wrong for three reasons.

First, Your Honor, SCO didn't raise the argument in its opening brief. It's improper for the reasons that I've already stated. Second, we haven't submitted a responsive pleading. The complaint hasn't been allowed in the case yet. Third, Your Honor, we have submitted in the case in connection with their other three complaints four responsive pleadings. In every one of those pleadings, notwithstanding their contentions to the contrary, and this is laid out, Your Honor, at Page 28 of our book, notwithstanding what their brief says, in every one of our responsive pleadings, we have asserted a defense of improper venue.

The second and last argument they make with respect to waiver, Your Honor, is that the claim is waived somehow by virtue of IBM's assertion of its Ninth Counterclaim. Your Honor, Section 22.1 of the Joint Development Agreement -- and that's wrong, by the way, Section 22.1 of the Joint Development Agreement, which is set out at Page 29 of the book, expressly provides:

No waiver of any portion of this agreement shall be effective unless it is set forth in a writing which refers to the provisions so affected and is signed by an authorized representative of each party.

There is no such writing.

Second, to establish waiver, they've got to show a voluntary and intentional abandonment of a known right. Cases to that effect are set out at 30. There has been no knowing and intentional abandonment of a known right. And the case law, Your Honor, indicates that the mere assertion of a counterclaim, as we show at Page 31, is an insufficient basis for final waiver.

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Finally, they suggest that the Ninth Counterclaim somehow encompasses the proposed claim. That isn't right, Your Honor. The Ninth Counterclaim was intended to be narrow in scope. The Ninth Counterclaim could not have been as broad as they contend because, A, the Court wouldn't have subject matter jurisdiction over it, IBM couldn't have brought a Ninth Counterclaim seeking a declaration of non-infringement with respect to the conduct at issue in their proposed complaint because we hadn't been sued for that, one; and they had never threatened to sue us for that, two. We lacked a reasonable apprehension suit. There would have been no subject matter jurisdiction with respect to a claim of that kind. And in any event, the claim that they contemplate having somehow been swept up in Ninth Counterclaim is a claim that must be brought, if at all, in New York by virtue of the agreement that IBM entered into with its partner in Monterey, the Santa Cruz Operation, Inc.

In summary, Your Honor, the motion should be

Honor --

denied. It should be denied because they've known about this claim from the very beginning of the case, and it should be denied because there is a forum selection clause here which requires this claim to be asserted in New York, not in the state of Utah.

THE COURT: If I let them amend as they want to do,

would it affect your motion to narrow the Ninth Counterclaim?

MR. MARRIOTT: Would it affect the motion? Your

THE COURT: In other words, would you still want me to grant that motion?

MR. MARRIOTT: Your Honor, the motion with respect to the Ninth Counterclaim is intended simply to reflect IBM's intent to filing a motion.

THE COURT: All right. So I'll call it a motion to clarify.

MR. MARRIOTT: Call it a motion to clarify. The motion frankly is of little consequence. It doesn't make much difference. SCO doesn't really care, Your Honor, about that motion except for purposes of being able to argue in this connection that somehow the claim is waived.

THE COURT: But my question to you is, if I let them amend, do you care about your motion?

MR. MARRIOTT: I don't care about the motion, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. MARRIOTT: Thank you.

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THE COURT: Reply, Mr. Normand?

I assume you'll be brief and efficient.

MR. NORMAND: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll make an effort to be brief and efficient. Mr. Marriott has raised some new issues, some new documents and some arguments that I'm hearing for the first time.

Just to clear the field, to begin with, Your Honor, the question of when documents were produced, I think we're going to have a factual dispute with IBM about that. I do not purport to have personal knowledge about when documents were produced, but it is my understanding that the documents had been produced after the amendment deadline. If we're incorrect, we're incorrect. It stands that several of the documents at least, as Mr. Marriott concedes, were produced after the deadline. And this goes to the point of plaintiff's entitlement to collect a core critical mass of highly privilege documents. There is no question that some of the very important documents were produced after the deadline. And we have not purported to present to the Court with all of the documents.

As an overarching matter, Your Honor, there is no argument of undue prejudice from IBM. And under the Supreme Court precident and under a lot of other precidents, that's

the primary overriding factor. There is no undue prejudice.

IBM makes a series of arguments about Rule 16. We think those arguments misconstrue the case law and are overstated. Let me note from the onset, Your Honor, that, as I noted in my opening argument, there is no place for Rule 16 here. There may not be a place for Rule 16 because there may be a new amendment deadline.

Even if there is not a new amendment deadline, the question, then, is Rule 16, because there is no question that many of the documents, at least, even pending this dispute with IBM over the timing of production of documents, there's no question that some of the documents were produced after the deadline. If there's been no undue delay and Rule 15 is prior to the deadline, Rule 16 has been placed. In any event, the questions under Rule 16 as we cite in the briefs is whether the plaintiff uncovered previously unknown facts during the discovery that would support an additional cause of action. The question is whether the supporting facts did not surface when the last amendment deadline had passed.

Now, with regard to another matter, IBM spends a lot of time going through the documents, the documents that we had not seen before, internal documents from Santa Cruz. We think that misses the point entirely. There is evidence that people at Santa Cruz might have known that as part of the Project Monterey the parties intended to allow copying to

happen. IBM, first of all, argues that there was an authorization, but they don't point to the Court or to us any basis for that supposed authorization.

Santa Cruz understood that the product was to be developed. Santa Cruz understood that there would be sharing of the code as part of the project, but there is no allegation and no proof that anyone at Santa Cruz or SCO actually knew they had a claim. More importantly, IBM's arguments ignore the key evidence that we've uncovered. It is highly relevant that IBM itself thought and its product release did not authorize itself to use the code. And I'd like to walk the Court through that in a little bit more detail.

Part of that proof is the question of the operation of the JDA. Very relevant evidence as to the operation of the JDA is how IBM thought the JDA operated. Accordingly, very relevant evidence to our claim is IBM's view that it was not authorized under the JDA to undertake the copying it did. There is just no question that that evidence is relevant. IBM's argument produces the claim that the evidence is irrelevant, that it added nothing, that we could have brought a copyright claim without knowing that IBM thought that the release was pretextual. I don't think that's true to the extent that an argument is an accrual argument. And I'll address that in a moment, Your Honor.

IBM tends to confront the three reasons that we've offered for why we think it is appropriate. Some of the reasons are ones that IBM has frankly mischaracterized. They first discussed the documents and say that we dismissed the documents. As I said, that misses the point that as many of the documents that are released, they did not either attempt or give any basis for thinking they have copyright claims. And none of the documents suggest that anyone at Santa Cruz knew that IBM itself regards itself as having lack of authorization of the copying of the code. That is a critical aspect of the claim we propose to bring. It is an aspect that we could not have discovered possibly until we reviewed the documents in this litigation.

Argument -- IBM then argues the issue of whether we should be imputed to have what little knowledge Santa Cruz might have had about the subject matter of the claim. We think IBM misses the point there, as well, Your Honor. IBM cites no case for its proposition and for purposes of Rule 15 that plaintiff should have knowledge of its predecessor imputed to it. These are the cases that IBM cites, cases in which the defense of laches had already barred the predecessor's claims when the predecessor purported to assign the claims to the successor. Those cases make sense. If laches were to preclude the predecessor's lawsuit, he should not be permitted to escape his untimeliness by selling or

giving his patent or other intellectual property rights to a successor to then try to file a timely lawsuit.

SCO does not seek to gain any rights that Santa Cruz did not have. The only issue here is whether SCO can bring a new claim as an amendment in this proceeding. IBM cites no cases to support its oral argument that knowledge of Santa Cruz, however limited, should be imputed to us.

IBM illustrates what I think is its failure to confront our main argument where it says the most basic of public and internal investigations would have revealed the basis for our proposed claim. That is not true. It's not remotely true. We would not have known even with the most intense investigation that IBM itself viewed itself as unauthorized to publish and to copy code as it did. That's critical evidence, Your Honor.

IBM argues that we acknowledged in our opening brief the JDA applied. That's not true, Your Honor. Here's the statement we made in our opening brief.

SCO recognizes that the parties' JDA for Project Monterey contains a forum selection clause for New York courts.

We acknowledge that the JDA contained a forum selection clause. We weren't obligated to raise every argument, Your Honor, in which 22.3 would not apply.

We're also at the height of formality here, Your

Honor. IBM filed an ex-parte motion for leave to file a surreply after they concluded that when we raised the issue of waiver in the applicability provision in our reply brief, they argue that we raised that for the first time. They got permission to file a surreply. They filed a 16-page surreply, and we're here arguing the points before Your Honor. I think it's an incorrect argument, and in any event, a technical one that shouldn't preclude the consideration of merits.

 As to the interpretation, Your Honor, of Section 22.3 of the JDA, IBM ignores again our main argument, which is by their own lights, the provision doesn't make any sense. They leave the accrual portion of the provision out because it would give the provision an unreasonable reading. They cite several cases that they say support their arguments, that in light or analogous provisions a forum selection clause should apply.

We think those cases make our point. In contrast to those cases, Section 22.3 does not encompass all claims relating to or arising under the agreement or concerting the parties' rights and duties under the agreement. That is not the scope of this provision. That's the scope of 20.1. It's a reason not to give the reading of 22.3 that IBM does.

IBM argues that there's been no waiver of the provision. We think that's wrong, Your Honor, for one basic reason, which is the scope of the Ninth Counterclaim. I

quoted the Ninth Counterclaim before, and it is extremely broad. It asks for a declaration of non-infringement. It does so in plain language. It was a counterclaim that exceeded the scope, as Mr. Marriott concedes, as praise as written that he exceeds the scope of our claims. That makes it not a compulsory counterclaim, as Mr. Marriott again explicitly concedes, but a permissible counterclaim. Parties pursue litigation from one forum constitutes the waiver of that party's ability to enforce the forum selection clause to another forum.

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The Ninth Counterclaim is permissive. None of SCO's claims required any fact finder to determine whether IBM's development of AIX violated any SCO copyrights. We think the precident makes clear that the defendant waives any venue objections when it objects to new issues in the case.

10th Circuit held long ago in Thompson, 1962, that the filing of a counterclaim can constitute the waiver of a forum selection clause.

Campbell, I believe it's Campbell, in which the Court concludes that if the counterclaim was compulsory, it would not be a waiver. But the rule as it stands and as we can prove from a variety of precidents is that the defendant voluntarily submits himself to the forum through filing a permissible counterclaim. We think the plain language of the