subject: RE: Windows Focus Squad Meeting Reminder
Date-. Mon Dec 16 17:48:47 PDT 1991
steveb will not be attending as well but the meeting
should still take place ….. thanks
###################################################### 348
Fran carls Mon Dec 16 16:00:05 1991
To: billg bradsi paulma tcmle
Subject: ULSI
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 91 15:58:22 PST
fyi…
| >From [email protected] Mon Dec 16 15:27:25
1991
| Return-Path: <mipos3 [email protected]=””>
| Received: by mipos3 (5.57/10.0i); Mon, 16 Dec 91 13:53:32 PST
| Received: by intelhf .hf.intel.oom (A=~A Smail3.1.17.5 #17.19); Mon,
16 Dec 91 13:50 PST
| Received: by oatt.hf.intel.com (ccmgate) Mon, 16 Dec 91 13:50:10 PST
| Date: Mon, 16 Dec 91 13:50:10 PST
| >From: Mike Bruck <mipos3 !mike=”” [email protected]=””>
| Message-Id: <[email protected]>
| To: Robert_Sullivan[S]_at_ccssw [email protected], [email protected],
| mipos3!intelca!microsoft!carls
| Subject: ULSI
| TO: ESM, PR CONTACTS
| THE FOLLOWING RELEASE WAS ISSUED OVER BUSINESS WIRE AT
| 12:00 NOON (PACIFIC STANDARD TIME.).
| Contact: Pam Pollace Intel Corp.
| (XXX) XXX-XXXX
| OREGON JUDGE GRANTS INTEL’S REQUEST
| FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON KEY MATH COPROCESSOR PATENT
| Key Licensing Issue Also Decided in Intel’s Favor
| SANTA CLARA, Calif., December 16, 1991 – Intel Corp. said it has
Thanks. Alessandro
###################################################### 365
Fran bradc Mon Dec 16 16:54:21 1991
To: bradsi
Subject: RE: EMI
Date: Mon Dec 16 16:54:1l PDT 1991
yup, was there when they signed today,
sergio helped vith this a bit too.
big win
| From joachimk Mon Dec 16 15:43:46 1991
| To: billg bradsi steveb
| Subject: EMI
| Date: Mon Dec 16 16:20:06 PDT 1991
|
| Mike signed a 20 M$ commit license today for all their 386 sx and
higher end
| systems/per pocessor for WIN and DOS. This was a tough one against
DRI. THey
| will continue to ship DRI on 286 and 8086 systems honoring an old
license
| agreement. DR was at $3-4 with DOS, ve are getting more than $35 for
WIN and
| DOS. The slim pack DOS helped to close the deal.
###################################################### 366
Frcm gaben Mon Dec 16 16:55:03 1991
To: davidcol
Cc: a-kelm davidtry noladr richsa stevesh valorieo vinwar
Subject: Re: WPG Dropping the ball on the PCT
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 91 16:53:44 PST
Ok. We’re just going to keep working with DavidTry on the PCT
testing
(see his mail below on Valorie’s buglist) . If there is anything else
we need
to do, let me know.
Thanks.
| >From davidool Mon Dec 16 16:12:28 1991
| To: gaben
| Subject: Re: WPG Dropping the ball on the PCT
| Cc: a-kelm davidtry Doladr richsa stevesh valorieo winwar
| Date: Mon Dec 16 16:10:59 1991
|
| Clearly something is screwed up, Windows folks
| don’t usually flame other groups like this
| without good reason. However, we are deep in the middle
| of getting our final beta out and thus won’t be able to
| resolve until after. Fran richsa’s original mail, it
| looks like ve can deal with the gap for final beta.
|
| >From davidtxy Mon Dec 16 14:29:42 1991
| To: valorieo
| Cc: a-kelm gaben noladr richsa
| Subject: Results of Valorie’s testing
| Date: Mon Dec 16 14:29:16 PDT 1991
|
| Here’s the most recent info I’ve received fran Valorie. This
| is exactly the sort of data I was looking for. My comments are
| prefaced with “>>>”
| CSD is installed on the machine when you install IBM PCLP NET on
it.
| I believe that the PCLP NET install docs state which DOS 4.00 CSD is
| required for it. I believe that different versions of the PCLP NET
| require different DOS 4.00 CSD versions. I also believe that it is
| very difficult to tell which DOS 4.00 CSD is installed on a particular
| machine, you simply have to KNOW which one is installed. You might be
| able to tell by looking at the date on the system files (IBMBI0.COM/
| IBMD0S.COM), but I am not at all sure about this.
|
| If you are running an IFSFUNC.EXE that does not match the IBM DOS 4.00
| CSD that you are running, you will get no warnings, the PCLP NET will
| be perfectly happy to start. Windows Enhanced Mode will NOT be happy
| to run correctly on such a machine however! All sorts of very very
| peculiar stuff will start happening. The one case I know of is that
| wierd stuff, breakage, hangs, reboots, bugs will start occuring.
| Either in windows, or in the DOS applications, or in both. I do
| not know the specific cases of all possible combonations of PCLP
| and DOS 4.00 CDSs.
|
| I have been struggling with a machine in the network lab downstairs
| 1041 (NETLAB 22, IBM PS/2 model 55sx) for three days!! This problem
| is what was wrong with it. The IFSFUNC.EXE with PCLP NET that was
| installed on this machine did not match the IBM DOS 4.00 CSD that was
| installed on this machine.
|
| I am inclined to say the following things:
|
| All PCLP NET test machines are possibly broken.
|
| The validity of all PCLP testing that we have done is at risk.
|
| I know several factual things:
|
| All PCLP test machines need to be checked.
|
| All NET testers need to be educated how to not INVALIDATE
| both the testing and the machines.
|
| All development folks who may be involved need to be educated.
| I for one, am completly unwilling to look at anything having to
| do with PCLP until it has been explained, al least to my satisfaction,
| what the scope of the problem is. And when, or if, it is going to be
| fixed.
|
| We have not been careful. We are now going to pay the price for not
being
| careful. It remains to be seen what that price is……….
###################################################### 192
>From spanky!operdst
Sun Dec 15 17:02:41 1991
Received: by darla.UUCP (DBCUS UUCP w/Smail); Sun, 15 Dec 91 17:00;39
PDT
Date: Sun, 15 Dec 91 17:00:39 PDT
From: <operdst @darla.uucp=””>
To: microsoft!bradc sergiop adamt richf dianet bradsi johncon richba
Subject: DOS 5 mtd Shipments…
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 1243 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1243 Page 1 of 16
To: Joachim Kempin. Distribution
From: Jeff Lum
Date: Februrary 25, 1992
Re: January Europe OEM Sales Status Report
Attached is the European OEM Sales status report and US OEM sales
status reports for January. Please provide me with any feedback that
you deem appropriate.
Copies of more detailed reports from each subsidiary or account
managers are available upon request.
Distribution:
Reif(Ralf?) Skoglund(?) MSAB
Bengt Akerlind(?) MSAB
Peter Slum(?) MSAG
Petslek(?) Da(?) Smedt MSBV
Hans Rensal?(?) MSBV
Jochen Heinik(?) MSGMBH
Juergen Hu?h MSGMBH
Egon Salmutter(?) MSGESMBH
David Svendson(?) MSLTO
Sandy Duncan MSLTO
Mohol(?) L?oomb?(?) MSSARL
Peacel(?) Martin MSSARL
Umberto(?) P?olucci(?) MS SPA
Mauri?o(?) Bodino(?) MSSPA
Ign???(?) F?u(?) MSSRL
Sunir(?) K?poor(?) MS Europe
David Britton MS Europe
Robbie(?) Beck MS Europe
Hans(?) Apel MS Europe
Bernard(?) Vergnes MS Europe
Tim B??rd(?) 10N/1261(?)
Peter Bramen(?) 10N/1314
Brad(?) Chass(?) 3/2046(?)
Mark Chestnut(?) 10N/14??(?)
Dougl?s(?) J?ckson ?S/1077
Arne(?) Josefeberg(?) BP/8181(?)
Dwight Krouse(?) 1/1080
Paul Maritz(?) 2/2045
Nell(?) Milter(?) 8M/2258(?)
Lorl(?) Morrison(?) 10N/124?(?)
Sergle(?) Fineds(?) ?/205?(?)
Frenz Reu(?) ?5/2122
Brer?????????rg(Smudged on purpose?) ‘???4??(Smudged on purpose?)
Carl(?) Stertz(?) 2/2100(?)
Adam(?) Tayl?r(?) 3/2052(?)
John Williams 6/2061
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] **MICROSOFT SECRET**
[STAMPED] MS7035050 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 1343[?] [illegible]
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1164632 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1243 Page 2 of 16]
January Status Report
Europe OEM Sales
Jeff Lum. Director
| Revenue (see attachment for details) |
| Area |
January
Actual |
January
Budget |
FYQ3
Forecast |
FYQ3
Budget |
Ovr % of
Budget |
| Europe OEMs |
1,126,791 |
0 |
17,500,000 |
16,692.125 |
105% |
| US OEMs |
7.067,782 |
6,776,780 |
20,000,000 |
19,184,844 |
104% |
| Europe Sales |
8,194,573 |
6,776,780 |
37,500,000 |
35,889,043 |
104% |
Comments on revenue:
Europe OEM: Over a million dollars in pure miscellaneous revenue
throughout the subs on a budget of $0 for the first month will give us
a nice boost for the quarter.
I expect to finish close to $1M over budget for the quarter as we do
some catch up billings as well
as invoice several due-on-signings for license renewals. US OEM: Breman
Team Ravenue for
January was $2.7 million against a plan of S2.6 million 104% of plan.
This indudes all the new
accounts now assigned to Peter’s group. Tandon came In at $1.9 million
against-a plan of $1
millon which more than offset the $700,00 in lost revenue, bacause of
tha Tandon/Positive merger.
Compaq had a decent quarter in FYQ2 shipping ovar 2S0K units, and we
should be at or near plan
for February revenue. Chestnut Team Revenue for January was $4.3
million vs. plan of $4.3
million. NCR had a surprisingty strong second quarter, and also
reported some previously
unreportad net revenues, which resulted in $1.9 million in January
revenues. The revenue outlook
for Q3 is looking much bettar – $11.4 million vs. budgat of $10.S
million. The addition of Logitech
to the group is a major reason for this as they are expected to finish
$1 million over budget in 03.
AST shipped a record 120K systems in O2 and is also expected to finish
well above budget for Q3.
| New Business Signed |
| Account |
Product |
Comments |
| European OEMs |
|
|
| Facit AB |
DOS 5.0; Win 3.0 |
New M/C = $2S0,OO0/year |
| Detevsrehuset A.S |
DOS 5.0; Win 3.0; OS/2 1.X |
New M/C = $562,000/$562,000 |
| Prill Computer GmbH |
DOS 5.0; Win3.0 |
New M/C = $116,000/year. |
| BSC Computer GmbH |
DOS 5.0; Win3.0 |
Amendment M/C = $125,400/$169,800 |
| Sender Computer Systeme GmbH |
DOS 5.0; Win 3.0 |
Amendment M/C = $113,200/year |
| C & S Comp & Service Vertriebe GmbH |
DOS 5.0; Win 3.0 |
New M/C = $97,500/year |
| J & S Speth Software Systeme GmbH |
DOS 5.0; Win 3.0 |
New M/C = $64,800/year |
| Geosoft Brender & Kreft GmbH |
DOS 5.0; Win 3.0 |
New M/C = $43,500/year |
| Pyramid Computre GmbH |
DOS 5.0; Win 3.0; OS/2 1.X |
Amendment M/C = $54,000/year |
| Lehmann und Partner |
DOS 5.0 |
Amendment M/C = $240.000/year |
| Rain Electronik GmbH |
DOS ROM; WIN ROM; Flash |
New M/C = $22.000/year. |
| Ti’Ke Computer Corporation Ltd. |
DOS 5.0; Win 1.0; PPack |
New M/C = $383,500/year |
| Psion PLC |
DOS 1.11; Flash 1.0 |
Amendment M/C = $87,500/year |
| Matavidooler S.A. |
DOS 5.0: DOS ROM 5.O |
New M/C = $67,500/year |
| Unidata SRL |
DOS 5.0; Win 3.0: MMW |
New M/C = $182,000/$200,000 |
| Microsy Electronics SRL |
DOS 5.0 |
New M/C = $720,000/year |
| US OEMs |
|
|
| NCR |
OEM Premier Suppport |
$15,000/year |
| HP Corvallis |
MS-DOS 5/Windows 3.X |
Per processor for two additional years |
| HP Corvallis |
Excel; Word: Mail: Schedule+ |
LOI for Lion Project |
** MICROSOFT SECRET **
2
[STAMPED]HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS7035051 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164633 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1243 Page 3 of 16]
General Issues
AB ICL willl start working with Novell. The market demand for Novell
is there, and with the general
reorientation from a pure technical company to a more market oriented,
ICL appears to have taken a
decision to complement LAN Managar with Novell. ICL is very upset
bacause we did not carry out
what was promised at the LM Open Council in September regarding one
upgrade price to 2.1.
Instead they have at least 5 different RR depending on the customer
situation. This in contrast to
Retail side. This is really a general problem that the Retail offering
and OEM offering generally don’t
overlap on work group products, creating situations of discrimination
against tha OEM.
IBM is very active selling OS/2 2.0. Victor remains cool, but ICL is
leaning over to IBM. Tha major
issue is that Micrsoft is not really interested in supporting OS/2 (as
Steve Ballmer made very clear).
GmbH The situation with Schneider is still unclear. We proposed a
solution where Schneider has to
write off half of their $3.4m PPB. Schneider may step out totaly of the
PC-business. For IPC we
couldn’t find a solution up to now. because they felt blackmailed by
our proposal, to terminate the
contract within the new agreement. ObS is threatening us by several
proposals from their side
were they want to deduct a high amount from their invoices because of
losses the mada caused by
not getting the delivery partner contract. Escom and Peacock started a
negotiation with us to
combine their purchasing. They even told us that it is possible that
both companies merge.
Robotron Ascots and Robotron Soemtron are liquidated. Open Invoices win
be paid.
LTD News that we are cutting a deal with Phoenix to allow them to sell
ROM DOS with their BIOS
and motherboard design is BAD ! We’ve been working hard in the UK to
establish a ROM DOS
‘distribution’ channel. Contracts will be signed in early Feb. The
development of this opportunity
is a delicate one that has already taken up a lot of our time and
effort. The distributor needs a dear
run at tha market – the Phoenix deal will provide totally unnecessary
competition.
Apricot have asked to re-negotiate their agreement. They’re over
committed by at least 50%.
Wa’ve tentatively agreed to reduce their second year’s min. commit to
$1.3M from S2.2M in return
for adding a third year to the agreement.
The FG DOS business is an area for growing concern. In December we sent
out 26 licenses and
only saw 7 of these returned. In January we sent out 38 new agreements
and only saw four of
these returned !!!! In addition five of December’s agreements appeared
in January bringing our total
for the two months to less than 30%. It’s becoming s critical issue as
we need to look for new
business to replace existing pack DOS OEMs as we sign the top guys up
to royalty. We desperately
need two FG-DOS account managers.
We are also suffering from an explosion of pirate DOS. Products bearing
the Minta and AcBEL
labels are foremost but at the and of Jan. we saw tha worst yet, with
our US EZ DOS appearing on
the open market st less than £25 per copy. Our strategy is
ideally to put this to bed at source
(typically these ‘pirate’ products are rogue products produced under
valid MS agreements but
shipped without Hardware). If we can’t do this then we have been
attempting to get to the UK
distributor and simply sell him our genuine package product at price
list. As I write we have
received an order for 1,000 units from one of these “distributors” in
Stonehaven, Scotland.
SPA the “old” OEMs are twisting our arms to lower their numbers to
match those of new deals.
Trying to reach good tradeoffs, and not to make enemies out of old
friends. Andreab is pushing
CDC to cover all their systems, eliminating the risk of a DR revamping.
Compaq marketing group continues to grapple with tactical issues on
Windows opportunity.
Compaq concerned with number of corporate agreements MS has closed for
Windows business.
IBU division closed to further discussion of EBU and Mouse products.
Compaq requests per-system
pricing for DOS license.
** MICROSOFT SECRET **
2
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1243 Page 4 of 16]
[STAMPED]HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS7035052 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164634 CONFIDENTIAL
Ungermann-Bass: UB is concerned about our presenting a clear
strategy for LM to the marketplace
as we approach NT implementation and move away from OS/2. This strategy
needs to be put into
a format that the UB sales force can sell into their large accounts. We
continue to release deals to
the retail channel without considering tha OEM channel. UB would like
to be able to compete on a
level ground with the resellers (i.e., if we give the channel a free or
reduced royalty for upgrades we
should offer the same deal to our OEM’s).
Positive wants to bundle applications on their hard drives. This would
enable the user to evaluate
the applications on their own system in their own home for a fixed
number of use . They would
than have to call Positive with their credit card number to purchasa
the key code which would
unlock the applications so that they could run. Mike Maples does not
buy into this.
Phillips: We are attempting to license the rights to PhotoCD from
Philips to be usad on all Windows
based Products.
ZDS – has informed us that our best price for Ballpoint is over $11
higher than Trackman. ZDS is
very likely to choose Trackman ovar Ballpoint.
ZDS – informs us that Spinnaker is offering lower pricing, free
documantation and no foreign uplift.
We are uncompative from a price standpoint.
AST – AST’s Tammy Watanaba is recommending IBM’s JDOS and even DR’s
JDOS ovar MS’s
product due mostly to MS Japan’s expressed attituda towards AST. AST is
angry bacause thay
believe MS Japan is continuously quoting misleading delivery dates and
AST is watching MS Japan
‘court Compaq’ while MS Japan basicaly ignored AST’s afforts to enter
the Japan market.
General News
AB Tandy will open a superstore in Copenhagen, selling Victor, IBM,
and Compaq. It is the familiar
Computer City concept from the US. Observe that it is Tandy that is
opening, not Victor
Preparations are in full swing. Victor will continue operations as
before. Both Computar City and
Victor will source from Victor’s newly opened factory in Scotland. It
is expected that certain
changes in the management structure will occur, but this is not
confirmed publicly.
BV At a seminar organised by Intel IBM was giving a presentation on
OS/2 2.0. Tha product looked
very stable. Thay used tha latest build, and the presenters were very
confidant that IBM was going
to make the target date of end march. At the presentation they
positionad OS/2 as the DOS task
switcher. Windows compatibility was shown. IBM states that thay have
full DDE between OS/2
apps and Windows apps that was not shown. The system performence (a
P75) was very acceptable
in DOS, Windows and OS/2. At the demo they explicitly showed also
DR-DOS in ths OS/2 DOS
box. The story was that users are using Windows mainly as task switchar
and OS/2 can do this
much better. On top of this you get full Windows and OS/2 that is
indispensible for IBM mainframe
communication. The Apple/IBM deal will not generate products within
five years(!) And in the mean
time OS/2 is the best solution.
GmbH started a Win3.1 program together with 52 OEM’s for CeBit. Almost
all of them agreed to
show Windows 3.1 on their machines at CeBit. The program is very well
accepted. We started to
work, on this together with tha local systems business unit. All OEM’s
were informed about our
plans for the Windows 3.1 launch and all OEMs answered a questionnaire
about thair plans for
Windows 3.1.
SPA Good MYR, no change to OEM dept Retail (in lira) at 69% MTD, 86%
YTD. SW market
worsened in January. Clone market healthy. Super deal closed with
Microsys, see Other OEMs
section.
SRL 2 finalists for the LA Rep position are ready for final interview
with you. Other highlights of the
month were the MYR and Systems Strategy Briefing to 3 OEMs and 3 LAs.
** MICROSOFT SECRET **
4
[STAMPED]HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS7035053 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164635 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1243 Page 5 of 16]
Account News
Compaq announces sales of $873 million for O4CY91 showing improvement
over Q2 and Q3. Net
income was $131 million. Compaq announces agreement to resell Novell
Netware. Compaq ands
SGI joint venture agreement.
Sofboume has fired their president and laid off 30% of their employees
within this last month.
Philips: Rob Hamersma, the Managing Director of Philips Consumer
Electronics, has bean replaced
by Lars Nyberg. Mr. Nyberg comes from Philips Information Systems.
CompUSA: Artisoft shipping free software, diske, and documentation.
Introducing new Slim line machines
in March.
Creative Labs: Will introduce a 16 bit sound card in June.
Media Vision: Will introduce new portable sound board that plugs into
printer port in March.
Headland Technology: Getting out of the sound board business.
NCR – The WPD reorganization is complete and Clemson now handles all
softwara managament.
Representatives from all of the key NCR organizations will be in
Redmond on Febuary 10th to
learn about MS OS/2 to NT Migration plan so they can assist their ISVs
and customers in the transition.
NCR – Received good news from 3140 group via Stevab conversation with
Tom Mays that the 3140
will not be Hobbit (RISC) but will be most likely SL based architacture.
ZDS – ZDS will offer 7 out of the 49 bids for DT4. During the first
round of bidding, ZDS bid MS on
all Windows bids. However ZDS bid Windows on fewer than half of their 7
bids. We are working
to convince ZDS to bid MS and Windows on all bids.
ZDS – announces further layoffs and a restructuring of field sales.
Over 60 sales and support
people are cut.
ZDS – will reportedly be supplying IBM with a large quantity of
portable machines for IBM resale via
Bull. Rumor has it that ZDS will supply 150k machine per year to IBM.
If this it true, it will double
the number of portables shipped by ZDS.
AST – Genelle Trader, Director of AST notebook products, resigned and
accepted a job as Everex’s
VP of Marketing.
AST – MS made significant progress with AST on DTIV. After our meeting
with AST’s Bob Becker,
AST is expected to ship MS products only and abide by the Option 3
terms.
HP – HP Vancouver’s DeskJet 500C announced last Fill at $1095 SRP, is
getting good reviews
from the PC press. Nearly every review notes the product’s fundamental
flaw of being modal
(either good monochrome or good color, but not both at the same time)
while endorsing this
product as the best low cost color option available today.
DG – DG announced that they started fiscal year 1992 in the black, but
just barely. DG earned $4M
on sales of $294.8M in Q1 of fiscal year ’92. This represents the fifth
consecutive profitable
quarter for DG after sustaining two and one-half years of losses.
DG – DG announced that Robert Mars has assumed the position of VP of
the PC Business Unit.
Mars comes to DG from Tandon where he was VP of Sales. Mara fils the
position vacated by
David Ruberg, who left in August.
** MICROSOFT SECRET **
5
[STAMPED]HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS7035054 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164636 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1243 Page 6 of 16]
Area Summaries
Finished Goods DOS – Europe
| Subsidiary |
January
Actual |
January
Budget |
FYQ3
Forecast |
FYQ3
Budget |
| MS AB |
8,497 |
1,982 |
13,792 |
6.792 |
| MS AQ |
2,038 |
1,744 |
8,000 |
5,323 |
| MS BV |
4,033 |
2,100 |
8,873 |
7,200 |
| MS GESMBH |
429 |
984 |
1,300 |
3,002 |
| MS GMBH |
44,589 |
29,343 |
102,688 |
86,477 |
| MS LTD |
16,110 |
8,500 |
44,075 |
35,500 |
| MS NV |
1,074 |
1,842 |
4,993 |
5,629 |
| MS SARL. |
8,473 |
10,800 |
69,141 |
60,100 |
| MS SPA |
4,285 |
2,200 |
9,274 |
5,900 |
| MS SRL |
2,525 |
3,345 |
3,500 |
10,600 |
| TOTAL |
92,033 |
62,444 |
263,836 |
217,523 |
January was the strongest month for PackDOS in the history of MSAB.
The figures speak for
themselves. In reality January was a super month because of shipment
problems in December. This
has triggered several PackDOS accounts to consider licensing.
BV The pessimistic outlook we had for this month did not come through.
Despite the fact that
Sydec signed a licensed agreement they still placed an order for FG
M5-DOS. So this month BV is
on 180% of budget. The Belgium sale continues below budget. However the
application sales in
Belgium is at record levels. Clearly this indicates that the dedicated
FG-DOS sales person is
urgently required.
GmbH Revenues are far over budget. With $5.9M we are at 153% of budget.
The forecast for
January was 41,800 units of package MS-DOS Incl. DOS/Windows combo
packages. Actually we
achieved 44,100 units which is 155% of our budget with 28.400 units.
According our February
forecast we expect to ship in total 29,000 units. Mice business went
well. too. We delivered 9.000
units as forecasted. D+S raised their forecast for the rest of the
FY’92 to 12,000 units each
month.
LTD ANOTHER RECORD MONTH !!!!! Tht subsidiary beat $10M for the first
time ever and our FG
DOS sales contributed by beating the 16,000 barrier for the first time.
We almost doubled
our revised budget of 8,500 units. This is even better news when you
take into account the ‘loss’ of
Ti’Ko to a royalty contract. They were ordering at least 1,000 units
per month previously.
Our windows penetration has continued above the 50% mark for the third
month in a row.
However, this is slightly worrying as we try to move these customers to
full royalty licenses due to
the high cost of producing DOS and Windows manuals. Dearly EZ DOS isn’t
enough without EZ
Windows. Meantime we’ve persuaded Phoenix to do OEM manuals at under
$35 which will help
but it isn’t perfect. This combo needs to cost the OEM less than $20 to
be effective. The news
that we will be bring the EZ packages to Europe was very encouraging
but I have serious
reservations regarding Ireland’s ability to deliver small quantities in
good time to multiple delivery
points. We should do a local deal for the UK/Europe. I will be
investigating the possibility of using
Amstrads printer who are based in England and provide VERY competitive
pricing for Amstrad.
The outlook for Pack DOS sales is extremely positive. Feb. looks
quieter than January but we’ll still
easily exceed our revised budget Of 11,000 units. Msrch, which is year
end for the majority of UK
companies, looks like being a MASSIVE month.
SPA Sales of PackDOS keep great. at 194% YTD. In units, 21.726, we have
beaten this FY budget.
Revised budget is 31,000. Doing more active prospecting, and planned a
new edition of the
packDOS ad we did in November.
** MICROSOFT SECRET **
6
[STAMPED]HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS7035055 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164637 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1243 Page 7 of 16]
SRL Pack DOS sales were 76% vs. MTD budget (98% vs. YTO budget).
CSEI and Comelta were the
first customers converted to royalty business and several others like
ADL (5K units) and Sieesa
(10K units) may go straight to royalty business next month. Expectation
is we will be way over
royalty business budget ($8OOK vs. $150K budgeted] and somewhat short
on Pack DOS budget
(35K vs. 40K units).
Market Trends
MS AB (Bengt
Akerlind)
Interest for Win 3.1 is gearing up. It is common knowledge when it will
be released. We will ride
this wave and convert as many PackDOS accounts as possible from “naked
MS-DOS” over to MS-
ODS/Win. Rumor has it that IBM will launch OS/2 2.0 on March 25. a few
days after our local
Win3.1 introduction.
MS GMBH (Jurgen Huels)
MurtiMedia is taking off in Germany. Escom and Vobis are advertising MM
machines on their front
pages of the *Extrablatt” and “Denkzeell”,
We see a high demand for hard disks which is currently not satisfied by
any hard disk vendor. This
is especially slowing down the notebook business.
MS LTD (Sandy Duncan)
Prices of new machines is getting sillier and sillier. Latest record
broker of note is from Opus.
386SX/20. 40MB HD. 1MB memory, color monitor. VGA and DR-DOS at a list
price of £599.
Viglen and Elonex have pledged to follow! This compares with the PC
World (superstore) price of
£1,599 for a similarly configured Dell machine and £999 for
an Amstrsd with the same spec.
Lotus have appointed a full-time “Director of Copyright Protection” to
defeat piracy. Lotus believe
that 50% of all software in US is illegally copied.
IBM UK announced that they lost £124M in FY ’91. This compares
with a profit of £420M in FY
’90. Total UK employees is down by 2,639 to 14,909 and turnover
declined by 14%. Total UK IT
market in 1991 was estimeted at £27 Billion, up 5.1% on 1990.
Projections for 1992 predict
similar growth to £28.5 Billion. Largest sector is Finance,
followed by manufacturing. Construction
was the smallest sector with Telecom showing fastest growth.
Novell is reported to be signing Merisel-Softsel as a disty on a
pan-European basis. Could be the
start of a significant trend?
The only superstore in the UK “PC World* hasn’t had a lot of press
recently but they are reported to
be running a ‘mass demo’ of OS/2 2.0 on Feb. 15. They either believe
that there’s a significant
home/hobbyist market for OS/2 or that corporates make purchasing
decisions on Saturdays ! – Very
strange.
February looks like being s VERY busy month. Highlight will be the
Windows Show in London.
OEM people are heavily involved with a total of 12 man days. We’ve
helped create a separate
technology stand with OEMs including Victor, Zenith , Compaq. NCR and
Apricot showcasing their
various windows based technologies including NT. 3.1, Pen and
MultiMedia.
Key Account Summaries
European OEMs
Actebis Computer GmbH
Oh January 16th, we had a meeting and with Harr Urban and Herr Puhrsch
to discuss the final
details for an amendment to their contract. Agreed upon was a two year
amendment to their
contract for 1OOK units of MS-DOS per system at $16.00 with Shell (and
this would be for the
German version and the $2.00 uplift for all other versions), and $25.00
for 50K Windows (also for
German version). We are also working with them on getting approval for
their packaging of MS-
DOS and Windows.
** MICROSOFT SECRET **
7
[STAMPED]HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS7035056 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164638 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1243 Page 8 of 16]
Amstrad (Richard
Barrie)
Amstrad have been reasonably quiet after thrreatening to erupt last
month !
Major incident took place in the Amstrad car park. Richard Barrie was
last seen travelling out of
Brentwood on the M2S at 150mph after bashing Sugar’s Rolls Royece in
the Amstrad car park.
Apparently left his name, address and Digital Research’s phone number
on the windscreen.
Apricot (Dale
Borland)
Dale and I met with Mike Jordan , who is rssponsible for the contract.
Put simply – they’re
massively over-committed. From April their min. commits go up to 650K
per quarter and they’re
currantly only fortcasting half of this. We have agreed tentatively
with them to extend the contract
by one more year at a commit of £1.3M rather than one year at
£2.2M. Currentiy we’re waiting for
Apricot to confirm this is OK. Meantime Peter Horne will be meeting
with Paul Maritz and Pam
Goldschroldt when he visits Redmond on Feb. 18. Dale will attend. Horne
has some notion that
Multi Processing is fundammentally flawed – hopefully Paul can convince
him otherwise.
Brother
They have started talking about putting DOS in their typewriters. This
is the pot of gold that we’ve
always been looking out for ! – they build 10.000 tvpewriters every
week 111 – We have a LONG way
to go but this could be very lucrative business for us.
ESCOM (Michael John)
The meetings with our marketing BU’S have been successfully finished.
ESCOM will advertise Works
for Windows stand alone on one page of his April magazine issue. They
still want Microsoft
to take over a part of the advertisement cstn for that issue. but we
won’t.
ESCOM finally agreed on the application deal. They will hard bundle
Excel 3.0 and Word for
Windows 2.0. They get a discount of 60% and DM 150.000.00 for
advertisement which they will
use for their magazine issue. ESCOM will preinstall all application
demo’s and test software from
Microsoft on every PC.
G2 (Hans Ranselaar)
We finally agreed on the new amendment for G2. Peter Breedijk will sign
it on short notice. This
amendment will be effective Oct.. 1 .1992 and will include Works for
Windows. Where is the Dutch
version of Work for Windows anyway? Susan Boeschen told G2 that they
could expect this early
December 1931.
ICL/Nokia LTD (Lars
Ahlgren/Dale Borland)
ICL came in with a very strong Q4 report. The Nordic figures showed
over 27,000 units shipped,
and from the UK we hear that they shipped over 20.000. This indicates
that ICL is getting close to
a 50,000 units quarter.
License negotioation is closed. We sidestepped Norokorpi and went
straight to Mills who gave a
verbal OK on (DOS + Windows) $32 PP/PI/3Yrs + $3 for localization. This
was a good win for us.
Microsys
Excellent deal closed with Microsys, in a rush to cut off DR from
negotiations. A nice royalty
for DOS, and a commitment of $720/year, and most of all a bad wound for
DR. This gives us almost
free way to try and attack Olidata. the last big customer of DR in
Italy.
Olivetti (Maurizio
Bedinal)
General. Olivetti slowly starting up back again, people is still quite
de motivated, in spite of a very
good quarterly shipments result: 221.000 systems. Too bad, this only
means they pushed a lot
down in the channel in December, that implies, Q3 will be bad. IBM
approached Olivetti with an
offer similar to Bull’s, which Olivetti politely turned down.
** MICROSOFT SECRET **
8
[STAMPED]HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS7035057 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164639 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1243 Page 9 of 16]
LM2. The news they got re our mktg. plans for LM CTP ara no big
deals, and -worse- we know
there is practically no plans. Trying to push Mktg. to endorse this
program & push it. if this won’t
happen. CTP will be a flop and LM will be even more at risk in
Olivetti. They are seriously talking to
Novell.
Comms server for NT. Lots of activity in this araa (this is one of
the hot banking topics, together
with NT). They met us, then DCL, conf called us again, and will meet
DCL again. Basically we are
trying to sell them the 1.1 for OS/2 as a product now, and its
evolution to NT as a perspective
Quoted std royalty rates (ind. commitments) and $100k for the source
down from $2SOk (as thay
will do significant enhancaments that in turn they’ll license to us for
free). We may be able to close
this deal, prob. at 50% now. Bad news is Dondolini accepted a job for
Olivetti Italy and will be
gone in one month.
MultiMedia. Olivetti is whining for tha $15 royalty with no commit,
which they consider high, and
still messing up with MediaVision.
NT-OS/2. Thsa issue is becoming hotter and hotter. On the banking
front, Brandi, Mensi!, and
developers just had a mtg. with Davidwo, Perttir etc. In Redmond about
the issue of porting Olivetti
offer to NT. According to a preliminary report by Lorim & Maurz
(who was thare too) the mtg. went
well and bad. Well because anyway Olivetti is convincad that it a worth
the affort to consider NT
the target platform for the PB system, and therefore a cooparation will
start with us to ensure tools
and apps are ported smoothly. Bad bacause Olivetti made clear that thay
don’t consider Win 3.1 a
viable intermediate step betwean OS/2 1.3 and NT as a replacement of
OS/2 2.0. Thay confirmad
instaad that if a customar asks/needs OS/2 2.0 they will make this
possible, not only shipping OS/2
2.0 per se, but also investing to ‘dress’ OS/2 with suitable apps. This
meant thay will spend
energy in porting (or ready up to port) their apps, and even LM if we
don’t do it. This obviously
implies Olivetti widening up their contacts with IBM. On a different
front during an interesting mtg.
with Piol (that Umbertoo called up), he requested officially that MS
accepts to sponsor tha Olivetti
R4000 machine launch in Paris in April. This sponsorship is letting
them show NT to the audience
(only Olivetti top VARis wwide), having a MS executive give a speech,
and extending the NT for ISV
program to Europe, pushing Olivetti MIPS machines. Waiting for answers
from the US.
OPUS (David.
Bradley)
Bradley and I met with Adam Harris in late January. Basically a great
meeting. We’re sure that we
can get the DR DOS issue resolved and a Windows deal signed before
mid-March. (Their contract
expires end March).
One of thee issues that has arisen from this is an issue which effects
all of our channels at MS Ltd.
Opus’ biggest customer (British Rail) want to put Windows on all of
their new and existing PC’s.
The new ones are fairly straightforward, but the existing base of c.
8,000 windows capable
machines is more of an issua as our large accounts guys as well as one
of our dealers are bidding
for this business. The situation has been resolved – we will make a
proposal to allow Opus to
upgrade BR using White Box windows. We’ll also give the same proposal
to the dealer involved
(MSL) and they can make their pitch against Opus on a fair and equal
basis. MS retail, large
accounts. Opus, the dealer and ultimately the customer are all happy
with this.
Schneider Rundfunkwerks AG
(Andreas Niegel)
We proposed a solution to Schneider Rundfunkwerks AG to write off 50 %
of their prepaids. Mr.
Rusniok will present this proposal to the board of directors. We assume
that a decision will be taken
until February 15th. In this new amendment they want to commit to 50k
units a year for the period
from Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1992. Given that we take standard pricing on
this deal it will be a $2.65m
commitment. We assume that we have to take pan of their prepaids into
that contract.
** MICROSOFT SECRET **
9
[STAMPED]HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS7035058 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164640 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1243 Page 10 of 16]
Siemens Nixdorf
lnformationsystems AG (SNI) (Jaap VanArkel)
Meeting with Decision Makers in Redmond date Feb. 20th. In preparation.
Objective: Convinca SNI
that NT it on schedule and the complete NT platform can be offered
within our promised time
frame.
Windows. Working to get the documentation at SNI before their deadline:
February 14th. They
recieved the documentation files without artwork. SNI wants to
co-operate at the WIN 3.1 Launch.
Will work with Windows Business Unit to get maximum involvement.
Windows/CeBIT. SNI will show Windows 3.1 at the CeBIT. About 80
notebook (introduced at
CeBit) with Windows installed will be on several places at the CeBIT.
The Windows Business Unit
will get one or more SNI NT systems in our Booths. Their first
pre-installed Windows machine will
be introduced at the CeBIT. 386sx price 3000OM.
NT: SNI it pushing NT strategy to their Large Accounts. In all
presentation slides NT is positioned
as a strategic product. SNI has postponed the multi processor
development due to technical
problems with Intel.
NT-SNA/COM Server – System Management This month Vesa Suomalaimam (MS)
and Clive Partridge
(DCL) presented SNI Open Systems development department the MS Comm
Server status and
strategy and possible co-operation between MS and DCL. SNI was not
willing to give out
requirements and status on their SNA product for UNIX and OS/2. This
due to a bad experience this
group had with Microsoft in co-operation on these themes more then a
year ago. We agreed on a
new start. February 21 we will have a meeting in Redmond about
co-operation on system
management and get SNI committed to SNA server for NT.
LANMAN: SNI received the LAN Manager for UNIX source code this month
and started porting.
Expected release date shortly after the CeBIT (April 92). The LAN
Manager amendment is approved
by both LAN Manager for OS/2 and LM for UNIX planning departments at
Siemens and is approved.
Amendments are now to the SNI management to be signed. Waiting for
language for the TCP/IP
utilities.
Mouse: SNI is selling the COMFO package (Logitech Mouse (12$) MS
Windows and Comfodesk) as
a retail product. They signed up for 10,000 units of Windows (finished
goods) for the coming year.
MultiMedia: No change, the system is in development and will be
introduce at the CeBIT
Tulip (Hans
Ranselaar)
The BUN group is working on the LM 2.1. Tulip is offering a free
upgrade to customers who
purchased after 1 dec. 91. The LM 2.1 package will be made up with the
Microsoft manuals and
the FG OS/2 1.3 package. This package is much cheaper than the license
and the manuals.
Our technical people are working with Tulip R&D to fix some LM
bugs. We have the attention from
Redmond now and this is helping. However there Is not much progress in
solving the problem, but
there is nothing we can do more.
Tulip had an excellent Q2FY92. they sold about 30K units which 80% more
then the previous
quarter, making this the best ever. Our royalties amount to over
$1000K. The processor split for
this quarter is 32% 286, 63% 386Sx 5% others. In particular the sales
of Window machines are
up.
Roland Diets Marketing manager of TCI will leave April 1, he has
accepted a position as marketing
manager with the Elsevier publishers.
Tulip is further delaying payments of our latest invoice until all
amendments are processed. There is
a PPB of about $150K, but the royalties in the last quarter are much
higher then the MC. This
means that after processing all the amendments Tulip will have to pay
us an additional $100K on
the old contract. So after the two years of the contract, the
difference between the MC and the
actual royalty is less then 2%.
** MICROSOFT SECRET **
10
[STAMPED]HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS7035059 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164641 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1243 Page 11 of 16]
Victor (Magnus
Larsson)
During the spring Victor will launch the new series of Grid Pen
Computers. The development is
handled by Grid.
Tandy will establish the Computer City concept in Europe. Tha first
store will be locatad in Glostrup
outside Copenhagen. It will ba a 3,000 square meters suparstore
containing hardware from IBM,
Apple. HP, Compaq and Victor. There
are plans to establish three more stores in Sweden and one
in Norway during 1992. Info in italic it NOT OFFICIAL information yet,
even if there has been a
flash about it in a Danish newspaper.
Vobis (Stafanie
Reichal)
During the Mid-Year Review, Bill Gates visited the Vobis store in the
Arabella-center in Munich.
Bill has now seen their efforts for DR-DOS, unfortunately, but we are
working on a long term plan
to dramaticaly improve the presenee of MS-DOS in Vobis stores.
On January 28th, we had a meeting with Vobis together with Dahmen to
discuss the relationship
and to officially introduce Stafania as their contact. Issues that ware
discussed were whether they
would be interested in licensing Win Works and they said they might be
interested in talking to us
more about it especially at a price of $15.00 or $30.00 bundled with
Windows. He is also
interested in discussing possible PCWorks 2.0 to WinWorks updates. We
think that once he starts
feelind stiffer competition from Escom that he will want to talk more
to us about this subject of
WinWorks.
In this metting we were also informed that thay shippad 103,000 systems
in Q2FY92 and we will
be getting signed and finalized royalty reports from them in the next
meeting on February 6, 1992.
68K units want out with MS-DOS S.0. and about 50% of all units went out
with Windows.
US OEMs
Compaq (teresach)
The primary activity this month was Windows 3.1 negotiations. Jeffl and
Teresach traveled to
Houston to begin negotiations. This was followed up by numerous
conference calls and a written
proposal, counter-praposal, and response. The current status is that
Compaq will license Windows
for products due out in the June time frame. While Teresach continues
to push for the April time
frame. Compaq has been unable to move quickly enough to take advantage
of the launch
opportunity. Peterbra visited the top three Compaq subs in Europa to
discuss joint marketing
opportunities between the MS and Compaq subs. Billg and Eckhard
Pfaiffer spoke briefly regarding
Compaq announcements and Windows licensing status. Additional
activities were a Pen Windows
briefing, NBU and printer meetings.
Ungermann-Bess, Inc. (markbu)
UB is still dedicated to a LM strategy and is interested in raising the
level of the strategic
relationship between our two companiess. We met with UB to understand
the new organization
there and to present the MS strategy to them. It is still unclear on
how tha new relationship will
eventually be structured. It is clear that it will change over the next
months as UB’s new rganization settles in.
tomhen
Commodore: Negotiations for the per-system Windows and Works for
Windows license is going
very slowly. although we did receive a $42.000 PO. for Works for
Windows document films.
Tomhen made MS DOS 5.0 Portable Computing Initiative Preeentation to
their technical staff, which
was well received. This is the continuation of our effort to replace DR
DOS on their palmtop
machine. Tomhen spoke with Lou Egglebrecht (their palmtop architect),
he agrees MS DOS belongs
on the palmtop.
** MICROSOFT SECRET **
11
[STAMPED]HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS7035060 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164642 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1243 Page 12 of 16]
Tandon: Tomhen attended their biyearly executive level Product
Planning meeting with Joachimk,
and Peterbra. They presented the MS System Software Strategy and Trends
in the Intel PC
Market.
maricba
Philiphs: Most of January was spent obtaining final signature for the
new Master Contract and
pushing the contract through the channels at MS. Additionally, Markba
spent a great deal of time
preparing for the Executive Briefing which is scheduled for February
12th. Philips is presently
establishing a factory in Europe that will receive basic PC
configurations from Montreal and prepere
these PCs for distribution in Europe. Most of the Montreal staff has
been in Europe helping to
setup this new organization.
We have also had a great deal of activity surrounding tha licensing
of PhotoCD directly from Philips
to MS. This license issue is very complex and requires the cooperation
of the highest levels of
management from both our companies. It appears that we will be
successful with this license and
thus MS will be able to support PhotoCO on all Windows based devices.
Part of the Feb. 12th
agenda will be to come to agreement on this issue.
Northgate: NG was involved in the budgeting process for almost the
entire month of January. As a
result things were fairly quiet. We did accomplish the reconciliation
of the outstanding moneys MS
owed to NG and that did take quite a bit of time. Resolution to this
issue was greatly appreciated
by NG management. NG is also in the process of re-evaluating its
marketing strategics and
considering vertical marketing approach to bundling software.
debbiefl
CompUSA: CompUSA has agreed to add a third year to their MS-DOS license
and commit to
100.000 units. They have also agreed to license 50.000 copies of
Windows for three years.
They will preinstall Windows on their machines. They would not commit
to a per-processor deal, as they
do not want their costs burdened at the low and where they have so few
margin dollars. They will
be attending WinHEC and using our logos. They have completed the HCT.
There is substantial
opportunity for both high and low end applications business.
Creative Labs: The Bookshelf license was finally completed. There
had been several snags, as MS
had told them originally that they could sub license Bookshelf. Our
agreements with the third
parties, like Houghton Mifflin, do not allow us to sub license.
Unfortunately, MM Pub wasn’t aware
of that. We also found out that CL cannot distribute Bookshelf in the
UK because of a naming
dispute MS is having with another company. An amendment allowing them
to act at a replicator
for OEM’s with MMWin license was drafted and delivered. Pamelago and
Debbiefl visited them this
month to discuss MM marketing plans and the testing procedure we are
implementing for MPC
compliant components and systems. CL is extremely interested in being
our supplier for Foghorn.
Media Vision: The issue that has been open this month is whether or
not we can license them for
Windows 3.1 to bundle with their Thunderport board at a price they find
acceptable. They have
been vary unhappy with what we have quoted them. There are several
issues we are pursuing from
a legal standpoint, so we can understand exactly what we have to
provide them under their current
contract. They have an amendment in their hands for signature that will
extend their ability to
upgrade their installed base until March 30. 1992 and allow them to act
as a replicator for OEM’s who have MMWin licenses with MS.
** MICROSOFT SECRET **
12
[STAMPED]HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS7035061 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164643 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1243 Page 13 of 16]
Pattyl
NCR – NCR signed up for OEM Premier Online support for $15,000. which
went into effect on
Monday, February 3rd. The new Mouse Distribution Agreement and the
Master License
Amendment are on Alok’s desk for signature and will be signed whan he
returns from Germany.
Introduced Mark Buick as the new NCR Account Manager via the MS-DOS and
Windows road show
meeting at E&M Dayton. Steve Ballmer and Tom Mays had an excellent
(last) call regarding
Windows NT and Steve has been invited to Dayton for a strategy update
meeting this Spring
(Paulma will probably attend). E&M Atlanta came to Redmond on
January 9th to understand our
pland for MS-DOS 6 and it looks like we’ll be able to accommodate their
needs before MS-DOS 6 is
available. E&M Columbia has been on site porting NT to the 3550 and
there are plans to work out
a program to ship NCR MP systems and NT code to selected (important)
ISVs. The E&M Clemson
NT enoineers were in Redmond for a metting with Carls and Mackm to
discuss potential joint
development of ‘Win32 on DOS’ (Panther) for their high-end
workstations.
Johnmc
AST – Account turnover from Jeffd began. Traveled to AST and presented
to 12 manager and
director level personnel a presentation on MS-DOS and Wlndows plans for
launch and future
directions. Met with engineering group and listened to concerns of NT
development, getting a
better communication network up and running (direct email via gateway).
Discussed AST’s custom
Configuration program for direct sales through the resellers. Met with
Jim Schraith, VP of channel
marketing , Julia Irvine, Marketing manager of mass merchant channel
and had Mike Negrin
present and outline MS marketing channels and strategies.
AT&T/NCR – Came to verbal agreement with Safari systems group to
amend the Rhapsody
agreement for MS-0ffice to utilize existing pre-paid from Rhapsody
agreement for Safari systems.
Met with Naperville Multimedia group and provided information on Win
3.1 and MultiMedia
extensions. Naperville group outlined new product plans for a
MultiMedia system due in Q193.
Confirmed the Naperville group is now responsible for the upgrade
MultiMedia kit developed by
AT&T. Began formulation of royalty pricing for the PC mail groups
Easy link project. Finally
scheduled technical review meeting with 3140 group to review MS and NCR
future products.
Account turn over to markbu began and will be completed in February
Wyse Technology – Met with Rich Wesson and Jim Munro to address
outstanding issues. The
meeting was very encouraging. Discussed alternative arrangements for
EBU products for the Wyse
Decision laptop. Wyse will most likely license Works for Windows and
Money on a Per System
basis for a 6 month period. Discussed the license for Windows and came
to a verbal agreement for
Windows Per processor if issues surrounding corporate licensing
programs can be resolved. Wyse
also wants to present to MS executives the business case for the
Windows NT Terminal proposal.
Wyse sent a programmer and system to NT development group to begin the
porting process of NT
to the Wyse 700i. Met with NT technical staff to outline projected
milestones for SMP port of NT.
Tomda
Zenith – This has been another month of high activity in the ZDS
account. ZDS entered the mass
market at the January ’92’s CES show and announced that Spinnaker Works
will be shipped with all
mass market machines. We have lost this business. ZDS is soon to
announce a portable pointing
device available for all ZDS portables. Logitech’s Trackman is the
likely winner. ZDS will ship in
excess of 100k units of this product per year. We also met with ZDS and
gained closure on
Winball. Upon availability of Winball. ZDS will ship this product with
all ZDS network ready
machines. Groupe Bull and IBM announced that IBM will purchase a stake
in Groupe Bull and that
IBM will resell ZDS portable machines.
** MICROSOFT SECRET **
13
[STAMPED]HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS7035062 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164644 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1243 Page 14 of 16]
Jeffd
AST – AST’s VP of Channel Marketing. Jim Schraith, visited MS’s Mike
Negrin. Alex Nadar, and
John Williams to discuss co-marketing activities for Windows World, the
mass-market channel, and
MS’s Fall Promotions. These discussions want well and will be followed
up with Mike Negrin
visiting Tom Yuen on March 4th. AST announced its new AST Office
Advantage product line at the
CES show in Las Vegas. Their press announcement stated that Lotus was
on Office Advantage PCs
which was not true (see issues). AST’s account transition began. Johnmc
introduced himself well
presenting MS’s system software update on MS DOS 5’s APM and Windows
3.0 momentum. John
and I will work together on the outstanding issues and the transition
will be complete by February
13th.
AST continues to grow selling 120K
systems in Q2.
Darcyh
HP Corvallis -Signed the LOI for Lion. Additionally, signed the MS-DOS
5.0 and Windows 3.X
Amendment per processor. Remaining issues are what will be used for the
PIM on Lion. MS Mail
group presented a spec, for Address Book, as part of Schedule Plus, but
did not fully meet HP’s
requirements. Chrisp has assigned Roberd full time as Project Mgr.
replacing Josephr. Roberd will
work to define best PIM solution for HP and to be key technical
interface for Lion for MS. Delivered
first draft of tha Agreement for Lion.
HP Grenoble
Met with Jacques Clay, GM, Grenoble, at dinner with HP Sunnyvale to
discuss proposed Windows
bundling proposal. Discussed Windows bundling options and how Windows
could benefit
Grenoble’s planned network ready/capable desktops, planned for release
this spring and Fall.
Grenoble is interested in pursuing an exclusive bundling option similar
to Corvallis’ Lion. Would like
to investigate joint development opportunities. Will be meeting with
Jacques in February to
investigate how Grenoble/MS can work together. Jimko, TAM, will be
visiting Grenoble in
Feb./Mar. to review support for HP, and how MS can better support
Grenoble.
HP Sunnyvale
Held a meeting with Sunnyvale to hear about plans for ‘Edison’ a
pen-based 386 PC, with email
and fax capabilities. Planned release Q1 ’93. Key opportunities for MS
are Pen Win, MS Mail and
Schedule Plus. Met with Duane Zitzner, GM, Sunnyvale, at dinner to
discuss Windows bundling
proposal. Discussed Windows bundling options and how Windows and Window
applications could
benefit Sunnyvale’s planned 486/25 CPU upgrade able machine planned for
spring ’92. Submitted
revised Windows proposal, and will review with Sunnyvale in effort to
name Windows system by
2/28, which is required in contract in order to recover $100K of
current PPB.
HP Colorado Networks Division (CND)/lnformstion Networks Division (IND)
Bobkr and Darcyh met with Information Networks Division (IND) and
Colorado Networks Division
(CND) in joint meeting on 1/30. IND is now responsible for all mktg. of
LM for UNIX Systems.
Discussed ways to promote joint networking strategy and reviewed
strategy for LM for UNIX
Systems. IND continues to defend Novell announcement as a simple
‘balancing’ message, as they
have been leaning too far towards LM. Darcyh will be scheduling meeting
with mktg. groups from
MS and IND to further educate IND on LM strategy and to investigate
joint PR opportunities.
Richab
Hewlett – Packard – The new year brought with it some good progress on
the HP front. Highlighting
the month was a successful executive meeting where HP gave us their
final commitment to build
TrueType into the Payette printer. In addition, agreements were drafted
to put to rest concerns
relating to ownership and disclosure plans for two interface standards.
** MICROSOFT SECRET **
14
[STAMPED]HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS7035063 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164645 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1243 Page 15 of 16]
+--------------+ | Jeff Lum | | Director | | Dept 8806 | +--------------+ | + --- Debby Johnson | Admin Asst. +---------------------------+--------------------+----+------ -- -- -- -- ----+ | | | | +---------------------+ +----------------------+ | +--------------------+ | Braman Account Team | | Chesnut Account Team | | | | | Peter Braman | | Mark Chesnut | | | European OEM Sales | | Group Manager | | Group Manager | | | | | Dept. 1501 | | Dept. 1505 | | | | +---------------------+ +----------------------+ | +--------------------+ Mark Baber Rich Abel Lorl Morrison Bengt Akerlind Northgate, Philips Compaq Printer Bus Database Arministrator MS AB (Scandinavia) Hewlett-Packard Printer Bus. European Sales Support Teresa Chapman Meurtzio Bedina Compaq Mark Buick MS SPA (Italy) NCR/AT&T Debbie Flynn Sandy Duncan Activision, Headland Jeff Daniels MS LTD (England) Compudyne, Media Vision Data General, EMI Logitech, MAS Ignacio Feu Tom Henningsgard MS SRL (Spain) Austin Computer, Commodore Tom Davis Swan, Tandon Sun, Zenith Jurgen Huels MS GmbH (Germany) TBH Darcy Holle Atari, PC Innovations Hewlett-Packard, Momenta Pascal Martin Tandem/UB MS SARL (France) Patty Lazarus NCR Hans Raneelaar MS BV (Holland) John McLauchlan AST, Wyse
Microsoft Confidential
Rev. 1.31.92 Christu
[STAMPED]HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS7038064 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164646 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1243 Page 16 of 16]
[The last page shows the members of the OEM sales team]
[Unreadable]
[STAMPED]HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS7036065 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164647 CONFIDENTIAL
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 1394 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[STAMPED “PLAINTIFF’S
EXHIBIT 1394” BUT OCCURS AMONG RESPONDENT’S FILES ON THE COURT WEB
SITE.]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1394 Page 1 of 4
>From stefanir Thu Aug 13 21:41:20 1992
To: baerblb bengta bernardv carstens cwedell jeffl joachmk jochenh
Cc: berndk gerdab reginaw stefanir wolfe
Subject: URGENT-VOBIS Meeting with Lieven Aug 13, 1992/Impt. long email
Date: Tue Sep 01 09:10:45 PDT 1992
Date: Thu Aug 13 21:38:28 PDT 1992
You are all probably going to demand that my email rights be taking
[sic] away after the length of this email, but I felt it was very
important to communicate all the issues that happened today…..
Today I went to Vobis to discuss current business issues and to prepare
for the agenda of items that Lieven wishes to discuss in next weeks
meeting with Billg in London. Also attending the meeting with Lieven
was Gerda Beining, Channel Marketing Specialist from the OBU. I invited
Gerda along with me in order to approach Lieven on the Marketing Plan
targeted towards working together with Vobis that we developed together
(This plan was distributed to all of you on July 6th). We also wanted
to present a proposal for working together on a Christmas Promotion and
WinWord campaign in Germany.
Overall, the meeeting went very well and included some very positive
reactions on many issues, which I need to tell you about and get your
feedback as quickly as possible.
Lieven is looking forward to the meeting with Billg next week. He is
excited to be able to discuss with him where MS’s strategy is going and
his own. Currently, Lieven is very positive towards MS and is very
committed to the contract which was signed on July 2nd. The negative
problem areas that exist in the relationship right now are the problems
that have happened in the past and currently in the receipt of product
tapes and documentation.
Lieven plans on mentioning this issue because he sees it as an area
that continues to stand in the way of us working together smoothly and
for him to be able to bring to market the products. Otherwise he is
very positive. I was also able to present to him in this meeting
information on MS-DOS 6.0 and WFW. He was very excited to hear
about our intentions for MS-DOS 6.0 (for example H/D compression and
our anti-virus product.) It turns out that he was lately in contract
discussions with Central Point to license from them their anti-virus
product, but they couldn’t agree on price. Needless to say, he
was impressed and excited.
I also discussed with Lieven our plans for WFW. Many of you are
aware that our competitors in the market are aggressively targeting our
OEMs, and they are not forgetting Vobis. LOTUS has been actively
targeting Vobis in licensing and selling Lotus 1-2-3 and AMI-Pro for
DM 88.00. BORLAND has also been approaching them lately as well
with offeres and WordStar Germany has offered WordStar for a license of
DM 2.00. NOVELL is also aggressively targeting Vobis with selling
NetWare Lite and DR-DOS, especially since they are their top OEM in
Europe.
The Sum of All of this is as follows:
Lieven has been giving thought to these offeres, but he prefers our
product palette and feels that we are the market leaders. Price is
ofcourse [sic] important to Lieven, but he would rather pay a slightly
higher price to us knowing that he can offer the customer the leading
market standard and high quality products. What he is willing to
do, is commit entirely in a “Strategic Alliance”….He even said he
would be willing to no longer offer DR-DOS, LOTUS, or BORLAND
etc. In exchange for such
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1394 Page 2 of 4]
a committment [sic] and investment from him, he would like to see an
equal committment [sic] and investment from Microsoft. Along these
lines, he would like to have a commitment from us for better customer
support to him in areas such as documentation and in joint marketing
and strategically working together in the marketplace.
On this topic, I would then like to refer to our discussion together
with him on the topic of our Marketing Plan and the proposed Christmas
and WinWord promotion. Call it fate, but it just so happens today he
introduced a gentleman by the name of Marc Pastuere. He is a new member
of the Board and is Lieven’s right hand guy in getting Vobis and in
particular the “HIGHSCREEN” name recognized in the market. The timing
of our presentation and his coming on board couldn’t have been more
perfect. They invited us to Lunch to discuss the marketing proposals
more in depth. After several hours of discussion, they loved the
concept and are basically ready to do the following:
– After next weeks [sic] meeting with
Billg, he wants to issue together with us a press release stating the
“Strategic Alliance” to us and committment [sic] to Microsoft’s
strategy. (This would send a
very direct statement to the public and the media that they have chosen
MS, and not DRI, NOVELL, Lotus or Borland). [HANDWRITTEN
UNDERLINE]
– They will invite us in early Octoboer to present and train their
Store Managers and sales people from all of their stores in Europe on
MS-DOS 6.0, Win 3.1, NT and WFW as well as applications.
– They will also commit to atleast [sic] initially to a WFW agreement
for 25K WFW licenses with the anticipation of much more since they have
plans to break into the networking market and target small businesses.
They would NOT offer NetWare Lite and instead push us and they are
planning on having a stand at the PC-Windows Show in Frankfurt Oct
14-17th, where they would issue jointly with us a press release stating
that they are committed to MS and our strategy with WFW in networking.
(NOT NOVELL’s NetWare Lite)
– Lieven wants to do ACTIVE marketing with us…. He wants to actively
on a Europe-wide base aadvertise and promote software in all 130
stores, including information displays, auto-demos, show window
displays and stickers in windows etc…. He is willing to share costs
with us and at NO CHARGE to MS bring us into his flyer “Denkzettel”
that has a current distribution in Germany alone of over 6 Million, and
around Christmas he estimates it to be at over 10 Million. He also
wants to bring us into his new Advertising campaign for Highscreen
computers which is appearing on Billboards and major business magazines
(ie. Stern, Spiegel etc).
– Lieven also wants to start actively selling retail packages of
software, in particular WinWord and Excel to his “Power user” that
needs more than the Works for Windows product.
Many of you who attended the meeting at CEBIT92 where Lieven stated
“That he doesn’t care about software and is a “Hardware Seller only”
and is not interested in marketing or selling software”, are probably
wondering now why Lieven had a 180 degree turn in his viewpoint. This
is because quite simply, Lieven sees what is happening in the
Marketplace and that he needs to react if he wants to continue to grow
and be successful in the marketplace. He now understands and “Has seen
the Light” regarding the importance of software helping sell his
hardware. He knows that he cannot offer every operating system, every
spreadsheet or every word processing product.
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1394 Page 3 of 4]
He therefore feels that as the leading OEM in the Market he should
partner with the leading software company….which he feels is
Microsoft. In exchange for the above items which he wants to do with us
he proposed the following committment [sic] from us on the Marketing
side:
– To participate in the Microsoft
Christmas Promotion in all of his 100 stores in Germany. He will only
do this if we give him exclusivity and not if we are proposing on doing
this with ESCOM or Shadt etc.
– He would then like to work together with us very aggressively along
with a Decoration Service for Window display where he will also pay for
a share of the costs.
– He will put atleast [sic] 1 or 2 pages of free advertising of
this promotion in all of the flyers/Denkzettels that go to approx. 10
million recipients per month.
– He wants to plan to do joint datasheets that would then be
displayed in info racks throughout his stores along with coupons to
mail back for more information.
– He wants to do joint mailings on this to both the Vobis and MS
database.
– He wants to be able to bundle WinWord and Excel with his computers
during the time of this promotion. He wants them on commission and sell
them as follows:
Machine bundled with Works for Windows: Price-DM2999.00
Same machine, but with option to choose WinWord or Excel:
Price-DM3499.00
Same machine with both WinWord and Excel: Price-DM3949.00
(I realize that these are ridiculously low….Lieven knows it, but its
[sic] what he proposed and he basically wants a counter proposal that
is attractive and competitive)
– He also wants to sell all of our app
products such as Office, Winword, Excel, Powerpoint, WIndows, PC-Word,
Mouse, Publisher Money, Golf, and Flight Simulator. He wants to be able
to sell them as closely as possible to the prices that mail order
houses sell for and get them from us on commission and at a price where
he can earn a little on it.
(All of the above is waiting for a counter proposal from us….even if
we do not agree to all, he basically needs something to differentiate
and would only want the special prices during the promotion period.
Afterwords, [sic] he would go to standard prices and buy from
distributors. He sees our benefits as being able to achieve in this
short period time a high market penetration and get the update
business. He says at the prices that our competitors are offering that
we need to be aware that alot [sic] of OEMs may just sell it to get the
business in the store.)
– After this promotion, he would want
to continue to work ith us on a regular basis doing in-store promotions
and havingnormal non-christmas information displays etc. as we had
proposed in our original marketing proposal for Vobis. They also would
like us to work together at the different sub-levels doing promotions
in each country.
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1394 Page 4 of 4]
He needs to know that if we do this project, that we really are
committed and support them in making a success, just as they will.
He says that unless we can offer him something which is for a short
period of time exclusive for 3 months and can help differentiate
himself in the Market and from his competitors, then he is not
interested in giving us exclusivity or any of the above mentioned
items. Quite simply said, he needs to decide in the next month which
partner with whom to work and he is asking us first. He wants us, but
may have to choose another partner if we are not interested in this
type of strategic alliance. I ask that you consider his proposal for
working together and I am basically just reporting to you what Lieven
and Vobis are interested in doing. The strategic decision for such lies
with you, the management in how we should proceed. Lieven wants to act
on this as soon as possible, especially since any Christmas promotions
etc. need to be planned to take place as soon as November.
As follow up and to emphasize his interest, he has requested a meeting
with Jochen Haink on Tuesday, August 18th in Munich.
Please respond as quickly as possible on your thoughts regarding this
email and let me know how we should proceed.
Thanks
Stefanie
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 1397 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1397 p. 1 of 4
[This is a fax cover sheet. Printed letterhead addresses at top and
bottom impossible to read, mostly hand-filled out form.]
Microsoft·[fancy logo]
Microsoft GmbH
[ADDRESS / TELEPHONE /FAX]
Nordrrlassung(?) Brrlm:(?)
[ADDRESS / TELEPHONE /FAX]
Nieferlasmng(?) Kad(?) Hambury;(?)
[ADDRESS / TELEPHONE /FAX]
Microsoft·(fancy logo) GmbH
Telefax – Mitteilung
An : Bill Gates
Fax Nr.: [FAX]
CC:
Von: Stefanie_Reichel
Datum : August 17, 1992
Gesamte Seitenzahl: 14
Pre-meeting briefing notes + VOBIS
Account Profile
Bill –
Please find attached(?) the requested(?) information for the meeting
with Vobis in London this week. I will be briefing you in more
detail on Tuesday at the Hyatt Carlton Towers.
Regards,
Stefanie Reichel
[LETTERHEAD FOOTER WITH ADDRESS / TELEPHONE ]
[STAMPED] SR00015 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1164660 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 1357(?) Reichel(?) 8/26/98 CER(?)
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1397 Page 2 of 4]
Microsoft – Vobis
Pre-Meeting Briefing Paper
| DATE: |
August 17th, 1992 |
| |
| TO: |
Bill Gates |
| |
| CC: |
| |
Bengt Akerlind |
Jochen Haink |
| |
Jurgen Huls |
Joachim Kempin |
| |
Jeff Lum |
Christian Wedell |
| |
| FROM: |
Stefanie Reichel |
| |
| Re: |
MICROSOFT – VOBIS Executive Meeting in London
August 19th, 1992 |
Attached are pre-meeting briefing notes and the Vobis Account
Profile for
your reference in preparation for the meeting with Vobis’s Founder and
President, Theo Lieven. The meeting will take place on the day before
the
Annual Board of Directors Meeting being held in London, England.
The meeting will be a lunch meeting where current and future
strategic
issues related to our two companies working together will be discussed
and an opportunity for you and the President and Founder of Vobis to be
able to meet. I intentionally did not include a formal agenda because I
would like to have the meeting be more informal. The pre-meeting
briefing
has been scheduled for Tuesday, August 18th at the Hyatt Carlton Towers
hotel in London at 2PM where I will review the issues and agenda with
you in more detail.
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1164661 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] SR 00016 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1397 Page 3 of 4]
Microsoft – Vobis
Pre-Meeting Briefing Paper
| Meeting Date: |
August 19th, 1992 |
| |
| Time: |
1PM |
| |
| Location: |
Restaurant “Chez Nico”
90 Parklane (by Hyde Park)
London, England
Tel.#: 44-71-409-1290 |
Vobis Attendees:
| Theo Lieven |
Founder and President |
Microsoft Attendees:
| Bill Gates |
CEO and Chairman |
| Jurgen Huls |
OEM Sales Manager – MS GmbH |
| Stefanie Reichel |
OEM Account Manager-Vobis |
Purpose of Meeting/Overall Meeting Objectives:
1) To demonstrate to
Lieven/Vobis that Microsoft is committed to them as a partner and that
we want to build a successful and mutually profitable business
relationship with them.
2) Discuss Microsoft’s
future product and systems strategy. (MS-DOS 6.0, Windows NT and
Workgroups for Windows.)
3) Discuss Vobis’s
plans for the future and how they plan on responding to the quickly
changing market.
4) Get commitment for
a “Strategic Alliance” between Microsoft and Vobis to work together
closely in the market.
5) Get a commitment to
get DRI/Novell out of the Account.
6) Get a commitment
for Windows for Workgroups.
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164662 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]SRO00I7 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1397 Page 4 of 4]
Microsoft – Vobis
Pre-Meeting Briefing Paper
Key Issues to Address:
– Windows for Workgroups
– Windows NT
– MS-DOS 6.0
– New Contract and Marketing Actions
Hot Issues:
– Late Delivery of Documentation and Products
– Problems of Past
– Pricing
NOTE:
Please review the attached Vobis Account Profile which contains
up-to-date
information on the status of the account and an Executive Summary and
personal
profile on Theo Lieven.
[STAMPED]MS-PCA 1164663 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED]SR000I8 CONFIDENTIAL
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 1513 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1513 Page 1 of 10
VOBIS Microcomputer AG
Account Profile for Q1FY93
Microsoft·(fancy logo)
&
VOBIS
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 1339 Reichel(?) 8/26,6g(??) CER(?)
Stefanie Reichel
OEM Account Manager – Germany
SR 00034 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
EXHIBIT
vergnes(?)
45
6.2207(? – half of line cut of due to end of fax or something)
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0195373 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1513 Page 2 of 10]
Executive Summary
Vobis Microcomputer AG (Vobis) represents one of the most strategic
accounts to
Microsoft both in terms of the revenue they bring us, but also because
of their fast
growth and strong presence in the German and European market.
From a market share standpoint, Vobis is by far the largest
manufacturer and seller of
IBM compatible computers in Germany with 1991 annual shipments of
270,000 at a
sales revenue estimated at over DM1 Billion ($650 million – the figures
have not been
officially reported yet). In a recently published IDC report. Vobis was
placed as
having 15.3% of the Intel-based PC market share in Germany, leading by
a significant
margin against IBM which had 10.5%, Siemens-Nixdorf with 52%, Escom
with 5.1% and Compaq
with 5% respectively.
Vobis is also projected to continue to grow rapidly and dominate the
German market
and eventually expand into the rest of the European market with as much
momentum.
In the last three quarters alone, they have shipped over 255,000
systems, and expect to
ship a record 350,000 systems this CY92. This will place Vobis as the
largest shipper
of PC’s in the German market
From a royalty revenue standpoint for Microsoft, Vobis is by far our
largest OEM in
Germany, and one of our largest in Europe. Since they started shipping
our products
with our systems in Q2FY91, they have brought in $2,506,980.00 in
royalty revenue
for FY91. Actual revenue for FY92 was $7,449,632.00 although they had
been
forecasted at $5,174,336.00. Effective July 1st, 1992, Vobis committed
to a new I8
month contract agreement for an annual commitment of $11,880,000.00.
This
commitment includes new licenses for Works for Windows and
Entertainment Pack.
In addition, we believe there is potential for additional revenue for
licensing products
such as Windows for Workgroups. This could mean royalty revenue for
Microsoft
exceeding $12MM in FY93.
Vobis’s strengths and reasons for such success lie in their ability
to offer the lowest and
most competitive prices for PCs in the market In addition, they have
more visibility
and presence than any other PC reseller due to their network of 100
sales outlets in
Germany and 30 others throughout Europe. This has allowed them to offer
customers
more convenient locations and easier “one stop shopping” than is
readily available
elsewhere. They also actively advertise their aggressive pricing for
PCs in a monthly
collateral piece which is inserted in the top 10 newspapers and
magazines in Germany
with an estimated circulation of over, 6 million. They also have fast
logistics
and a quick central operations group in their headquarters.
Vobis’s weaknesses lie in their growing reputation for poor quality
control in their
products and in customer support. This is where many of their
competitors are trying
to steal market share from Vobis, even if they cannot compete with them
on price.
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] SR 00035 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0195374 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1513 Page 3 of 10]
Our greatest challenge and threat in this account has been DIGITAL
RESEARCH
(DRI). Vobis is still DRI’s largest OEM in Europe and where they have
had their
strongest foothold in an account. There are many reasons that DRI was
able to get
this position with them. One of them is that Vobis does not want to
feel dependent on
one vendor and this means Microsoft. Another reason is that internally
at Vobis there
are several “DRI Disciples” who preach within and to the Vobis customer
base that
DR-DOS 6.0 is better than MS-DOS 5.0.
Our challenge in countering this DRI threat is slowly being achieved
and in the last
three quaners alone, the percentage of DR-DOS sold to MS-DOS has
dropped from
50% to 18%. In addition, Windows is taking off. In Ql and Q2FY92, our
percentage
of Windows penetration was 50%. Since Q3FY92, the Windows penetration
on their
systems was increased to 63%. It is currently after Q4FY92 at 77%. By
Microsoft
continuing to work together more closely and supporting Vobis with a
dedicated
Account Management team, by dedicating marketing monies for projects
such as
training and seminars for their store managers and promotions in their
stores (such
as with Windows), we will be able to create needed visibility and
continue to chip away at
DRI’s stronghold in this account as well as any other competitcrs.
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] SR 00036 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0195375 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1513 Page 4 of 10]
Company Business Profile
Vobis Microcomputer AG (Vobis), a manufacturer of IBM Compatible
personal
computers and systems, was officially founded in 1975 in Aachen,
Germany by Rainer
Filing and Theo Lieven. The company originated as a purchasing club at
Aachen
University of Technology (Germany). Within two years it had become a
full-time mail-
order business operating out of the garage and apartment of the two
founders with a
turnover of DM 2 million ($1.15 million) in their first year of
business. By 1980, obis had reached a turnover of more than DM 10
million (S5.7 million). The
company has since then grown rapidly at an average rate of almost 100%
each year.
In 1989, in order to finance and maintain their tremendous growth
rate, Vobis sold a
50% share of their business to KAUFHOF Holding Group, the largest
retail store
chain in Germany and a division of the Metro International Group.
By establishing this new distribution channel and partnership with
KAUFHOF, Vobis
was able to expand its market from the private sector to the
semi-professional and
professional market Currently, Vobis markets and sells direct to
business enterprises
and home users with their own brand name called ‘Highscreen’. They
accomplish this
in Europe through their own network of 130 sales outlets and the
network of their
partner’s retail outlets (Kaufhof and MediaMarkt) and small business
wholesale centers
(Metro) which is estimated at being over 400 locations.
The projected annual sales for this CY92 are 350,000 systems at over
DM 2 Billion in
revenue (S1.2 Billion). Vobis’s primary business and sales are in
Germany and they
continue to dominate and grow at a strong rate in the German market.
However,
Vobis’s main strategic goal is to continue to aggressively expand with
additional stores
throughout Europe (mainly Spain, Italy, Belgium, Holland, later France,
UK and
Poland), and to grow these markets as successfully as they have grown
the German
market.
Vobis currently manufacturers their PC’s in locations such as
Berlin, Vienna/Austria,
the former Philips Computer Plant and through the hardware manufacturer
Aquarius
Computer. In addition, they just completed building a Warehouse and
Assembly Plant
near their headquarters in Aachen, Germany where they will be able to
centrally store
and ship their products to all stores throughout Europe with an
immediate response
time.
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] SR 00035 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0195376 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1513 Page 5 of 10]
Quick Personal Profile on Theo Lieven:
– Founder, President and Member of Board. Age 40.
– Attended Aachen University of Technology in Germany, receiving a
degree in Mathematics.
– Lieven is the main contact for Microsoft. He is a very complex
character who needs special attention to his success and ego-stroking.
He is an intelligent, very eccentric man with a great sense of humor.
He can be sensitive and if he is teased in a negative manner, he shuts
off completely.
Examples of his extraordinary lifestyle and personality are:
- He is still a registered student in the 40th semester in
mathematics
- He is a concert pianist with over 12 years of training and lessons
- He is a certified pilot and flight instructor
- He drives only 12 cylinder cars (Jaguar, Mercedes, BMW) and
collects eld sports cars
- He indulges daily on gourmet food and expensive old wines
Previously, Lieven did not see the importance of the Operating
Systems or software
applications to his company’s success. He was aggressively marketing
several software
products and three (3) operating systems (DR-DOS, MS-DOS, and OS/2). Up
until
recently, he favored DR-DOS despite the fact that he had to pay for
these licenses
extra, since he has a per processor agreement on MS-DOS. He is most
likely paying
about $5 for DR-DOS on a per copy basis.
However, with the signing of the new contract agreement. Lieven has
been showing
signs of wanting to work closer with Microsoft in a “Strategic
Alliance”. He has
recently come to realize that the market is becoming increasingly
competitive and he
needs to be able to differentiate himself from his competitors. He also
has had the
problem of a growing reputation for poor product quality and service.
In order for Lieven to continue to keep Vobis growing and be
successful, he feels that
as the leading OEM in the Market that he should partner with the
leading software
company …Microsoft. He is even willing to discuss no longer offering
DR-DOS if we
are willing to work together with him in marketing in the European
market and helping
him sell our software with his hardware. The Marketing Plan which was
written
towards working together with Vobis was presented to him and he is
willing to allow
us to include in his stores information racks, auto-demos, window
displays, posters,
stickers in windows and joint advertising in his flyers. We are
currently discussing
with the GmbH how we can agree on a joint strategy to work together and
present a
proposal to Lieven.
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] SR 00035 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0195377 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1513 Page 6 of 10]
Vobis at a Glance*
Name and Address;
Vobis Microcomputer AG
Postfach 1778
Rotter Bruch 32-34
D-5100 Aachen
Germany
Business:
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) of IBM Compatible personal
computer systems.
| # of retail stores: |
# of employees: |
| |
| Germany: |
100 |
| Austria: |
10 |
| Switzerland: |
4 |
| Italy: |
5 |
| Belgium: |
2 |
| Holland: |
9 |
|
1283 |
| |
| Annual Sales: |
Channels: |
| |
| 1989: DM 280 million |
Vobis Stores: 90% |
| 1990: DM 540 million |
Distributors: 9% |
| 1991: DM 1 Billion + (Figures not reported yet) |
Mail Order: 1% |
| |
| Markets: |
Sales by Territory: |
| |
| Individuals/Semi- Professionals: |
75% |
| Medium Business/Fortune 250: |
15% |
| Education/Government: |
0% |
|
|
* Most figures above are based on
1991, but his been updated with information from 1992.
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] SR 00039 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0195378 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1513 Page 7 of 10]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] SR 00040 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0195379 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
Product Line
Vobis sells a complete line of IBM compatible desktops, laptops,
servers and
accessory products. This product line is as follows:
Desktops
| Name of Product Line: |
Highscreen Kompakt Serie III |
| # of Desktops: |
6 |
| Processor Types: |
| AT 286-16 |
AT386SX-25 |
AT386DX-33 |
| AT386SX-16 |
AT386DX-25 |
AT486SX-20 |
Laptops:
| Name of Product line: |
OEM Notebook Series (No Name) |
| # of Desktops: |
4 |
| Processor Types: |
| 286 |
386DX-33 |
| 386SX-20 |
486DX-33 |
Servers
| Name of Product Live: |
Highscreen Tower Serie |
| # of Desktops: |
5 |
| Processor Types: |
| AT386DX-25 |
AT386DX-33 |
AT486SX-20 |
| AT486DX-33 |
AT486DX-S0 |
Software Bundles
Presently, when Vobis sells any of the above PCs to a customer, they
receive a cardboard carrying box
called “Software Package” in which they receive the following software
bundle:
- DR-DOS 6.0 -OR- MS-DOS 5.0
- Power Basic Basisversion
- PC Tools 7.1
- Microsoft PC-Works 2.0
-OR-
Windows 3.1 and WAYS 1.1 with the book tided “Ways” by J. Schieb.
- Microsoft Works for Windows 2.0 on select 386/486 Windows
machines.
- Microsoft Entertainment Pack Volume 1 on their Video Pro 286
machine.
- HP New Wave 3.0 (on all 386 tnd 486 processors with more than 4
MB).
Other Products
OEM Brand Name (Olivetti, He-Mett Packard, Epson, and other)
Printers, Monitors, Modems, Scanners and Mouses;
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1513 Page 8 of 10]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] SR 00041 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0195380 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
Unit Shipments and Processor Mix
* The above is based on actuals that we have through Q4FY92.
All other is based on our Forecasts.
[The histogram shows sales of Intel 8086, Intel 286, Intel 386, Intel
486 for each of 11 quarters from Q2FY91 through Q4FY93. It is
difficult to read the histogram due to the poor quality of the image,
but total shipments for each quarter range from 60,000 through 120,000,
more or less increasing from quarter to quarter.]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1513 Page 9 of 10]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] SR 00042 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0195381 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
Royalty Revenue of Microsoft Products
[IMAGE: Histogram of Royalty Revenue of Microsoft Products, over six
quarters from Q2FY1991 to Q3FY1992.]
Revenue for FY91 – $2,506,980.00
Revenue for FY92 – $7.449.632.00
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1513 Page 10 of 10]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] SR 00043 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS98 0195382 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
License Profile/Contract Summary
- New License Agreement effective July 1,1992 – December 31. 1993.
Total per processor royalty is $29 .70.
- All products to be pre-installed and they are a Ready-To-Run
licensee is well.
- MS-DOS commitment doubled from 200K to 400K units annually per
processor.
- MS-DOS royalty at $9.00 for all language versions.
- Windows commitment increased from 100 K to 320 K units annually
on all 386 and 484 systems.
- Windows royalty at $15.00 for all language versions.
- In addition, they have committed in a new separate one year
contract for 100K units of Works for Windows Version 2.0, 80K units of
PC-Works Version 2.0 md 40K units of Entertainment Pack Vol.1 Version
1.0.
- They will also no longer be licensing OS/2.
- They no longer have update rights for products and will be
including Microsoft registration cards in with all product manuals.
Summary of Terms:
Product
Uplifts** |
List price |
License |
Royalty* |
Volume |
m/c |
Int’l |
| |
MS-DOS 5.0
with shell |
$15.00 |
P/P
Pre-install |
$9.00 |
400.000 |
$3.600.000.00 |
None |
| |
| Windows 3.1 |
$19.00 |
P/P
Pre-install |
$15.00 |
320,000 |
$4,800,000.00 |
None |
| |
Works
for Windows
Version 2.0 |
$26.00 |
P/System
Pre-install |
$24.00
(annually) |
100.000 |
$2,400,0O0.OO |
None |
| |
Works
Version 2.0 |
$12.00 |
P/System
Pre-install |
$12.00
(annually) |
80,000 |
$960,000.00 |
None |
| |
Ent. Pack
for Windows,
Version 1.0 |
$3.00 |
P/System
Pre-install |
$3.00
(annually) |
40,000 |
$120,000.00 |
None |
| |
Test
Software |
$0.00 |
P/System
Pre-install |
$0.00
(annually) |
400,000 |
$0.00 |
None |
| |
| Yearly Total in Royalty Revenues: |
$11,880,000.00 |
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 3247 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3247 Page 1 of 1]
[handwritten] re you _happy?_
Theo Lieven, President and CEO
Vobis Microcomputer AG
MICROSOFT VISIT ITINERARY
In addition to the attached agenda for the OEM Briefing Conference, the
following meetings have been scheduled and arranged for your visit to
Seattle:
Tuesday, September 22
[handwritten] does he meet BillG? – Debbyjo said for ½ an
hour either before or after his speech – I’m waiting for confirmation –
apparantely[sic] he is flying in for the speech + then flying out…
7:00 p.m. Arrive Seattle
(from Atlanta on Delta Airlines)
Seattle Limousine Service (Steve Morgan [TELEPHONE]) will pick up and
deliver you to the Seattle Sheraton Hotel.
Accommodations
Seattle Sheraton Hotel [TELEPHONE / FAX]
[handwritten] Ask Debbyjo to make arrangements + re: Billg mtg.
Wednesday, September 23
Accommodations
Seattle Sheraton Hotel
Thursday, September 24
7:00 a.m. Breakfast
Meeting
Microsoft Attendees:
Steve Ballmer – Sr. VP of Sales & Marketing
Bengt Akerlind – Director of European OEM Sales
Stefanie Reichel – OEM Account Manager
Location:
Banner’s Resaurant (Sheraton Hotel)
6:30 p.m.
Seattle Limousine (Steve Morgan [TELEPHONE]) will pick up and deliver
the following individuals to the Hunt Club ([TELEPHONE]) at 900
Madison, Seattle:
Theo Lieven
Juergen Huels
Joachim Kempin
Stefanie Reichel
Bengt Akerlind
7:00 p.m.
Dinner Meeting at The Hunt
Club (Sorrento Hotel)
Seattle Limousine will transport the entire group back to the Seattle
Sheraton after dinner.
[STAMPED] SR 00008 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT [illegible]
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1164685 CONFIDENTIAL
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 3475 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[STAMPED PLAINTIFF’S
EXHIBIT 3475 BUT OCCURS AMONG RESPONDENT’S FILES ON THE COURT WEB SITE.]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3475 Page 1 of 3]
[STAMPED] MS 5055904 CONFIDENTIAL
Second feature: I have a Syquest drive. So far I haven’t been able to
install DR6. It seems that DRDOS is trying to create a directory in the
Syquest Drive. The Syquest drive returns “Not ready error reading drive
D” ARF.
I’ll try removing the Syquest drive!
######################################################## 474
>From ericst Thu Sep 19 11:36:50 1991
To: dosbug
Cc: bobcook dos5beta
Subejct: Re: didn’t work
Date: Thu, 19 Sep [19]91 11:37:31 PDT
You must run from the dos prompt. If you try running it in a Windows
dos VM, you will get a message saying you can’t run under windows. If
you try running directly from windows, screen just flashes.
Exit windows and run.
Bugmaster: Please enter the following bug:
Sev 3 – Fix for 5.0a
Getting Started section on problems running setup needs to tell users
to not run from windows.
Eric.
>From bobcook Thu Sep 19 09:32:44
1991
To: dos5beta
Subject: didn’t work
Date: Thu Sep 19 09:30:36 PDT 1991
screen flashes and it exits with no messages. tried reading trouble.txt
but its too large for vi or notepad, tried setup /i and same thing.
running under windows 3.0 on northgate 425i.
######################################################## 475
>From johnen Thu Sep 19 11:46:16 1991
To: bradsi jimla
Subject: FW: Bambi:&DR DOS 6.0, may files turned into crosslinked
mess
Date: Thu Sep 19 11:36:08 PDT 1991
>From lawren Thu Sep 19 11:34:15:1991
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3475 Page 2 of 3]
[STAMPED] MS 5055905 CONFIDENTIAL
To: winbug
Cc: bambi scottq lawren
Subject: Bambi:&DR DOS 6.0, many files turned into crosslinked mess
Windows Bug Report
Title: Bambi&DR DOS 6.0, many files turned into crosslinked mess
Opened By: lawren
Sev: 1
WinVer: 3.10 47
Product: Drivers
Area: Bambi
Origin: Internal
Sugg.Assign: scottq
DOSVer: 6.00
Mode: high
Name: Phone:
Problem Statement: Had run fine other times. Did a “DIR” and I got
garbage characters. Chkdsk found well over 100 files with crosslinked
files, invalid clusters, and invalid & incorrect lengths.
Machine Configuration: Cumulus 386 2M VGA
Config.Sys:
Autoexec.Bat:
Form #: SYS003 Version#: 2.00 Revision Date: 08/22/[19]91
####################################################### 476
From karlst Thu Sep 19 11:55:06 1991
To: steveti
Cc: bradsi philba
Subject: jeanp/vacation
Date: Thu Sep 19 11:34:54 1991
I believe we’ve settled the issue with jeanp regarding his vacation.
Don’t call him. Kudos to bradsi for making this happen.
####################################################### 477
From philba Thu Sep 19 11:58:17 1991
To: lawren
Cc: bambi bradsi lawren scottq
Subject: Re: Bambi:&DR DOS 6.0, many files turned into crosslinked
mess
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 91 11:34:11 PDT
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3475 Page 3 of 3]
[STAMPED] MS 5055906 CONFIDENTIAL
tee hee hee… thats what you get for running an incompatible OS
sorry I couldn’t resist. Scott, lets figure this out asap — could be a
problem thats lurking for real DOS
>From lawren Thu Sep 19 11:34:15:1991
To: winbug
Cc: bambi scottq lawren
Subject: Bambi:&DR DOS 6.0, many files turned into crosslinked mess
Windows Bug Report
Title: Bambi&DR DOS 6.0, many files turned into crosslinked mess
Opened By: lawren
Sev: 1
WinVer: 3.10 47
Product: Drivers
Area: Bambi
Origin: Internal
Sugg.Assign: scottq
DOSVer: 6.00
Mode: high
Name: Phone:
Problem Statement: Had run fine other times. Did a “DIR” and I got
garbage characters. Chkdsk found well over 100 files with crosslinked
files, invalid clusters, and invalid & incorrect lengths.
Machine Configuration: Cumulus 386 2M VGA
Config.Sys:
Autoexec.Bat:
Form #: SYS003 Version#: 2.00 Revision Date: 08/22/[19]91
####################################################### 478
From greglo Thu Sep 19 12:10:11 1991
To: bradsi
Subject: Re: bambi
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 91 12:05:40 PDT
The new WzMail version (which uses the WinMail document handling
routines rather than the ancient DH library) also gives you a huge perf
boost. If you use WzMail you want it.
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4178 Gordon v.Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4178 Page 1 of 1]
Windows and DOS
Development
August Status Report
Phil Barrett
Windows 286 & 386 Rel 2.1D
Release 2.1D development work was completed in August. The product was
release[sic] to Manufacturing Sept 6 A 2 1D
release of the 386/XT version of Win386 was not released since no bug
fixes in 2.1D affected it.
Windows Rel 3.0
Windows 3.0 moved into high gear in August. The Windows 3.0 product
plan was completed and presented to SteveB and BillG for review. The
basic plan was well recieved[sic] with one major addition(?) —
Protected-Mode Windows. Thanks to some midnight efforts by DavidW and
BobGu?s a
demonstration system was available to prove the feasibility(?) of
pW. This was very well recieved[sic]. More planning has been done and
it appears that an end of July 1989 ship date is feasible.
A fair amount of progress was made in August. Drop shadows on menus and
proportions system font are working The keyboard friver reorganization
was completed — this allows us more flexibility for supporting
international keyboards. Windows 386 scheduler is working giving us the
ability to boost the priority of the VM using the Keyboard providing
for a much smoother response.
Interface/Tools
The Windows 2.1 SDK beta release was made in August. This was mostly to
gain feedback on the suitibility of CVW for general use. The feedback
was quite positive so
the product was released to manufacturing and is now shipping to
customers.
Planning for the 3.0 SDK began in August with the specification of the
work areas that will be focused on. External suppliers of tools are
also being examined(?). Whitewater Group and Eikon Systems are two.
DOS
August saw the IBM release of DOS 4.0. August also saw the discovery by
the press
of DOS 4.0 bugs. Probably the biggest complaint is poor EMS support.
This and several other problems have been corrected for the PC-DOS
release. In addition the maintenance release will have a reduction of
the number of physical pages consumed by expanded memory usage. A Beta
OEM release was made in August and the Packaged product release is
planned for Sept. Progress on EMM386 was made in August with
substantial progress made on both functionality and size. Plans are in
place for a second round of improvements (most size) for the
maintenance release.
August was a big month for DOS planning. Evaluation of the IBM
Lifeboat(?) (4.1) specification occured in August (and is ongoing) DOS
plans
were presented to BillG and we recieved[sic] the go-ahead to
investigate Protected-Mode DOS. Initial planning started on a Retail
Upgrade Package of DOS.
Recruiting & Personel [sic]
Four offers(?) were accepted in August making it(?) a top month for
recruiting. We recieved[sic] accepts from Clark Cyr (Tools). Guther(?)
Ziaber(?) (GDI/Drivers). Laitha(?) (Printer Drivers)
and Sriram(?) Rajagopaian(?) (DOS). Thanks to Beth Davies and Susan(?)
Vositer(?) for a top-notch job. The bad news. we are still 7 under our
FYSS(FYBS?) plan. We have also obtained a Waterloo Coop student and
there is a possibility of a second. This will help out quite a bit.
Current recruiting(?) status:
Offers Out: Mike Morgan. Paul Klemond
Offers Rejected: Eric Meyer (salary)
Headcount Plan:
Group Current FY89
Windows 386 5 5
HPC 1 4
DOS 5 8(?)
CD-ROM 2 2
Group 1 1
Total 28 35
[STAMPED] CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] ATTORNEYS ONLY
[STAMPED] 10152375
[STAMPED] EXH 49 DATE _5/17/[20]02 WITNESS Barrett MARY W. MILLER
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1148405 CONFIDENTIAL
DEFENDENT’S EXHIBIT 417 – Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Defendant’s Exhibit 417 Page 1 of 5
[STAMPED] EXHIBIT 67 Barrett 5/31/[20]02
[The exhibit is a photocopy of the cover of a book. The cover art shows
a man in a business suit (Bill Gates) posed like Rodin’s “The Thinker,”
looking up at a lightbulb with the Internet Explorer logo on it. The
lightbulb is flanked with images of the Earth as a globe.]
HOW THE WEB WAS WON
HOW BILL GATES AND HIS INTERNET IDEALISTS
TRANSFORMED THE MICROSOFT EMPIRE
With a new chapter on the impact of the Justice Department trial
verdict.
PAUL ANDREWS
COAUTHOR OF THE NATIONAL BESTSELLER GATES
Defendant’s Exhibit 417 Page 2 of 5
[Pages 140 and 141 of How
the Web Was Won]
nism for Gates to be exposed to the Internet side of the online service
argument. Silverberg sensed that because of Gates’s close relationship
with Siegelman and Myhrvold, the chairman had been hearing a one-note
song. Nevertheless, for Silverberg, Shumway was hardly an earthshaking
occasion. He listened to the debate of online versus the Internet with
interest. It was an intriguing psychological dynamic for Microsoft, but
it had little impact on his thinking. His mind was made up. Shumway
merely reaffirmed the need for him to keep moving down the trail he had
already been blazing. As far as he was concerned, the debate could
continue without him. The Windows effort could not affort to sit on its
hand, waiting for an elusive consensus to emerge. By then it would be
way, way too late.
So Silverberg started the Chicago team down an Internet path that was
in many ways parallel to the goals of Siegelman’s online effort.
Chicago was firmly in the camp of supporting open Internet protocols
for things like e-mail, security, and dialing up from home. Marvel was
building its service from the ground floor up, on its own e-mail and
publishing and dial-up protocols, with the hedge that if users wanted
Internet access, they would be able to get there from Microsoft’s
online service.
The Siamese-twin approach had enormous inefficiencies in development
and personnel overlap. It was the kind of budget drain most executives
and big companies would never countenance. Choose one or the other,
they would direct their managers. But Gates saw benefits to
multitasking the online strategy. It gave him the chance again to play
two hands at once, as Microsoft had with parallel OS/2 and Windows
development. Competition was important, even if it was internal. And
Gates was loath to discourage entrepreneurialism within his ranks.
Creative tension was needed in an organization for it to thrive and
move forward. Gates was not going to stand in the way of a process that
would save Microsoft from becoming a Wang or an Apple or a Lotus or an
IBM.
Gates also was caught in the bind of the Silverberg-Siegelman
personaility conflict. It too was nothing new in Microsoft’s
competitive, ego-driven culture: “It’s just another thing you have to
manage,” Gates said later. In this case, he saw benefits to a macro,
not micro, managed approach. He had given Siegelman the green light
well before the Net was a factor. And at the Shumway retreat he had
made it obvious that Silverberg was to intergrate the Internet into
Windows. Gates was like the basketball coach having two point guards
play one-on-one to see who would get the starting assignment.
After the Shumway retreat, Silverberg met with Phil Barnett, a lead
systems manager who had just joined the Windows 95 development effort.
Silverberg asked him to look at how Internet capabilities could be
woven into Chicago. Included on the list were Allard’s initiatives
regarding TCP/IP, ftp, telnet, WAIS, auto dialer, and other Net acces
features. Silverberg added another item to the laundry: browsing
capability. Should we include a browser with Chicago? he asked Barrett.
What would be the browser’s role vis- à-vis Chicago connectivity
with the Web? Should we build it ourselves, from the ground floor up?
What would that take, in terms of resources and time? Would it be
better to license or buy existing technology and improve on it?
Silverberg did not want to rush headlong into a drain on Microsoft
resources. There were lots of browsers out there, after all, and little
discernable demand. There was still plenty of time, it seemed, for
Microsoft to make its play in the browser sweepstakes.
Barrett hired two part-time program managers and by midsummer had a
college intern on hand to help out with product management. But his
primary focus was on Chicago, not the Internet. “Everyone was focused
on getting Chicago out,” he recalled. “Bill may have said the Internet
is very, very important, but organizationally, I don’t think that took
right away at all.” Barrett took on the assignment, but for him the
Internet was not a huge action item. As for the browser, Barrett had
heard nothing about integrating it into Windows at the Shumway retreat,
and he felt little urgency to pursue the issue.
For Silverberg, however, browsing in Windows was a top priority. The
Windows three-year plan he presented after Shumway specifically
outlined “integrated Net browsing in [Windows] Explorer.” [Square
brackets in original] He was not sure what form it would take, but
browsing needed to be there. On board as well was John Ludwig. “It was
clear from Shumway that we needed to Internet-enable our operating
system much, much, much more, and that a browser was the most important
part of this,” Ludwig later recalled, even if all the t’s were not
crossed or the i’s dotted.
Six weeks after the retreat, Silverberg attended Windows World at
Spring Comdex in Atlanta, with an eye toward finding out what Windows
vendors were doing with the Internet. Sinofsky was there with a similar
goal in mind. The two hooked up and strolled the floor together. In a
tiny booth tucked away on a side aisle they found gold — or at least
some glitter. BookLink Technologies, Inc., a small software developer
based in Wilmington, Massachusetts, was showing an early iteration of
Internetworks, browsing technology that integrated tightly with
Windows. Silverberg and Sinofsky had learned of BookLink from Allard,
who knew one of the company’s principles, Bill Hawkins, though various
Internet conferences. Hawkins, who
Defendant’s Exhibit 417 Page 3 of 5
[How the web was won, pages 162 and 163]
For Silverberg, long the Marvel skeptic, the problem was that the
browser, and by extension the Internet, was too low a priority for
Marvel. Siegelman had simply blown a huge opportunity, and now
Microsoft was back to square one. Silverberg was determined to have
browser technology in Chicago. It looked like his team would have to
develop or obtain it themselves. John Ludwig, the networking veteran
who was “blue-skying” future opportunities for Windows for Silverberg,
agreed: We had better reassess where we are in the browser game, he put
it to Silverberg. We need to decide whether we are serious about this
stuff, in which case we had better start moving faster and more
decisively. Or we need to cut bait. It was a short conversation. As far
as the Internet goes, Silverberg said, we’re as hardcore as Microsoft
has ever been about anything. It was more than a year before Bill
Gates, on December 7, 1995, would say the same thing to the world at
large.
Tall, gentle-mannered, and cerebral, Ludwig brough keen analytical
skills and a calm rationality to the browser project. Ludwig monitoring
a project was like a submarine tracking a target. He preferred working
below the surface, unnoticed, while tirelessly and unflaggingly
plotting political strategy, honing in on challenges and charting
progress. Silverberg and Ludwig made a great alliance. Both hated
ego-boosting or self-aggrandizing schemes. Both practiced a subtle form
of leadership where they enabled those around them either to make the
right choice or to learn from mistakes — miscues neither of them might
have committed, but which were necessary as lessons learned. Both drew
more satisfaction from watching those around them succeed together than
from calling attention to their own contributions. From mid-1994 on
Ludwig was a critical part of each significant strategic decision
Microsoft made on the browser front. Yet, innumerable articles and
analyses of the browser competition almost never identified him.
There was an almost audible shifting of gears going on for the Redmond
gang. Through early fall of 1994, browser development had more or less
meandered along as part of the Chicago effort, but not a huge part. It
was not so much that the browser was considered unessential or
insignificant. The Shumway retreat, and Gates’s mobilization e-mail
immediately following, made it clear that integrating browsing
capability into the operating system was a vital goal for the company’s
Internet effort. But it seemed unrealistic to expect that a browser
could be cobbled together in time for Chicago’s release, at the time
still scheduled for the upcoming fall of 1994. Integrating an entirely
new dimension would mean lots more coding, debugging, testing, coding,
debugging, testing — the seemingly endless programming cycle. If you
altered one line of code in a program as complex as Windows, Silverberg
was wont to point out, you usually stood the chance of introducing a
bug or glitch, and so on down the line. Software development at its
heart was a mind-drubbing, Sisyphan chore of debugs and fixes.
Microsoft’s ability to persist to the bitter end in ferreting out as
many bugs as possible and in addressing user needs helped explain its
successes where others had run out of ideas, steam, or initiative.
The previous spring, Barrett had been assigned to look into a browser,
but with attention focused on more pressing issues in the Chicago
upgrade, he had not put it on the front burner. Over the next few
months he talked to a few people, looked over the field — then
consisting of a wild assortment of browsers that did one or two things
well but overall were slow, underfeatured, and immature — and drew up
some preliminary specifications. But no team got assembled, no product
description or business plan got drawn up, and no code got written.
Neither did any alarm get sounded. The BookLink discussions were
progressing along a normal path, after all. With most browsers
available for free, there was no real commercial pressure on Microsoft.
Once the Internetworks code became available, the thinking was the
browser effort would be able to ramp up production quickly.
When the BookLink deal fell through, everything changed.
As luck would have it, and Microsoft often did have luck, a coding
maniac by the name of Ben Slivka had other ideas. Bearing a striking
resemblance to Anthony Edwareds — Dr. Mark Greene on the TV series ER
— Slivka combined a studious demeanor with alacritous energy, stamina,
and will. Starting the previous summer, Slivka had agitated Ludwig’s
next-generation Windows team to o something like Mosaic for Windows.
Although it was not true that, in order to be part of Microsoft’s
Internet effort, your last name had to begin with “S” and feature some
combination of “v,” “i,” “n,” or “l,” Slivka was a perfect fit for the
company’s aborning browser development. A veteran of the OS/2, DOS 5
and DOS 6 projects, Slivka had a ton of code under his belt and was
known as a just-ship-it kind of guy. He liked impossible challenges,
particularly if he could drag his friends into them as well.
Ludwig, looking for a programmer to start prototyping browser
technology for Windows, asked Slivka onto the team. At that point, the
Internet was just one aspect of the blueprint for Memphis, as the
leapfrog upgrade of
Defendant’s Exhibit 417 Page 4 of 5
[Page headings How the Web Was Won]
[Page Number] 164
[Page Number] 165
Windows — the one following Chicago — was code-named. The whole idea
of projecting an upgrade ahead was a new twist for the Windows team. It
harkened back to Silverberg’s conviction that software development had
to happen in incremental iterations rather than one shot only. Besides
the Internet, on the Memphis team’s plate were things like wireless
comminications, game machines, PCs in the home, the eventual merging of
Chicago with Windows NT. Permeating the effort philosophically was the
Gates vision of Information At Your Fingertips, approaching its fourth
anniversary. How would the Windows of three or four years hence
continue the IAYF vision? Ludwig thought about the question every day.
After joining Ludwig’s team in July, Slivka initially was interested in
the notion of indexing all the content on the Internet. It seemed a
natural extension of the IAYF metaphor. In order for the unthinkable
amount of data on a vast interconnected network to be useful, it would
have to be indexed in a way that gave meaningful access to users.
Ironically, by that point, the summer of 1994, Slivka had not even
gotten a home connection on the Net. He knew next to nothing about the
Web. He hadn’t seen the Allard or Sinofsky memos. He hadn’t attended
the Shumway retreat. Of all the eventual architects of Microsoft’s
Internet presence, Slivka was undoubtedly the last to the starting
line. But in terms of producing actual code, Slivka was first out of
the blocks.
Ludwig loved this about Slivka. Ben is not a patient fellow, Ludwig
would say. When he identified something that needed to be worked on,
Slivka was like a woodpecker, tapping, tapping, tapping till he got to
the meat of the matter. “He’ll come at you every day with ten things
you ought to be doing,” Ludwig put it. “Some percent you already are
doing, he just didn’t know about it. Some percentage are just shooting
from the hip, he hasn’t really thought through. But some percentage are
dead on and you should listen to him. I let him have his say, and he
tells me how to do my job, and then I throw away the nine things I
don’t want to hear about. The one thing he says that’s accurate, I say,
That’s a good idea, I’ll try to do better on that one.”
First Slivka tracked down a Microsoft technician and browbeat him into
providing an Internet tap to Slivka’s office. As of the summer of 1994,
getting an Internet line at Microsoft still was not a trivial
procedure, where security concerns about the Net still kept it from
being widely accessable. Once he got on the Net and downloaded Mosaic,
Slivka spent twelve hours straight surfing. He would get on a home
page, then click to a link, then go to another URL, then find a dozen
more links. It was revelation after revelation. This was as close as
Slivka had seen to an actual manifestation of IAYF in all its original
intent.
After his tour of the Web, Slivka did not just feel the world had
changed, he set about making sure it had — at least, his world. He
started sending around e-mail, asking questions, communicating with
programming teams. He asked Silverberg and Ludwig where the company was
on the browser. Shouldn’t we be developing something for Chicago? From
the standpoint of programming, the browser did not seem to be a
monumental challenge. Even if we can’t get it in time for the Chicago
release, Slivka told the Windows team, we ought to have it ready within
a few months afterward. Directed to consult with Barrett, Slivka became
even more convinced that Microsoft needed to move more quickly. WWhat
he found was pretty bare bones. Barrett had “already decided this was
nuts. This is going nowhere, and I don’t particularly want to be in an
enormous company.” To his mind, Microsoft did not get the Net and was
not likely to soon. It was time to move on. By August “I’d already made
a decision to leave,” Barrett recalled. Knowing he was a short-timer,
Barrett ignored the Internet project.
Oblivious to Barrett’s disenchantment, Slivka spent little time
puzzling over the situation. Microsoft would get a browser, he decided,
if he had to write every last line of it himself. Slivka’s first step
was to take a comprehensive look at Mosaic, break it down feature by
feature, figure out how the stuff worked, and where Microsoft had the
opportunity to improve. What was the competition in the browser space?
Who were the players? What were the feature sets? What problems do
users encounter with surfing? One of Slivka’s first assumptions was
that browsing — at the time still being referred to as “viewing” —
would supersede gopher and ftp. This despite the fact that at the time,
gopher and ftp were by far more popular ways of navigating the Net than
any of the browser technologies. Our focus should be on the Web, Slivka
told Ludwig and Silverberg. That’s where our resources should go.
Like Ludwig himself and Silverberg, Slivka was a systems guy, which
meant he thought in terms of platforms. How could Microsoft use a new
technology to benefit Windows users? How could the company get
thousands of software developers to use Microsoft technology? That was
the key question to platform guys. At the time, the Memphis team was
well aware of parallel efforts to incorporate browsing into other
Microsoft products. Pathe had the Internet Assistant project going for
Word. Evslin headed the effort to make browsing a part of Microsoft’s
Exchange e-mail project. No, no, no,
Defendant’s Exhibit 417 Page 5 of 5
[Pages 166 and 167 of How
the Web Was Won]
the systems guys were saying. Browsing — viewing, exploring, whatever
— should be a part of Windows. Not that Pathe or Evslin were misguided
in wanting to make browsing a key part of their end users’ experience.
But writing a browser for Word, and another one for Exchange, and yet
another one for Windows would waste resources and create a lot of
redundant code.
On August 22, in an e-mail time-stamped 5:10 P.M., Slivka notified the
Memphis planning team that he had gotten started on the user interface
design for what he termed Microsoft’s “WWW Explorer” — there was that
word again. Slivka had cataloged the entire Mosaic user interface — at
least as far as http was concerned; ftp and gopher mechanics were still
awaiting assessment. To a crack systems programmer like Slivka, Mosiac
was a collection of pieces, as its name implied. There was an html
piece, a user interface component, a caching element — caching
referring to the process where things like Web pages, or URLs, were
stored on the local machine for ready reference by the browser user or
the browser itself. Caching made it much easier and faster for the
browser to call up previously displayed URLs. Slivka though it was done
pretty poorly on Mosaic, and it became one of the WWW Explorer team’s
top priorities and early triumphs. From his initial analysis, Slivka
concluded that the process of Web browsing was pretty similar to
network browsing and hard-disk browsing. It was all exploring, he
thought at the time. Slivka started a list of what changes and
improvements the Windows team could make to Mosaic, but a key design
question also needed to be addressed: “At this point, I’m not sure if I
want to be TOTALLY INTEGRATED INTO THE CHICAGO EXPLORER, or if we want
a separate window for the html viewer.” The reference provided another
benchmark in Microsoft’s plan to blend Windows with the Web.
Eventually, Slivka would have it both ways. The html viewer — browser
— would start off as its own window but gradually, with the release of
Internet Explorer 4.0 in September 1997 and Windows 98 the following
June, meld with the Windows Explorer.
Slivka’s persistent questioning of the browser effort got back to
Silverberg. He looked into the situation, found it wanting, and told
Barrett he was not happy with the progress he was making. Silverberg
was a patient manager as long as progress was evisent. It looked to him
as if Barrett did not understand what the browser did and what
Microsoft needed from the technology. Barrett was in no frame of mind
for second-guessing. By the first week of October, he told his
supervisors, “I’m quitting and I’ve got four weeks of vacation. See you
later.” Within days Ludwig was paying Slivka a visit. How would you
like to be in charge of the browser effort? Ludwig asked. It was an
entirely rhetorical question. Slivka did not even bother to ask what
happened to Barrett. As it turned out, Barrett took about a month off
and then joined Rob Glaser’s Internet startup, Progressive Networks, as
vice president of software development.
It was fitting that Slivka found himself on the cusp of Microsoft’s
biggest paradigm shift since DOS-to-Windows. Everything in his
upbringing and career path had pointed toward a day when he would
tackle something worthy of his talents. Since childhood, Slivka had
been self-driven towards programming achievement. One of twin boys born
in 1960 in Seattle to a public librarian mother and Seattle Symphony
percussionist father, Slivka grew up playing with a variety of
electronics. His first-generation Russian father, Meyer, put together a
Theremin, a rare electronic musical horn whose “wooo wooo” sound
changed tone when one’s hands passed over its surface. Meyer also built
an oscilloscope and TV set from Heathkit and, in the mid-1970s, put
together his own electronic music synthesizer. Assisting him, young Ben
got handy with a soldering iron. It was his mother, Enid, however, who
introduced Slivka to programming. In the early 1970s she took a course
on programming in BASIC, and Slivka got intrigued by what you could do
with computer code. He was still a little on the young side to do much
on his own, but a seed had been planted. When Hewlett-Packard came out
with its programmable pocket calculators, Slivka would go downtown
after school, a half-hour bus trip, and program display models for an
hour or two at Seattle’s leading department store, Frederick &
Nelson. The salespeople, amused at what a kid could do and figuring it
might attract buyers, were tolerant.
Slivka learned eraly on the value of hard work and independent
thinking. His working mother had the two boys helping out almost from
the time their younger sister was born. “The poor things never knew
what is was like to sit still and have someone wait on them,” Enid
Slivka recounted. As a result they learned to speak their minds when
they wanted something, a trait heartily encouraged by their mother.
Enid Slivka had read a book about the Compton family, which produced
two university presidents and Nobel Prize-winning physicist Arthur
Holly Compton. “The way their [Compton] children were encouraged to
investigate things for themselves made quite an impression on me,” she
said. Ben eventually drew the admiration, not to say awe, of Microsoft
coworkers for being able to repeatedly challenge a boss named Bill
Gates, and take the return heat without flinching. [Groklaw
transcriber’s note: square bracketed [Compton] is original.]
Slivka eventually outgrew the calculators and discovered bigger
terrain. Near Green Lake in north Seattle, a treasure trove called the
Retail Com-
[END OF MARCH 19, 2004 Gordon v.
Microsoft Transcript.]
Gordon v. Microsoft Exhibits Published March 24, 2004
21 Exhibits 82 pp.
(Microsoft, Go Corporation, Compaq Corporation: Pen Computing, PenPoint
OS, July 1988 to January 1993.)
Nearing completion.
Last Revised 4/29/2004
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 27 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
NONDISCLOSURE STATEMENT
GO Corporation has disclosed or may disclose business or technical
information (“GO Information”) to you in connection with a proposed
business relationship.
In consideration of any disclosure and any negotiations concerning the
proposed business relationship you agree as follows:
1. You will hold in confidence and not use or disclose any GO
Information except information you can document (a) is in the public
domain. (b) was known to you prior to diclosure by GO or (c) was
properly disclosed to you by another person without restriction.
2. If you decide not to proceed with the proposed business relationship
or if asked by GO, you will promptly return all GO Information and all
copies.
3. You will promptly notify GO of any unauthorized release of GO
information.
4. You understand that this statement does not obligate GO to disclose
any information or negotiate or enter any agreement or relationship.
ACKNOWLEDGED AND AGREED:
Name: (Print) William H. Gates
By: (Signature) William H. Gates
Date: 7/8/[19]88
GO CORPORATION
By [signature illegible]
[STAMPED] KAPLAN DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 3 4/18/[20]02
[STAMPED] KAP01-16
[FAX TIMESTAMP FOOTER] JUL 05 ’88 15:51 GO CORPORATION P. 2/2
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 58 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 58 p. 1 of 3]
GO Corporation [GO logo]
[ADDRESS / TELEPHONE / FAX]
February 10, 1989
Mr. Jeff Raikes
Microsoft Corporation
[ADDRESS]
Dear Jeff:
This letter documents a joint project between Microsoft Corporation of
Redmond, WA and GO Corporation of Foster City, CA.
Assumptions:
* Microsoft is interested in exploring
potential business opportunities relating to the GO notebook computer.
Potential projects include native applications, adaptations of
desktop-based Microsoft products, and insuring smooth exchange of data
between notebook and desktop applications.
* GO is seeking strategic partners to develop applications for GO’s
notebook computer.
Goals:
* Establish a working relationship in
which technical, marketing and strategic information may be shared
between GO and Microsoft for mutual benefit.
* Support Microsoft’s explorations of potential opportunities relating
to the GO notebook computer.
* Support GO’s corporate and product development efforts to establish
its notebook computer.
Project Definition:
Microsoft will assign a minimum of one half-time person to work with GO
to identify projects of potential interest to Microsoft.
GO will provide temporary office space, access to proprietary design
documentation and related information, and technical cooperation to the
assigned Microsoft project representative(s).
KAP0155
[STAMPED] Kaplan DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 4 4/18/[20]02
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 58 p. 2 of 3]
GO Corporation
[ADDRESS]
GO will attempt to incorporate design elements and system services
into the notebook computer that complement and support Microsoft’s
efforts.
The project will result in a jointly authored report describing
the results of the investigation, This report will be jointly owned,
and will be held in confidence by both organizations.
Term:
The project will extend for a period of 3 months beginning February,
l5 1989, and may be extended by mutual agreement.
Confidentiality:
In the course of this project, each party may at their sole
discretion provide the other party with access to proprietary, trade
secret and confidential information (‘Information’) includinq, but not
limited to, design documents, program code, draft documentation, and
market research, as required to further the project.
Each party agrees to treat the other’s Information with the same
care with which they treat their own.
To protect each party’s Information each party agrees:
1. To use Information only for the purpose of furthering this joint
project.
2. To hold in confidence and not use or disclose the other’s
Information except to the extent they can document that it (a) is in
the public domain, (b) was known to them prior to disclosure (c) was
properly disclosed to them by another person without restriction.
3. To label written Infomation as confidential, and to follov up
oral disclosures of Infomation with a written confirmation of the
disclosure describing the Information within 30 days followinq oral
disclosure.
4. That no copies of Information are to be made without the express
written consent of the other party.
[STAMPED] KAP0156
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 58 p. 3 of 3]
GO Corporation
[ADDRESS]
5. To return all tangible forms or Information received from the
other upon written request.
6. To promptly notify the other party or any unauthorized release of
the others Information.
The participation of Microsoft and GO staff in joint design and
implementation efforts will not create an interest or ownership on
behalf of either party in the other’s proprietary, confidential, or
trade secret information.
Agreed:
|
Agreed: |
[signature of R. M. Carr]
Robert Carr
Vice President of Software
|
[signature of Jeffrey S. Raikes]
Jeff Raikes |
| Date: 2/13/89 |
Date: |
[STAMPED] KAP0157
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 101 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
To: rc
From: jkaplan
Date: May 10, 1989 6:16 PM
My thinking is that while he is here, we should cooperate fully with
him. Giving him doc to read is fine, if we can usefully give him a PC
with some tools to try out, that’s fine to [sic]. In fact, not doing
this may seem a bit odd, given that Gary (for example) has been able to
develop a sample aps on his machine.
We should set him up in a booth at the other end of the world from Bob
Vallone.
I think we should request that he not remove (or copy) documents from
the offices from the time being, and explain that this is not a
personal criticism but reflects the early state and relative lack of
definition of our relationship with MSFT at this time.
Do you think this will be taken in the right spirit? If not, we should
consider a specific agreement about what will be done with our docs
(like a log of who sees them that we get a copy of, that they by kept
under lock and key, and that they not be duplicated?
J
[STAMPED] Kaplan DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 12 4/18/[20]02
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 115 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 115 p1 of 3]
[handwritten] File: Notebook Computers
[STAMPED] Kaplan DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 15 4/18/[20]02
[STAMPED] X 584359 CONFIDENTIAL
File : c:wzmailmailbox.fld
Messages: .
####################################################### 50
>From dinash Thu Jun 8 15:19:01 1989
To: cindych
Subject: pls print
Date: Thu Jun 08 13:40:44 1989
>From peteh Thu Jun 8 11:47:53 1989
To: dinash
Subject: pls print
Date: Thu Jun 08 11:44:35 1989
>From ralfha Wed Jun 7 14:20:48 1989
To: peteh
Subject: Lloyd’s GO Trip Reports
Date: Wed Jun 07 14:19:20 1989
>From lloydfr Thu May 4 18:39:08 1989
To: gregs jeffh ralfhe
Subject: Trip to GO Corporation
Date: Thu May 4 18:36:37 1989
Trip Report – GO Corporation, 5/4/[19]89
(150 lines long)
Yesterday, Kathleen Schoenfelder (soon to be permanent MS employee, now
Stanford MBA) and I met with Robert Carr, Jerry Kaplan, and Suye
Toenfskoetter (GO director of marketing). Carr was with us the whole
day; Kaplan and Sue dropped in occasionally.
WHAT GO IS DOING
They see themselves primarily as systems software developers for a new
class of comptuers. Out of the 35 people that work there, approx 25
actually write code (15-17 on systems kind of stuff, 5-6 on apps), and
only a few work on the hardware. They subcontract the hardware out to a
bunch of companies, and in the future might have closer ties to the
Japanese. They haven’t figured out if they are going to license their
systems software to other computer manufacturers. Hardware is not their
competitive advantage, it’s the software. They hope to ship everything
by summer of ’90.
Hardware
It’s a 12 mhz CMOS 286 with 2-8 meg static ram, LCD screen, EGA,
640×400 80 DPI, 2 planes. Special pen that interacts with a magnetic
field above screen. They can tell how far the pen is from the screen,
it’s [sic] angle to the screen, and rotation. A second processor deals
with the pen interaction. Either a standard modem or fax modem card can
be put in the unit (hopefully they’ll be able to oput them both on one
card). They have a “home base unit ” which includes a battery
recharger, 3mb floppy, SCSI, parallel, and RS-232 ports, LocalTalk/TOPS
connection, keyboard connection. Optional home base stuff is network
card to get to Novell or MS-Net, and a hard drive. Active Matrix screen
will be option sometime. Standard with 2 meg and base unit will cost
around $4000. The only demo we saw was a year old – this July they
should have prototypes. It’ll weigh 4 1/2 lbs and be about and [sic]
inch thick, still kind of bulky.
Software
They’re doing their own GUI, object-oriented, protect mode operating
system. They seem to have a lot of bright people who have gotten fairly
far along with this. Their design appears pretty similar to our object
strategy. They have a kernel, class manager, file system, etc, and on
top of this they have an application framework. You build apps by
subclassing off of the system objects and adding your own stuff on top
of that. Carr talked a lot about embedded objects and other merits of
GO OS. I agreed that this is all very nice, in fact we’re doing the
same thing, but just imagine if this was completely compatible with the
x million desktop computers in existence. All of this workgroup,
networking, and communication would be so much easier. His response was
he needed it soon, and specifically to meet the constaints of notebook
type computers. Carr wouldn’t let me bring home the API documents or
their SDK, and I didn’t get a chance to actually see the stuff working.
But he wants me to spend a few days down there looking it over and
talking wit some of their developers. I think this would be very
worthwhile for me to do.
The apps they are doing initially are: notebook manager,
notetaker/simple wordprocessor, fax/markup up, e-mail, forms manager,
rolodex, calendar/To Do. They are likely to add small apps and change
their emphasis as they find key customers who talk about buying several
thousand machines. A lot o fthe objects they are using in those apps
will be part of the system so that other ISV’s will be able to leverage
off their work.
They say their handwriting stuff is really good and flexible depending
on what each app wants. In a workdprocessor, the apps tells the HW
sftwr [sic] to try and map the input to words in its dictionary. A
spreadsheet would constrain the input to numbers, formula’s [sic] and
names. Fields on a date entry form might ask only for date input. These
levels make it easier and faster for the HW recognition. They have two
modes: one is gesture recognition and the other is interpret what the
user is writing. Again, I haven’t yet seen the API or if this all
actually works.
ANALYSIS
Carr really wants us to write apps for their machine. I pointed out the
many difficulties for us to do this – namely a whole new platform. I
said I thought Windows with some modifications and enhancements would
be
ideal for this sort of computer. Essentially he’s writing an operating
system from scratch of which 90-95% of the functionality can be found
in Windows or PW. Why is he doing all of this work when we have already
done it? Mostly because he wanted to design something from the ground
up which took into consideration the following: a pen being the primary
interface, everything is in ram, can’t crash the system, have to
conserve battery power, and he needs a whole new class of apps. He
figures that if people are going to have to write new apps, what’s the
big deal switching to a new platform? And since it’s all object
oriented, it’s much faster to develop these apps. He certainly didn’t
convince me that
[PAGE FOOTER] C:TMPDH002595. Thu Jun 08 15:05:14 1989
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 115 p2 of 3]
creating a whole new, non-compatible OS was the right way to address
their concerns.
I really doubt they are going to radically change the direction of
their company and use Windows or PH as their OS. But they are
interested in co-existing nicely with current and future “desktop”
operating systems and apps. This is where we can help them out a lot,
mostly by exchanging information. Carr sees Microsoft as being
potentially their biggest competitor, but he is still very interested
in working closely with us on many different fronts.
WHAT CARR WANTS
Systems
(1) Info on our Attributed File System. Should I send him this
documentation? Urgent.
(2) he needs a command/control language for his operating system. I
mentioned BASIC and he’s very interested. Should we consider licensing
him some version of our interpreter, maybe OO BASIC, maybe EB? Urgent.
(3) More info on protect mode windows. He still doesn’t have a copy.
(4) Info on our object oriented framework. Persistant objects, OOFS. Do
we want to show him what we’re doing? In what detail? Would it help him
be more compatible with our objects?
(5) Info on C++. They use C 5.11 for all of their development, and in
their SDK.
Apps
(6) Email – he wants to talk to us, see how we’re doing it and get some
direction. If we have an engine we’d be willing to license, he’s
interested.
(7) Microsoft developing apps for GO computer. His idea is that we
would give them some money and they would find some developers (or we
would send some down) then the developers could start wok on an app of
our choice at GO. Carr was pushing for a wordprocessor. (Since lawyers
would use this a lot for marking up documents, this would be a good
entre into the legal market, he said.) The goal would be to produce a
demo, and then decide on the next step. He said one of our main
benefits of this would be learning what is involved in writing these
types of apps. An interesting idea, but I don’t think it makes too much
sense for us to do real soon, if ever. We should keep talking to other
vendors, and gradually figure out what approach to take.
ACTION ITEMS
- Resolve Issues (1) and (2) ASAP (Attrib File Sys, BASIC)
- develop an idea of how much we want to cooperate with GO
- decide whether I should go down there and spend a few days
pouring [sic] over the technical documents, playing with their SDK, and
talking to their programmers.
>From lloydfr Wed May 17 19:09:32 1989
To: billg jeffr leno mikemap raleighr sherryr tandyt
Subject: 2nd GO Trip Report
Cc: gregs jeff raitha russw
Date: Wed May 17 19:06:29 1989
GO Trip Report – May 15, 16
(100 lines long)
Purpose of trip:
(1) For me to learn in more detail what GO is developing. In particular
(a) their development environment and (b) their notebook metaphor. We
can take this information into consideration when putting Windows on
similar types of machines.
(2) Discuss GO’s interest in licensing our email and BASIC technology.
(3) Continue to tell GO that we believe a modified version of Windows
is the best environment for this type of computer.
Results:
(1)
(a) GO Development Environment
This is really bad. Not only do they have a totally non-standard OS,
but their way of doing object oriented programming is inefficient and
hard to use. The reason for this is they do all of their OO stuff in C,
not C++. And since everything in their system is an object, they force
to [sic] programmer to adhere to their kludgy model. The way you apply
a method to an object is to call the function ObjectCall() with three
parameters: (1) the message # which the programmer defined in a .h file
(2) a handle to the object (3) a pointer to a block which contains the
params for that specific message. The object has to have its own
message processing proc which does a switch on the message #, and then
calls the relevant function. If you fall through the switch statement
then you do a[n] ObjectCallAncestor() with the same params and pass the
message up the hierarchy. To create virtual functions, you simply stop
propagating the message. To access instance variables somewhere up in
the hierarchy, you have to do and [sic] ObjectRead() call, which I
imagine is as inefficient as the method dispatch.
A lot of errors that would be caught by C++ at compile time (scoping,
typing) will only be found at runtime, and this makes it MUCH more
difficult to develop apps. The programmer also has to manually do a ton
of things that C++ does automatically which makes the code much longer,
more complex, and therefore more prone to have errors. GO claims that
in this OO environment, more code will get re-used. This might be true,
but a lot of sacrifices are being made.
So why did they do their OO stuff this way? I think mostly because
their [sic] isn’t a really good C++ compiler in existence. They wanted
to build on a very solid base, MS C, and put their objects on top of
that. I don’t think they realize the dangers of being only part way
object oriented.
(b) Notebook metaphor
I think this stuff will work out fine. Essentially it is a
[STAMPED] X 584360 CONFIDENTIAL
C:TMPD[H?M?]002595 Thu Jan 08 15:05:14 1989
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 115 p3 of 3]
[page number] 5
specialized version of a shell. They have tabs on the side of the
screen which represent folders, and then a table of contents and index.
You can place GoTo buttons and PostIt Notes any place in the notebook.
They could do all of this on top of Windows and I think it would be
very good.
One thing I might mention is that I never actually saw anything running
on a computer, I just buried myself in stacks of documents for a few
days.
(2) Email and BASIC
As far as email goes, we don’t have anything to offer them. In 6-12
months when slingshot is further along we might talk about
possibilities. If GO sticks with their OS, they would only be able to
license some very low-level code from us.
They are very interested in licensing EB from us. They have a table
object which does indexing and other ISAM-like tasks. They are going to
develop a forms app for people who need to do data entry outside of an
office environment. And they need a language to snap the two pieces
together. Sounds a lot like Visual BASIC to me. They also want to use
EB as their “batch” language for the OS. This sounds like a mix between
Ruby and VB. So, the question for us to ponder is whether or not we
want to license them EB.
(3) GO and Windows
The whole time I was down there, I was politely telling them that it
was very unlikely Microsoft would develop apps for their machine
because of their non-standard OS and not so slick OO environment.
Finally, Carr said he wanted to come up and discuss technical issues
with the Win 3.0 people, and explore the possibilities. E.g. what kind
of modifications to Windows would be necessary? This kind of caught me
by surprise, but I said we’d be happy to do that. If anyone wants to
see him while he’s up here, let me know.
Other Info:
The one key piece we need in order to put Windows on flat computers
made by other manufacturers is the handwriting recognition software.
The GO people wouldn’t let me get near any of their stuff (with good
reason). So, while I was down there, I spent a night in the Stanford
library photocopying six IBM research reports on this topic. These
reports have fantastic bibliographies and references to groups (at
universities and corporations) who have done work in this area.
Eventually, we will have to decide if we want to acquire this
technology or build it ourselves. I will be looking further into this
subject.
[page number] 6
C:TMPD[W?H?M?]2595. Thu Jul 08:15:05:14 1989
[STAMPED] X 584361 CONFIDENTIAL
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 117 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 117 page 1 of 2]
[STAMPED] Kaplan EXHIBIT 88 5.8.[20]02
GO Corporation Confidential Mar 20, 1991
MEMORANDUM
TO: File
FROM: Robert Carr
DATE: June 16, 1989
SUBJECT: Draft Response to Microsoft Pitch for Cooperation
COPY: Jerry K
SAVED AS: \go\thirdpar\microsft\890616.fw3
Robert will call Jeff Raikes and say: Jeff,
here’s the range of what we’re thinking. I want to give it to you now,
within 1 week of our meeting last week.
FIRST OF ALL:
We agree to the
principle that it’s a shame for both parties to duplicate efforts or
fragment the marketplace unnecessarily.
We’ve really thought through the issues involved, and concluded:
– We believe we’ve got the right
approach for NB computers. There are serious technical tradeoffs in the
rival approaches
[underline is handwritten] of GOOSE and Win H and we feel there’s
significant market opportunity for a GOOSE solution.
– it doesn’t make sense for us to use Win H in place of GOOSE
– they might want to consider usign the consierable efforts &
expertise we’ve already invested
IF MS DOES NOT PROCEED WITH WIN H:
There are circumstances under which we’d be open to MS being the
licensing vehicle to 3rd party HW vendors.
We would split royalties w/ MS. Under this scenario MS would not
compete with GOOSE through a Win H product.
MS would make material commitments towards their level of support
through evangelism, 3rd party licensing efforts, tie-in development
efforts etc.
An equity investment in GO would be an additional possibility.
Page 1
KAP0105
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 117 page 2 of 2]
[STAMPED] KAP0106
[Page Header] GO Corporation
Confidential Mar 20, 1991
IF MS INSISTS ON PROCEDING WITH
WIN H:
If you do want to do your own work and system in this area, then
we certainly still want to cooperate on:
file format exchange
& other tie ins.
we’re exploring MS
Press publishing our reference books.
you putting apps on our
machine (but we’re hesitant to have technical exchanqe with you on this
until you assign active development teams for GO specific versions or
until our technical design is public knowledge anyways). Once GOOSE is
public, then we’ll actively support you as much as you want.
Handwriting Recognition licensing from GO to MS could be a topic
of discussion. We’d probably look for royalty streams and healthy
advance on royalties in return.
If Jeff wants a written document: we’ll be out of town next
week, after that we need some time and discussions with board
members to work up a more specific proposal or to capture
anything in writing.
[Page footer] Page 2
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 293 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 293 p. 1 of 9]
[STAMPED] X 188680 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] Raikes DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 48 10/18/[20]01
[STAMPED] X188680
stylus input) to those features stored in the computer. We [wo]uld add
to this feature set to enable recognition of lower [ca]se (e.g.
vertical height of the chars), but this would probably decrease the
accuracy rate. Jeff said he thinks he knows how to do text recognition
using ideas somewhat related to neural nets. This would take several
years of development.
Although Grid’s handwriting s/w might not be as full fledged as GO’s,
there would be many fewer conflicts of interest in working closely with
Grid instead of GO. Grid is in the business of selling hardware, unlike
GO who sees themselves more like Apple selling both hardware and the
system software.
Grid wants to come up here around the first week in August to describe
their handwriting s/w in gruesome detail and discuss other ways we
might work with them on this project. They will also give us a demo of
their machine.
– Lloyd
>From jeffr Mon May 28 16:14:19 1990
To: billg mikemap
Subject: FYI-GO competition
Date: Mon May 28 16:14:18 1990
Mail-Flags: 0000
>From luist Mon May 28 15:30:01 1990
To: jeffr rice
Subject: Go and Momenta(?)
Date: Mon May 28 15:39:22 1990
I met a friend that just came from talking to GO and Momenta. Though
she was under non-disclosure, she said a couple interesting things:
* If we still had any doubts: GO is trying to licence their operating
system. Her words: “they want competition in the hardware side…they
want as many people as possible to build the machines”
* About price: “it is a neat idea, but i have a hard time seeing many
people paying so much money for it…” It sounds like it will be on the
expensive side for a Grid like machine. For some reason she came out
feeling they are equivalent (beyond the handwriting recognition
side…), which is great news. GO will probably have a hard time
positioning the machines (happy, Pradeep?).
* About the ‘Momenta’ machine: “well, its [sic] so far into the future
that it probably won’t be very interesting” what is the momenta company
about?
:
luis.
>From jeffr Wed Jun 6 17:47:58 1990
To: billg jonll mikemap
Subject: FYI-Momenta on GO
Date: Wed Jun 6 17:47:57 1990
Mail-Flags: 0000
>From pradeeps Wed Jun 6 16:04:07 1990
To: jeffr
Subject: Info on GO from Momenta meeting
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 293 p. 2 of 9]
[STAMPED] X188681 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] 188681
Cc: lloydfr pradeeps
Date: Wed Jun 6 16:04:05 1990
Jeff – you may want to relay some of this to Billg:
Momenta claimed that IBM is giving $7m to GO; of which $700k is
equity; $6.3m
is pre-paid royalty. This originated as a single customer deal –
initiated
because of an $80m deal with an insurance industry IBM customer.
Other perceptions from Momenta about GO: GO is a software company
(i.e [sic] looking
for OEM licencees). IBM is not restricting GO’s ability to licence the
GO OS
to other OEM’s. That there is a third unknown partner involved with IBM
and
GO. (My speculation: this could be Slate (no news there..) OR it could
be
Toshiba who is already supplying GO the integrated tablet and other h/w
components. Toshiba could be a GO OS licencee..)
>From jeffr Wed Jun 27 07:37:08 1990
To: billg mikemap
Subject; FYI-Intel and GO-ByronB’s comments
Date: Wed Jun 27 07:37:08 1990
Mail flags: 0000
>From byronb Tue Jun 26 18:29:49 1990
To: carls jeffr rice
Subject: A few personal impressions from the mtg with Intel
Date: Tue Jun 26 18:28:12 1990
Taken a face value, the meeting resolved around the issue that they
are
[a] hardware company want to purchase stylus/tablet technology CHEAPLY
in
order that they may manufacture these machines and we are a software
company worried about the confusion caused to out OEMs by an
apparent endorsement of GO software by intel.
It may be telling that first major issue brought up was Mike’s
apparent
fondness for the GO folder paradigm. It makes me quite skeptical that
their only focus is hardware. I assume their real worry is that they
want to make sure that stylus based machines use intel silcon [sic]
(they
said
so) and they don’t want to dependent on Microsoft for the software
(they
weren’t willing to say this). They brought up
the telling and accurate analogy of Microsoft hypothetically investing
in MIPS. So they could be hedging their bets on stylus software.
They seemed willing to do some sort of ‘damage control’ for the GO
investment. They proposed an joint announcement by Intel/Microsoft
saying
that Intel is investing in hardware technology owned by GO and that
Intel supports supports WIN-H as tha OS of choice for stylus based
computers. They even proposed bringing in an OEM willing to announce
an intel x86 win-h machine. This offer seemed insincere considering
they want to sign with GO next week and that we told them we were
not willing to announce Win-H until October.
While they would love to hear about what leads Lloyd can give them
about other hardware technologies sources. It will not change their
mind on GO; they will just view them as additional sources of
technologies.
We did not convince them to not invest in GO. We probably convinced
[th]em that 1) the investment will give bad signals to OEMS 2) We are
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 293 p. 3 of 9]
[STAMPED] X188682 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X188682
a serious contenter [sic] and will be heavy competitor to GO 3) That
our
[ar]chitecture (open, based on Windows) and positioning are sound.
What should we do? From my humble view point in the trenches …
Reiterate through Bill our concern about confusing the Market and OEMs
and work with them on ‘damage control’ to see if they are serious on
this.
My read is the deal is as much as done with GO and from their point of
view today’s meeting was about learning more about what is going on in
the notebook computer world and not about reconsidering Intel’s
investment.
Some impressions from the demo …
When one of the intel guys tried the tablet (who admittedly had
bad writing), I was embarrassed by the results, but he gave the comment
he thought it was quite good. I got some genuine Wows! with the cursive
demo (4 out of 6 words correct). This tells me one of three things:
1) Go is not as far along as we think. 2) They have not seen GO’s
handwriting
yet (unlikely) or 3) They were being polite.
>From jeffr Wed Jun 27 07:34:19 1990
To: billg byronb carls lloydfr marline pradeeps
Subject: Intel Stylus Technology/GO Corp.
Cc: mikemap nathanm paulma samf steveb
Date: Wed Jun 27 07:34:16 1990
Mail-Flags: 0000
Addition to CarlS’s mail:
They didn’t say the investment in GO would be for hardware only. In
fact,
[Pa]ul Otellini specifically said that they might “have the GO
operating
[en]vironment on the shelf, and if an OEM (AT&T was the
hypothetical
OEM used) wants to buy it, they would sell it.” I pointed out how
potentially confusing that was, and Michael Aymar jumped in with a
comment about how we did software for the Mac.
>From Carls Tue Jun 26 18:46:38 1990
To: billg byronb jeffr lloydfr marline pradeeps
Cc: mikemap nathanm paulma samf steveb
Subject: Intel Stylus Technology/GO Corp.
Date: Tue Jun 26 18:44:52 1990
Mail-Flags: 0000
We met today with the group of people at Intel that is pushing an
investment in Go Corp. We attempted to dissuade them from that
investment by seeking to find ways to meet their objectives without
this
investment and by explaining why we thought the investment would be a
bad idea. In particular, we presented the Windows H project to them. We
didn’t suceed in convincing them not to invest, and they did not appear
very open minded. One appropriate followup is probably for
us to write a letter to Grove with a followup phone call by Bill
Intel
—–
Paul Otellini, VP, Assistant to the President
Mike Aymar, VP MCG, GM of SMD I
Tom Galvin, Finance Manager, Business development MCG
Mike Bruk, Microsoft Liaison
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 293 p. 4 of 9]
[STAMPED] X188683 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X188683
Microsoft: Jeffr, Pradeeps, Lloydfr, Marline, ByronB, Carls
Our objectives for the meeting were to:
- present and demonstrate out WindowsH project to show that we
have good stylus/handwriting technology; that it integrates with DOS
& Windows; and that we are working with leading OEMs;
- to attempt to understand Intel’s real objectives behind making
such an investment; and
- attempt to dissuade them from the investment.
Intel believes that stylus computers represent a very important
emerging market; they want to be sure that Intel participates in
that market both by having Intel chips used in those computers as
well as as a manufacturer of such computers. Go is not the only
investment Intel has been pursuing in this area–there has already
been one that has fallen through and they will consider more. I
inferred
from listening to them that Aymar, Galvin (who works for
Harold Hughs), and Avram Miller (not present) are proponents of
the stylus market oportunity, and are trying to get Intel into it.
We had told Intel that we think an investment in Go Corp would be
a bad idea. These guys wanted to operate under the assumption that
Intel
would invest in Go, and how could we minimize or mitigate any
damage–they were not very open minded. This is understandable
since they have been pushing the Go investment inside Intel and see
us as an obstacle toward their objective. They had been told to come
and
see what we are developing and if it changes the rationale for
investing
in Go, but these guys clearly want to make the investment.
[L]loyd, Pradeep and Byron gave a good presentation of what we are
trying [t]o achieve and how we will go about doing it. We covered
[h]ow we are building on top of standard Windows and standard Windows
apps, and that we are working with numerous OEMs. Byron’s presentation
on our character recognition software was particularly
good–I think they were impressed that we are pushing the state of the
art in this area.
We attempted to understand what their objectives were in making the
investment. They gave the following:
- They want to learn about the stylus market and technology
- They want to license hardware technology for use by their
systems division to make stylus computers to sell on an OEM basis
- They want to be able to design silicon (chip sets) that OEMs
will use in stylus computers; this investment will let them better
understand what silicon to design
- They want to make sure that the x86 is at the heart of stylus
computers in general and the Go system in particular in case Go is
successful.
It is not clear what technology it is that they hope to get from Go.
They said something about a squishy tablet. When we asked them to
list the technology they wanted, the list was:
- display
- stylus interface
- small form factor technology
- integrated tablets
And a key point they made is that they want access to this
technology
without having to give up any Intel technology (e.g. chip licenses).
[I?] don’t know enough about Go–someone tell me if I am wrong–but it
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 293 p. 5 of 9]
[STAMPED] X188864 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X188684
seems unlikely to me that Go has such great hardware technology in
[t]hese areas–it sounds like stuff you would get from Japan. We
[vo]lunteered that we could help Intel to get access to the technology
from someone else, and they asked us to follow up on that.
This is what they said. Unclear what the real motives are. The
investment in Go would give them a license to Go’s design as well as
Go’s software, including sublicensing rights.
As I mentioned they weren’t really interested in finding alternative
ways to get stylus/tablet technology–they wanted to take the approach
of saying: assume that Intel does invest in Go, how can we mitigate the
impact? They say they are willing to position their investment as
strictly a hardware technology investment, and issue an endorsment of
Windows H. We did not pursue this discussion.
The points we made are:
- Windows H builds on top of DOS and Windows and will run existing
and new apps and be open to everyone.
- Establishing a new OS is hard and unlikely.
- Establishing a new hardware and OS standard divides our market,
confuses customers and ISVs and is unnecessary
- An Intel investment in Go will send a strong message to OEMs and
ISVs and cause confusion
- We are already working with key OEMs, and they will not be
unhappy with this Intel activity
- It is an anti-Microsoft move because it competes with our OSs
and it weakens the Intel platform standard.
- Finally–we’ll help you to get the technology; we will deliver
technology and OEMs making stylus computers using x86; you don’t need
to make an investment.
[Th]eir response is: they don’t care about Go’s operating system and
whether or not it succeeds; they will work to reduce any impact on OEMs
and ISVs by positioning it as a hardware-only investment;
it isn’t an OS thing so it’s not anti-Microsoft; the Go platform can be
made to run DOS; and this is a quick way to get technology.
We weren’t making any progress, so we ended the discussion. If they
are sincere about what their objectives are, then if we show them
alternative sources for the technology, we ought to be able to persuade
them from the investment.
I fear that either they have further motives, or this is another
case
where Intel has just decided to do “something”, which means put money
into something they think helps x86. Without considering how OEMs are
going to feel, how we are going to feel, or whether it really makes
any sense at all. Just throw money at it. Sounds like the Bell
Technology deal. Or some of Intel’s Unix work.
Aymar asked a lot of questions about application software, and how
users
locate documents and files and things; how they navigate through
“folders” etc. I think he thinks of Windows as being too complicated. I
don’t know if he has seen some demos of Go software that look easier to
use, but that is my impression. That makes me think they must also be
interested in Go’s software and just not telling us. I would have to
assume that reducing their dependence on Microsoft is also in their
minds.
[Th]ere are 2 next steps:
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 293 p. 6 of 9]
[STAMPED] X 188685 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X188685
- See if we have some stylus/tablet technology sources we can
introduce them to. We need to decide if we want to do this, since they
could then try to sell Go’s technology to them, or otherwise interfere
in our work with OEMs. If we want to do this, we need to get this
moving by the end of this week. Billg–give your input on email. If
yes, Lloyd/Pradeep own the followup to identify tech. sources.
- Write a letter from Billg to Grove and follow up with a phone
call. I’ll draft a letter. Send it out on Email for comment tomorrow.
>From tomos Mon Jul 16 04:52:30 1990
To: lloydfr
Subject: Summary report of Intel Team in Japan
Cc: billg carls jeffr makon mikemap pradeeps samf tomos
Date: Mon Jul 16 20:42:04 1990
Mail-Flags: 0000
Subject: Summary report of Intel Team in Japan.
Followings are summary report for the above mentioned team’s
activities in Japan. I coordinated meetings with Kyocera, Wacom and
Seiko Denshi for their survey of stylus technology . Prior to those
meetings. I had a preliminary discussion with them on 7/11 at the
hotel to get their objectives of survey in Japan.
1. Team members and visiting schedule.
| Mike Moon |
Consultant, Strategic Technology
OEM Microcomputer Platform Division |
Kathryn Harrignton [sic?]
|
Technology Planning OS & APPs
OEM Microcomputer Platform Division |
| Tom Gablin |
Finance Manager, Business Development
Microcomputer Component Group |
Mike is the boss of the team and he knows the latest stylus
technology
and trend. He is the key person to create a report to Grove. He
knows the fact that GO is using Wacom’s stylus pad for their product
under development when I asked the question. Kathryn is software
oriented person who want [sic] to know hardware from Hand Writing
Recognition software(HWR) point of view. She made several questions
related required functions for better recognition rate and she showed
much interest in Sony Palmtop when i saw it to her. She might be a
key person for Win-H discusion scheduled in Redmond on 7/17. Tom has
his interest in possibility to expand market of Intel’s microprocessor
through stylus computer including development of co-processor for HWR.
>From these point of view, Intel’s team will create their report
from
several point [sic] of view not from one point of stylus technology.
2. Objectives of their survey in Japan.
Mike indicated their objectives of survey in the preliminary
meeting.
Intel has interest in stylus computer itself as the possible new
computer in the future which will expand market opportunity of Intel’s
microcomputer. They want to establish the platform of microcomputer
in this product segment same as they succeeded in PC. >From this
point of view, they want to know following points to be reported to
Grove prior to the meeting on 7/20.
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 293 p. 7 of 9]
[STAMPED] X 188686 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X188686
I will finish this report now. If you have questions, please call me
[a]t the office, I will be the office 9:00-9:30AM Japan time then will
be out of office.
Regards
Tom
>From johnsa Tue Jul 17 12:07:09 1990
To: billg jonl lloydfr mikehal mikemap steveb tonya
Subject: ibm/go announcement
Date: Tue Jul 17 12:05:13 1990
Mail-Flags: 0000
lee reiswig just called to inform me that there will be an
announcement today
that ibm and go are engaged in a joint project to pilot certain pen
based
applications. if the pilot works out it could lead to jointly developed
porducts [sic]. ibm is licensing certain go technology.
the Q & As will attempt to address the DOS issues as follows:
| Q. |
Why endorse a new platform to support notebook computers as
opposed to enhancing existing platforms? |
| A. |
the go platform has been optomized [sic] to make it natural
for the
user to write with a pen. it will be easy to exchange data betweeen the
go platform and those platforms that run on the desktop. |
| |
|
| Q. |
Will the go applications run on dos or os/2? |
| A. |
No. |
He will send us a copy of the press release.
[>F]rom jeffr Tue Jul 17 22:20:45 1990
To: mikemap
Subject: Go ancmnt – GRID’s questions..
Date: Tue Jul 17 22:20:44 1990
Mail-Flags: 0000
>From pradeeps Tue Jul 17 14:54:22 1990
To: jeffr lloydfr
Subject: Go ancmnt – GRID’s questions..
Cc: billg
Date: Tue Jul 17 14:54:20 1990
I just spoke to Alan Lefkof (Pres, Grid Systems). GO is announcing
their
machine tomorow. (I don’t know if this is a separate, but related event
to
the IBM press release described in Johnsa’s email). Alan wanted to know
what
was going to be our response and what should he say about Win-H.
He didn’t have much data on the announcement, except that IBM will
endorse and
licence the s/w (not h/w) and that three ISV’s will be there: Slate,
Pensoft
(a 2 man flaky operation) and either Lotus or Borland. We think it’s
Borland.
(Dan Bricklin is coming West this week for the announcement, I guess,
not for a
board meeting).
Aln Lefkof plans to say that Grid has a large account focus which
requires open
architectures and adherence to standards. MS-DOS is the standard today.
As
new standrads [sic] emerge, Grid will look at them. He does not plan to
say
anything
about Win-H unless we decide that we are going to. Even then, he is
concerned
that we would be forced to talk about unannounced harware [sic] if he
said
that Grid
[wa]s making a machine which will run Win-H.
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 293 p. 8 of 9]
I’ve told him that I will talk to Jeffr and get back to him with our
party
[li]ne.
>From jeffr Tue Jul 17 21:59:19 1990
To: billg mikehal mikemap rice sarahch steveb w-connib w-pamed
Subject: FYI-GO says
Date: Tue Jul 2l 21:59:16 1990
Mail-Flags: 0000
>From
mcimail?TO:__Gregory_Stikeleather#___EMS:_MCI_MAIL#__MBX:_0004262752 Tue
To: JeffR
Subject: GO Press Briefing
Date: Tue Jul 17, 1990 1:16pm EST
From: Gregory Stikeleather
EMS: MCI Mail
MBX: 0004262752
Handling: LETTER
Message-Id: 21900717231512/0004262752NB1EM
Dear Jeff,
Congratulations on your promotion to Vice President of Office
Systems. It is certainly clear outside of Microsoft the key role
you have played in building the applications Division, and we
here at GO are pleased to see you acknowledged for your work.
Everything is proceeding well here; in fact, we are conducting a
[pr]ess briefing this week that outlines part of our strategy. We
[wa]nted you to hear this directly from us. These are our four
[m]ajor points at the briefing:
- GO is developing a new operating evironment designed for
pen-based computers.
- This environment is available for license to computer
manufacturers wishing to enter the market.
- We have completed an agreement with our first licensee, IBM.
- There is already substantial support from independent software
companies, VARs, and corporate customers.
I am sending you press releases that you should receive tomorrow.
Jerry sends his regards.
Sincerely,
Greg Stikeleather
Manager of Advocacy
[STAMPED] X 188687 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X188687
>From lloydfr Wed Jul 18 23:15:50 1990
To: billg carls jeffr johnsa mikehal mikemap rice sarahch steveb tonya
w-connib w-pamed
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 293 p. 9 of 9]
Subject: GO News
Date: Wed Jul 18 23:13:12 1990
[Ma]il-Flags: 8000
UPf 07/18 2304 IBM licenses pen based computer technology
By BRIAN ROONEY
UPI Business Writer
SAN FRANCISCO (UPI) — IBM Corp. gave an important endorsement
Wednesday to an emerging technology that allows computer users to
enter data with pen-like writing devices.
The nation’s largest computer company announced it was the first
licensee of a pen based computer operating system developed by Go
Corp. of Foster City, Calif., a 3-year-old startup company.
IBM said it intended to create computers operated by pens on a flat
screen. The computers will be able to easily exchange information
with other IBM and IBM-compatible personal computers.
Insurance examiners, architects and other mobile professionals could
use the portable machines on the job and later transfer the
information into their primary computers.
The technology “will make using a computer as easy as writing on a
piece of paper,” said James Cannavino, IBM vice president and general
manager of its Personal Systems Division.
Cannavino said it was too early to tell when IBM would introduce its
first pen-operated computers or how much they would cost.
Because of IBM’s size in the computer industry, its endorsement
could
make Go’s technology the standard for pen-based computers, just as
IBM’s licensing of Microsoft Corp.’s DOS operating system made it the
standard for personal computers in the 1980s.
Go Corp. said it would make its technology available to any
manufacturer that wanted to license it. IBM also invited other
manufacturers to adopt the Go system.
Software developers Lotus Development Corp., Borland International,
Wordperfect Corp., Slate Corp. and PenSoft Corp. already have
announced plans to develop software applications for Go’s operating
system.
Companies that are developing their own pen-based machines adopted a
wait-and-see approach to Go’s system.
“I think IBM’s endorsement of the whole stylus-based computing
market
is nothing but good news for people building these types of devices,”
Rizzo said. “It is way too soon to make any kind of rational
statement about whether it will be a standard.”
Grid Systems Corp., the first U.S. company to introduce a
pen-operated computer last fall, said it would let the marketplace set
the standard but would consider licensing Go’s technology if
necessary.
[La]st page !
[STAMPED] X 188688 CONFIDENTIAL
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 349 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 349 p. 1 of 3]
112
>From gregw Tue Jul 31 23:56:40 1990
To: billg darrylr jeffr mikemap
Cc: bradsi jabeb lloydfr tonyw
Subject: Re: GO threat
Date: Tue Jul 31 23:42:48 1990
The L&E stuff was not meant to be a real architecture. Our
applications could not respond to a real architecture. The AppDT work
will form the basis of a real OO architecture – a robust extensible
data model
which works with the AFX view models.
Our instances can’t be viewed as containers of information today. This
means that it is very difficult to implement index and content
querying. The system would be forced into understanding file formats
(we know this is not workable).
(the remainder is long)
The GO machine brings home the following point in a big way.
Once we have implemented enough interesting data types and viewers
using [here a “?” appears on a line by itself, apparently a glitch] our
OO frameworks and interfaces, there is no need for DOS and Windows as
we know it. Instead, the file system can be replaced by a simple memory
manager with a backing store to yield persistence. The notion of
processes and applications disappears replaced by a single address
space with concurrent threads of activity. On the notebook, detached
from [the] rest of the world, the security of separate processes is
unnecessary. There is still a need for concurrency controlled resource
management (memory and screen real-estate).
Why bother with DOS apps or Windows apps as we know them, the DOS apps
don’t interoperate and the Windows apps are not much better.
These apps are easier to write – no file formats and I/O (only
in-memory storage), few format conversions (enough to support content
and queries), natural container-containee relationships, garbage
collection, objects have well defined behavior (implement a set of
protocols). Objects that can be queried support the content protocols.
The system can enumerate all objects. If it makes sense to have a
container which knows about all instances of a particular type, this is
easy to implement and install.
The GO UI is probably the least interesting part of the product from a
technical perspective. Like Hypercard and some aspects of Toolbook, it
will show how far graphics art can take you. Of all of our products
Windows 3.0 is perhaps the best, but it doesn’t come close to these
other examples.
[here a “?” appears on a line by itself, apparently a glitch]
GO is scary but they are a small player attaching themselves to a
limited hardware platform. Their distributed machine plans are
interesting and very focused.
In our business there are the following things that are important –
[STAMPED] EXHIBIT 35 [indistinct due to fax or repeated photocopying]
[STAMPED] X 531240 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 349 p. 2 of 3]
1. ownership of the information type implementation
2. location of the information
3. diversity of information types
4. end-user ability to integrate information into new components
We need to be taking control of these 4 things with our system and
application strategies. GO (or any new platform) is going to have a
hard time addressing these 3 issues. They are completely dependent on
making the hardware platform compelling soon after the initial
introductions. We need to understand what we think are the compelling
features and have a response in the form of product and strategy. We
won’t be able to get a product (an OEM to support us) until we have a
compelling strategy to sell.
? [sic]
The OO architected system is the key part of that strategy (we need to
[sic?] same pitch to go against New Wave except forget the NT-OS/2
heavy duty features for notebook computers). We need to be able to
demonstrate that handwriting does not require new UI concepts and looks
by making existing apps work with minimal changes. Most of the apps
that people say that notebook computers need are keyboard apps that we
are missing today. Other apps like the math equation app are just
brain-dead – what ever their implementation, it is unlikely that it can
be effectively reused at a low level in other places in the system –
high level reuse is easier but the right application contexts need to
be found.
What do we have going for us –
1. handwriting is neat but not as reliable as a keyboard for entry
2. handwriting computers will have keyboard options
3. with a keyboard DOS apps can run
4. handwriting / pen interface techniques integrate smoothly into
Windows apps
5. information is naturally exchanged with the primary location (no
unreliable format converters – using the same application)
6. diversity of applications for our environments
7. long term strategy that makes sense on the three interesting machine
environments – notebook, workstation and server. Keep the picture
simple. The GO solution is weak on interoperability with the
?[SIC]
workstation and server.
8. new hardware fits into the big picture of office work – take home
and travel (take the information with you)
9. huge ISV support for Windows apps with huge base (can evangelize
when software and hardware are ready – need it soon)
10. … (we have some more going for us – left to the reader as an
exercise)
What are we missing –
1. low-end personal organizer apps (windows desktop needs these also)
2. low-end information types (we’re dieing [sic] for windows works 2.0)
3. OEM hardware (may be we have it)
4. some of the below
What do we have going against us –
[STAMPED] X 531241 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 349 p. 3 of 3]
1. higher cost due to larger memory requirements
(need to figure out if this is offset by lower software costs – we
have a2 machine / 1 user licensing problem)
2. compelling features of GO UI and software
3. very focused competitors – we need a good economic model for their
businesses – the financial bootstrapping process for them is
complicated and could be interrupted by successfully using our
advantages above
? [SIC]
4. confusing endorsements by OEMs like IBM
5. … (there must be more)
The bottom-line is that we have a compelling alternative to the GO
machine. We are having real difficulties in articulating it.
Enough said by me – use it as you like – I have other things to do.
[BELOW EMAIL IS QUOTED IN THE
ABOVE EMAIL]
>From billg Tue Jul 31 21:39:11 1990
Subject: GO threat
Date: Tue Jul 31 21:36:15 1990
In reviewing some sketchy stuff on the GO machine it is clear that the
threat posed by GO is as much an integration threat as a handwriting
threat. By using an object oriented approach they allow for searching,
hypertext linking, and index and table of contets across all data
types. They allow new objects to be added easily in their framework.
Their shell is quite visual — with foler [sic, “folder”] tabs and
pages. We should try and learn more about it. Meanwhile it is time for
our L&E stuff to deal with linking and sorting. I can’t believe we
don’t have this as part of our architecture when a real architecture
would al [sic] allow for these things. Our handwriting group should
write up what they know. ACtually [sic] the esther dyson article does a
good job explaining what should be done
?[sic]
(GO doesn’t do all of it).
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 355 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 355 Page 1 of 14]
[STAMPED] Gates DEPOSITION 56 2/28/[20]02
[STAMPED] X555301 CONFIDENTIAL
[handwritten] GO Corp –> Lloyd Frink [checkmark] 8M 8/13/[19]90
Microsoft Memo
To: billg darrylr, jeffr, mikemap, bradsi [handwritten
underline] jabeb, tonyw, gregw, [s?]andyt, pradeeps, marline
Subject: GO Corp Info.
From: lloydfr
Date: 8/1/[19]90
Attached is a packet of information I have collected on GO. There are
some of GO’s very preliminary specs, a slide show of theirs, two of my
trip reports on GO, and some press information.
Essentially, GO has been going out and telling the world that you need
a whole new OS and apps for portable, pen based computers. People seem
to bite on this, especially when they see that IBM is a strong backer
of the GO OS (GOOSE). They use their notebook shell and OO framework
combined with gestures and handwriting recognition to show everyone
that their platform is indeed very different from the standard
Windows/Mac world. They say you can’t “hack this into an existing OS.”
Well, we know this isn’t so, and the best way to prove them wrong is to
do our own “notebook” app. The big constraint is that we get it done in
a year. So this won’t be the most beautiful thing, but it should serve
as a stopgap measure until we do our Win 4 shell and have all of our OO
stuff in place.
GO Notebook Shell
When you turn on a GO computer, the user sees something that looks like
a notebook. You can write directly on the page, probably do pictures as
well. On a page you can open many document windows of any type. They
use an object oriented approach to their OS, so opening up a document
is just creating an instance of that clss type. When I was down at GO,
Carr talked a lot about embedded documents, bu thte screen shots we
have don’t actually show that. These guys are smart, so I’ll bet they
will make it possible. When you leave a page, and later return to it,
all of the documents will be in the same state as when you left (i.e.
open/iconic, position). At the top of the screen is a menu bar with
system-wide and generic document commands. If you want to create a new,
blank document, you use the Create menu and choose the document type.
Inside of each document are menus that correspond to that class.
Besides the many benefits of being OO, the thing which sets the GO
notebook apart is the ease of navigation. On the side of each page are
a set of “tabs” which correspond to folders, just a page in the
notebook. Touch the tab and instantly you will go to a predefined
workspace (similar to excel, but multiple document/object types). It is
not clear if they are going to have only one level of folders, a “show
all tabs” command, or some sort of hierarchy. The really nice thing
about these tabs is that they are always visible and never get obscured
by other windows. There are prev, next, and back buttons as well (the
upper right hand corner). I suggested they add the ability push and pop
of pages (hypercard). At the beginning of the notebook is a Table of
Contents, which is a listing of the folder and page titles. At the end
of the notebook is an Index of keywords the user has marked. Clicking
on an item in either the TOC or index sends the user to that page. The
user can also search for information in all documents and can create
“goto” links (not really clear how they have implemented the latter).
There are probably several other standard methods which can be applied
to all objcets.
This metaphor does have a few drawbacks. If they number every page by
sequence, and you keep inserting pages, then your page numbers are
always changing and lose some meaning. Since they seem to be avoiding
very many levels of hierarchy, what happens when you get tons of info?
Does something like a piece of email belong on a page by itself, or
with other email? What about rolodex cards? You kind of have next,
perv, back navigational type issues within a window on a single page of
a notebook. The notion of having a multiple page document, or a
multiple record table in a window on a signle page of a notebook
might seem confusing.
But this metaphor has a lot of appeal, especially compared to our
program/file manager combination. I thnk we can whip something up in a
year that embodies some of these ideas. I’ll think about this in more
detail and write it down in the next few weeks.
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 355 Page 2 of 14]
[STAMPED] X 555302 CONFIDENTIAL
[This exhibit page shows a pen-computing user interface]
[The diagram is labelled with a document control number] 4.4.89 1
[Handwritten caption to diagram: GO Corporation Confidential]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 355 Page 3 of 14]
[STAMPED] X 555303 CONFIDENTIAL
[This exhibit page shows a pen-computing user interface]
[The diagram is labelled with a document control number] 4.4.89 2
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 355 Page 4 of 14]
[STAMPED] X 555304 CONFIDENTIAL
[This exhibit page shows a pen-computing user interface]
[The diagram is labelled with a document control number] 4.4.89 3
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 355 Page 5 of 14]
[STAMPED] X 555305 CONFIDENTIAL
[This exhibit page shows a pen-computing user interface]
[The diagram is labelled with a document control number] 4.4.89 4
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 355 Page 6 of 14]
[STAMPED] X 555306 CONFIDENTIAL
[This exhibit page shows a pen-computing user interface]
[The diagram is labelled with a document control number] 4.4.89 5
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 355 Page 7 of 14]
[STAMPED] X 555307 CONFIDENTIAL
[This exhibit page shows a pen-computing user interface]
[The diagram is labelled with a document control number] 4.4.89 6
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 355 Page 8 of 14]
[STAMPED] X 555308 CONFIDENTIAL
[This exhibit page shows a pen-computing user interface]
[The diagram is labelled with a document control number] 4.4.89 7
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 355 Page 9 of 14]
[STAMPED] X 555309 CONFIDENTIAL
[This exhibit page shows a pen-computing user interface]
[The diagram is labelled with a document control number] 4.4.89 8
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 355 Page 10 of 14]
[STAMPED] X 555310 CONFIDENTIAL
[This exhibit page shows a pen-computing user interface]
[The diagram is labelled with a document control number] 4.4.89 9
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 355 Page 11 of 14]
[STAMPED] X 555311 CONFIDENTIAL
[This exhibit page shows a pen-computing user interface]
[The diagram is labelled with a document control number] 4.4.89 10
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 355 Page 12 of 14]
[STAMPED] X 555312 CONFIDENTIAL
[This exhibit page shows a pen-computing user interface]
[The diagram is labelled with a document control number] 4.4.89 11
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 355 Page 13 of 14]
[STAMPED] X 555313 CONFIDENTIAL
[This exhibit page shows a pen-computing user interface]
[The diagram is labelled with a document control number] 4.4.89 12
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 355 Page 14 of 14]
[STAMPED] X 555314 CONFIDENTIAL
[This exhibit page shows a pen-computing user interface]
[The diagram is labelled with a document control number] 4.4.89 4 [the
last “4” is crossed out and replaced by a handwritten] 13
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 359 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[resolution too poor to resolve periods and colons: these have been
inserted where the text implies them]
>From lloydfr Thu Aug 9 15:32:22 1990
To: mikemap
Subject: GO Info
Cc: cathyw
Date: Thu Aug 9 15:25:21 1990
I sent a memo to you last week which had a bunch of info on GO corp.
Turns out some of it was confidential and I was not supposed to make
copies. Could you please return all of it to me so that I can destroy
it?
Thanks – Lloyd
[handwritten] [indistinct] Material Redacted
[STAMPED] Raikes DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 99 11/2/[20]01
[STAMPED] X 578746 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X578746
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 370 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
>From jeffr Wed Aug 29 19:41:42 1990
To: debem
Subject: Please print
Date: Wed Aug 29 19:40:13 1990
For Go Corp file. Thx. Jeff
————–
>From claraj Wed Aug 29 19:32:28 1990
To: jeffr rice
Subject: GO
Date: Wed Aug 29 19:28:50 1990
Phil Taylor, Dir. of PC Platform at Softview (a forms co.), is quite
eager to give us info on GO. One of their software developers has
attended two training sessions, April and June this year. Phil has
access to technical documentation and will get more detailed
information.
Softview has put a halt on pursuing the GO platform due to lack of
resources in time and money in writing apps for a new operating
environment. He is definitely interested in developing Windows apps.
Being a Windows developer himself, he is definitely pushing for Win-H
and open to giving us info on GO. I think he’s being straightforward in
his description. He was flipping through the papers while talking to me.
Due to my novice status, some of this information may be redundant, and
the more technical information a bit fuzzy.
So…based on a technical documentation dated April 24, 1990, the GO
machine has:
12 MHz. 80c 286. Zero weight [sic,
should be “wait”] state.
3 meg RAM std expandable to 8
1 meg FEPROM
2 meg SRAM for user data
640×400 resolution. Black and white. LCD. Super Twister Reflection.
800 DPI 1:1 aspect ratio
4 shades of gray
9.5″ x 13″ x 1″ with screen size of 5.5″ x 8″
weight: 4.5 lbs
removable NiCd battery with backup Lithium cell. Battery life is 4
hours with 1.5 hrs to recharge.
optional expansion slot for Group 3 fax board – 9600 baud
Stylus is cordless. (Phil will check on button) supports in & out
proximity, pen events (move up, down, window enter and exit)
NO disks. No h/d or floppy disks.
The current GO notepad has three components: memory, screen and pen.
It does offer an optional base station module-recharger that includes
serial and parallel port to print to (HP LaserJet II, Dyconax 150
[STAMPED] Kaplan DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 62 4/19/[20]02
[STAMPED] X531215 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 370 Page 2 of 3]
[STAMPED] X 531216 CONFIDENTIAL
(portable printer), Epson Fx/LQ), standard IBM PS/2 keyboard
and Appletalk RS232. Floppy drives and hardware modules are
optional on the base station.
Phil does not believe that GO is manufacturing the hardare,
He
heard a rumor that IBM is. GO has been having a tough time in
receiving the hardware to fit their time schedule.
Handwriting recognition is CURSIVE and
trainable. Phil does not
think it’s neuronetbased, based on it being a 286. The
developer
who went to the training class was very impressed by the demo.
However, it was used only by Go’s representative and not tried out
by anyone from the audience. Recognition is
concurrent with a
slight lag but not distracting. He has little
information on Go’s hwx
other than they are using static and dynamic approaches (speed,
direction, sequence, timing).
Go does NOT havg a collision problem between gestures and
characters. It doesn’t sound like they’re relying on different
modlities. They’ve spent much effort in defining them and have
cycled them twice already in the past few months. As of April,
they
were using double taps, triple taps, circle, carets, horizontal
and
vertical slash, question mark, X. Having started out with
20 system
gestures, they have cut it down to 10-12. Phil mentioned that
they’re
shooting for the magic seven. In addition to system gestures are
application gestures and user-defined gestures (???).
GO uses a constant daytimer metaphor with tabs on the
side, even
when an application is being used. Thus, it forces the user to
define
the GO notepad as a daytimer.
Applications bundled are a word processor and a central address
book. Tbeir operating system includes file
conversion and network
communication. Optional software is a drawing program
(COM ??),
a faxviewer and forms. He mentioned Tenpoint as one of their
ISV’s.
It does do multitasking, threads — perhaps pre-emptive
multitasking.
With reqards to the operating environment codenamed OSN, it’s
pseudo object-oriented written in C, not C++. It utilizes
special
structures and pound defines to look like object oriented code.
But
it is definitely not an object-oriented language. It
contains an app
framework, Win class, app class and object-oriented exensions to
C.
The developing environment contains standard editors, linkers
and
source code debuggers. Development is done on DOS. Tools are
DOS-based. The debugger and the emulator is done on Codeview.
Developers develop on the PC on an emulator which simulates the
GO environment. Then, when they receive the hardware, they can
cross compile on the GO machine. The developing environment is
split. One compiles and links on text-based DOS. But, booting is
graphical (Windows). Thus, the developer has to be aware of DOS
and Windows. Apparently, Go is pushing their training classes
(100
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 370 Page 3 of 3]
[STAMPED] X 531217 CONFIDENTIAL
ISV’s in the April session) to encourage ISV
development prior to
having the hardware prototypes. Phil says converting existing apps
to OSN is highly dependent on how carefully the coding has been
done and most likely result in re-programming from scratch.
No compatability with DOS or Windows.
No screen rotation suport.
Phil will get hold of more manuals and sort through then, in
addition to talking to the person who went through training to get a
better feel of UI. I told him I’ll contact him Monday–to give
him
time. Given that further information is probably more technical,
I
think one of the development team should be here when I talk to
him. Hope this information is useful.
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 443 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 443 p1 of 2]
[STAMPED] X531274 CONFIDENTIAL
>From jeffr Thu Nov 1 07:37:40 1990
To: debem
Subject: Please print
Date: Thu Nov 1 07:35:39 1990
For Go Corp file. Thx. Jeff
—————-
>From lloydfr Wed Oct 31 16:40:34 1990
To: billg gregs jeffr mikemap pradeeps
Subject: Approaching GO
Date: Wed Oct 31 16:39:37 1990
Our primary mission right now is to stop GO. We could do this by either
1) making sure they sign up no OEMs or ISVs, hence have no customers or
2) convert them to Windows. I’ve been thinking that it might not be
such a bad idea to give #2 a shot again. My reasoning follows.
No matter what GO says, they know they don’t need a whole new OS to do
most of the things they are doing. I believe the reason they’ve gone
into the OS business is mainly to make a lot of money, but also because
they did not want to be burdened with the past. The fact that we’ve
sold over a million copies of Win 3 and developers are flocking to
Windows might make them see that being “burdened with the past” really
isn’t such a disadvantage. And, we’ve heard from someone inside of GO
that GO is running into Win-H everywhere, especially the people Billg
has spoken to; they call it FUD. If we’ve spoken to the accounts first,
GO has a hard time getting off the ground. And to people GO though they
had locked up and we talk to them, GO has to visit them again
(Cannon?). The idea is not to get them to convert right away, but to
build a relationship with them so that it is not so distasteful for
them to go that direction at some point in the future. Right now we are
the big bad Goliath, and I don’t think we have much to lose by being
very open with them about what we are doing and how they could fit into
it.
How could GO make money working with Windows? Basically I think they
have a lot of smart people and good ideas. They have three things which
would work well on top of Windows – their HWX, their notebook shell
with applets, and their OO framework. They should see that as well as
portables. there is a huge desktop market that could use this same
technolgoy. And you just have to have a compatible OS to try and reach
the desktop. If they decided to port their stuff to Windows, then they
would essentially be competing with both the handwriting group (HWX and
notebook applets) and AFX, but not the Windows group. We could license
Win 3.1 to OEMs, and then the OEMs could buy GOs stuff on topof that.
I’m not sure how much of a business opportunity this is, but at least
it is something for GO to fall back on if they are unsucessful in the
path they are taking now. Also, do we want to risk losing some of
potential revenue?
If we were to approach GO, I assume we would meet with them, give them
our API’s now and an SDK when it’s ready. We might want to show them a
demo of the compatibility layer, but definitely not the notebook. We’d
just try to be more open and friendly and not ask for anything in
return. We’ll say that our apps division will consider writing apps for
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 443 p2 of 2]
the GO machine, but realistically we wouldn’t make that decision until
they have sold a fairly large number of machines.
A last benefit of taking this friendly approach is that we might lessen
the chances of them suing us for some unknown reason right as they are
about to go under.
Just an idea, any comments?
– Lloyd
[STAMPED] X 531275 CONFIDENTIAL
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 478 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 478 p. 1 of 4]
GO Corporation Confidential Mar 5, 1994
December 2, 1990
Jerry Kaplan notes for meeting with
Jim Cannavino
Executive Summary
* Go has excellent technology, lead
time, visibility, and is well received by industry
* GO + IBM licensing has not proved enough to win over other companies
to date
* Microsoft strong competitive threat has stalled progress, put
financial pressure on GO
GO Status
* Completing “developer release” of 286
hardware and software
excellent reception of development
environment by ISVs
200 people trained
Tens of application development projects
good press, visibility, book series
* Penpoint unveiling and developer product announcement Jan [19]91
* Starting on 386 version
software promiseed to IBM end of 3Q91
* Customers excited about product
IBM special accounts signed up and
ready to go
Many VARs interested, seeking credible hardware vendor
* $15M raised – will last for the next year.
GO’s Plans
* Establish “clean” 32-bit 386 version
as market standard
* Limit 286 to developers and pilot testing
* Complete and license 386 hardware version, then
* Spin out hardware/system’s busines
January Announcement
* Full day of press and developer activities, San Fran 1/22
* Boston Computer Society meeting 1/23
Page 1
[STAMPED] Kaplan DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 34 4/18/[20]02
[STAMPED] CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] KAP0500
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 478 p. 2 of 4]
[PAGE HEADER] GO Corporation Confidential Mar 5, 1994
* Third party application products announcements
* With luck, possible additional Penpoint licensees
* Expect VERY heavy press coverage
What will it take for us to succeed?
* Multiple manufacturers with Penpoint machines
* ISV support
* Staying power to fight competition during market development
What are we finding?
* “Wait and see” attitude among manufacturers
IBM support is not effectively communicated
Unlike the PC, no IBM machines as example
Unlike the PC, no proven market need
* Good developer support, but concern about when machines will be
available. General availability in 1991 is essential.
* Microsort is stalling our progress, hoping to starve us out
Microsoft – our only serious
competition
* Their strengths –
Perceived as a standard setter.
Financial staying power.
Relationships with ISVs, OEMs.
* What they are doing –
Copying us.
Creating confusion.
Promising everything to everyone.
Tryinq to unhook our ISVs, licensees.
Nearly giving product away.
* Their basic pitch –
Microsort is standard setter, not IBM/GO.
They will do whatever GO does in time.
Their system will be compatible with Windows.
IBM will be forced to work with them
eventually.
[PAGE FOOTER] Page 2
[STAMPED] CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] KAP0501
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 478 p. 3 of 4]
[PAGE HEADER] GO Corporation Confidential Mar 5, 1994
GO’s strategic advantages
* Great technoloqy – only system really designed for a pen
* Two year lead over Microsoft
* Outstanding development staff – 60 of 90 people
* Attracting the creative talents of the developer community
* IBM “design win” and public support
What we need from IBM
* Increase visisbility of IBM comitment
* Clear messages
1. IBM sees a major market for pen-based
computers.
2. IBM has evaluated Microsoft and GO, and has
chosen to work exclusively
with GO.
3. IBM is supporting GO to make Penpoint an
open industry standard.
4. IBM will bring a product to market running
Penpoint in 1991.
5. IBM is now working with major customers on
pilot projects.
* Promotion of GO licensing efforts
Active support from IBM Japan executives
Direct high level contacts: NCR, Toshiba,
others?
* Ship a Penpoint machine to general distribution as soon as possible
* ISV support
Assign advocacy/technical support resources
Seeding/””scholarship” program for universities
Multi-city road show support
Internal applications development – ASD?
Outside applications support – Easel?
Internal Territory Management Systems effort?
“Venture fund” for Penpoint ISVs
[PAGE FOOTER] Page 3
[STAMPED] CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] KAP0502
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 478 p. 4 of 4]
[PAGE HEADER] GO Corporation Confidential Mar 5, 1994
What can you do personally?
* Strong video endorsesment for January announcement
Personal appearance at Boston Computer Society,
Authorize a WSJ ad congratulating GO.
* A few interviews – Fortune Magazine (by 12/10), some dailies
* Improve and expand executive focus on helping GO to succeed
Promote GO/IBM relationship inside and outside
Clear roadblocks, reduce bureaucracy, control PR
Centralize and coordinate negotiations
* Allocate some discretionay budget for non-development Penpoint
promotional activities
* Do not cooperate with Microsoft in this area at this time!
Summary
* We’ve got the right technology, the lead time, and the hearts of the
ISVs.
* We need to turn up the heat on Microsoft.
* We need to exand IBM standard setting support,
* We need to increase overall investment in Penpoint,
Give us air cover and runway, and
we’ll create a new (non-Microsoft) systems software standard for
pen-based computers!
[PAGE FOOTER] Page 4
[STAMPED] CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] KAP0503
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 687 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 687 Page 1 of 2]
[Fax Cover Sheet]
To: EXECUTIVE From: MICROSOFT CORP
APR 18 [19]’91 11:00 FROM GO CORPORATION PAGE .001
4-18-91 12:09pm p.1
GO Corporation
[ADDRESS / FAX / TELEPHONE]
DATE: 4-18-[19]91
TO:
NAME: Mr. Bill Gates
COMPANY: Microsoft
FAX NUMBER: [FAX]
FROM:
NAME: Jerry Kaplan
NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING COVER SHEET): 2
IF YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEMS WITH THE RECEIPT OF THIS FAX, PLEASE CONTACT:
Holli Maxwell AT [TELEPHONE]
MESSAGE: Thank you!
[STAMPED] Kaplan DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 39 4/18/[20]/02
[STAMPED] X 504392 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 687 Page 2 of 2]
[ADDED BY FAX PROCESS] To: EXECUTIVE From: MICROSOFT CORP
4-16-[19]91 12:09 pm p.2
[ADDED BY FAX PROCESS] APR 18 91 11:00 FROM GO CORPORATION PAGE
002
[STAMPED] X 504393 CONFIDENTIAL
[ADDED BY FAX PROCESS] ** TOTAL PAGE 002 **
[LETTERHEAD]
GO CORPORATION
[ADDRESS]
[FACSIMILE]
[TELEPHONE]
April 17, 1991
Mr. Bill Gates
Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
1 Microsoft Way
Redmond, Washington 98052-6399
Dear Bill:
This is to follow up on our phone call of yesterday.
I appreciate your offer to sit down with me to discuss any potential
issues GO may have with Pen Windows.
As I explained, at this time I am simply trying to learn enough about
Pen Windows to make an informed evaluation.
I’d like to take you up on your offer to provide us with relevant
materials without restriction. We have already received the Pen Windows
developer kit, but it arrived with a license agreement stating that it
must only be used for the purpose of developing applications. Given our
conversation, I will assume that it is OK with you for us to examine
these materials vithout signing the license. If this is not what you
had in mind, please let me know by next Monday. I will wait until than
before opening the materials.
Should the developers kit not contain the current version of the
“notebook applet”, may I request that you forward this to me (object
code is fine, as long as we can run it).
After we get a chance to look over these materials, I will let you know
if additional materials will be helpful. I will try to complete an
evaluation in a timely manner.
I’d like to reiterate that I have no interest in stirring up press
interest in a “GO/Microsoft fight”. I appreciate your willingness to
cooperate with us, and look forward to resolving the matter.
Sincerely,
[SIGNATURE]
S. Jerrold Kaplan
Chairman
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 718 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 718 Page 1]
Microsoft Corporation [ADDRESS / TELEPHONE / TELEX / FAX]
[handwritten] Billg
[Microsoft Logo]
VIA AIRBORNE EXPRESS
May 3, 1991
Mr. S. Jerrold Kaplan
Chairman
GO Corporation
[ADDRESS]
Dear Jerry:
After our phone call and your letter to me last week, I decided to
write this letter so that my view is clear.
Microsoft has been very interested for a long time in handwriting
recognition software using the pen as the primary interface. When Jeff
Harbers and I met with you and Bob Carr on July 11, 1988 we discussed
the fact that we were working with several companies on system software
for handwriting machines.
When Microsoft met with GO in May and June of 1989, GO knew that we
were seriously considering putting handwriting recognition into
Windows. During these meetings, you and Bob Carr tried to get
Microsoft’s commitment to develop handwriting applications for the GO
operating system. You knew we’d be in the business, whether on GO’s OS
or on our own, and you were careful about what you showed us and told
us about handwriting recognition and gestures. Specifically, Lloyd
Frink saw no code at all and received no information about how you did
handwriting recognition. He wasn’t permitted to take any documentation,
any software or the early version of the SDK out of your offices. Lloyd
did see a couple of gestures that have been staples of the Associated
Press editing guides for years.
Microsoft received no information about GO’s pen product, except what
we read in the papers, from the time of those meeetings until your
recent public demonstrations of PenPoint. What information we learned
during our meetings was largely irrelevant since we saw nothing about
handwriting recognition, which we cared a lot about, and a lot about
GO’s OS, which we cared not much about.
[letterhead footer] Microsoft is an equal opportunity employer.
[STAMPED] X 504373 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 718 Page2]
Mr. S. Jerrold Kaplan
May 3, 1991
Page 2
We have been clear at all stages of our discussions that we were
interested
in putting handwriting recognition and a pen interface in Windows. You
hoped to convince us to rewrite our applications for your operating
system.
However, nothing that we learned from Go undermined our belief that
Windows was the way to go. As a last attempt to convince GO to write
its
software for Windows or license it to Microsoft to put on Windows, we
asked Robert Carr to come to Redmond and we disclosed a lot of
confidential information about our plans for Windows. The upshot of
that
meeting was your offer to license GO’s technology to Microsoft, but on
terms we could not accept. Reluctantly we went our own way.
As I said over the phone, if you have any problems after looking at
our Pen
Windows SDK and other materials, or if you think you need other
materials,
please call me and l will make the matter top priority, I am ready to
sit
down and discuss any of this, and any other concerns you might have.
Very truly yours,
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
[signed] Bill Gates
Bill Gates
Chairman
cc: Bill Campbell
[STAMPED] X 504374 CONFIDENTIAL
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 733 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 733 p1 of 2]
GO Corporation
[ADDERSS / FAX / TELEPHONE]
[STAMPED] RECEIVED MAY 15 1991 CORPORATE
[handwritten] file –> billg. Cc: jeffr mikemap mikenal billn jonl
May 13, 1991
Mr. William Gates
Chairman of the Board & CEO
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
[ADDRESS]
Dear Bill:
Thank you for your letter of May 3 clarifying your views. However, I
must take issue with your version of the events downplaying the
significance of GO’s disclosure of confidential information to
Microsoft.
When we initially discussed GO’s work in July, 1988, contrary to your
statement, there was no discussion that you were working with several
companies on systems software for handwriting machines which use the
pen as the primary interface. In fact, the concept as a whole appeared
to be quite a surprise to you at that time.
After our initial meeting in July 1988, you and executives in your
applications division expressed a serious interest in considering
writing applications for our system. It was represented to us that your
applications division was separate from your systems software division,
and that information obtained from us would not find its way into your
system’s software division and therefore would not be used to deveop
competitive products.
Based on these representations, we hosted some Microsoft employees,
including Lloyd Frink, for extensive briefings about our designs,
plans, and implementation, with the view toward having Microsoft’s
applications division develop applications programs for our system. We
discussed at length the results of our research and investigations, our
intended marketing approach, and what we had learned through
prototyping and testing of different approaches. Lloyd had free access
to our design documents, handwriting interfaces, gesture set, and
engineers.
[STAMPED] Gates DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 60 2/28/[20]02
[STAMPED] X 504369 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 733 p2 of 2]
Letter to Mr. Gates
May 13, 1991
Page 2.
If we had known that Lloyd might become a principal supervisor of
Microsoft’s development of a competing product, we would not have
disclosed our trade secrets to him, much less provided him with an
ofice in our headquarters and unsupervised access to our confidential
information.
The demonstrations of Pen Windows we have seen to date, quite frankly,
cause us concern about use of the information we disclosed to
Microsoft, Frink’s involvement in the design of Pen Windows, and the
apparent similarities between Pen Windows and PenPoint. I will get back
to you with a more definitive analysis after we complete our review of
your materials.
Sincerely,
[signed] Jerry
S. Jerrold Kaplan
Chairman
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 746 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 746 Page 1 of 5]
>From nathanm Sun May 26 10:03:18 1991
To: pradeeps
Cc: billg bradsi cameronm gregs jeffr jonl karenh lloydfr marline
makemap raleighr robg steveb
Record-folder: C:NATHANMFOLDERSWSENT.FLD
Subject: RE: PCs that aren’t PCs
Date: Mon Mar 16 11:31:28 PDT 1992
I agree with much of what you say. In fact, the part that you said I
didn’t understand is exactly what I would have expected you to say. The
only differences that we have are rather subtle, but I think that they
are important. Here are some specific comments:
The assumption that the PenWin mkt is
the ‘existing PC user’ while GO’s mkt is the ‘new user’ is wrong. (What
the hell is a ‘new user’ anyway? Presumably over the past 10 years,
we’ve gathered 50m ‘new users’.) GO wants to position us that way –
Yes, that is my point! I think that we [are] in violent agreement.
There are several quite different topics that seem that we potentially
could discuss:
– What your marketing position *is* – i.e. what people really perceive.
This is what you tell them as filtered by what they believe and retain.
– What your posture *should be* – i.e. the message you shouldbe
saying. Note that this is usually a strong function of the audience, or
market segment.
– What the fundamental “lay of the land” is – i.e. the techincal [sic]
and market *realities*. Note that these can be quite different than
either what you say or what people perceive. Sometimes you can get away
with saying things that are very untrue (like the misuse of the word
“Open” in the UNIX community, or the old practice of calling
dictatorships “The People’s Democratic Republic of…”). The usual case
however is that you need to make sure that what you are saying is in
line with techincal [sic] realities.
Go’s message is very pure in that all three of these line up. They say
that they are for people who are likely to only use a Pen based
machine, and do so primarily in tasks which are not typical on desktop
PCs (that is a good definition of a “new user” in this regard). PC
industry people believe Go when they say this, because it is obvious
that they can’t run any PC industry apps – so it is clear that they
want to be something else. Also, Go can make some credible claims to
having technically optimized for this case.
My comments about Pen Windows were primarily about the technical and
market reality, and I think you interpreted them as statements about
what your message should be.
WinMail 1.21 lynnra Mon Mar 16 11:18:50 1992 Page: 109
[STAMPED] EXH 22 DATE 02/14/[20]02 WITNESS [signature] SUSAN ZIELE
[STAMPED] MS 5024470 CONFIDENTIAL
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 746 Page 2 of 5]
The reality is that if you completely subtract the connection to
Windows apps,
Go is way ahead of us (in my opinion). That is not a message I would
suggest
you communicate, and I don’t think that many people percieve that yet
(fortunately) because you have done good work. The good news is that we
don’t
have to subtract Windows out, and you can use the aura of Windows to
help in
the other markets. This is explained more below:
we’re in this business
precisely because we have no intention of giving that market up. Better
than 50% of pen system sales in the next couple of years are likely to
come from fleet sales to people who are so-called ‘new users’. We
intend to win those sales. Yes, most of these will be sold direct; will
have few apps on them, but will still lead to a critical mass of pen
machines (and pen OS’s). Once the socket gets out there it will attract
ISVs. Those sockets must be PenWin sockets.
I agree that it is dangerous to cede these sales to Go, and I had no
intention
of suggesting that you do this. Your goals, and your message should
reflect
the fact that you want to win there too.
Even in the case of fleet sales, I believe that your ability to
convince people
that we have an advantage is directly or indirectly Windows. If you had
to
give a demo and sales pitch where you never once ran a normal Windows
app, or
otherwise used the imprima of Windows, you would be at best be on even
ground
with Go, and I don’t think that would be much fun.
So, to sum up on this, I was not misunderstanding your goal of doing
well in
that market, or your message which supports that goal. I just think
that
Windows is your ace in the hole, and that within the next 2 years 90%
of your
sales will be either directly be to Windows users, or to “new
pen-centric
users” (as defined above) who picked Pen Windows over Go directly or
indirectly
because of the connection to Windows (part of coroporate strategy,
support from
machine mfgr, FUD with going “against” Windows, expectation of future
apps…).
As an aside, I think that there is a big danger in your message
becomming to
diffuse if you tell everybody that you’ll win against Go in all
markets. Go
has a very focussed position, and as much as possible you should use
this
againtst them by letting them position themselves into a corner.
In particular, when it comes time to talk to ISVs, you really want
to make the
point that Go’s intended market is NOT a good place to sell their apps.
I
think that the point you raise above about fleet sales eventually
becoming
sockets for apps may have some merit, but this is a terrible thing to
say to
ISVs. X think the best *message* to ISVs is that Go’s market is
IRELEVANT to
them in turns of selling any maintstream PC app. Kany of the other
points I
made in my previous email also apply – the machines are priced such
that PC
industry people are a large part of the early market, PC OEMs are
building the
machines etc.
A specific point – yes,
Pens should be positioned as an integral part of the Windows soln (the
PenWin SDK will be bundled with the 3.1 SDK), but it is an
oversimplification to say that any good 3.1 app is a good pen app.
I believe that you must MAKE this true as much as possible. People
making
Windows apps that ship in 92 should feel embarrased as hell if they
don’t work
well with a pen. Note that this is ANY Windows app – I didn’t say “Pen
Windows
ISVs”.
We’ve got to evangelise
the pen stuff specifically – no Win developer is likely to build
support for ‘ink’ (scribble objects), interaction with the recognizer,
extended gesture support etc unless we raise the awareness of why pens
are important.
Yes, you must raise awareness, but ideally it should be in a Windows
context.
I would for there to be an ISV that says “yes we have a great Windows
app, and
later on we’ll make a Pen Windows app”. I’d rather have the guy
thinking “we
really have to fix our Windows app so that it works well with Pens,
outline
fonts and other new Windows features”. Some apps will target Pen
specifically,
just as color paint programs target machines with color monitors, but
the broad
mainstream should cover, it all.
We can get people to
buy our OS only because the end-user sees solutions that he can’t get
elsewhere – thus forcing the OEM to support our OS. Building
relationships with consumer OEMs is important as is building a lighter
weight Windows versions for the PCs w/o kbds. But NEITHER is as
fundamental as getting apps out there which meet those needs – even
though they may be on machines sold by traditional-PC OEMs and on a
overweight OS. The very existence of those apps will then drive the
consumer OEMs to adopt the MS soln. The basic argument is that the
proposition laid out in Nathan’s email: “PMK = Consumer hardware + ?
apps + consumer positioning” is a non-starter.
You HAVE to build from
your strength – existing PC’s; get the apps built; get people using
them, then grow the mktg broader through lowered price points on the
hardware. And that’s what our pen effort must do.
There are many valid points in what you say, but there are some
subtle
distinctions which I believe are crucial. I believe that they could
make the
difference between success and failure in this area.
What you have described is ONE way to approach the consumer market.
It could
be paraphrased as “PCs move down and take over consumer electronics”.
We start
with PCs, on which we are already successful, get apps built which
satisfy
consumer needs, let them incubate in the PC industry until the machines
are
cheap enough, eventually “forcing” (your word) the consumer electronics
companies to go with us.
I would love it if this happened, but it would be negligent of us to
RELY on
this happening. We are presently investing in this direction, because
it
happens to be a direct extension of our PC business – i.e. this bet is
already
covered. Pen Windows is one great step in this direction and our
Multimedia
efforts are another one.
I agree with you that we must build on strength, but this is more
than one way
to do this! We must hedge our bets.
The consumer electronics companies will regard the scenario you
describe as all
out war. They are oriented around proprietary standards and have a
different
mentality than the PC industry. If we remain insular and focus just on
“PCs
will move down”, then consumer companies will create alternatives. CD-I
is
exactly such a thing, but consider that the tip of the iceberg – they
will
create many more for PMK machines (and enhance CD-I a lot) . Remember
that
these guys buy movie studios and record companies just to feed their
gadgets
today. The amount of money that Philips has invested in CD-I titles and
other
infrastructure is staggering. They will make similar software
investments for
PWKs if they feel they have to, and the “PCs move down” scenario is so
threatening to them that they will feel they have no choice. I would
like to
see them do this in partnership with us.
I think that we should continue to press forward on “PCs move down”
approach
but IN ADDITION we should do a project with the following
characteristics:
– Work closely with, at least one major consumer electronics company
from the
very beginning, and learn to adapt to their culture and approaches (as
much as
is feasible). I think Sony would be be3t for a variety of political
reasons in
the consumer industry, but this is a huge topic unto itself.
– It would be nice to have 2 projects with them in the PWK area. One
would be
a fairly near term thing (such as Sony Bookman?) , and another would be
much
more ambitious – which might be considered a prototype in the inital
stages,
but which we want to be a product. The reason is that near term stuff
is
important to get a foot in the door and establish a working
relationship, but
it is too limited in terms of the hardware (8088 character mode…) to
be a the
base of anything longer term. We heed to get in on this, but also
leapfrog out
to the point where our full gamut of software (Windows etc) is
feasible.
– We would try to draw on things which appeal to our partner. As an
example,
Sony is a MIPS architecture licensee, and really wants to get into
chips.
Suppose we had a project to make a lightweight portable Wia 32
implementation
for a PWK. Sony could focus a project on making a super low cost MIPS
system
with custom chips, and perhaps even custom CPU. If we found a way to
need a
couple of special new instructions (say for power management…) and
they could
feel they were getting an edge on the world this way, so much the
better.
Another example would be to support some cool hardware that they had in
the
works – a new kind of storage (next generation mini-disk). We want to
work our
way into their strategies so that they rely on us in many ways.
– Our “strength” in this case is our credibility in software, our
position as
a partner, and the connection to the PC industry. I believe that we can
get
such a project going on this basis.
– Technically we want to tie in to the Windows world. This is what
gives us
the huge strategic win – we can draw on apps and other things being
developed
in the PC industry and our other initiatives (Pen, MMsys…). The
various
options mentioned in the previous mail (drop Dos etc.) still leave
considerable
overlap with Windows.
– When I wrote “? apps” in the equation you quote, I didn’t mean
that we would
want to run PC industry apps (although there are subsets, like Dos
apps, that
may not be relevant). The point is that the apps which will be
compelling to
PWK users are not part of the PC industry’s current inventory. We need
to get
them developed. The consumer companies are more than willing to spend
millions
doing this (again, look at the CD-I investment) . We want this
investment to be
channeled into something that will also benefit the desktop – by being
based on
Win 32.
I would love it if the PWK battle between consumer computers moving
up and PCs
moving down was fought with Windows on both sides. Our destiny is to be
the
Krupp Werks of the 1990s. I want us to be in a position such that we
DON’T CARE
if the PWK of the future is sold by Sony (and leverages connection to
entertainment media), or Sharp (and is more of a calculator), or is
sold by a
communications equipment company (and leverages cellular telephone), or
in fact
is a PC that moved down and is sold by IBM, Compaq and Tandy. In ALL
cases
they should be running Microsoft software – in particular, some variant
of Win
32.
We have one of these avenues firmly in hand, but we are not far
along in
getting the consumer people to work with us. I think it is time to
start
cultivating that community.
Nathan
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 746 Page 3 of 5]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 746 Page 4 of 5]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 746 Page 5 of 5]
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 809 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 809 Page 1 of 4]
[STAMPED] Kaplan DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 43 4/18/[20]02
[STAMPED] KAP0037
Microsoft Corporation
[ADDRESS / TELEPHONE / TELEX / FAX]
July 3, 1991
Mr. S. Jerrold Kaplan
GO Corporation
[ADDRESS]
Dear Jerry:
Thanks for your letter dated May 13. My heavy travel schedule has
delayed this response.
As to the July, 1988 meeting at GO, you and I have pretty different
recollections. While I don’t want to seem at all argumentative, I am
confident of the substance of my recollection as set out in the early
part of my letter to you dated May 3, and I invite you to consider some
corroborating material. I am enclosing a copy of an email message I
composed and sent on Thursday July 14, a few days after our meeting.
Several points emerge: a) we at Microsoft had considered well before
that visit a machine of the sort you were designing; b) I asked our
Systems and OEM Vice Presidents to pursue selling Windows to GO; and c)
I asked our VP for Applications to consider an applications strategy,
albiet pessimistically. Also enclosed is a paragraph from my May 22,
1989 keynote address at the SPA conference, when I touted Windows-based
pen systems under design in Japan.
Regarding events after the July meeting, I stand by my description in
my May 3 letter of discussions between our two companies, each having a
preferred goal: Microsoft to license Windows to GO as the operating
system for your system, and GO to persuade Microsoft to become an ISV
of applications for the GO machine.
Regarding Lloyd Frink’s role, I can understand GO’s confusion about his
titular responsibilities. The fact is that I asked Mike Maples, our VP
for Applications to pursue the handwriting recognition technology and
he delegated it to Jeff Raikes who enlisted Lloyd. Lloyd believes he
negotiated in good faith the mertis [sic] of GO licensing Windows for
its operating system while entertaining GO’s arguments why Microsoft
should become a GO ISV and that he did not misappropriate any trade
secrets in the course of his discussions with GO.
[letterhead footer:]
Microsoft Corporation is an equal opportunity employer.
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 809 Page 2 of 4]
[STAMPED] KAP0038
Mr. S. Jerrold Kaplan
GO Corporation
July 3, 1991
Page Two
Jeff Raikes reports that he had a lengthy and constructive discussion
with you and Bob Carr in mid-May about these issues. If there is any
further information that we can provide, please let me know.
Sincerely,
[signed]
William H. Gates
Enclosures
cc:
William Campbell Robert Carr
John Dore
Mike Maples
Jeff Raikes
Greg Slyngstad
WHN:pf MiscWHG-Go
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 809 Page 3 of 4]
[STAMPED] KAP0039
Jul 20 08:04 1988 MAIL Page 15
>From billg Thu Jul 14 16:42:49 1988
To: gregm jeffr joachimk jons mikemap steveb
Subject: GO corporation
Cc: charless jeffh tandyt
Date: Thu Jul 14 16:42:45 1988
Jeff Harbers and I met with Jerry Kaplan and Lob Carr of GO corporation
Monday afternoon.
Basicly (sic) they are building a machine that Kay and I talked about
building along time ago – a machine with no keyboard and no disk
using-static memory. Its like an 80286 version of the model 20D with
2meg-8meg using a writing stylus with handwriting recognition
forinput. According to Marquardt there are a few other
people building
things like this – in fact there was one discussed in the WSJ this
week. Its [sic] notebook size. The LCD is 640×400 so about 55DPI (which
I
dont think is enough)
They-are doing ALL their own system software – a protect mode OS for
286 using visual objects (like everyone!). Its [sic] multitasking. The
interface
metaphor is a set of named folders with tabs on the right hand side
each containing any number of numbered pages and each page has on it
[sic] just ink (writing) or rectangles that contain application
sessions (which can be zoomed/unzoomed) All the old ideas like
using gestures for various commands they have “rediscovered” They will
announce in 1990 at $3k. Modem is optional. The[y] will bundle
some
drawing/wp/filing/notetaking/mail software but they want to get third
party isv’s including microsoft.
We tried out their handwriting stuff and it was terrible. Its very
possible to do this stuff correctly and maybe they will but they havent
yet.
ANALYSIS: This machine should be built as an open standard by a bunch
of Japanese makers. The software layers should be more compatible with
desktop-stuff. Kaplan isnt the best CEO. They have some OK ideas but I
dont think this thing will be big. We do need to think about note
taking and the fact that small machines can be used everywhere
especially with this input approach but I dont think we should be an
ISV for them.
ACTION ITEMS: Gregm – Carr wants our debug format to do a remote
debugger. If it is written up and easy to send then send it to him with
a letter
saying they will use it for developing on their-machine only. If it is
hard then have someone call and say sorry.
JoachimK/Steveb – we should be selling system software to people like
this. He is fairly far along at this point. What would we sell him?
Either stripped down PM or WINDOWS. WINDOWS is the best choice I think.
Tell him to use extended memory. He wont like this but it will sure
help him with applications developers. Who can take a pass at this
with Carr? Mikemap – Another applications opportunity but unless we
want something that fits on this machine for the desktop I doubt it
makes sense. They do want to create connections between stuff on their
machine and popular desktop stuff so we want to be friends with them
even if they are not an ISV. They offered to come up and present their
concepts to a larger group up here. I doubt that make[s] sense. I will
talk about this class of machine in our saturday morning meeting.
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 809 Page 3 of 4]
great things about this package is the way it uses dynamic data
exchange to enable you to use a spreadsheet to model your costs or
model certain engineering figures, and in real time feed that data into
the drawing so that if you change that drawing the data feeds back to
the spreadsheet, if you change the spreadsheet it feeds back to the
drawing. In fact it’s one of the most graphical illustrations of the
benefits of dynamic data exchange that I’ve ever seen.
One of the ways that Windows will be used in 1990 that I hadn’t even
expected is that we have a number of manufacturers, all of them based
in Japan, building machines where they take Windows and they put it
into ROM and instead of putting the keyboard on the machine they simply
put a touch-sensitive LCD plastic covering on the machine and so it
looks almost exactly like an 8-1/2 by 11 notebook. In fact there’s a
number of companies working on exactly this design. By using the
Windows software built in, and by having a handwriting driver that
allows an unmodified application to receive the keystrokes as though
they came in from the keyboard, we think that they will be able to tap
into a wide base of software and also get people to do special
modifications to their software to take advantage of the sorts of
things that people want to do in an environment where you can carry the
PC around. I think it’s fair to say that keyboard machines will never
find their way into meetings like this or to meetings inside your
company, they also won’t be carried around inside the office. And so
there is a hugh [sic] area of use that relates to note-taking and
communication and sales calls that only this stylus-based type PC can
accommodate. There are no technical breakthroughs required for this
machine – the idea of following the trace when you do handwriting and
recognizing the character is actually not a difficult software feat. So
this is not rocket science, this is not voice recognition or something
that will take a long time to develop – it’s something that you will
see in 1990 and I think is one of the opportunities in the Windows
environment for people who want to do specialized software.
Well I should talk a tiny bit here about the OS/2 operating system,
just to provide you an update about what’s going on. It’s fair to say
that no operating environment ever succeeded solely because of
technical strength, but people who create these things like to talk
about their technical strength anyway so if you’ll indulge me for one
slide I’ll talk about some of the things we are excited about that are
built into the OS/2 system. First of all, this is true multitasking and
true multitasking is different than what we have today on the Macintosh
Multifinder or on Microsoft Windows. The reason it’s different is that
at any time an application can come in and get system resources and
this is absolutely critical. If you want to receive electronic mail in
the background, if you want to have good prints
[page number] 8
[STAMPED] KAP0040
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 859 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 859 Page 1 of 4]
[STAMPED] X 189615 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] Raikes DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 56 10/18/[20]01
[handwritten] file
[then a single set of illegible initials, ticked off
with a check mark]
Microsoft Corporation [ADDRESS / TELEPHONE / TELEX / FAX]
Microsoft Memo
To: Bill Gates, Jeff Raikes, Steve Ballmer, Mike Maples, Brad
Silverberg, Jim Allchin
From: Greg Slyngstad
Date: July 24, 1991
[transcription note: the following “Challenges to PenWin” is circled
and annotated with a handwritten note which reads] OBU [or OBO] PCB
Re: Challenges to Pen Win
Cc: Pradeep Singh, Lloyd Frink, Aaron Getz, Marlin Eller
This memo highlights some of the threats of PenPoint and warns that Go
is making progress on many fronts and unless we take them seriously, Go
may emerge with a majority of the Pen OS business. Now is the time to
stop them, not after it is clear we are losing. I list several
indications of Go’s strength and suggest some items that we need to
work on in order to weaken their position.
I am more optimistic than this memo may indicate, but I am concerned
that our strengths (wealth of Win apps and Win momentum) are not
playing out as well as we would like. The majority of our resources (in
the Windows area) are focused on a diferent battle. However, there are
things that we should be doing that can help against both PenPoint and
OS/2.
Go Marketing Wins
* The press continues to favor
Go. We are making some progressbut the prevailing anti-Microsoft
attitude and the cool new technology of PenPoint makes Go very
appealing to the press. Even those editors that believe we will win,
want to see Go succeed.
* Go has a focused sales
organization. Almost every major corporation we visit has
already had a visit from Go. Many of these corporations complain about
the complexity of Windows and are open to exploring an incompatible
system. Go is very good at convincing them that PenPoint is amazingly
easy to learn and use. State Farm said they would rather their
technical MIS people had to put the effort into making the system work,
rather than the end user. On our side, the Microsoft field sales and
support force is reluctant to spend time on an OEM product (with a few
notable exceptions).
* ISV’s claim they are doing
their new Pen oriented software first on PenPoint (Lotus,
Software Publishing, WordPerfect as well as many of the startups) At
the recent Pen Conference in San Francisco, David Reed from Lotus said,
“We would be stupid not to support Windows for Pens, but our real
creative energy is going into Pen Point.” They will support Pen Win but
they downplay this and most ISVs are planning on doing simple mods to
their Windows apps.
* Most OEMs will make sure their
system will run either OS. People we know are headed this
direction: NCR, Toshiba, Zenith, Dell, Grid, Microslate, Wang and Tusk
not to mention IBM being PenPoint only. Recent discussions with Boca on
PenWin have cooled. I sense the high level anti-Windows sentiment is
stopping the pen group from moving forward.
* NCR is leaning towards PenPoint. They
claim OS neutrality but their recent add [sic, “advertisement”?]
highlights PenPoint and there are definite anti-Microsoft feelings in
their pen marketing group.
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 859 Page 2 of 4]
[STAMPED] X189616
[STAMPED] X 189616 CONFIDENTIAL
Scalability. Go is pushing OEMs to build small form factor machines. We
are claiming we will run on these systems as well. In theory Windows
should be scalable to these small displays. Lloyd has begun exploring
this and it is clear that it has never been tested and full of flaws.
He has reported some of these to the Windows team, but I wonder how
much effort will go into fixing the problems given the need to ship 3.1
(the program manager and file manager do not even use dialog units
based on the system font so they do not scale at all, the system menus
and min/max icons do not scale so you end up with an ugly title bar if
you increase the system font size.) We have only scratched the surface
at looking into this but it is clear we need to test this and be
prepared to fix the problems.
Silicon only storage. Go treats their storage space as one contiguous
address space and will execute in place when running on a silicon
storage (flash) system. Windows 2.1 will be ROMmable but it still
requires all apps and much of Windows be duplicated during execution.
Since silicon storage is required for highly durable systems and the
price for this storage is so high, efficient use is an important
benefit. IBM has told us they will never put a hard disk in a portable
pen machine.
Notebook User Interface. The Go shell is significantly easier to
understand and use than the Windows program manager and file manager.
Instant On. The Go system allows you to turn off the system and
instantly return to where you left it when powered back up. Not clear
if this works on hard disk based systems.
Windows apps in general work poorly with the pen. Selection and command
execution work well but with the exception of graphics entry apps (CAD,
Paint, Draw) the standard input expected still comes form the keyboard.
This means the user must suffer through character recognition. The best
horizontal pen apps will rely heavily on ink in its native form. This
applies to PIMs & notetakers, PenMail, handwritten annotations of
documents, ink in your database, FAX annotations etc. This means we
need to continue to get bandwidth from our ISVs and not let them think
that adding handwriting edit controls is sufficient to be a good pen
app.
Portable. It is not clear how much work they need to do to bring
PenPoint up on a non-Intel system. However, we heard that they offered
to do this for Motorola and hear rumors of their working on a RISC
based PC.
Screen Rotation. They highlight their ability to do screen rotation so
the notebook can be used in either portrait or landscape mode. We have
a driver under development, but the assumptions of GDI regarding video
memory make the portrait driver run very slowly. They support rotation
during any session. We must restart Windows.
PenPoint OO design allows for smaller apps. Unclear how true this is,
but the OEMs, press and many ISVs buy it.
Connectivity. PenPoint offers deferred I/O and autoconnect to a network.
True 32 bit preemptive multitasking. Their modern OS design appeals to
technical industry people. They push the fact that DOS is 10 years old.
Possible Scenarios
The worst case scenario is that Go ships on time, ahead of us. The
system is fast and stable and PenPoint apps appear rapidly. The
horizontal market for pen computers is very slow to develop and initial
sales are primarily through vertical sales force. The larges group of
initial users are the mobile workers and the Go incompatibilities are
not enough to overcome the perceived ease of use, more focused sales
effort and technical superiority of their solution. It turns out these
users really don’t need keyboards. We lose.
A more likely scenario is that we ship first or around the same time.
They have performance problems and their apps are slow to arrive (with
a few exceptions) but the system as a whole is stable and delivers as
promised. As with most new PC products, the first users end up being
the standard early adopters — [text continues on next page]
Threats to Windows for Pens Microsoft Confidential 7/26/[19]91
page 2
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 859 Page 3 of 4]
[STAMPED] X 189617 CONFIDENTIAL
technically adept people, with Windows familiarity. They will be split
in their preferences. Thy appreciate the coolness of PenPoint but
understand the benefits of sharing code across multiple platforms. They
have desks and they want to use the same OS and apps at their desktop.
However, like the early Mac users, some are willing to pay the price of
a new OS. We win this market but Go gets a good piece of it and
continues to win the technical comparisons. Go continues to focus on
mobile workers and as this market develops (more slowly as a result of
the long buying cycle and resistance to change of corporate accounts),
they get the larger share (due to lack of focused sales effort on our
part and IBM pushing PenPoint). As this plays out, the next generation
of smaller/lighter Pen machines begin arriving and with Go’s focus on
scalability and portability, they exploit these machines more quickly
and better than Pen Win. They may have the momentum.
What we should be doing
There are more things we should be doing to ensure that we win. I have
broken them down into Win 3.1, WinNext (4.0?), and Management issues.
Win 3.1
The Windows group in general has been cooperative but we are caught in
the middle of their priorities and frequently can’t get things done.
There are a few reasonable things that can be done that relate to
working well on small portable systems. Since portable systems sales
are growing so rapidly, it seems a logical place to invenst in order to
combat both OS/2 and PenPoint.
– Scalability. The Win 3.1 group should buy into testing Windows
scalability or at least fixing the bugs we report. Assume a small
screen display and large system font (640×480 but 1/2 the size so the
system font is around 50% larger).
– Deliver Power Management. This is happening, but the Windows group is
not planning on shipping anything so we are concerned that this will
lose focus in the rush to ship 3.1
– Deliver ROM Windows. This appears under control, but know [sic,
“no”] one seems to be addressing the issues relative to executing in
place on a Flash system.
– Reduce code size. Is there code that we carry around to run in
all three modes that can be eliminated when running only in enhanced
mode? Is anyone exploring other possible ways to reduce the size of
Windows?
– Power reduction. Windows is a power hog. Are we seriously
looking at ways to reduce disk hits?
WinNext
We would love to see some of these things in 3.1 but it is even more
important that 3.1 arrive on time so we can beat Go out the door.
– Deferred I/O. We should be able to print without being
connected. Ideally, we would have a general purpose output spooling
standard. The Pen group can share ownership in getting this defined,
but we ned someone in the Win group to work with.
– New Shell. This is coming. Will it be as simple as Go’s? Should we
explore doing a simpler version for the Pen?
– Instant On. Make it possible to save the state of Windows and
the apps so that they can be restored quickly to their previous state.
Some ideas were explored for Win 3.1, but there were enough
complexities that the idea was killed.
– Quick net connect. We need to be able to quickly configure the
system to attach to a network. I shouldn’t have to deal with errors
when I boot disconnected and I should be able to connect without
rebooting.
[page footer] Threats to Windows for Pens Microsoft
Confidential 7/26/[19]91 page 3
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 859 Page 4 of 4 ]
[STAMPED] X 189618 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] X189618
Size. We can’t keep
getting bigger. Silicon only storage
systems will prevail on pen machines and the forecasts for reduction in
price are not rosy. What can we do to optimize for a small Flash based
system?
– Portability. I hear that NT requires 8MB. This is not suitable
for a pen machine. We need to investigate what solutions there may be
that provide pen support on small non-Intel PCs.
– Screen Rotation. We should allow dynamic screen rotation and
enhance GDI to increase performance in portrait mode on VGA displays.
Management
– Focus from the field. We will need clear support from our field
sales organization (through some incentive?) or if that is not
feasible, beef up the Pen marketing group (FY 92 has 5 people) to
enable our competing more effectively in the direct sales accounts.
Many organizations are currently evaluating the competing technolgies
and some are starting their prototype development effors. We will be
battling the IBM sales force and the Go sales force. Go’s existence
depends on the success of PenPoint. The Microsoft sales force has
little reason to care about Windows for Pens.
– Support. We have discussed offering support to Pen Win end
users but the current plan is to offer support only through the OEM.
Can we offer free end user support?
– Does it make sense for us to invest more in marketing? Can we
raise the ante so Go is forced to spend more of their resources on
marketing/selling. Right now, it appears Go is spending more than we
are for pen specific marketing. This is based on their strong presence
in all pen events, their wealth of marketing collateral and their
ability to call on so many corporate customers. They can’t keep this
up. Assuming this market develops quickly, it will be at least a couple
more years before they can be profitable. Based on $50 per unith, they
need 200,000 units to do $10mil (ignoring possible apps revenue). Our
proposed marketing budget was cut substantially in FY 92 planning.
Some ideas:
– A pen oriented road show that makes it attractive for the early
OEMs to participate.
– Figure out how to sell the OEMs sales force on PenWin. We are
already offering a lot of training, but maybe we should consider
incentives for their sales force or at least provide collateral that
makes it easier for them to sell Pen Win.
– Create attractive marketing programs that help our ISVs. Free
catalog of apps, create a forum for ISVs to participate (the road
show?).
– I am sure others can come up with even better ideas.
Summary
Go has a technically superior solution (if they deliver as promised),
they have been sucessful in convincing a lot of people that the pen
requires all new apps and that Windows is too complex and inappropriate
for small form factor machines. The battle is no longer for OEMs,
although we are trying to find ways to stop them, most will offer both
solutions. The battle will be at the ISV and corporate/user level. For
ISVs we have succeeded in getting them signed up, but the small ones
prefer the lack of established competition in the PenPoint market and
the big ISVs do not want us to succeed. We are not well positioned to
sell or support an OEM product to end users without good support from
our OEMs.
We believe we have a great product. The pen user interface under
Windows is competitive with Go. We think our recognition will be better
than theirs. We will have more apps. But for broader issues such
as simplicity, size and applicability for clipboards, we are weaker. We
need to put more emphasis on portability/scalability and address the
marketing/sales issues or we risk leting Go win this battle.
[document footer]
Threats to WIndows for Pens Microsoft Confidential 7/26/[19]91
page 4
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 1002 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1002 p. 1 of 1]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
>From toshim Thu Oct 3 05:19:55 1991
To: richardf
Subject: FJ and Poqet …Pen
Cc: toshim
Date: Thu Oct 3 21:13:29 1991
Want to contact and ask Yonekawa san straightly. FJ (Japan) seems to
not only look into Pen Point but have plan to make the PC in parallel
with Win for Pen.
Thank you,
Toshi
————
>From richardf Thu Oct 3 14:38:10 1991
To: toshim
Subject: We have
Date: Wed Oct 2 22:35:40 1991
>rumore [sic, “rumor”?] that Poquet will license Go fpor [sic,
“for”?] new systems.
If this is their plan to offer compettive [sic] offering we will not be
interested to give Poqet any of theri [sic, ‘their’?] prepaids..1.over
to FJ license. Nor does it make me very interested in be
richardf
>From jeffr Wed Oct 2 09:18:52 1991
To: joachimk richardf
Subject: RE: Poqet Computer
Cc: pradeps
Date: Wed Oct 2 09:18:23 1991
My source is a consultant to them, but please don’t mention that to
anyone at Poqet since it would be a problem for the consultant. Thx.
—————-
>From joachimk Wed Oct 2 09:12:54 1991
To: jeffr richardf
Cc: pradeeps
Subject: RE: Poqet Computer
Date: Wed Oct 02 08:49:48 PDT 1991
They are part of Fujuitsi, and have huge prepaids.
i hope they understand, no mercy is an option for us.
Talk to FURAKAWA in J Richard
>From richardf Tue Oct 1 23:36:35
1991
To: jeffr joachimk
Cc: pradeeps
Subject: Poqet Computer
Date: Tue Oct 1 23:36:32 1991
Thi[s] is the first i have heard if tgus [sic “of this”]
this I asked stevemc about this today, he is with me here in tokyo. he
has not heard anything of this either,steve will look into tit [sic],
seems like we woudl [sic] have heard about it. who is your source ?
richardf
From jeffr Tue Oct 1 22:54:21 1991
To: joachimk richardf
Subject: Poqet Computer
Cc: pradeeps
Date: Tue Oct 1 22:53:43 1991
Who is the account manager? I’m told that they have decided to go with
PenPoint for a new pen computer. I may be meeting with the CEO next
monday. Thx. Jeff
[STAMPED] Kaplan DEPOSITION 48 4/19/[20]02
[STAMPED] MS 5003997 CONFIDENTIAL
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 1522 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1522 Page 1 of 14]
[This appears to be the title page of a manual, or perhaps a sales
document or advertising brochure.]
[late-1980’s looking computer logo emblazened “Compaq”]
Compaq
PDA Operating System Selection
Portable and Software Marketing
PC Division
Compaq Confidential
Need to Know
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject to Protective Orders in
Coordinated Proceedings Microsoft I-V
Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106 (S.F. Super. Ct.) and In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litigation
[STAMPED] COMPAQ 008073
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1522 Page 2 of 14]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject to Protective Orders in
Coordinated Proceedings Microsoft I-V
Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106 (S.F. Super. Ct.) and In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litigation
[STAMPED] COMPAQ 008074
Overview
- Process for launching PDA business
- Chronology of events and future milestnoes
- Recommended PDA O/S vendor
- Executive Summary
- Potential for market leadership, risks are acceptable, critera
for evaluation, evaluation of risk and return, outstanding issues
- Compaq commitment
- Summary
- Backup
- Microsoft and GO Proposal summary
- Summary of PDA market opportunity from 11/10 McKinsey
presentation
- PDA relative expected results
- Market forecasts for PDA hardware and software
- Technical assessment
- Product functionality, early market entry, WinPad and Amstel
architecture, resource assumptions
- Microsoft and GO risks and rewards
- Alternative Approaches
Compaq Confidential [Page Number] 2
1/13/[19]93 (Pda.ppt)
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1522 Page 3 of 14]
[The exhibit page is a powerpoint slide, showing a Gant chart/timeline
arrow from left to right across the width of the page. These arrows are
indicated in the transcript using the string – – – >”.]
PROCESS FOR LAUNCHING PDA BUSINESS.
[A legend in the upper corner of the chart makes a reference to the
right hand half of this table being the subject of] Today’s focus
|
McKinsey
presentation November 10
v
|
Team to complete vision for final
review March 1
v
|
Product
announcement 1Q 1994
v
|
|
Assess market opportunities
– – – >
|
Define business and
product vision
– – – >
|
Launch product and build business strategy
– – – >
|
DELIVERABLES
|
Detailed assessment of
opportunities
Decision on whether to proceed with oppotunity
|
Build strategic roadmap for
launching new business and product
Determine key software and communications skills required, current
skill, gaps, and plan for skill acquisition
Develop proposal process
for selection of O/S vendor
Choose O/S vendor |
Chose microprocessor.
|
Deliver product to market
meeting cost, resource, and time commitments
Implement key business strategies to ensure product success
- Market acceptance plans
- Skill acquisition
- Partnerships
- Distribution options
- Technology requirements
|
cqm002jan156.rjm
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1522 Page 4 of 14]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject to Protective Orders in
Coordinated Proceedings Microsoft I-V
Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106 (S.F. Super. Ct.) and In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litigation
[STAMPED] COMPAQ 008076
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AND FUTURE MILESTONES
Assess market opportunities
– – – >
|
Define business and
product vision
– – – >
|
Launch product and build business strategy
– – – >
|
[The list of dates below occurs in a giant line-drawing of a
“milestone,” like the mile markers in the Parker Brothers card game
“Mille Bournes” or like the rounded-off-top shape of the tombstones
outside English churches such as that in Stratford-upon-Avon.]
November 10 — McKinsey presentation to Eckhard and Division Management
November 16 Comdex– Meetings with GO and Microsoft to share general
plan to select O/S vendor
November 13- FAX to Microsoft and GO describing details of O/S
selection process and proposal topics to be covered
December 3, 9- Microsoft and GO meetings in Houston to review topics
and timeline for closure
December 10-Chase Definition Tiger Team Kickoff
December 28- Microsoft proposal received
December 31- GO final proposal received
January 4- Compaq proposal review meeting
January 5, 6- GO and Microsoft presentations at Compaq
January 7- Compaq proposal review meeting, recommendation
January 8- Recommendation review
March- Completion date for Chase Definition Tiger Team
cqm002jan157.rjm
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1522 Page 5 of 14]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject to Protective Orders in
Coordinated Proceedings Microsoft I-V
Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106 (S.F. Super. Ct.) and In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litigation
[STAMPED] COMPAQ 008077
Recommended OS Vendor
- Industry News Flash
- Compaq selects GO’s PenPoint operating system for its Chase PDA
- Some months later…
- Industry Headline
- Compaq announces its industry leading Personal Digital
Assistant, the Chase PDA. Chase is the perfect companion for today’s
business professional. It is loaded with unique features that make
Chase stand out from all of today’s competitive products. Chase is
based on GO’s PenPoint, a state of the art, object oriented operating
system.
1/12/[19]93 (Pda.ppt)
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1522 Page 6 of 14]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject to Protective Orders in
Coordinated Proceedings Microsoft I-V
Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106 (S.F. Super. Ct.) and In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litigation
[STAMPED] COMPAQ 008064
[Star Trek “Starfleet” logo clip art]
Potential Reactions to GO PDA Decision
- Sabotage our efforts to integrate PDA with the desktop (desktop
integration)
- How?
- Chicago would break our desktop integration design and
implementation
- Microsoft would withhold Chicago information and DSK
- Industry compatibility demands should restrict extent of
breakage
- Impact
- We would have to fix our desktop integration functions
- Existing example: Novell’s DR DOS
- Risk is manageable.
1/13/[19]93 Pda.ppt
Compaq Confidential
Slide 6
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1522 Page 7 of 14]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject to Protective Orders in
Coordinated Proceedings Microsoft I-V
Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106 (S.F. Super. Ct.) and In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litigation
[STAMPED] COMPAQ 008079
[“computer terminal” clip art]
Potential for Market Leadership
The potential for Compaq to take a position of market leadership with
GO far exceeds oppotunities with Microsoft
A. GO would probide Compaq with
significantly greater
sustained differentiation potential that would translate into
greater market share and higher margines
B. With sufficient Compaq commitment, a GO/Compaq relationship would
provide greater product
functionality to the customer resulting in faster market
adoption and greater market share
C. Compaq could generate significantly potentially greater non-hardware business
with GO than with Microsoft
D. Finally, Compaq’s ability
to work better with GO on a daily basis should help Compaq
achieve its goals more quickly and effectively
Compaq Confidential
[page number] 7
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1522 Page 8 of 14]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject to Protective Orders in
Coordinated Proceedings Microsoft I-V
Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106 (S.F. Super. Ct.) and In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litigation
[STAMPED] COMPAQ 008080
[“computer terminal” clip art]
Risks are Acceptable
Risks associated with a non-Microsoft decision while significant can be
mitigated and should be more than compensated by the potential benefits
A. Market acceptance
of a GO/Compaq combination although less certain than Microsoft
acceptance, could be ensured as a result of a number of factors
- Friction between ISVs and Microsoft
- Zero applications for Microsoft migrate to the PDA
- With significant investment, Compaq could help a critical mass of
GO applications
[The last two bulleted items above are underlined by hand, and the
handwritten annotation attached:] evangelize ISVs.
B. Although a GO decision might negatively impact Compaq’s
relationship with Microsoft in other areas, long term cost to
Compaq should not be prohibitive
- Microsoft less focused on a PDA O/S
- Alternate O/S provider could actually help our position with
Microsoft
C. Attempts by Microsoft to
sabotage Compaq/GO Integration
to the desktop is likely
D. Additional resources
(investment and unit cost) are likely to be higher with GO but
potential benefits from higher revenues and gross margins should
outweigh these costs
E. Although Microsoft could compete against Compaq/GO with other
vendors (e.g. HP, AST, DEC, Dell) Compaq’s greater product
functionality and sustained differentiation should win in the long run
F. GO has enough financial backing to survive for the next 2-3 years
and with Compaq support should become self-sufficient by 1994
G. Finally, a GO decision
provides a “fall-back” option as long as X86 is the chosen
microprocessor, while a Microsoft decision eliminates any near term
options with GO
1/13/[19]93 (Pda.ppt)
Compaq Confidential
[page number] 8
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1522 Page 9 of 14]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject to Protective Orders in
Coordinated Proceedings Microsoft I-V
Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106 (S.F. Super. Ct.) and In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litigation
[STAMPED] COMPAQ 008081
[“computer terminal” clip art]
Criteria Evaluation for PDA O/S Providers
CRITERIA
|
Weighting
|
Microsoft
|
GO
|
RETURN
|
|
|
|
– Sustainable differentiation potential
|
10
|
2
|
4
|
– Early market entry
|
8
|
3
|
3
|
– Product functionality
|
7
|
3
|
4
|
– Non-hardware business potential
|
5
|
2
|
5
|
– Organizational fit
|
3
|
2
|
4
|
– Total
|
|
77
|
129
|
RISK
|
|
|
|
– Market acceptance
|
10
|
2
|
4
|
– Impact on relationship
in core business
|
7
|
1
|
3
|
– Competitive threat
|
5
|
2
|
4
|
– Desktop Integration
threat
|
4
|
1
|
3
|
– Investment / unit cost
risk
|
3
|
2
|
3
|
– Hardware OEM
|
2
|
1
|
2
|
– Company viability
|
2
|
1
|
3
|
– Total
|
|
50
|
101
|
1/13/[19]93 (Pda.ppt)
Compaq Confidential
[page number] 9
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1522 Page 10 of 14]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject to Protective Orders in
Coordinated Proceedings Microsoft I-V
Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106 (S.F. Super. Ct.) and In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litigation
[STAMPED] COMPAQ 008082
Compaq Confidential
GO Expected Business Scenarios
|
Preliminary
|
|
Aggressive /
Optimistic
|
GO Heroic
|
1997
Assumptions
|
GO Realistic
/ Hardnosed
|
GO
|
Microsoft
|
PDA Hardware Market – $Millions
|
$2700
|
$2700 |
$2700 |
$2700 |
| PDA Software Market – $Millions |
$2025
|
$2025 |
$2025 |
$2025 |
Compaq HW Market Share
|
15%
|
25%
|
15%
|
30%
|
| Compaq SW Market Share |
1%
|
5%
|
0%
|
7%
|
Hardware Gross Margin
|
20%
|
50%
|
75%
|
75%
|
| Software Gross Margin |
50%
|
75%
|
75% |
75% |
Total ’93-’97 Investment O/S
Decision- $Millions
|
$43
|
$23
|
$10
|
$23
|
1997 Results
|
|
Compaq Total Revenue – $Millions
|
$385
|
$709
|
$365
|
$871
|
Compaq SW Revenue – $Millions
|
$20
|
$101
|
$0
|
$142
|
Compaq Total Gross Margin –
$Millions
|
$94
|
$216
|
$73
|
$289
|
1993 NPV – $Millions
|
$56
|
$263
|
$86
|
$377
|
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1522 Page 11 of 14]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject to Protective Orders in
Coordinated Proceedings Microsoft I-V
Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106 (S.F. Super. Ct.) and In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litigation
[STAMPED] COMPAQ 008083
EVALUATION OF RISK/RETURN TRADEOFF
[The exhibit page shows the upper right hand quadrant of a
two-dimensional graph. The horizontal axis is labelled RISK, and runs
from Low to High. The vertical axis is not labelled RETURN, but it is a
safe assumption given the context. The vertical axis also runs from Low
to High.]
[The area of the graph in the upper left hand corner (high return, low
risk) is labelled “Attractive.” ]
[The area of the graph in the lower right hand corner (high risk, low
return) is labelled “Unattractive.”]
[A dotted line runs vertically across the full height of the graph
about 40% of the way from low to high risk. Along the horizontal, or
“Risk” axis, this rectangular area from zero risk to 40% risk is
bracketed with the legend “Compaq typical operating zone.” (i.e.,
Compaq operates well below the average risk, whatever the rate of
return.)]
[A solid line runs diagonally from the origin upward and to the right
at 45 degrees along the locus where RISK = RETURN. The solid line
is
labelled “Normal return.” ]
[There is a big black dot about 25% of the way up from the origin on
this solid “Normal return” diagonal, as described above, the set of
points on the graph where risk and return are equal. The dot is
labelled “Microsoft today” which presumably means early 1993. There is
an arrow leading straight vertically downward from this dot, pointing
to another dot, labelled 1996. Presumably this means that in three
years, Compaq predicts Microsoft will have a lowered return, at the
same risk.]
cqm002jan107.rjm
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1522 Page 12 of 14]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject to Protective Orders in
Coordinated Proceedings Microsoft I-V
Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106 (S.F. Super. Ct.) and In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litigation
[STAMPED] COMPAQ 008084
[“computer terminal” clip art]
Outstanding Issues
- Do the benefits outweigh the risks?
Sustained Differentiation
|
Market adoption
|
Initial product functionality
|
Microsoft retaliation
|
Competition to Microsoft
(customers and ISVs)
|
Microsoft sabotage
|
Opportunity for software revenue
|
|
| Technical Leadership |
ISV response
|
Generate application support
Deliver on product vision
- How much additional non-hardware revenue is possible/realistic?
- Is this the best use of resources
1/13/[19]93 (Pda.ppt)
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1522 Page 13 of 14]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject to Protective Orders in
Coordinated Proceedings Microsoft I-V
Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106 (S.F. Super. Ct.) and In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litigation
[STAMPED] COMPAQ 008085
[“computer terminal” clip art]
Compaq Commitment
- Human resources
- Marketing funds to compete with MS and their WinPad OEMs
- GO/ISV investment
- Geographic divisions mind share
1/13/[19]93 (Pda.ppt)
Compaq Confidential
[page number] 11
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1522 Page 14 of 14]
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject to Protective Orders in
Coordinated Proceedings Microsoft I-V
Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106 (S.F. Super. Ct.) and In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litigation
[STAMPED] COMPAQ 008086
[“computer terminal” clip art]
Summary
- Choice: GO’s PenPoint
- High rewards merit risk
- Key risks
- Market acceptance and competition with MS and their OEMs
- Investment level
- Key rewards
- Sustainable differentiation
- Market leadership in new product segment
- Software business entry
- We are at a unqie point in time where the future rewards are
worth the apparent risks
1/13/[19]93 (Pda.ppt)
Compaq Confidential
12
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 3174 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3174 Page 1 of 2]
[STAMPED] KAP0011
[The page is an illustration of a screenshot of a PDA-style user
interface.]
[The user interface appears as if it were a tabbed user interface
window.]
[“Tabs” along the right hand side of the user interface are labelled,
from top to bottom:]
Contents Current Products Proposed New Products Sales Customers New
Bottle Design
[There is an icon bar along the bottom of the user interface, with
icons labelled, from left to right]
Help Preferences Tools Stationery Disks Keyboard Installer In Out
[The user interface has a title bar, which reads:]
Notebook Contents (1)
[The user interface has a menu bar, which reads, from left to right]
Document Edit Create [illegible] Show Sort
[On the menu bar of the user interface, the Create option has been
selected, and a small popup or context window appears, with these
options from top to bottom.]
Business Memo MiniText [a horizontal separator bar] Section
[The main content pane of the user interface is a tree-structured
indented list interface, with a Name and Page for each element. The
contents of the tree-structured list interface are, from top to bottom,
giving Name and Page number (these are separated by a long
ellipsis…….) :]
Current Prod[hidden by context menu] 2
Inventory 3
Standard Order Form 4
Proposed New Products 5
New Product Ideas 6
Capers 7
Chili Mixes 8
Sales 9
Sales by Region 10
New Hires 11
Customers 12
Chain Stores 13
Compaints to Action 14
New Bottle Design 15
Salsa/Condiments 16
Package Design Letter 17
Proposed New Design (3/2/91) 18
Bottle Design Sketch 19
Revised Bottle FAX 20
CONTRACT 21
New Product Draft 22
[The caption for the entire illustration is:]
PenPoint – Table of Contents
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3174 Page 2 of 2]
[The page is an illustration of a screenshot of a Microsoft
Windows 3.1
style user
interface. The caption for the entire illustration reads:]
Microsoft – Notebook Applet
[The title bar of the application reads: ]
NoteBook Page 1
[Below the title bar, the user interface has a menu bar. The menu
selections are: ]
Page Edit Go Format Help
[Below the menu bar, the user interface has a toolbar. The toolbar
buttons include a selection tool arrow; a row of four buttons whose
function is hard to make out (although the first one seems to be
depressed, radio-button style, and another one has a squiggle which may
suggest handwriting recognition); a button with an icon of a blank
document; a group of two buttons, the first of which looks like an SLR
camera, and the second of which looks like a file folder; a set of
three navigation arrows (back, previous, next?); a pair of text style
buttons for Bold and Italic type, and three horizontal text alignment
buttons (left, centered, and right.)
Table Of Contents
[A two column table follows, with titles and page numbers: in this
transcript, colons have been used to indicate column separation.]
XYZ Co. Mtg: 2
Ideas for Project MoonShot: 3
Scribe Co. Proposal: 4
Scribe Mtg Notes: 5
TechTalk Comments: 6
Sketches: 7
OEM Proposal: 8
Marketing Plan: 9
Page xxx: 10
Page yyy: 11
Page zzz: 12
February 1991: 19
Index: 48
[at the bottom of the user interface is a horizontal row of buttons
similar in style to a tabbed dialog. The selections are:]
Table of Contents Index Rolodex Calendar To Do Expenses Customers Ideas
Personal
Exhibits
published to Court Web Site on Mar 25, 2004 (Incomplete)
Last Revised 4/29/2004
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1520 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1520 Page 1 of 1]
[STAMPED] Kaplan DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 54 4/19/[20]02
[STAMPED] HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject to Protective Orders in
Coordinated Proceedings Microsoft I-V
Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106 (S.F. Super. Ct.) and In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litigation
[STAMPED] COMPAQ 007881
Microsoft Corporation [ADDRESS] [TEL] [TELEX] [FAX] [LOGO]
January 13, 1993
Mr. Eckhard Pfeiffer
President and Chief Executive Officer
Compaq Computer Corporation
[ADDRESS]
Dear Eckhard;
Bill and I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you and the Compaq
senior management team this Friday. In advance of this meeting, I want
to express our apologies if you got the wrong impression regarding our
sincere desire to partner with Compaq due to the tone of our meeting in
Houston last week.
During our meeting on Friday we hope to accomplish the following:
1. Discuss our desire to improve our
relationship in ways that benefit both companies’ needs and positions
both of us strongly for long-term success. This discussion should
include how to provide the industry’s best solutions to our mutual
customers in the areas of Plug and Play, Chicago and client networking.
2. Put the history of our relationship in perspective. This should
include a discussion of how we have helped each other in the past when
it came to product development, exchanging information and promoting
our relationship with key customers. We would like to fundamentally
analyze where and why the relationship has broken down and how we can
avoid this in the future. We want to work closer than ever before so
that together, we can look even better and promote each others [sic]
products in front of our mutual customers. We hope that these
improvements in the relationship will be supported at the highest
levels of management in both our companies and that the spirit of
cooperation will be a top-down commitment.
3. Further discuss a “Strategic Partnership” Agreement.
Eckhard, I appreciate you scheduling time for us on Friday and
personally believe we can reach agreement on the key issues to allow us
to further develop our mutually rewarding relationship.
Sincerely
[signature of Joachim Kempin]
Joachim Kempin
Vice President
OEM Sales
cc: Bill Gates
Doug Johns
Gary Stimac
Microsoft Corporation is an equal opportunity employer
[END OF Mar 25, 2004 TRANSCRIPT]
Gordon et. al.
v. Microsoft Exhibits Published to Web April
01, 2004
Not Complete
Last Revised 4/25/2004
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 2348 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2348 p. 1 of 2 Gordon v. Microsoft
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 2348
[STAMPED] GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 278
From: Bill Gates
[ITG/OXYGEN/billg]
Sent:
Friday, July 07, 1995 9:43 AM
To:
Brad Silverberg; Carl Stock (carts); Paul Maritz (paulma)
Cc:
Richard Tong; Craig Mundie (craigmu); Jim Allchin
(jimall); John Ludwidg (johnlu); Jonathan Lazaurus (jonl); Laura
Jennings
(laural);
Roger Heinen (rogerh)
Subject: FW: Our dinner
I spent 3 hours in San Jose Wednesday night having dinner with Andy
Grove.
Fundamentally Intel and Microsoft have not been doing a very good job
of working with each other in most areas. There are a few exceptions
like some NT related marketing or Plug and Play or TAPI.
I started out by explaining to Andy that for us Windows 95 is job #1. I
talked about how we spend over $500M taking calls from end users and
use that data to drive our development. I explained how successful we
expect Windows 95 to be. I went through how serious we are about
testing software.
The main problem between us right now is NSP. We are trying to convince
them to basically not ship NSP.
Andy said he did feel bad about a few things. First he felt bad that
the software was focused on Windows 3.1 and not Windows 95 or NT. He
says that was a mistake. Second he feels like the bad feelings between
all the software groups at Intel and Microsoft makes them reluctant to
work with us and even makes them hide what they are doing since they
think we will crush it. We both agreed we have to start on attitudes
and try and get communication going. Andy thinks his IAL people are
smart and hard working and he won’t believe there isn’t some way for us
to work to get a benefit from what they do.
On the other hand intel feels we are virtually impossible to work with.
They feel like if they offered something to use free we would say it is
too expensive
– they still have bad feelings over being called up and told we were
doing Picturetel and paying for it when they feel like they offered to
do anything to work together.
I went thru the DCI episode and how that was a step backwards. I went
through the problems we have with Intellectual property issues. I told
Andy that I think he should cut down the number of software people that
Intel has. I got the feeling he doesn’t plan on doing that.
Intel has software in 2 groups – the Frank Gill platform group and the
Craig Kinnie IAL group. The Kinnie group is a little over 600 people.
Andy says that 200 of the IAL people are the compiler type people who
work for Wirt. Andy feels like we asked them to have these people to do
hard core compiler tuning to compete with MIPS and he thinks they are
complimentary to our work. I didn’t disagree since I think there is
some kind of relationship with Roger’s group that works. He says 200 of
the people are doing communications related work like NSP. I wasn’t
clear what the other 200 are doing. Under Gill there is a
communications group run by Gelsinger, a networking group run by Mertz
and an Internet group [sic] was just started with 100 people run by
Mcgeady. Since Intel is just getting started on Internet, [sic] Andy
and I agreed that that is an area we should try and have a very
complimentary relationship. We agreed that there should be a high level
meeting with Gill to get this kicked off
– Paul or Jim Allchin will have to get involved in this. I tried
explaining to Andy that our Internet strategy needed to involved
getting specific code (in our case) and x86 instructions (in his case)
on the Internet.
I told Andy that he shouldn’t be concerned about software not eating up
his cycles. I said that MPEG2, object orientation, social interface,
3-d realistic rendering, natural language and speech were all things we
are making great progress on that will be popular and use lots of
cycles. I said they should stop resisting MPEG2 and they should stop
fighting with Rockwell over NSP. I said we are doing amazing graphics
work because we have hired the best people in that area. Andy asked if
NSP doesn’t do some interesting things that we don’t handle. I said we
hadn’t even seen all of what is sometimes called NSP but that the audio
related stuff did very little of value. Andy said Intel will not “pay”
people to ship NSP by using marketing dollars and they won’t force it
onto intel motherboards. He said he is the one who asked them to get a
game show off NSP and he said retailers and others he has show the game
to have “gasped”. Although Andy is super smart in software related
areas and in some aspects of the PC market it is amazing what he
doesn’t know. Andy is going to keep his 600 people and he wants us to
give them something to do that is constructive. In a spirit of openness
he asked who besides Paul was very calm and open minded about technical
work with Intel. I wasn’t sure who to say but I mentioned John Ludwig
as someone who I totally trusted to let me know if Intel was offering
to do things that were constructive or destructive. Andy said he had
heard good things about John.
One point I [sic] kept pushing to Andy is that we are the software
company here and we will not have any kind of equal relationship with
Intel on software. It is in his interest to have us making the hard
decisions and doing world class industrial strength work. I kept asking
how he would feel if we showed [sic] up with a bunch of microcode to
throw into the P6 at the last minute. I said equality cannot be the
basis of how we work together on software. Andy understood this but he
said that Intel has to push the “platform” forward and they see things
we weren’t doing. I said we have to discuss those in advance because
their “rabbit” approaches are just destructive. I said I thought it was
humorous that it took his 600 people to alienate us so much and cause
such poor communication that no one seemed to be talking about how
poorly the P6 runs Windows 95 applications. Andy said a second step P6
would run 16 bit operations better – however when he checked on
[STAMPED] MS98 0169009 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1092297
[STAMPED & HAND WRITTEN] [UNINTELLIGIBLE] A5 03/12/02
[ININTELLIGABLE] Stork
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2348 p. 2 of 2 Gordon v. Microsoft
page 2
that Thursday he found out that the P6 second step will still not look
good on Windows 95.
On chip relationships Andy asked why we [sic] were being slow to close
the P7 framework. I said we were being slow because: a) they didn’t
want to use the corporate NDA which simply said they would never sue us
over software b) they didn’t want to use the P6 framework and c) they
had been super slow getting a proposal to us and d) we were distracted
by the [sic] NSP crisis
– making sure no one ships that pile of problems. I promised we would
get back to them within 10 days on their proposal but that if it would
expose us to 338 type garbage we weren’t going to be able to do
anything with it. Andy said he recently decided to hire 1000 extra
engineers so they can do parallel design work on pure x86 chips and P7
type chips with 2 teams each [sic] for leapfrog development. They like
the P7 but they want to be hardcore about both approaches.
On marketing I said it was awful they weren’t helping us in education
or with Windows 95. Andy said he is giving a speech at Sun Valley and
to a cable and TV event (CTAM?) and at Siggraph and he needs support
from us to do his softimage demo and he feels he isn’t getting what he
wants. Laura
– please call Andy’s office and find out how we can help there. This is
urgent. Andy said he wants to focus on solving the software development
relationship before we spend our time trying to solve the marketing
relationship. He agreed Dennis Carter is stubborn. The one area they
want to work together and I agree is to pair NT and P6 as a major
phenomena to change computing. Dave House is involved in this. Dave
feels we haven’t taken full advantage of his willingness to work with
us, Rich Tong should form a strong relationship with Dave and really
push it to get as much as we can out of it.
Andy and I talked about their relationship with Compaq and everyone’s
fear that Intel is going to take over everything by making all the
boards and not letting anyone add value. Andy thinks these fears are
overblown.
I personally think we need to try and construct a new approach with
Intel where they take on some of the hard problems like speech with us.
I think we should figure out some way for Intel to help make Windows 97
more P6 friendly. I think we should get them involved in NT performance.
I believe we will see somewhat less pressure form Intel to ship NSP
broadly this year but they want to ship in h1 96. It will take a major
effort for us to convince them to back off from this. Andy wants me to
talk to him more regularly so I am going to get involved more deeply to
find ways for us to work together.
I see Andy again next week in Sun Valley and so I can talk about
specific problems or opportunities with him then. I am asking people to
have a positive open minded view of how we can leverage Intel’s work.
From: Andy Grove [SMTP:
Andy_Grove@[INTEL EMAIL ADDRESS]]
Sent: Thursday,
July 06, 1995 12:10 PM
To:
billg
Subject: Our dinner
Bill,
Thank you very much for taking the initiative and the trouble to come
down and have dinner with me. I am very happy to have had the chance of
a relaxed and in depth discussion with you
– in fact, I slept fitfully after that, sort of continuing the dialogue
in my sleep. Of course, you had it worse, having to fly home…
This morning I talked with Ron Whittier and Carl Everett about some of
the things we discussed. Ron will follow up modifying the Internet
sessions to include Frank Gill, and of course will pursue the NSP saga
with Paul.
Carl is meeting with Carl Stork this Friday. I hope they can energize
our work on the P6. On that subject, Carl (Everett) was unhappy with me
telling you that it’s OK to leave the 16 bit code in Win 95. It seems I
was overly optimistic on the improvements the next version of the P6
will bring. So, let me retract this comment
– and pls. Pass on to Carl Stork that we need all the 32 bit support in
Win 95 that we can get.
Again, many thanks for your visit. I hope the cassette tape you were
presented with during dinner will turn out to be a worthy investment
for you … 🙂
Regards,
Andy
[STAMPED] MS98 0169010 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1092298
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 2374 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2374 page 1 of 4
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 2374
[STAMPED] GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT [UNINTELLIGIBLE]
[INTEL LOGO, DROPPED E STYLE]
INTERNAL CORRESPONDENCE
Intel Architecture Labs
TO:
A. GROVE D.
HOUSE
R.
SULLIVAN
Date: 8/2/95
M. AYMAR F.
GILL
L. VADASZ
C. EVERETT M.
MAERZ
A. MILLER
A.
YU
C.
KINNIE
S. NACHTSHEIM
F. POLLACK S.
McGEADY
S. CHOU
FROM: Ron
Whittier
SUBJECT: Microsoft Meeting August 2, 1995
1. Processors/OSs
-
Gates issue: “Fundamental problem with “free”
software from IAL, cross-subsidized by processor revenues.” Gates would
not agree to let processors/Oss programs to progress unencumbered by
platform, communication program issues.
- Win’95/P6 16 bit
problems: agreed to put program on highest priority. Sense of
direction was that optimizations of GDI, User (current code base) is
the solution space. Gates/Maritz position was that a full 32 bit
GDI/User capability was a 48 month deal. So tweaking the OS (and the
P6) is the direction POR.
This will be followed up at the DPG/MPG Summit with Microsoft on
Aug 15. (AR: Everett/Yu: Microsoft side is Maritz).
Make the Aug. 15 session two days to really get
results (versus just another metting)… Grove directive.
-
MMx IP
issue… basically, will we take a proprietary, closed approach to
the MMx instruction set (copyright mnemonics, patents on ISA), or will
we go “open” on the ISA and protect implementations.
A second question is, if “open” when will we disclose [Gates: Q1’96:
Aymar Q4’96 with product]? One suggestion was to disclose at the time
the tools ship from MS (~Q2’96).
1
[STAMPED] MS-PCA1545107
[STAMPED] MS CID 00077 – Intel Confidential
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2374 page 2 of 4
The tool effort itself (at MS) is pretty straight forward (per Maritz).
AR: We need a policy decision on this quickly (Aymar/Yu); and then a
“simple e-mail” to Maritz (Whittier)…by August 7th, please.
-
P7
Contract…agreed that we need to elevate (from Legal) to
executive
staff level so that the business issues can be understood, resolved.
The AR is with A. Yu/P. Martiz assisted by Sullivan/Stork. Close ASAP
(in August).
-
Processor/OS
Marketing issues
- P6 – position as a server/WS product with NT – even Gates
said 32
bit is OK. Close on detailed positioning (Everett/Stork). Needs to be
done in advance of Aug. 15 session.
- UNIX: big flap – MS wants lots of UNIXes.
- Enterprise marketing…the server summit should be between
House team
and [UNINTELLIGIBLE]llchin/Bob McDowell…Marshall Brumer will set up.
(AR: House)
-
Long-term Processor/OS Consideration…a Microsoft
issue – Martiz to
review with A. Yu as part of the Aug. 15 meeting
2. Internet
-
Martz’ presentation covered ground of the July 26
session…agreed MS
(Intel and behind, that Internet is a platform [standards
engineer end
user values, which engenders more standards with more enduser
value-“feedback mechanism”], and the key is to win the client (patch up
the server later).
-
MS Strategy is to focus on MS Client
96-technologically not tough
stuff, but needs to be out “today”, Maritz
-
MS Server
is the basic WEB stuff (on NT) plus value add (Back office,
SQL, secure transactions, authentication)…integrate Back office into
the WEB, giving one-stop shopping for business/SOHO.
-
Issues:
MS: Very sensitive to what Intel might do on the
client side.
Example: JAVA, a show stopper. (Later Stork played back “you are doing
JAVA”.)
BG: Supporting certain third party deals will be a
problem …we need to
consider in the context of their (pervasive) internet program to assure
we are not unknowingly stepping on one of their key strategies!
BG: On the 30/70 use of 3rd party technologies,
Intel using Netscape in
a Windows environment is not a problem (provided we do not set up the
“positive feedback loop” for Netscape that allows it to grow to defecto
std.).
2
[STAMPED] MS-PCA1545108
[STAMPED] MS CID 00078 – Intel Confidential
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2374 page 3 of 4
page 3
-
What
Should Intel Do With It’s Internet Resources?
BG: “Go do a high end WEB server (super duper
server). This could be a
tied to their ‘Tiger’ program”. [Or we could go climb a mountain].
BG: Internet will be deeply integrated into the OS
over time, just like
messaging, conferencing, etc.
-
Internet Resources, by Company
Intel
(150)
MS
(400-500) + MSN (600)
NICS (ok)
No single focal point
Infrastructure (ok)
Tools
(Blackbird, etc) ~ 175
Web Server (ok)
Soft Image
(275)
High Performance Clients (~ok)
Browser/Shell ~ 45
Security/RT Media (not ok)
+ Best iNet SQL, Best iNet
Content, etc
-
“Intel needs to understand all the stuff MS is
doing on the iNET.”
Agreed that Microsoft will make a “sales call” disclosing the total
scope of their internet program.
AR: Maritz to set up sales call
visit to Gill/McGeady/Maerz
3. Closure of Afternoon
Meeting
4. Dinner Discussions
– range of topical issues discussed; then
serious
discussion on various aspect of the relationship and the way we work
with
each other. The most important conclusions:
-
On Processes
- Regular Disclosure Sessions (Disclose – Holes – Fill)
- No “going around” execs (if there’s a problem with
Whittier,
Gill,
etc, address directly with the individual, versus lobbying with other
execs to put pressure on the problem owner).
- Parallel processing of projects by directly connecting
execs
in the
two companies (see below).
3
[STAMPED] MS-PCA1545109
[STAMPED] MS CID 00079 – Intel Confidential
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2374 page 4 of 4
4. Start treating each other with
more
respect, i.e. like a valued
customer. Also, cut out the non-value added aspect of competing to lead
the industry.
Specific AR
Kinnie to review the Win ’97 plan for specific holes (and more
generally), and review with Gates directly. It was suggested this be a
written review with Face-to-Face delivery. (AR: Kinnie)
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 2418 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2418 Page 1 of 1
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 2418
[STAMPED] GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 281
From:
Bill Gates
Sent:
Wednesday, October 18, 1995 11:19 AM
To:
Brad Silverberg; Carl Stork (carst); Jim Allchin (jimall); Paul Maritz
(paulma)
Cc:
Bernard Vergnes (bernardv); Craig Mundie (craigmu); David Cole
(davidcol); Jeff Raikes
(jeffr); Joachim Kampin (joachimk); John Ludwig (johnlu); Jonathan
Lazarus (jonl); Nathan
Myhrvold (nathanm); Paul Osborne (Paulo); Pete Higgins (peteh); Rich
Rashid (rashid);
Richard [UNINTELLIGIBLE] (richta); Steve Balmer (steveb)
Subject:
Intel Grove – some opportunities to work together!
1. MMX! (bradsi, craigmu, carts)
Intel has instruction set extensions to allow for
higher speed in
multimedia operations called MMX. All Pentiums coming out after summer
95 (P55C) and all Pentium Pros coming out after Fall 96 will include
these instructions. Intel thinks they will have 200mhz Pentium Pros in
96, Intel has a plan to fix the 16bit performance of Pentium Pro but
not until sometime in 1997. Intel has decided to make the MMX
instructions available to the people who do x86 clones. Intel is
expecting support from Microsoft as it goes public with these
instructions in February 96. I am assigning Brad to prioritize more
discussions with Intel about MMX – where can we use these improvements?
For example: we should study Intels MPEG2 software using MMX and
understand if software only video conferencing becomes realistic. Even
though MMX isn’t perfect in its first release we need to support Intel
on this one and help them evolve it. If we really don’t like it we need
to be very articulate NOW. Our multimedia group in PSD and Craig’s
video group under Jay Torborg need to take a hard look. It is past the
point of major change for Intel. With Intel’s share I believe the best
thing for us is to push everyone to adopt MMX even though the
alternative may be technically superior. Intel would like elements of
Nashville to visibly support MMX even if its mainly a marketing thing.
If MMX enables video we should consider how our content and
applications should use it.
2. NT/Pentium Pro (steveb, jimall, paulma, craigmu, jon l)
Intel wants to work with us on marketing the
NT/Pentium Pro
combination. Intel has an architectural sales force that calls on large
accounts. They are willing as part of a cooperative arrangement to have
this group focus on promoting NTS on Pentium Pro servers and NTW on
Pentium Pro desktops. Grove thinks we could really help each other on
this. We would both still have modest activities where we are processor
independent and they are OS independent but they are willing to have
almost all of their message focus on the combination of our products. I
think this is the first time where we can really leverage Intel’s
marketing investment to help a Microsoft product. We might even be able
to get Intel to help us focus on tough accounts like National Security
Administration or other SUN accounts. We might be able to get Intel to
help us focus on Publishing and Higher Education.
Under the new organization Intel has 2 relevant groups –
Dave House
for servers and Carl Everrett for Desktop. Grove wants to increase the
bandwidth between BSD and these groups. Grove wants to know personally
things that hold us back for working closely with these groups to
deliver a strong message. If we want help on tuning, benchmarking,
working with particular ISV’s or customers Grove thinks Intel can be
supportive. Intel is actually doing 2 launches for the Pentium Pro –
one by each of these groups.
Intel as a customer has decided to skip Windows 95! They
have a roll
out plan to go straight to Windows NT. Grove says they put a lot of
time into thinking about this. They don’t want to go public on it yet.
I am actually surprised personally at the number of corporations
looking at going straight to NT.
3. Real time Communications (paulma, craigmu, bradsl, jonlu)
Paul – Intel feels we have all the OEMs on hold with
our NSP chill.
For example they feel HP is unwilling to do anything relative to MMX
exploitation or the new audio software Intel is doing using Windows 95
unless we say its ok. This is good news because it means OEMs are
listening to us. Andy believes Intel is living up to its part of the
NSP bargain and that we should let OEMs know that some of the new
software work Intel is doing is Ok. If Intel is not sticking totally to
its part of the deal let me know. Andy knows you are down seeing Albert
Yu on October 2[UNINTELLIGABLE]. He will grab a short meeting with you.
He think Intel still has a lot of strength in “real time communication”
and that combining this with the great strength he fears we have
developed in graphics/video is the key to getting interactive
applications on the Internet to require more than a simple terminal. He
wants us to recognize that despite problems in the past combining our
strengths here makes sense. He says the key groups involved here now
work for Gill. He is willing to lay out everything they are doing. He
understands telling us at the last minute does not work.
[STAMPED] MS98 0169058 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 101686
[STAMPED] EXH. K[OR X]8 DATE 03/12/02 WITNESS STORK SUSAN ZIELS
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3667 – Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3667 Page 1 of 8
[STAMPED] Government Exhibit 920
[STAMPED] DT EVOL, SLIDE
1
DC 75
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1020245
[STAMPED] MS CID 00208 Intel Confidential
[The exhibit is a Powerpoint-style presentation with a background logo
that says] ADL ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT LAB INTEL CONFIDENTIAL
Destop Platform
Goals/ Strategies
- Grow the Market for Intel Architechture PCs
- Requires new Media and Comm based Apps
- Requires a new Common Baseline of media and comm functions in
mainstream PCs
- New Common Baseline must be easy to use and manage
- New Common Baseline must fit within cost constraints of today’s
$2K MM PC
NSPRP = NEW COMMON BASELINE
NSP = KEY TECHNOLOGY FOR COST AND EOU
|
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3667 Page 2 of 8
[Still present is the background logo
that says] ADL ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT LAB INTEL CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS CID 00209 Inter Confidential
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1020246
NSP Reference Platform
[Beneath and to the left appears a down-pointing arrow-box with the
logo of a CD and an illegible word written in a clip art
starburst shape over the upper right hand corner of the arrow
itself. Within the arrow-box are written the following:
Open Design Guide
Industry Work Groups
SDKs
DDKs
[To the right of the arrow are the following:]
ISV’s
Media & Comm Based Applications
|
Base Capabilities
OEM’s
NSP Reference Platform
[ with check marks next to each of the following, excepting “Scalable
Performance”]
Scalable
Video
Transparent Connectivity
3D
Graphics
Plug and Play
Sharable
Audio
Manageability
Scalable Performance
|
Balanced Partitioning
[Here follows a box containing a picture of a plain seesaw-looking
balance that weighs on the left two hard disks and a pentium processor
logo equally with (on the right) a square with the words, ‘ Signal
Processing H/W” in a square with multiple squares indicated behind it
of equal size. The letters “IHVs” are in the upper left hand
corner of this box.]
[STAMPED] DT EVOL, Slide
2
DC ’95
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3667 Page 3 of 7
[Still present is the background logo
that says] ADL ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT LAB INTEL CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS CID 00210 [and barely decipherable the words:] Inter
Confidential
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1020247
Intel- MS Platform Engagement Summary
- Beginning in late 1991, Intel shared with MS a long range
application and platform vision as well as detailed requirements for
system software.
- We were not able to engage on any meaningful joint development on
any of the goals identified. We did get active
resistance/competition from MS business units.
- Intel began to engage directly the relevant groups at MS to
develop the eight key areas that now constitute the NSPRP.
(PCI, DCI/Indeo, TAPI, P&P, DMI, 3DR, Native Audio, NSP)
- Intel developed the key standards and driver level S/W required
to implement all eight areas in Windows 3.1. MS has publicly
supported 6 of these 8 areas at one point or another.
- Only three of these areas are scheduled to be supported by MS in
the first release of Win ’95 in a compatible way. (PCI, P&P,
TAPI)
- There are many cultural, strategic and legal issues that cloud
our relationship, but the fundamental issue is that MS firmly believes
that the largest developer of Pentium Processor based platforms has no
business developing platform level software!
- Intel has proven its ability to lead the PC platform evolution
and develop platform level software. It is fundamental to our business that we
continue to do so.
[STAMPED] DT EVOL, Slide
3
DC ’95
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3667 Page 4 of 7
[Still present is the background logo
that says] ADL ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT LAB INTEL CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MS CID 00211 Inter Confidential
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1020248
Intel – MS Platform Engagement
What joint development would look like
- MS acknowledges/accepts Intel’s leadership role in defining PC
platform standards and developing software.
- Cooperation on establishing a new common baseline Win ’95 Desktop
PC.
- NSP/Native Audio:
-MS public endorsement of NSP.
-Define joint development plan for MS support of Native interfaces in
future Win ‘9x and Win NT.
– Define Intel support of Direct Audio interfaces on Native Audio.
– Joint development/ evolution of DCI/Direct Draw interface.
– Support of Indeo V4 in future Win ‘9x and Win NT releases.
– Joint development and support of 16 and 32-bit DMI MI and CI
interfaces in Win ’95 and Win NT
– Acknowledgment of coexistence on RM and 3DR interfaces.
– MS to port RM onto 3DR libraries.
– MS to freeze 3D-DDI spec.
– Intel to evangelize 3D-DDI interface for graphic drivers.
– Acknowledgement by MS of Instant On as valid Win “95 applet.
– Joint development and evolution of APM spec.
- Continued cooperative development
of TAPI, WinSock 2, USB and PCI.
[STAMPED] DT EVOL, Slide
4
DC ’95
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3667 Page 5 of 7
[EXACT REPLICA OF PAGE 2]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3667 Page 6 of 7
[EXACT REPLICA OF PAGE 3]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3667 Page 7 of 7
[EXACT REPLICA OF PAGE 4]
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4410 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4410 p. 1 of 2
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4410
[STAMPED] GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 283
[INTEL LOGO, DROPPED E
STYLE]
Internal
Correspondence
-Intel Conf
To:
List
Date: 8 November 1995
From: Russell Barck,
408-xxx-xxxx [PHONE NUMBER REDACTED]
Frank Ehrig, 206-xxx-xxxx [PHONE NUMBER REDACTED]
Subject: Summary: 11/7 Kinnie/Gates Feedback
Session
cc:
Attendees: Intel MS
Craig
Kinnie Bill
Gates
Gerald Holzhammer Paul
Maritz
Frank
Ehrig
Carl Stork
Russell
Barack Marshall
Brumer
David
Cole
Summary
Overall a very good session. Craig did an excellent job of
constructively identifying and addressing underlying differences in the
manner in which each company translates its vision into requirements
and diffuses its technology to the industry. Lack of detailed MS
product schedules was highlighted (and acknowledged by Bill) as a major
issue that needs to be addressed to enable successful engagement. Also
highlighted was difference in fundamental philosophy: Intel
Focus=Demand Creation, MS Focus = Demand Fulfillment. Concerns over
acceptable quality levels surfaced as a result of divergent focus
– Martiz reinforced desire to make “quality” primary goal of any joint
activities. MS places the quality imperative first and foremost in
their efforts to improve the end-user experience.
General discussion was open, honest, and free-flowing. Atmosphere was
one of “genuine desire” to fix problems that lead to rift in the
relationship. Craig’s feedback was received well by MS with a few
exceptions
– most notably MS’ lack of active new app development focused on
driving new platform capabilities and MS’ generally reactive approach
to incorporating OEM and IHV input in their products. Several key areas
for follow-up and further engagement were identified: Realtime
Services, Native Audio, 3D API/DDI (which Maritz finally agreed to
release to Intel
and 3DR-team), VBI/Intercast, S/W Midi, DMI/RDMI, USB,
Surfboard/Schroeder, POTS-VC, and Dino.
Bill concluded the session by saying that he felt it was “super
valuable” and that he would like to sit down with same group in 4
months and review the progress. He also commented that it would be
extremely beneficial if Intel would disclose our software activities to
MS as soon as possible.
Insightful quotes from Bill:
- “Graphics is the single greatest area that MS is investing
in” [referring to Talisman project]
- “Intel wants to push [the market] – this is very good thing”
- “IAL having 700 software engineers running around in the
industry is an OK thing, as long as MS know what they’re doing
first!”
- “These are areas we should definitely spend more
time with each other in” [referring to Craig’s overview on
Surfboard/Schroeder, Teladdin, POTS-VC, and VBI/Intercast
- “Today’s API is tomorrow’s DDI” [MS doesn’t want to
relinquish control over APIs]
- “Sounds like Intel’s motherboard strategy!”
[tongue-in-cheek – referring to creation of Universal Driver Model]
[STAMPED] MS CID 00128 – Intel Confidential
[HAND WRITTEN] BARCK #1
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4410 p. 2 of 2
[PAGE 2]
Focus Areas to Advance the Platform
- RTS & RTMS in Win9X and NT – Define clear
roadmap to the industry on how we converge
- 3D API and DDI – Provide clear, scaleable
interface direction to the industry
- DMI & RDMI – Implement common roadmap
launched at DMTF
- USB – Need commitment for aggressive driver
development and device support
- Video Capture and DDI – Need clear direction
in Quartz 2.0 for Video Capture
Bill commented that timeline is the real issue on RTS – it could
potentially be 2H96. He stressed (again) need to share detailed
schedules so we (Intel) can do analysis of whether or not it’s worth
waiting for, MS asked to add VBI, Native Audio, Dino, and Soft MIDI to
list of short-term engagement items.
AR Summary/Next Steps
AR: Stork/Kinnie – Explore renaming NSP to
something with less negative industry equity
AR: Barck – Coordinate disclosure of POTS VC,
Surfboard/Schroeder, HHD, and Teladdin to MS similar to SIPC
presentation to Intel)
AR: Cole/Kinnie – Identify appropriate contacts
within respective companies to initiate early disclosure/engagement
AR: Brumer/Barck – Coordinate MS SW Midi
disclosure/evaluation
AR: Brumer/Ehrig – Coordinate UDM “Sales Call”
to Intel
– use USB as model
AR: Brumer/Landsman – Coordinate Talisman
disclosure to Intel/Resolve open MS IP issues
AR: Brumer/Ehrig – Coordinate discovery meeting
with MS Research to discuss MIPS-intensive apps
AR: Brumer/Barck – Provide detailed 6 month
roadmap and schedules on MS deliverables
AR: Brumer/Barck – Coordinate follow-on SIPC
presentation to Intel w/next-level of detail
AR: Maritz/Ehrig – Release 3D DDI to Intel (no
caveats on 3DR exposure)
AR: Ehrig – Coordinate MS visit to Hillsboro
for USB Driver Debug/Development
AR: Brumer/Barck – Provide Intel with plug-in
point for Quartz work
AR: Maritz/Kinnie – Explore less-restrictive
driver model implementation.
AR: Barck – Initiate and manage engagement on
Top 7 issues
[STAMPED] MS CID 00129 – Intel Confidential
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4411 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4411 Page 1 of 2]
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4411
[STAMPED] GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 563
From: Gerald S
Holzhammer [Intel email address]
Sent:
Thursday, April 13, 1995 2:40 AM
To:
Gerald_S_Molzhammer [Intel email address]; Claude_M_Leglise [Intel
email address]; Bill_R_Miller [Intel email address];
Robert_Sullivan [Intel email address] Ronald_J_Whittier [Intel email
address]; Craig_Kinnie [Intel email address];
mcg [Intel email address]
Cc:
Ken_Rhodes [Intel email address]; Murali_Veeramoney [Intel email
address]; Joe_Casey [Intel email address];
Frank_T_Ehrig [Intel email address]
Subject: Microsoft Face to Face
Summary
Text item: Text_1
Bottom-Line:
– Based on W95 experience MS finds that they need to own all drivers
– Expect no real cooperation from MS on NSP or media; input/education
is welcome, of course
– At Games developers conference focus on “Design scalable games for
Pentium” message; DON’T make a half-hearted attempt to push Native
audio without a compelling ISV story (current POR). MS
messages are
tuned for this audience; we’d come across defensive at best
– Bill, let’s do the Native Audio press release before GDC; it won’t
harm our MS relationship 🙂
Gerald
Details:
We met with Carl Stork, Marshall Brumer, and Eric Engstrom for 3 hours.
WinHEC clearly opened their eyes regarding the scope of NSP. They are
upset with us being in “their” OS space
– no surprise there. Interestingly, they have evolved their thinking on
what their “space” needs to be.
1-MS moving towards vertical integration of driver SW.
In short, they feel they need to own ALL driver software “to the metal”
i.e. silicon
– a significant shift from owning the core OS and allowing innovation
at the driver/HW level. A recurring theme was that nobody but MS is
qualified to do good driver SW. In their mind, W95 was delayed 9 months
by 3rd party driver dependence. That this means for the games SDK is
that they are focusing only on the ISV (API) aspect and all but ignore
the IHV (HAL/DDI) aspect. They intend to provide ALL drivers for all
interesting HW
– a fallacy given the horizontal nature of the PC industry.
Nonetheless, they are serious. (If they follow through with this,
innovation at the HW level would grind to a halt since silicon vendors
would need to rely on MS to get driver support for their new stuff. The
good news is that IHVs would have to flock to Intel supported open NSP
DDIs as the only way to innovate without depending on MS driver support
for their widget.)
2- Cooperation – NOT!
Stork openly admitted that MS has completely missed the boat on
developing a compelling state of the art media subsystem for Windows95.
But this is high priority for W96/97. He eluded to an upcoming reorg
that may combine Osborne’s and Ludwig’s team to develop the next
generation media architecture (nothing concrete yet but it will build
on the Games SDK). Intel is welcome to provide input
– but they own it down to the silicon 🙂
3- Games Developers Conference
I don’t expect MS to openly attack NSP at the GDC, BUT their thrust is
clearly counter NSP. Eric went as far to insist that “any DSP
[STAMPED] 477MSCID00235 – Intel Business Information – Highly
Confidential
[Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4411 Page 2 of 2]
page 2
regardless how poor in performance is better than doing processing on
the host –
since the game is left with all of the CPU” (something games ISV’s are
very vocal about). Amusingly, Direct Audio has an NSP-like SW emulation
layer if the HW does not support a certain feature. This is not an
inconsistency in their mind, of source, since MS will provide this SW.
We should be watching out for a games-enabled ISA card/reference design
from MS that provides advanced audio, 3D, and 2D support. Performance
is achieved the old-fashioned way: lots of acceleration and memory
behind a slow ISA bus.
4- DCI primary surface support makes it into W95; offscreen gets
rearchitected later.
According to Engstrom the offscreen aspect of DCI 1.0 cannot be
reliably supported in W95
– they were not paying attention when DCI 1.0 was implemented. (I’m
sure he is totally objective here given that DCI 1.0 was done by his
predecessor jointly with Intel) He claims the DCI drivers provided by
IHVs are buggy and violate the Windows programming model. He is paying
lip-service to MS providing a Direct Video incarnation of the DCI 1.0
draw handler to support off-screen surfaces in the future but since
video is not part of the games SDK this remains at risk. And, NO, Intel
cannot help since this code has to be integral to W95.
Games SDK Schedule (I expect this to change)
Beta 1 Games Dev Conference
Beta 2 July
FCS September
[STAMPED] 477MSCID00236 – Intel Business Information – Highly
Confidential
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4559 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4559 p. 1 of 2
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4559
[STAMPED] GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 284
S. McGeady
From: Steven
McGeady [mcg]
Sent: Thursday,
November 09, 1995 5:43 PM
To:
Frank Gill
Cc:
Andy_Grove@[INTEL EMAIL ADDRESS]
Subject: Re: marritz meeting summary
I interpreted [sic] our meeting today consistent with Frank’s last
paragraph. We now have completed our AR and will begin the Java program
full force, consistent with the direction to do so without public
disclosure.
I take minor exception to the “insurance policy” positioning. I’m OK
with that for MS, but Java isn’t an insurance policy for us at this
time – it’s an important component part of a major application
strategy. However, I don’t think that this needs to be resolved.
I’m assigning about 5 existing ITL people to this, opening reqs for
another 3-4, and engaging with IAL’s media suppliers to budget
resources to include support in their media components, all per the GSR
outcome.
I take an additional AR to continue to educate Frank on the merits of
Java and the position and motivation of Sun.
On other topics, Richmond will get AR to “win” MS for Intercast
architecture convergence at (virtually) any cost,
mcg
———– Original Message Follows
>From: Frank Gill Frank_Gill@[INTEL EMAIL ADDRESS]
>Subject: marritz meeting summary
>———
>
> overall very good but java remains a major
controversy. Paul
> really appreciated the spirit of openness and
strong desire to
> cooperate. Major points summarized below.
>
> -on intercast and their direct tv program, we
both felt we are
> early enough that we can cooperate to make these
programs
> complementary and even divide up the work. i
want to really make
> this happen and demonstrate [sic] we can do a
successful program
> together.
>
> -we told them again we are using netscape in
first release of our
> internet-in-a-box and reasons why. while
disappointed, they
> understood and paul told me after “this is how
we should handle
> things with no surprises”
>
> -re java, we told them that we felt java is on
the way to becoming
> and internet std and felt a need to optimize
around IA and
> particularly optimize our media components for
the java
> environment. they see this as supporting their
mortal enemy….and
> argue SUN is our enemy as well. Paul describe to
me as “this is
> equivalent to us optimizing for powerpc”. i left
it with him that
[STAMPED] 475MSCID00015 – Intel Business Information – Highly
Confidential
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4559 p. 2 of 2
[PAGE 2]
> have not starting anything until we talked
today, we will not
publicly endorse java, and i needed internal review before authorizing
this work to
> commence. So, bottom [sic] line, this is BIG BIG
DEAL to them.
> i am still pretty dumb in this space, but think
we should do the
> Work quietly as an insurance policy and see a
few more cards
> before any public disclosure. Lets talk. frank
———– End of Original Message
[STAMPED] 475MSCID00016 – Intel Business Information – Highly
Confidential
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4560 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4560 p. 1 of 2
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4560
[STAMPED] GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 285
S.McGeady
From: Dave Landsman [Intel
email address]
Sent: Monday,
November 13, 1995 7:01 AM
To:
[Intel email addresses]
Cc:
[Intel email addresses]
Subject: Draft Notes from Gill/Maritz Summit on
11/9
Attorney/Client Confidential
Here are my notes from the Gill/Maritz summit on 11/9. Give me any
comments and let me know if you’d like me to publish a full set of
minutes, with more detail.
Attendees from MS:
Paul Maritz – Exec VP Platform Division
Brian Moran – Program Mgr – Broadcast PC
Craig Fiebig – Director Biz Strategy – WW Strategy Group
Marshall Brumer – Acct Manager
On Phone for Realtime Discussion:
– Rich Rashid – VP Research
– Paul Leach – ??
– Yoram Bernet – Senior Architect – Multimedia Server
Key Issues:
Java. We told MS that we were seeing this become enough of a factor in
the market that we felt the need to fund efforts into performance
tuning. Frank stated that we would not evangelize publically. Maritz
reacted strongly to this, saying “it is premature for Intel to do this,
there are very few apps being written for Java today, and nobody is
going to make an architecture decision based upon Java”. MS’s stated
concern in this area is not the Java language, per se, which they will
support in their products as “just another language”, but Java
component object model. MS wants Intel to support OCX’s and their
object model, which is integral to their OS platform. Maritz said he
would try to convince us to spend our energies elsewhere.
Server. We told MS that we are using non-MS products (except for NT) in
the initial [sic] version of our server. Reasons: 1) Our OEM’s are
asking for the products we are using; 2) MS’s does not have a complete
product set, specifically with respect to integrated HTML authoring and
document management; and 3) MS has not treated us as a customer. For
#3, we cited a number of issues. For example, we still don’t have ITL
and ISD people registered as Gibraltar and Blackbird users, and that we
only got Gibraltar through Alan Holzman, who happened to get it at an
Internet briefing he was invited to, to which ITL and ISD were not
involved. Bottom line: they are not treating us as a customer. Maritz
said he would “fix it”.
Where we can work together. Maritz identified two key areas for working
closely together: 1) Integration of Internet and voice/video/telephony;
and 2) 3D, specifically Talisman, within a month. On #1, we did not
identify a specific AR, so AR is for ICG to identify how we proceed on
this and have MS team close back with Brumer for who/how to proceed at
MS. Many discussions are already underway around this topic. Perhaps we
also need to roll up a vision here and present back to Maritz as a
proposal, or ask him for one. One #2, Landsman has already been in
touch with Jay Torborg. Torborg told me, as of 11/8, that he is waiting
for Maritz’s go ahead to engage. So AR is: Landsman to get relevant
Intel folks (PCD/OPSD/IAL) engaged with Torborg’s group.
1
[STAMPED] 457MSCID00040 – Intel Business Information – Highly
Confidential
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4560 p. 2 of 2
page 2
Other Topics
MS Overview of Internet Plans. Maritz gave an overview of their
Internet plans that essentially stated the same info we heard in
Redmond in meeting on 8/30. They plan to integrate the overall browsing
environment into windows by having the right tools, runtime support for
various content languages (including their own native document types,
like Word and Excel, as well as 3rd parties, like Java, etc). Maritz
said he would do an update of these plans to us in Dec/Jan, once they
have gotten to the next level of detail.
Real-Time. BSD is working on RSVP on Winsock2 sometime after the shell
release of NT. Rashid is working on real-time as well, in context of
Tiger. They agreed to have Abel to meet with R. Rashid (Research) and
Dave Thompson (NT) on real-time. AR: Weinrib/Landsman
Intercast. Maritz is very positive about Intercast. They want to
continue the engineering discussions. He broke the topic into Windows
platform issue and content. On platform, they want to continue the
engineering discussions: “we do the DBS stack, you do the VBI stack”,
and make sure it is supported well in Windows. As for standards group:
“let’s synch on the engineering and that will take care of itself”.
Content was kind of [sic] left off the plate in this discussion.
AR: Haight/Landsman – Followup on Intercast engineering discussions.
AR: Gill/Maritz – followup discussion in approximately one month
toreview progress.
Other Stuff
I noted a comment that “DirectX will not be in the Shell release of NT”.
2
[STAMPED] 457MSCID00041 – Intel Business Information – Highly
Confidential
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4562 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4562 p. 1 of 1
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4562
[STAMPED] GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 565
[TRANSCRIBERS NOTES: AUTHOR USES MANY ARROWS AS BULLETS, WHICH ARE NOT
REPRODUCED. ARROWS THAT CONNECT SENTENCES ARE NOTED]
[HAND WRITTEN NOTES]
[STAR] Microsoft Java Meeting – 4/9/96
Rewritten the VM [ARROW] Goes back to Sun
Plan to ship broadly w/Inet
Explorer
Natively knows how to talk
to COM
Should work together to define APIs for Java Media
“low-level manifestation”
should be through COM object ifaces embedded
VM
COM object interfaces / will
publish these soon [ARROW] Slightly before Beta
ifaces:
mid may/end of May
JIT
Byte code Invocation
native methods
[ARROW CONNECTS ifaces GROUP TO] Rob Wellend /John Thomason
Mike Tutongie[NAME?] [STAR]
“Broad distribution rights”
Ludwig [ARROW] Media Interface
Dean McRory – in Muglia’s
group
Rob Wellend – Ludwig
John Thomason – “
“Joel Spegal’s [NAME?]
organization”
IE 4.0
[UNINTELLIGABLE] – Fall ’98 // IE3.0 – This Summer
[STAMPED] 477MSCID00271 – Intel Business Information – Highly
Confidential
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4563 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4563 p. 1 of 2
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4563
[STAMPED] GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 566
From: Alan J Hotzman
[email address]
Sent:
Friday, April 19, 1996 2:56 PM
To:
[email addresses]
Subject: MS/Intel Java Meeting Minutes –
4/18/96
Text item:
Trip Report from Alan Hotzman & Burt Perry:
MS/Intel Java Meeting 4/18/96
Attendees
Bob Muglia, VP
Tools
Microsoft
John Ludwig, VP
Interfaces
Microsoft
John Thomason, Program
Mgr
Microsoft
Mike Tatongy, Prject Lead –
Java
Microsoft
Alan Hotzman, Strategic
Partners
Intel
Burt Perry, Eng Program
Mgr
Intel
Greg Eastman, VM Project
Lead
Intel
Frank Ehrig, SSTM
Mgr
Intel
MS will take part in the Sun 4/30 announcement of Java OS platforms
MS VM built from spec, no Sun code
MS has changed native interfaces. Not compliant w/Sun’s current native
interface at the binary level:
As part of rewriting the Java VM, MS has completely
changed the
internal object model to accommodate COM. We
think they have not
told Sun and this may be an issue for Sun as well as
us if Intel and
MS give a single optimized IA Java RT back to Sun.
The current
method for calling native methods in the MS Java VM
is different and
not compatible with Sun’s. MS will provide include
files that allow
you to bridge between the two al the source code
level but not at the binary level.
MS believe their VM is 2X faster than Netscape
Discuss w/Clary. how can we work w/Microsoft ?
Get Sun permission
Tell Clary to call Muglia on
us working together if there is a problem with Clary agreeing to it
Get a letter from Clary
giving us permission to work together
MS has not done interpreter optimizations and is very interested in
working together to produce a single reference implementation for IA
Java on Windows.
The IE 3.0 timeframe of June is not possible for integration of Intel
&MS VMs, but IE 4.0 in fall is IE 3.0 will have new MS VM in it
through.
IE 4.0 (as part of
Nashville) is right target to combine MS & Intel VM work
Muglia/Ludwig want exclusive access to IA’s VM work:
Ludwig does NOT want us to
give Netscape our VM work
Netscape access to VM is
VERY touchy w/MS!!!
Ludwig wants us to work
through Microsoft, not got to Netscape
unless we were unhappy with MS cooperation (or lack thereof). Let
Ludwig know we’re unhappy BEFORE we got to Netscape
Issue: If we work with MS, they want us to start with their new code.
Technically this is not a problem but when we jointly give Sun the
code, they
will be astonished because it will be totally different
[STAMPED] 477MSCID00026 – Intel Business Information – Highly
Confidential
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4563 p. 2 of 2
page 2
than their source base and will have no shared code with any other
implementation. Rather, it will be Microsoft’s architecture. How will
Sun feel
about this and our participation in this (Wintel all over again?).
A Java JIT will be standard in the OS from MS. Will always be there,
make decisions on what to JIT and why
Borland doing the same with
Netscape!
Class Libraries
MS has integrated COM as inherent part of Java VM so they want all
classes to
simply be COM interfaces. Plan to develop cross platform (Windows, Mac,
UNIX)
class libraries (built in native code, not Java) for: Media and
graphics, Data
building / data access, forms.
MS is considering a UNIX client for IE
Software AG is/WILL port COM &
DCOM to all UNIX platforms
MS assuming that class libraries will be anti-MS coming from Sun no
matter what!
thus, get ISVs &
developers to write to MS class libraries
Get anti-MS developers
by porting COM to the MAC etc.
Forms class libraries were THE most important to MS
Can we work together on defining Java Class libraries “outside” of the
Sun Class Library definitions ???
Muglia wants to work with us on defining media classes that work
directly with COM
BOTTOM LINE:
They want developers writing to their APIs not Sun’s Java APIs and
strongly want us to rethink what we are doing. They want to work with
us to define media class libraries that we are happy with. Ludwig will
give us a date for their Media Class Interfaces Specs on Monday 4/22
after he meets with the engineers.
Key Ars:
1. AHotzman/BDawson – get Clary letter on MS & Intel working
together
on VM (combine work).
2. AHotzman/BDawson – Investigate – How do Intel/MS work together on
defining Class Libs. Look at our Sun Media NDA and see if there
are legal issues that prevent us from working with MS. Do we want to
work with
MS on these?
Attached document placed in:
/tmp_mnt/ffs/f/mcg/attach/java/micros~1.doc on
Sat Apr 20 13:21:40 PDT 1996
[STAMPED] 477MSCID00027 – Intel Business Information – Highly
Confidential
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4564 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4564 p. 1 of 2
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4564
[STAMPED] GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 1204 Jackson 10/7/98
[1 line unintelligible]
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 1997 00:53:36 -0700
To: [email addresses @prognet.com]
From: Rob Glaser <robg>
Subject: MS-RN meeting 10-9
Cc: [email addresses]
RN Confidential
On Thursday (10-9) Jim B and I met with Anthony Bay to discuss how we
might move the MS-RN relationship forward in a positive way. The
meeting was a follow-up to a meeting that took place last week.
Joining Anthony (unexpectedly) at the meeting was David Rinn. The tone
of the meeting was frostier than my recent interactions with Anthony,
indeed colder [sic] than expected.
Anthony began by saying that the relationship between our 2 companies
is in his mind “95% competitive.” At first he said he couldn’t think of
anything positive that had happened between our companies. I countered
that we thought they would think the ASF area was positive. He backed
off a bit and said he agreed that our joint ASF work had been very
positive.
We (Jim and I) expressed a strong desire to have a positive
relationship between our two companies where possible, recognizing that
while there would be substantial areas where we would compete, we
thought that there were substantial areas where we could cooperate.
Anthony was not exactly receptive to this, although he didn’t want to
close the door. He and Rinn indicated that in their opinion, RN had not
always behaved honorably since the MS-RN deal was done. He suggested
(and Rinn said point blank) that we had not been straight with MS about
our intentions on a number of fronts.
For instance Rinn said we must have had a secret plan to go public
before we did our deal with them, suggesting that we did this
intentionally to devalue their warrants. Jim told them the exact date
of the board meeting where the topic first got serious attention, and
the date of the board meeting (when I was in New Zealand) where we made
the decision. Since it was outrageous statement season, Rinn again
reiterated the MS finance view that at the time we did the deal, RN had
“screwed MS over the warrant.” I disputed this and asked him to explain
why he thought this was true. He declined to do so.
Moreover, they said that they had hoped/expected that RN would not be
staying in the horizontal streaming media business, and, perhaps even
more outrageously, they claimed that I had privately suggested this to
senior people at MS. I completely disputed this, pointing out for
instance that the structure of our deal with MS ($25 and $35 million
future options) runs directly counter to the notion of RN not doing
future horizontal work. They backed off a little, and suggest I talk
privately with the person who they say claims that I said this. I
certainly plan to do so.
Throughout this Jim and I stayed calm (not as hard as I thought it
would be, because their comments were so ridiculously off-base). After
they finished venting, we tried to get the discussion back on track to
focus on constructive things we could do together.
Anthony again suggested “hey why don’t you guys just become like SAP,
building everything on top of MS’s full platforms”? We said that it was
unlikely to make sense for the foreseeable future for us to just do
this for a variety of reasons.
[STAMPED] MS-PCA1548647
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4564 p. 2 of 2
page 2
[1 line unintelligible]
but adobe has a big apps business that supports MS platforms. Anthony
was not super willing to embrace the “Adobe” model, though it was not
absolutely clear why.
Going from abstractions to practicalities, we said that were truly were
open to supporting MS platforms in value-added ways, including where
appropriate even their streaming media platforms if they provided a
business model that made sense. We said we thought the right set of
initiatives could move the needle from 95% adversarial to say 80%
adversarial and 20% cooperative, and that there was real value in this
especially if one focused on the trendline. We touched on ideas such as
having Timecast list programs in ASF and/or Netshow formats, or having
our player play their formats as well as our own.
We took the action item to write up a list of proposed ways to work
together. I will draft up a list this week then pass it around
internally for comment. The plan is to meet with Anthony in about 10-15
days to go through the list.
We also touched on a few tactical issues, including:
n MS’s warrants and decision regarding stock conversion (a subject of
great emotion for Maffei and Rinn). I proposed a compromise — that if
MS agreed to take nonvoting shares, including potentially the warrant
if exercised, we would agree that these shares could convert to voting
upon sale. Rinn said he would check with Maffei on this and get back to
us. Mark please follow-up with Rinn.
n MS pre-paying us the full $30 mil license fee. They “want the $10 mil
back” until we fulfill the obligations. I agreed to look into this and
get back to them this week. Mark please drive this and keep me posted
when we’re prepared to get back to them.
n Them saying that they had not gotten the full deliveries from us of
all the bits. On friday Anthony sent me a list of missing pieces, and
Phil is in the process of formulating a response and delivery by EOD
monday.
n On-going issues regarding branding and uninstall. The[y] said they
would get back to us whether they wanted us to just do the uninstall
work as part of our 6 person-months of consulting. (Phil have you
gotten an estimate on this yet? If not please do so). Re branding,
Kelly ball is in your court to write a letter re: our position on what
they currently have up on their site. Kelly pls let me know when you
can get this letter done, hopefully by EOD tuesday.
n Anthony it’s clear that Anthony is choosing to more closely identify
with the hostile troops than with a more balanced view of the
relationship. This is unfortunate, but we will do the best we can given
this reality.
[STAMPED] MS-PCA1548648
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4574 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4574 p. 1 of 2
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4574
[STAMPED] GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 289
From: Bill Gates
Sent: Sunday, June 09,
1996, 10 26 PM
To: Paul
Mantz
Cc: Carol
Stork, Marshall Brumer, Bob Kruger, Joachim
Kempin, Brad Silverberg, Jim Allchin
(Exchange), Rich Tong, Hank Virgil, Craig Mundie, John Ludwig
Subject: Intel – Andy Grove meeting June 7
I spent 2 5 hours with Andy on Friday. We met 1-1 and discussed a
variety of
important topics.
Background. Our relationship with Intel is advancing on many fronts. I
was
very impressed by the Intel roadmap presentation although I wasn’t
there in
person. They are going to deliver 50% performance increases every year
in
massive volume. If you compare their plans to the other processors
vendors Intel
seems to be pulling ahead. I am pleased that more group at Microsoft
are taking
the risk of really involving Intel.
Issues
1. DMI. Intel is super serious about DMI. Although we have promised to
ship
DMREG they feel we continue to see DMI as a want on our real approach.
Andy
thinks cost of ownership is super important and he thinks DMI is here
now and we
should embrace it rather than trying to go around it and do something
better. I
told Andy that I thought we still didn’t see DMI as central to our
strategy
but I would dig into whether there is an approach or a change that
might allow
us to be more synergistic here. If we are going to leverage Intel and
the
industry work done on DMI we may need to think of this as more than a
mapping
layer. I pass this one along to Bob Kruger to consider.
2. Cost of Ownership. As discussed in #1 Intel is heard core about
trying to
show PCs can be low cost of ownership. Andy showed me a diagram with a
2×2 and
where centralized admin is one axis and power needed is the other axis.
He has
airline res terminals and the like as the centrally admined and lower
power. He
has decided that someone in Frank Gill’s group needs to get involved
with
this. He was excited when I talked about including Gartner. Like us
they will
move this from their NC group. Steve Nochshern will continue to do
Webphone
working with CPD. We didn’t talk about Webphone specifically but he
thinks
their effort is important. Someone under Frank will work with us on
this cost
thing. Andy was very excited about the idea of a “stateless PC”.
Unclear to
me how we leverage Intel’s resources to help out on this initiative. A
minor
note is that Andy thinks their cost of ownership is $8k per pc per
year. I said
that sounded 4x high to me but it must be a difference in what is
included.
3. AGP. Intel is hard core about AGP. They [sic] know it requires some
system
support. They feel it is super important for them as they induce
Klamath. They
[sic] would like to really push MMX, Klamath and AGP as part of a “big
bang”
as early as next April even though these programs don’t come out on
exactly
the same day. They will only ship a few hundred thousand MMX parts this
year so
they won’t be pushing that in the mainstream. They are counting on us
for AGP
support.
4. Merced LOI. I told Andy that we were quite optimistic things will
get
resolved with HP in the next few weeks and then we will move quickly to
sign the
Merced LOI. In the next meeting I have with Andy in September we will
review how
much Intel should count on our work. Andy will determine how much they
focus on
other operating systems based on whether he feels he needs them as an
insurance
policy. I said based on the way we are working with Intel and getting
them to do
most of the Merced work, I thought he would be pleased 3 months from
now how
much has gotten done. Intel is disappointed we seem to think that their
98 date
has a lot of risk. They don’t feel that it does. Andy wanted to
understand our
DEC 64bit announcement.
5. NT/Pentium Pro marketing. Intel is not shy about spending money IF
they
are really our only partner on this and if they get equal treatment and
its not
just them supporting us. They want Pentium Pro to get prominent
positioning from
this. I said I thought we would make them glad they are part of this
but I would
double check to make sure their expectations would be fulfilled.
6. Intel and Intranet day. I told Andy how great this event is going to
be.
He said they had heard that but they were told they couldn’t attend. I
said I
would make sure we freed up 3-4 seats for them and have someone contact
them on
Monday. It is URGENT that someone follow up on this. Marshall should
check how
to do this and make sure the invites get offered.
7. Security. They are not happy about our work with them. I said we
have to
work with W3C as a top priority. I didn’t have enough data to explain
why we
aren’t able to get along on this. We should try again.
8. Conferencing collaboration. I got the mail about the problems we are
having with them too late to bring this up. Andy heard we are working
well with
them. The recent mail I got says we are not. I suggest Paul call Pat
Gelsinger
(who Andy thinks walks on water) and/or Frank before I get involved. I
am happy
to get involved. They may never have gotten over the issue of this
being a
P&L versus purely strategic. It sounds like we have concrete
evidence of
them not being a good partner.
9. JAVA. I told Andy that it’s [sic] inappropriate for their group to
take
anything resembling a Windows API and wrap it as a JAVA API. He agreed
this was
out of line but he didn’t think that was what his 6 people were doing.
He
thinks they are just optimizing for Intel. If they are taking DirectX
aps [sic]
and wrapping those then I need to register a much louder complaint.
10. Browser. I thanks Andy for pushing his web people in our
direction. I said
it was important to us that they NOT ever publicly say they are
standardizing on
Netscape browsers.
[STAMPED] MS98 0169187 CONFIDENTIAL
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4574 p. 2 of 2
page 2
11. Hood River. Talisman/Wizard. I told Andy these
are
excellent very important efforts that from our point of view they
should make
sure to put a lot of resources into because they fit perfectly with out
strategy.
We will meet again in September and continue to exchange lots of email
between now and then. The Fortune magazine coming out in a week
features a
joint Interview with Andy and I where we are very friendly to each
other.
[STAMPED] MS98 0169188 CONFIDENTIAL
Gordon et. al.
v. Microsoft Exhibits
Published to Web April 06, 2004
Not Complete
Last Revised 4/25/2004
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4423 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4423 Page 1 of 2
[STAMPED] SIGNED ORIGINAL
?51625?
AMENDMENT
AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO THE LICENSE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
ZEOS INTERNATIONAL, LTD. AND MICROSOFT CORPORATION
DATED JANUARY 1, 1990, CONTRACT NO. 4934-0130
This amendment to the License Agreement between MICROSOFT
CORPORATION (”MS”) and ZEOS INTERNATIONAL, LTD. (“COMPANY”) dated
June 1, 1990 (“Agreement”), is made and entered into this 1st day of
November 1990.
1. The Effective Date of this Agreement will change from June 1,
1990 to April 1, 1990.
2. Section 9, second paragraph located on page 8 is hereby replaced
with the following:
Upon execution by both parties. this Agreement
supersedes and replaces MS Contract #4934-0022 (“PRIOR AGREEMENT”)
between COMPANY and MS. COMPANY shall receive a credit equal to: (i)
the minimum commitment payments made by COMPANY pursuant to Exhibit B
of the PRIOR AGREEMENT, minus (ii) the amount of said minimum
commitment payments determined to represent earned royalties in
accordance with the PRIOR AGREEMENT. Any such credit shall be applied
to reduce COMPANY’s minimum commitment payment due upon signing of this
Agreement, as reflected in Exhibit B.
3. Telephone numbers found in Section 15 (page 11) will change from:
(COMPANY) 612-633-1175 to 612-633-4591 and (Legal)
612-633-4591 to 912-633-1175
4. Any Customer Systems shipped between April 1, 1990 and May 31,
1990 without Windows 3.0 shall be excluded from any royalties due for
Windows 3.0 as stated in Exhibit C1. Any and all royalties due for
MS-DOS on such systems shall still be in effect. The Customer Systems
excluded from royalties must be stated as such on the royalty reports.
5. Any Customer Systems shipped between January 1, 1990 and July 31,
1990 under PRIOR AGREEMENT and this Agreement that included Packaged
Product MS-DOS purchased from MS under license #4934-9125, and/or
MS-DOS purchased from Phoenix Technologies, Ltd. shall be excluded from
any royalties due under PRIOR AGREEMENT or this Agreement. The Customer
Systems excluded from royalties must be stated as such on the royalty
reports.
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 1302 No: 2:96CV645E
[STAMPED] ENTERED MAR 06 1991 Document Database
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1193954 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MSC 5007949 Highly Confidential
[STAMPED] MICROSOFT LICENSE NO. 4934-0130
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4423 Page 2 of 2
6. In the event of inconsistencies between the Agreement and this
Amendment, the terms and conditions of the Amendment shall be
controlling.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment to the
License Agreement as of the date set forth above. All signed copies of
this shall be effective upon execution on behalf of COMPANY and MS by
their duly authorized representatives.
|
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
[signed]
by
Michael R. Hallman, President
Name & Title (Print)
2/9/91
Date
|
ZEOS INTERNATIONAL, LTD.
[signed]
by
Greg Herrick, President
Name & Title (Print)
11/29/90
Date
|
Date Of Issue: November 1, 1990
This Agreement shall be deemed to be invalid, unless executed by
COMPANY and returned to MS within thirty (30) days of the above “Date
of Issue”. FAX copies are unacceptable.
11/02/90 3026M
[STAMPED] MS-PCA 1193955 CONFIDENTIAL
[STAMPED] MSC 5007950 Highly Confidential
Gordon, et. al v. Microsoft
Exhibits Published to Web April 07, 2004
Not Complete
Last Revised 4/25/2004
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4576 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4576 p. 1 of 5
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S
EXHIBIT 4576 Gordon v. Microsoft
[HANDWRITTEN] Follow up 5/10[/1993?]
[HANDWRITTEN] F Microsoft
[STAMPED] Reiswig [?] Exb. 1
[HANDWRITTEN] 931270287
[STAMPED] CONFIDENTIAL IBM 0410327245
Administrative Assistant,
Office of the AGM, Market Development and Operations
[ADDRESS] [TELEPHONE]
May 6, 1993
MEMORANDUM TO:
Mr. W. W. Casey
Mr. J. V. Kalb, Jr.
Mr. E. M. Lineen
Mr. J. R. Patrick
Mr. L. R. Reiswig, Jr.
SUBJECT: Briefing Sheet for Gerstner Call to Bill Gates May 26
The attached briefing sheet has been prepared for Lou Gerstner for his
May 26 call with Bill Gates. Please review and return your comments to
Mike Nolan by May 10 so that he can incorporate them into the final
version for Jim.
Mike Nolan’s PROFS ID is [PROFS ID]; Fax [FAX] T/L [TELEPHONE]. Thank
you.
R. L. Blair
RB/ag
Attachment
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4576 p. 2 of 5
[STAMPED] CONFIDENTIAL IBM 0410327246
[FAX TIMESTAMP] May 6 ‘[19]93 8:33 FROM IBM BOCA [FAX NUMBER] PAGE 001
Fax Transmittal Memo 7672
To [HANDWRITTEN] Ray Blair
Number of Pages 4
From [HANDWRITTEN] Mike Nolan [?]
Today’s Date [HANDWRITTEN] 5/6[/1993]
[FAX NUMBER] [TELEPHONE NUMBER]
Microsoft
Company Profile:
Founded: 1975
Incorporated: 1981
IPO: 1986
CEO: William H. Gates
Exec VP Products: Michael J. Maples
Exec VP Marketing: Steven A. Ballmer
Employees: 11,500 (WW 12/92)
[COLUMN HEADER FOR PERCENTAGES BELOW] % Rev
Total Revenues (1/92-12/92) $1.2B [?]
Cost of Revenue $0.5B 17%
Gross Profit $[?] 83%
Operating Expenses
– R&D $0.4 B 13%
– Sales and Marketing $1.0B 32%
– G&A $0.1B 3%
SG&A Expense/Revenue 35%
Statement of Operation: Engaged in Design, Manufacturer, Marketing, And
Support Of Microcomputer Systems and Application Software Products And
Related Books, Hardware, And CD ROM Products
Vision: “Information At Your Fingertips”
– Empower The User By Making Inforamtion Easy To Find & Use
– Make Technology More Approachable Yet Offer[indistinct] People
Access To More Information Than Ever Before
– “Windows Everywhere” is the Foundation Of This Vision
Strategy Summary:
Microsoft develops and markets the broadest line of PC software
products for Intel, Apple, RISC and UNIX platforms. Their goal is to
establish “Windows Everywhere” by extending their operating systems
from the desktop up to workstations, servers and mainframes and down to
consumer devices such as wallet computers, fax machines and television
cable converters. The operating systems then leverage Microsoft’s
programming tools, applications and services. Products are acquired or
developed internally using proprietary tools and customers are used
exclusively for testing. Being early to market is more important than
function or quality.
Their business strategy is focused on defining industry standards
through market share. Specific tactics to drive market share and
long-term customer commitment include:
– Exclusive contracts for preloading Microsoft software on OEM
equipment
– Deep discounts for running Microsoft software on all PCs in
large accounts [indistinct]
– Aggressive upgrade pricing and bundling of competitive
functions in the operating system
Microsoft also publicizes their strategies and product directions
frequently and aggressively, highlighting future offerings years before
availability. Microsoft executives are highly visible with customers,
press and the consultant communities. Generating negative information
about the competition seems [indistinct] to be part of their PR effort.
Bill Gates:
Bill Gates is Microsoft. The company’s identity and products are all
perceivedto emanate [indistinct] from him. He is a Harvard University
dropout… very driven… an innovator and visionary. Bill Gates has a
special allure that attracts curiosity, as well as an abundance of
press about him. He has ben labeled the “Julius Caesar of the software
industry” .. ruthless, incisive, and tactically brilliant. “Unlike most
founder-chairman types, Gates is a strategic thinker…at every turn of
the road, he’s made long-term decisions that have paid off. He licensed
MS-DOS to IBM instead of selling it. Most 25-year-olds would have sold
the farm.” At the brink of success of Visicalc, Gates decided that
application software (spreadsheets, word processors, data bases, etc)
would be a category he would have to dominate in order to achieve his
goals for Microsoft.
Bill maintains a very casual demeanor (e.g. he uses words like “cool”
& “rad”). He works 15-hour days, 7 days a week. He is frequently
considered “quirky”…likes expensive sports cards and did not own a
television until recently. He has publicly stated that his goal is to
“bury IBM” and that “OS/2 is dead.”
IBM Confidential
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4576 p. 3 of 5
[NOT YET TRANSCRIBED]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4576 p. 4 of 5
[NOT YET TRANSCRIBED]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4576 p. 5 of 5
[NOT YET TRANSCRIBED]
Gordon et. al.
v. Microsoft Exhibits
Published to Web April 15, 2004
Not Complete
Last Revised 4/25/2004
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 62 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 62 Page 1 of 3
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 62 Gordon v.. Microsoft
[STAMPED] X180836 CONFIDENTIAL
[text begins with the end of a sentence]
we need.
From billg Tue Feb 21 19:55:09 1989
To: mikemap
Subject: Microgrphx
Cc: steveb
Date: Tue Feb 21 19:55:09 1989
Mail-Flags: 0000
Steve talked to grayson at the conference. The[y] said they are wiling
to make it 10k for big companies and 1k for companies with less than
either 3M or 2m in sales. Based on this us getting full use for you
including source code and rights to incorporate wherever at noe [sic]
extra charge after that seems like a shoe-in. Talk to steveb about
this. I am excited about us making this happen.
From steveb Wed Feb 22 10:18:49 1989
To: billg mikemap
Subject: Micrographx
Date: Wed Feb 22 10:18:47 1989
Mail-Flags: 0000
as billg said mike only question is corp accts[.] They dop [sic “do”]
not resell[.] should be 1000 not 10000 but confirmation with MG is
needed[.]
From billg Tue Feb 21 17:09:01 1989
To: mikemap
Subject: Re: Mirrors
Date: Tue Feb 21 17:09:01 1989
Mail-Flags: 0000
These guys told me explicitly they were not trying to make money on
this product and they did it for their own use at first and were
pleased others might want to use it. Their price is $10k. Agreeing to
pay them $100k to get total source rights and all updates is a
fantastic deal for them. I want to call and tell them they are liars
and we would have to create this ourselves if they don’t get
reasonable. They explicitly said we could have source. They will get a
great deal if they take updates from us. I dont [sic] want there to be
any restrictions on us after a year because we may incorporate some
comatibility stuff into windows or PM and althought [sic] we dont [sic]
plan to use their code I dont [sic] want any garbage from them. windows
or pm after a year we pay a small sum. They should want us to make
windows and PM closer. This is all crazy. We need to get moving and
that means closing a deal fast. I thought these guys bragged about
quick decision making. GO ahead and work on them so[me] more and keep
me posted.
From cameronm Thu Apr 13 22:28:45 1989
To: martyta paulma petern waggenerltwg warrenm
Cc: alistair billg bobt jonl lioneljo mark[?]sc mikemap patbe peteh
steveb viktorg
Subject: Comdex OS/2 ISV Luncheon
Date: Mon Apr 10 21:23:53 1989
Mail-Flags: 0000
On Tuesday 4/11[/1989] IBM and MS hosted a luncheon at Comdex for the
top ISVs in the industry to evangelize and push OS/2 PM application
development.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 62 Page 2 of 3
[STAMPED] X180837 CONFIDENTIAL
Talks were given by Lee Reiswig and Jim Cannavino of IBM and by Billg
and Steveb. After the brief talks it was opened up to discussion and
comments/suggestions by the ISVs.
Lee Reiswig began by going over the marketing promotions we will be
offering ISVs (advetorials, co-op advertising, road show, trade show
space, etc.). Bill and Steve went over the technical support we are
offering and the device driver schedules and distribution plan. Jim
Cannavino disclosed IBM’s plan to remove the additional cost from the
customer[‘]s decision in choosing OS/2 as an environment (he hinted and
later said more clearly that IBM would ship machines configured with
4Meg at no additional cost). IBM will also offer low cost memory
upgrade kits for OS/2 buyers.
The luncheon was to reiterate MS and IBM commitment to making OS/2
successful and helping ISVs successfully develop and market OS/2
applications.
Problems that were brought up:
- The end-user cost of OS/2 (memory requirement) needs to be
reduced (Samna)
- Co-residence of OS/2 and DOS on same machine is difficult
(Micrografx)
- Cost of the OS for future versions of OS/2 is a factor that can
affect when people go to OS/2. If corporate buyers don’t know the
upgrade policies for future version of OS/2, then they might think they
can save money by waiting for the next release of OS/2 rather than
buying now. (WordPerfect)
- Merely removing the barriers to OS/2 in terms of cost, memory,
config, etc. is not enough. This makes OS/2 less painful but does not
provide a compelling reason to go to OS/2. (Ventura)
- MS/IBM have done well in promoting OS/2 within the industry but
there’s not enough mass market and general business awareness of OS/2.
(Microrim, Symantec)
- People don’t understand the benefits of OS/2. We must create
end-user demand for OS/2 products. (Ventura, Microrim)
- Device driver availability and performance (in line drawing) is a
problem. We are weak in fonts and need additional typographic
characters. (Ventura)
- Fonts are very hard and awkward to install, in general usability
and installation are not as good as the Mac. (Aldus)
- Our PostScript driver is woefully inadequate. (Aldus)
- We need to get OS/2 on corporate approved purchase lists. We need
to identify corporations who are predisposed to adopting OS/2 early.
(Symantec)
- MS OnLine support does not give as fast a turnaround as it
should. The 16Mb virtual memory limit is too restrictive for some apps.
(ISoft)
- MS OnLine interface is very bad and doesn’t run under OS/2
itself. (Asymetrix)
- There aren’t enough tools for moving Windows apps to PM. (Aldus)
- App developers need cascading and pop-up menu support.
(WordPerfect)
- Positioning of Win 3 versus OS/2 is unclear and confusing
especially to corporate customers (ISoft)
- Windows 3/386 may be misinterpreted as being better or more
advanced than OS/2. (Asymetrix)
- OS/2 needs a 32-bit coordinate system. (Micrografx)
In general the biggest point made was that while everyone understands
the
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 62 Page 3 of 3
[STAMPED] X180838 CONFIDENTIAL
costs and problems of OS/2, very few people understand its benefits.
IBM and MS need to create demand for OS/2 products by explaining OS/2’s
benefits. While technical problems were raised they were enver
belaboured because the ISVs seemed comfortable that we knew about them
already and that we would fix them (Billg took them through the latest
device driver schedules and distribution plan).
Suggestions that were made:
- Provide a better dual boot and simpler installation procedure for
people who want both OS/2 and DOS to reside on the same machine.
(Micrografx)
- IBM should offer OS/2 and DOS machines at the same cost. IBM
should offer machines with 4Meg installed for same cost bundled with
OS/2. (which IBM basically said they were going to do). (Samna)
- Provide a low cost and liberal upgrade policy for future versions
of OS/2 to 1.1 buyers so they won’t be tempted to wait. (WordPerfect)
- Do more marketing to corporate users and business people (as
opposed to industry-related promotions). Do a lot more classic mass
market advertising including TV advertising. Run an ad during the
SuperBowl. (Microrim)
- Do not run an ad during the SuperBowl, but do market aggressively
to user groups and PC managers/coordinators – emphasize corporate
buyers. (Ventura and Symantec)
- Identify corporate early adopters and share this information with
OS/2 app developers. Help get corporate beta sites for OS/2 apps.
(Symantec)
- Identify specific OS/2 solutions that corporations can being
buying, we need to show them where to implement OS/2 in their company.
(Symantec)
- Provide more Win to PM tools, especially a metafile conversion
utility. (Aldus)
- Promote OS/2 technical futures at the time Windows 3/386 comes
out so people don’t think that only Windows will have advanced features
like demand paging. (Asymetrix)
The ISVs want to see more end-user demand for OS/2 and OS/2
applications and generally agree we should concentrate and focus on
corporate buyers. We need to make OS/2 cheaper, easier to implement,
and promote specific OS/2 application solutions to those who actually
buy and use the apps.
ISV Attendees:
Ashton-Tate, Joe Brillando, VP Corporate marketing & Strategy
WordPerfect, Alan Ashton, President & CEO
Borland, Philippe Kahn, CEO
Microsoft, Mike Maples
Aldus, Mike Solomon, VP Marketing
Symantec, Gordon Eubanks, CEO
Ventura, John Meyer, President
Microrim, David Hull, President
Samna, Said Mohammedioun, CEO
Asymetrix, Steve Wood, VP Marketing
DRI, Dana Hooper
MDBS, Gary Rush, President
Informix, John Millovich (server business)
Informix, Ron Ferguson, VP Marketing (Wingz & Smart)
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4588 Gordon v. Microsoft [ Top ]
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4588 p. 1 of 2
[STAMPED] PLAINTIFF’S
EXHIBIT 4588 Gordon v. Microsoft
[STAMPED] Grovernment Exhibit 277
[STAMPED] MS98 0169352 CONFIDENTIAL
[MEMO LETTERHEAD] Bill Gates
From: Bill Gates
Sent: Thursday, May 25, 1995 9:42 AM
To: Carl Stork (carls); Paul Maritz (paulma)
Subject: FW: NSP
Here is mail I sent to Andy. He and I will talk on the phone in the
next few days. Any furhter [sic, “further] guidance is valuable
although I think Carl’s mail laid out the issues quite clearly.
We need so[me] decent compromise here and its not clear to me what it
is. Should we agree to work with this group on specific things to get
them redirected?
It’s a shame we have no input from them on Windows97.
From: Bill Gates
Sent: Thursday, May 25, 1995 9:34 AM
To: ‘Andy Grove [EMAIL ADDRESS at Intel]’
Subject: NSP
I’ve learned some more about this. I am not emotionally involved in
this particular debate but there is a significant problem here that is
on a path to get a lot worse.
NSP means a lot of different things. What it means in terms of hardware
and the processor being able to take over more and more functions in
[sic, “is”] non-controversial. What is a problem is the incompatibility
and overlap of systems software done under the label NSP. Actaully
[sic, “Actually”] some of the software elements are Ok – we still seem
to have a common view of TAPI, IrDA and APM. Each of these has to be
improved so with our current relationship we will probably diverge on
each of these. The ones that are a major problem for Windows95 and
WindowsNT today are SPOX, Native aduio [sic, “audio”], DCI, 3DR, DMI,
PCMCIA card services and Instant on. These are incompatible with where
we are taking Windows and have many problems with Windows95.
When we talked I didn’t realize that Kinnie was involved in NSP. In
fact not only is he involved but he feels that he has personally
championed all of the elements against resistance inside Intel and
Microsoft and that he will overcome non-believers. He seems to feel
that although Intel doesn’t share what it is doing in system software
with us that he feels like we are supposed to explain exactly what we
are doing in advance.
Just recently we called to get a SPOX development kit and nnow Ron and
Craig are thinking about whether to send us one or not. They first
demanded we guarantee compatibility with SPOX before they would send us
the kit.
ISVs are more confused about what to do by Intel’s attacks on our
Windows plans than they are by Apples.
Structurally it[‘]s very hard to have our people working as best they
can to advance PC software standards with a group of 200 people fully
funded to basic[al]ly try to do the same thing in parallel with no
guidance to coordinate with us at all. They don’t share with us because
of Intel’s IP attitude. We tried shipping some Intel code relative to
DCI and ended up in this Apple lawsuit that has been very damaging.
I don’t understand why Intel funds a group that is against Windows95.
Craig’s group uses VxDs. Even if he fixes his stuff to run with
Windows95 we don’t have VxDs on Windows NT. Craig[‘]s attitude is he
doesn’t care about NT and our family strategy.
It turns out that the P6 slows down certain 16bit operations so it only
runs Windows95 about 15% faster than an equivalent pentium. Windows NT
gets the full benefit of the P6. It seems like Craig’s not believing in
Windows NT will be a major boon for AMD chips since they will run
todays Windows 3.1 faster than any Intel chip.
The problem we have is that we have to sort of choose in software
related issues which company will lead and which will follow. In chips
its very clear. In software you hav a group that won’t allow us to lead
and has all the prestide [sic, “prestige”] and profits of Intel to
drive them forward.
If we picked someone neutral and asked them to compare what we are
doing in graphics and sound to Native Audio, 3dr DCI and your other
work I have no doubt they would say our work is equal or better.
However Craig and Ron don’t believe they should give up on anything.
Meanwhile we have told our group that they need to evolve Windows
software including Windows NT.
[PAGE NUMBER] Page 305
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4588 p. 2 of 2
[STAMPED] MS 0169353 CONFIDENTIAL
We should talk on the phone more about this.
[PAGE NUMBER] Page 306
Last Updated Monday, December 07 2009 @ 08:21 PM EST
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