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2816 (FY98 - A Foundation Year) | 428 comments | Create New Account
Comments belong to whoever posts them. Please notify us of inappropriate comments.
4257 (Enterprise Beans Spec - Attorney Client Priviledged Communication)
Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, June 15 2013 @ 06:56 PM EDT
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/4000/PX04257.pdf


<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 4257<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>

<p>
<b>From:</b> Greg Hope<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, December 15, 1997 11:58 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> Mohsen Al-Ghosein; Dave Reed; Bob Muglia (Exchange); Joe
Maloney; Erich Andersen
(LCA)<br />

<b>Subject:</b> RE: Enterprise Beans Spec - Attorney Client
Priviledged Communication
</p>

<p>
Do not touch the spec until we work out a process with legal. It's at
<u>http://java.sun.com/products/ejb/docs.html</u>
</p>

<p>
There is a weak whitepaper prepared by our friend ann thomas at
<u>http://java.sun.com/products/ejb/white_paper.html</u>
</p>

<p>
It contains some shots and factual errors on MTS. There are some more at
<u>http://java.sun.com/products/ejb/faq.html</u>
</p>

<p>
Joe has a marketing response they used last week at internet world. Joe,
status?
</p>

<p>
We can't do a feature comparison/response until we can safely read it and
compare. But from press in the last
week and the whitepaper etc. it is obviously still basically just a MTS
knock-off. They don't get state mgmt and
last week they split the spec under pressure from ibm/oracle so that there is a
1.0 version that allows for
"transient" objects and a 2.0 which requires "persistent"
objects. And the txn stuff is over jts/ots/xa so they
are going to have lots of and lots of problems with XA including thread-state,
weak spec, crummy implementations
in most databases etc. I haven't heard of anything interesting and unique so
far.
</p>

<p>
But we should kick the crap out of them on the marketing side, we have a
gigantic lead and they are still
struggling to copy a subset of our 1.0 features in the spec when we have shipped
2.0 and have announced and
demo'd 3.0 (com+).
</p>

<p>
btw, the 1.0 spec is out for public 90 day review before it's official, so they
still don't even have a spec today!
</p>

<p>
-----Original Message-----<br />
<b>From:</b> Mohsen Al-Ghosein<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Sunday, December 14, 1997 3:21 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> Dave Reed; Bob Muglia (Exchange); Joe Maloney; Greg
Hope<br />

<b>Subject:</b> RE: Enterprise Beans Spec
</p>

<p>
I don't know where this stands at this point. We absolutely have to be all over
this.
</p>

<p>
Greg?
</p>

<p>
-----Original Message-----<br />
<b>From:</b> Dave Reed<br />

<b>Sent:</b> Friday, December 12, 1997 10:34 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> Bob Muglia (Exchange); Joe Maloney; Mohsen
Al-Ghosein<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Enterprise Beans Spec
</p>

<p>
I was under the understanding it is under private review.
</p>

<p>
-dave.
</p>

<p>
-----Original Message-----<br />
<b>From:</b> Bob Muglia (Exchange)<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, December 12, 1997 6:57 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Joe Maloney; Dave Reed; Mohsen Al-Ghosein<br />

<b>Subject:</b> Enterprise Beans Spec
</p>

<p>
Did Sun actually make this thing available? I looked on their website but
couldn't tind it. It is very important
that we go over this very carefully asap.
</p>

<p>
bob
</p>

[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]

Apparently ChrisP got distracted.
Authored by: ChrisP on Saturday, June 15 2013 @ 07:25 PM EDT
Actually, I got bored clicking reload and waiting for the 30 seconds to time
out, so I thought I would leave one for someone else.

---
Gravity sucks, supernovae blow!

[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]

  • Pro Tip - Authored by: jbb on Saturday, June 15 2013 @ 09:18 PM EDT
    • Pro Tip - Authored by: Wol on Sunday, June 16 2013 @ 07:17 AM EDT
      • Pro Tip - Authored by: jbb on Sunday, June 16 2013 @ 04:37 PM EDT
2816 (FY98 - A Foundation Year)
Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, June 15 2013 @ 07:41 PM EDT
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/Comes-2816.pdf

<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2816<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>

<h1>FY98 - A Foundation Year</h1>
<p><b>Joachim Kempin</b><br />
<b>Sr. Vice President, OEM Sales</b>
</p>

<p>
Just when we thought we had it all down to a fine art, the industry is facing
yet another
major challenge by some of our fiercest rivals: IBM, Oracle, NSCP and SUN.<br
/>

If truly aligned, this would be a formidable coalition, but despite a certain
amount of
displayed unity, all of the above are truly competing as fiercely with each
other as they
are with us. The key for us in OEM will be to isolate them from the rest of the
industry
where they, except SUN, hold signiicant stakes. Knowing our roadmap, it will
take us
12-18 months to respond with superior TCO and productivity solutions. The only
weapon we have in the interim is to use our current good relationships with the
majority
of the PC manufacturers to keep them in our camp and isolate the dangerous four
in the
market place. While the company is moving toward a D-day type announcement on
June
24<sup>th</sup>, 1997, we in OEM need to continue to point out to PC
manufactures that any
cooperation with the dangerous four - even from groups outside their PC
division, will
hurt the PC industry mission of providing superior productivity solutions to our
mutual
customers. Naturally, talk alone will not pull us out of this crisis. This is
why I am
calling FY98 the foundation year.
</p>

<p>
This is the year, which will determine ours and MSFT's success in the year 2000,
which
is only 3 years away. Job #1 is unchanged - we must continue to build
competitive
immunity. The key initiatives in FY98 to prepare us for the year 2000 challenges
are as
follows:
</p>

<ol>
<li>Learn how to improve our customer intimacy record
significantly</li>
<li>Execute a value added web strategy for System Builders</li>
<li>Nurture and influence the transition to NTW for all business
desktops</li>
<li>Increase bootable OS penetration in key development
countries</li>

<li>Increase WW piracy efforts by creating a grass roots movement as well
as
stepping up legal enforcement</li>
</ol>

<ol>
<li><b>Improve customer intimacy</b>
<p>
I have always been convinced that the key to customer intimacy is delivering
real
value. The first critical step to doing this is listening! We have just gone
through the
first round of IE 4.0 discussions as well as a series of meetings with customers
in
regards to an improved Windows experience at boot time. In both cases we have
demonstrated that we can listen and allow our partners more freedom to run
their
business and generate happier end users in the process, a value proposition
every
participant has been looking for. At the same time, we're going through a major
rewrite of our master agreements. This should make it much easier and
predictable to
deal with us when we roll out a 3-year T&amp;C framework independent of any
licensing
agreement. The value here lies in less time spent in negotiations and more time
spent
in working with OEM customers to improve their business position while
increasing
their trust in us. These are just 3 great examples of how listening to customers
can
change our business practices and deliver real value to customers. We need to
do
more of this and I hope you all will actively participate in developing and
delivering
more value to our OEMs than ever before resulting in customer oriented change in
the
OEM group for the years to come.<br />
To that end, we have initiated an OEM training program - Holden Value-Based
Selling. Over the next 18 months, all sales, management, marketing and SE
personnel will undergo this training. We are investing in you to build a
"value"
oriented sales and marketing organization. It will help us to engage customers
at the
right level with full understanding of their value disciplines. So, less
frustration on
both sides, more understanding of where we can help each other effectively with
measurable results. If executed well it will lead to customer intimacy. We will
have to
learn this in order to stay sharp and be competitive in the new century.<br
/>
At the same time, we will use this opportunity to overhaul our sales and
marketing
processes in OEM to be the best in the industry. It is more fun to lead than to
follow!
The most important current thought leadership project to improve customer
intimacy
is the IE 4.0 and Memphis adoption process by the PC manufacturers. In working
with them, we will lead them to more opportunities in nurturing their customer
base.
This should increase their chances for repeat, as well as, add on business and
create
happier customers through closer communication. And I hope we all understand
that
an investment in our technology by our customers will make it much harder for
competitors to deteriorate the Windows UI as the standard Web access tool.
</p></li>

<li><b>Value added web strategy for system builders</b>

<p>
We need to make the Web our bet when it comes to reaching out to System
Builders
and DSPs. Knowing that not all countries around the world have a supportive
infrastructure in place, we will invest in the industrialized countries first
and leverage
our investment in the other countries as the infrastructure comes along. We
have
several projects underway to improve SB relationships via the Web:
</p>
<ul>
<li>Improve current MOOTI and make it a more inteactive Microsoft
marketing tool</li>
<li>Integrate DSPs in these marketing activities</li>
<li>Help SBs to source components more efectively through a MOOTI
extension</li>
<li>Make MOOTI a support tool for SBs and possibly even their
endusers</li>
<li>Help SBs to sell more PCs via the Web by adding an enduser accessible
configuration model to MOOTI</li>
</ul>

<p>

While it will take us 12-18 months to complete this project, it should
demonstrate our
commitment to this customer base. SBs at the end will consider MOOTI as their
business lifeline, so will the DSPs and other component vendors. This should
give us
the opportunity to sell sponsorships to find future development and promote our
products where it counts.<br />
Our benefits will come from newly to be learned interactive marketing methods
via
virtual account management. We have started a pilot program in the US already
and
will extend this to other regions as soon as we can recruit enough SBs for our
Internet
site. Without customer e-mail addresses, no action! FY98 needs to see a major
drive
by all subsidiaries to increase their e-mail database. Eventually SBs without a
known
email address will be without communication as we phase out classic mailings in
most countries. Ultimately we will tie our sales out information into the MOOTI
site
and reward customers who buy on a monthly basis more than the ones who buy only
infrequently. This will hopefully be another way of educating customers to buy
genuine products from legit sources.
</p></li>

<li><b>Transition to NTW for all business DT</b>
<p>
This is a hard core business issue for the next three years to come and we have
to
work on it now. While generating close to $3.8B worth of net revenue for the
corporation in FY97 and having a shot at $5.0B in FY98, we will have to lay the
foundation for our $10B FY2000 dream. This dream will not come true if we
increase the NTW penetration to only 25%. We will need 60-70% NTW penetration
in FY2000 to make the $10B dream come true. This means spending marketing
money now to engage OEMs to make the move ASAP. I recommend we spend 50%
of all DSP, Named and Multi-National marketing funds for this purpose alone.
Seminars, road shows and closely working with ECU and OCU are the key methods
to work this issue. For the next 6 month I recommend you spend at least 25% of
your
time with the account on this subject as well.<br />
Given OEMs limited funds, we cannot do it alone. To make the equation work, we
must cooperate with all parts of MS to make NTW the OS of choice for small,
medium and large organizations.
</p></li>

<li><b>Increase bootable OS penetration</b>
<p>
The key focus areas for FY98 will be in the following key development countries
but
not restricted to: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia and PRC where we will try
hard to
establish a MS partner program and use the COA to build awareness between
endusers. This should put pressure on dishonest middlemen as well as organized
crime. So you will see lotteries and enduser advertising in these countries to
change
product buying behavior. All this will only produce results if we can engage
Named
Accounts, SBs and Multi-Nationals in these countries simultaneously. Be
prepared
for a long battle knowing that changing this type of entrenched behavior is
super hard
to achieve. We have our work cut out for us in all countries around the world
and
we'll need all our energy and passion to produce the desired anti piracy results
to lay
the foundation for our FY2000 ambitions.

</p></li>

<li><b>Increase WW piracy efforts</b>
<p>
Piracy is our enany number one when it comes to revenue. A potential $1.5-2.0B
per
year is being lost in the OEM segmmt through HD loading, counterfeiting and
"good" neighbor OS. Piracy exists in all countries. Our naked system
counts in most
countries are substantially understated. 15-20% is normal for industrial
countries and
some development countries should show as much as 50-60%. Piracy is also
rampant
in the retail area and I urge all of you to work closely with your counterparts
in
Microsoft to fight piracy wherever possible. We will step up the effort in FY98
by
making it harder to counterfeit our products, continuing enduser education and
further
improve law enforcement. Marketing money needs to be spent in every subsidiary
to
support these efforts and we will use the Web more efficiently to make our
efforts
more transparent to endusers, DSPs and SBs. While we are doing this, the
product
group is laying the foundation for better technical solutions to protect our IP.
I expect
them to be in place in FY99, just in time to have some impact in FY2000.
</p></li>
</ol>

<p>
Let me close my FY98 direction statement by saying thank you to all of you who
contributed to a great FY97 and express my hope that I can count on your support
to
tackle FY98 with FY2000 in mind. Take the long-term view and start working now!
</p>

[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]

2844 (Java on Macintosh/IE Control)
Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, June 16 2013 @ 09:27 AM EDT
<p>
PLAINTIFF's EXHIBIT 2844<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>

<p>
<b>From:</b> Don Bradford<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 13, 1998 7:35 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Ben Waldman<br />

<b>Cc:</b> Bill Gates; Paul Maritz; David Cole; Dave Reed; Charles
Fitzgerald; Jon DeVaan<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Java on Macintosh/IE Control
</p>

<p>
IE HTML Control<br />
Apple wants to keep both Netscape and MS developing browsers for Mac - believing
if one drops out, the other will
lose interest (and also not really wanting to pick up the development burden).
Getting Apple to do anything that
significantly/materially disadvantages Netscape will be tough. Do agree that
Apple should be meeting the spirit of our
cross license agreement and that MacOffice is the perfect club to use on them.
</p>

<p>
Apple has integrated our component for HTML Help as an engineering exercise and
now wants to ship it with Allegro.
If we make it too hard for Apple to get our technology, they might be pressed to
direct some of the "freeware energy"
building Nav for Rhapsody, into building a Nav based component for HTML Help. A
Nav based component would not
use COM or our rendering engine. There are several Apple developers interested
in licensing the Mac HTML control.
Have been unwilling to sign MS up for the maintenance/ support costs although we
did do a special license with
QualComm based on a Win32 deal. Think support costs outwiegh the boost to MacIE
perception / adoption.
Personally, am OK giving Apple the source and having them pick up the
maintenance/support. Would also like to get
something that helps IE browser share - comarketing on IE 4.01, a press release
of Apple announcing IE as the
"standard, preferred or best" browser for Macintosh and an IE download
button on Apple's "HotNews" page.

</p>

<p>
ISL is something Apple seems to really want, to jumpstart their protocol work
and act as an integration point for their
new key chain stuff. It could really help Netscape, so I've only been willing to
talk about in the context ot IE as the
exclusive browser. [They could ship Netscape on secondary media]
</p>

<p>
Java<br />
IE has been the only browser supporting JManager and MRJ. Netscape has taken
damage for this and is fixing for
future versions. Here too, Apple wants to sit on the fence; dealing with us and
staying 100% pure. After many
discussions, Apple really wants to do their own VM (and is willing to take an IP
infusion from us, if they can continue to
follow the 100% pure java line and deliver JDK 1.2 earlier than mid 99). From an
applet perspecitve, we've helped
Java on the Mac with IE 4. The current MS VM is a differentiator for IE. If
both IE and Nav use the same VM applet
performance ceases to be a differentiator for the browser but
Netscape/JavaSoft/Apple are forced to invest in the VM
(not just API's) to meet the performance/stability bar we set [performance
deltas: MRJ:2x, Nav:3X]. Could be that
Mac users interested in Java will be forced to use IE 4.0 until MRJ catches up
and that Apple's investment in perf work
will delay JDK 1.2 deployment on Mac.
</p>

<p>
One of the messages we've been delivering from a platform perspective is that
DHTML/CSS is a better option for
dynamic Web content than Java. The message we're trying to craft with
Apple/Metrowerks is that Java is a
programming language and should leverage J/Direct to target native API's.
</p>

<p>

Apple does get their VM deployed as "default" (eventually
"exclusive) in the "default" browser shipped with their OS.
We get our API's deployed in perhaps the only VM on Mac, reinforcing
Java-is-a-language-not-a-platform, while
minimizing our investment.
</p>

<p>
-----Original Message-----<br />
<b>From:</b> Ben Waldman<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 13, 1998 1:02 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Don Bradford<br />

<b>Cc:</b> Bill Gates; Paul Maritz; David Cole; Dave Reed; Charles
Fitzgerald; Jon DeVaan<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Java on Macintosh/IE Control
</p>

<p>
Re IE &ndash; <br />
Sounds like we will give them the HTML Control for nothing except making IE the
"standard browser for Apple?" I think
they should be doing this anyway. Though the language of the agreement uses the
word "encourage," I think that the
spirit is that Apple should be using it everywhere, and if they don't do it then
we can use Office as a club. So I guess
I'm saying that I don`t think we should give them the HTML control unless they
make IE the exclusive browser (and
not need to bargain with ISL).
</p>

<p>

Re Java &ndash;<br />
Why does Apple care whether or not we use J Manager and make MRJ the
default?<br />
Why would Apple want us to discontinue shipment of our VM? Why would we want to
do this, if we think ours is faster
&ndash; wouldnt this make our browser less good?
</p>

<p>
Ben
</p>

<p>
-----Original Message-----<br />
<b>From:</b> Don Bradford<br />

<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, February 12, 1998 8:26 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> Bill Gates; Paul Maritz; David Cole; Dave Reed; Charles
Fitzgerald; Jon DeVaan; Ben Waldman<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Java on Macintosh/IE Control
</p>

<p>
Am meeting with Avie Tevanian tomorrow for lunch to discuss a couple Mac
internet topics. Want to get closure
on these topics to meet press deadlines and solve Apple's problem of integrating
our IE HTML Control with
MacOS before we worked out a license. These have been covered in previous mail
threads but wanted to give
everyone a chance to red flag before the meeting.
</p>

<b>Java</b><br />
will propose that Apple:
<ul>
<li>announce suoport for J/Direct, MS Security and MS Debugger API's
within 45 days</li>
<li>implement support for same by end of year
in exchange for Microsoft's</li>
<li>continued support of Apple's JManager, making MRJ the default VM for
MacIE.</li>
<li>discontinuing shipment MS MacVM after IE 4.01</li>
</ul>

<b>IE</b><br />
will propose that Apple:

<ul>
<li>make IE Standard browser for Apple (with co-marketing
campaign)</li>
<li>could offer source license to ISL in exchange for IE as exclusive
browser bundled with MacOS. [Nav on
secondary media]
in exchange for Microsoft's</li>
<li>source license of the IE HTML Control and consulting
support</li>
</ul>

[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]

2829 (Steve Jobs Call)
Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, June 16 2013 @ 09:49 AM EDT
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2829<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>

<p>
<b>From:</b> Paul Maritz<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, January 22, 1998 10:02 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Bill Gates; Bob Muglia (Exchange)<br />

<b>Cc:</b> Jim Allchin (Exchange); David Cole<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Steve Jobs Call
</p>

<ol>
<li>I will be closing the loop this week with jimall, davidcol, johnlu on
issue of MacIE development.</li>
<li>A decision to work seriously with Apple on VM technology really means
a decision to work seriously with them on
COM+. We do have some options/questions as what we can/should do while COM+ is
being developed, but these
need different forum. I have meeting with CharlesF and lawyers
today.</li>
</ol>

<p>

-----Original Message-----<br />
<b>From:</b> Bill Gates<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, January 22, 1998 8:18 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Paul Maritz; Bob Muglia (Exchange)<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Jim Allchin (Exchange); David Cole<br />

<b>Subject:</b> FW: Steve Jobs Call
</p>

<p>
I agree we should probably change the location of MacIE.
</p>

<p>
There is a big question of what we should do with JAVA on Mac - whether doing
more work and working closely with
Apple could help us in this "battle". I think it can and would hate
for Apple to have to go back to the SUN camp. I
think we can gain a lot of share with IE on Mac if we do some modest things.
However others may not agree.
</p>

<p>
-----Original Message-----<br />
<b>From:</b> Don Bradford<br />

<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, January 21, 1995 11:42 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> John Ludwig; David Cole; Bill Gates<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Steve Jobs Call
</p>

<p>
Got a couple calls from Steve Jobs at home tonight &mdash; the first
motivated by a conversation he had with Rick Holzli
(our Apple Evangelist). To set the stage: I played hardball with Rick Holzli
earlier in the week with regards to Apple's
support of IE. Suggested that Microsoft's level of effort on Mac internet
clients deserved stronger support from Apple

&mdash; driving IE browsershare on Macintosh [as opposed to simply saying:
"Navigator's still bundled and easily
accessable but many people prefer IE". Rick took my "devil's
advocate" position back to Steve: "How would Apple
feel if MacIE evaporated?" This was the motivation for Steve's first call
&mdash; assured him this wasn't under serious
consideration, just used to illustrate the point. He made it clear that Apple
could easily go back to preferring
Netscape, if we quit delivering IE on Mac. [Given MS/Apple crosslicense
agreement and public sneaks of Nav5 on
Mac, believe MacIE4 will be competitive and therefore Apple's default browser
through atleast 98. believe the effort
to keep IE competitive with Nav, rather than "best of breed" can have
a significantly reduced scope in the future.]
</p>

Steve's key points
<ul>
<li>Single Mac group at Microsoft is desired by Steve (and Apple execs) to
focus communication. From Apple's
perspective, MacOffice is the most important product (no surprise here). He
liked the idea of an MS Mac group
composed of MacOffice and MacIE and had heard the idea was being considered.
[Did confirm that MS was
doing some org thinking. Was interesting to hear MS "scoop" after it
had been through the rumor mill at Apple.]</li>
<li>Steve was frustrated that we hadn't made more progress on Java and
Quicktime. [Explained that these decisions
would be made after BillG review.] He was clear that Apple needed continued
support of JDK for Oracle and
other partners and that any Java deal with MS would need to leave that API
avenues open. He also said that
Sun really hadn't done anything to piss Apple off and he needed a good reason to
break with Sun. [180 degrees
from what I hear in other parts of Apple] Steve reiterated that media is
important for Apple and encouraged us to
adopt Quicktime.</li>
<li>MacOffice marketing is perceived as strong, IE marketing's presence is
not felt at Apple. Steve suggested this
as one reason that there wasn't stronger IE push from Apple. I didnt buy that
but didn't push it with Steve on the
phone. He wants to setup a meeting in the next couple weeks to talk about a
stronger push for MacIE. Worth
doing, especially with the Allegro launch coming up.</li>
<li>Steve called back to express his concem over NetShow's public message
about killing QuickTime. Specifically
said Apple would never bundle a version of MacIE that installed NetShow.
Assured him that only the Full Install
version of IE included NetShow and that it was not in the version bundled with
MacOS.</li>
</ul>

After discussions with JohnLu and DavidCol today, think it makes sense to
transition MacIE into BenW's org.
<ul>
<li>MacOffice is the biggest Apple carrot. From a browser, mail client and
java perspective, Apple has other options
and will try to sit on the fence. Negotiating from a single point, centered
around MacOffice, will give us better
leverage. believe Apple would have a strong negative reaction to IE moving into
the Windows org from a
general principal and NDA perspective.</li>
<li>down level browser technology (DHTML) should be complete by MacIE 4.x.
(with the exception of VBScript)
Work scope should be significantly reduced after that focusing on MacOS
enhancements and U/I consistency.
by adopting MacOffice's baseline platform: PowerPC, 32M could achieve better
win32 leverage while removing
68k and small footprint development hurdles.</li>
<li>believe this transition should be post IE 4.01/Allegro. should use
this time to bring Ben up to speed and build
team in Ben's org. believe we can radically reduce the scope of this effort if
we focus on delivering a Nav
competitive browser and are satisfied with the crossplatform down level support
in Mac IE 4.01</li>
</ul>

<p>
Think we should use this opportunity to push Apple into stronger support of IE
(assuming that's as important as it
once was) and bring BenW into range of Apple discussions. Believe we should
shut down all IP discussions unless
there's some "greater good" that I'm not seeing. Do want to manage
public recognition of any change in my team's
charter as this could embarrass Apple and complicate our relationship with them.
Think engaging BenW in a range of
discussions with Apple and the Mac trade press will minimize this.
</p>

<p>
Key questions for me are: (1) how important is browsershare on mac in fy98/99,
(2) how quickly can we build share in
an OS bundle environment, given: Apple's runrate on platforms and os , public
perception and inclusion of
Navigator.

</p>

<p>
Other Apple related topics:<br />
<b>Java</b><br />
Am very reluctant to do any kind of IP deal with Apple and Java. Netscape seems
to have laid off most of their Java
(and usability) teams. The remaining Netscape Mac Java engineers are reportedly
adding JManager support to
Navigator. Apple has only discussed Java collaboration assuming source access
and no limitations on non-VM
technologies (JDK). Can only see our IP jumpstarting Java credibility on Mac.
Current MacJava plans end with IE
4.01.
</p>

<p>
<b>ISL</b><br />
Apple has finally recognized the value of our Internet Services Library on
Macintosh and wants the IP. Am reluctant
to go here today. Started this discussion before OS bundle deal was finalized.
Too much of a chance a downsized
Netscape could leverage this technology. The focus on ISL work is OE related
and ends with IE 4.01.
</p>

<p>

<b>IE Control</b><br />
Apple has been using the 3.01 version of the Mac HTML control to add HTML help
to Allegro, in parallel of license
discussions. Don't want to incur a support obligation here. Since this is
older code, could consider an limited source
/ IP license to Apple that restricted use to HTML Help.<br />
Apple is also considering use of the HTML Control for Finder Integration -
DavidCol and PaulMa are thinking this
one through.
</p>

<p>
Don
</p>

[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]

2826 (DRG Summit)
Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, June 16 2013 @ 02:00 PM EDT
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2826<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>

<p>
<b>Due to the varying sound quality and subject matter of tapes, the
information in this
transcript may contain inaccuracies. Please proof carefully.</b>
</p>

<p>
<b>DRG Summit</b><br />
<b>James Plamondon</b><br />
<b>1/17/98</b>

</p>

<p>
<b>JAMES PLAMONDON:</b> In fact this is another...I can do all the,
you know, the theory
of evangelism as war and tactics for doing so __________ channels of
information
and so forth. But then you go back home and you go, and now what do I do. Okay.
And
we have found a very good vehicle for getting people to actually do things
according to
our timeline is a very programmatic approach to evangelism, where we say we will
give
you these benefits if you give us this implementation according to our timeline.
And you
can pull that altogether in a letter of agreement that you offer to the ISV
where they need
to have an officer of their company sign the agreement which does two things.
First, it
means it's a legally binding agreement, although these things are not, you know,
the kind
of thing you sue people over. And two, it means that there is some high level
executive
at the company who's personally bought into this program. It's not just some
program
manager who thinks it's a swell idea. It's some officer of the company who's put
his
reputation on the line saying that we're going to deliver this to Microsoft. So
if he screws
up, he's in trouble with Microsoit. Okay.
</p>

<p>
Putting together the letter of agreement also forces you to think about what
does this
person need to do in order to do what you want him to do. And when you want him
to do
it by. That is, for example, the things I offer and the purpose of the Power
Wave
Program is to get ISV's to support Windows NT on the power PC. It's a very
focused
campaign. I just want them to get that Power PC version. Because Apple
Computer,
again my nemesis, the enemy I'm fighting. Apple is shifting to a hardware
platform
called the Common Hardware Reference platform that will run both the Mac OS and
the
Windows NT. They suspect that this is going to help them sell their hardware
into
corporate environments. They think that Windows NT is just a little teaser, that
no one
will really run Windows NT on these computers because there aren't any apps for
it,
among other reasons. And so really the promise of Windows NT on those machines
will
trick people into buying them and then they'll just run the Mac OS. Well, I'm
going to
use that against them by getting enough support for Windows NT on the Power PC
so
that Windows NT is the compelling platform on their hardware, blow the Mac OS
off
their own hardware, ha ha. Take that. Okay. So that's why I'm trying to do it.
</p>

<p>
Any evangelism program needs to offer the ISV two things. Technical assistance
so they
can get the job done. And co-marketing assistance so that it's worth doing.
Because the
opportunity cost is, these developers could be doing something else during this
time.
They could be implementing like features that customers have asked for, they
could be
implementing the sleeper, they could be implementing who knows what else. So
you
always have to pay attention to what you're asking your ISVs to do that could
detract
from things that other evangelists are asking those ISVs to do. So here's the
technical
assistance benefits. We'll provide them with two copies of Visual C++ 4.0 for
Windows
NT on the Power PC. So we're giving them the compiler they need to do the job.
If
they're already using Visual C++ for their Intel versions, it's really very
little more than a
re-compile to get NT on the Power PC. There's some data alignment problems and
so
forth but given Visual C++ which is exactly the same compiler they're using on
X86, the
NT version's almost trivial. Furthermore, we include them in the data for VC5
since their
final deliverable is in November of next year by which time VC5 will be
available.
</p>

<p>

Number two, we provide them with a substantial discount on the purchase of two
NT
Power PC machines. It's basically 50% off so you can get one for your tester and
one for
your developer at the same price it would normally cost you to buy one. So we're
giving
a pretty complete solution. A compiler and the platform to run it on. We provide
them
with enhanced access to later betas of the shell update release. That means we
put them
on the technical beta so they get access to the ISDN site or the FTP site or
whatever it is
that we're using to get betas out to those guys. If all else fails we've got X
on the CD.
Okay, if it's somehow or other we get them the later betas.
</p>

<p>
Three, we give them a substantial...whoops, I skipped one. Number two is we give
them
a substantial discount on MS TN level two which is how they get the betas of the
shell
update release and all the SDKsthey need in order to do their jobs. So we give
them the
compiler, the hardware and the SDKS. Five, Microsoft will support companies'
development of the product and three special Power Wave technical workshops in
the
porting labs. The porting labs is great. It means a developer can sit there at
home and
he's got like five main tasks he has to do. Normally, when you're developing
something,
you start working on it, working on it, working on it and you hit a roadblock
and you get
stuck. You can spend two weeks banging on that roadblock trying to figure out
where
the bug is, what's going on. Instead of that, you just stop. Just tell the
developer to just
stop working on it when you hit a bug that you can't figure out and you spend
more than
like five hours on it, just stop. Write down what the problem is and go to the
next thing.
And start working on that and make some progress. And when you encounter a
problem,
stop. Write it down, go to the next thing. That way, when you come to the
porting labs,
you've got this list of five or six problems that you understand and that you've
described
and you can say to the guys at the porting labs, these are the live things I
need to do this
week. I need this and this and this and this. And the guys in the porting labs
can say,
well then I need to bring in this guy and this guy and this guy. And so they
move...people come into the porting lab and you just blast through those bugs
and you
leave the porting lab having made incredible progress. They love us, they're
getting done
faster, everybody's happy. In fact, one of the tougher parts of the whole
evangelism
process is making the porting labs work well. Getting the right technical
support people
into the porting lab, getting the right people from the tools development team
and from
the operating system development team, into the porting lab so that they can be
there to
help. I'm sure that's even harder if there are remote sites. I don't know if you
guys have
remote porting labs sites. But I would suspect that offering your developers the
chance to
come to Redmond, to be in our porting lab, with immediate access to developers
here
could be a significant benefit to you, although, of course, they have to travel
farther. So
you get your pick on that one.
</p>

<p>
<b>DIFFERENT SPEAKER:</b> I have a question. What [Inaudible]
</p>

<p>
<b>JAMES PLAMONDON:</b> I'll get to that. I'll get to that in a
minute, but I'll go ahead and
talk about it now. I always use or I almost always use three porting labs during
the
duration of the event, of the process. So when I get to the marketing benefits,
you'll see
that there's a marketing event at the end of the program. Okay. So we start the
program.
We have three porting labs, and then we have an event where we all show off all
the cool
stuff we developed in the program. Okay. The last porting lab is a week or so
before the
event to polish everybody's' demos, to make sure that they've delivered on time
and so
forth. That's the delivery date by which they've got to give their completed
demo to
Microsoft. On the Friday of that porting lab week. Okay, so that's a week or so
before
the event. You want it to be not right the week before the event because they're
spending
two weeks away from home there and their kids don't like it. Okay. The second
one
needs to be pretty much right in the middle of the process. And the first one
needs to be a
month or so into it, ideally. Okay. Enough time that you have time to line up a
whole
bunch of people to sign the LOA(?). Enough time into the program that they will
have
had enough time to start working on their code and get something done and have
some
problem. But it also needs to be early enough that it's a stake in the ground
that says you
need to be started by now. If you haven't started by now, you know, you're going
to
come to the porting lab and look like an idiot. Okay. So it kind of compels the
developers to get started by some fixed date. Does that answer that question?
Okay.

</p>

<p>
And then Number 6 says we will provide enhanced technical support to company in
its
development of product through normal channels. Again, as I just said yesterday
what
that means is I say to everybody go through tech support, normal PSS and if they
don't
answer your question to your satisfaction, then send the email __________ to me
including PSS's responses that were inadequate and I'll escalate it to their
management.
And I've never, ever had to actually do that because by the time it's gone to
PSS, and
they've actually gone through the process, PSS deals with it Okay. Especially
when PSS
knows that 1'm going to escalate it if they don't. So it's...enhanced technical
support. As
far as I know. It's just a way...if you say I'm going to give you good technical
support,
just call me, they'll call you every time like the mouse doesn't work or
something. I can't
handle that kind of crap. So I want to make them go through PSS first. But it
sounds
good, so they like that.
</p>

<p>
<b>DIFFERENT SPEAKER:</b> [Inaudible]
</p>

<p>
<b>JAMES PLAMONDON:</b> It's just my...there's no such thing as
enhanced technical
support TM, you know, registered trademark Microsoft Corporation. Co-marketing
assistance. The co-marketing assistance is much more important than the
technical
assistance. It took me a long time to realize this. Working with developers as
much as
we do, we tend to be tend to be very technology and developer centric. And we
figure,
you know, that if I just help you implement this cool stuff, then you'll do it,
right. And
that's really not true. The reason to be an early adopter is almost always for
marketing
reasons. They want to ride Microsoft's marketing coattails. They want their
prgduct to
be demonstrated along with Office, when Office supports OLE. Or along with
Explorer
when they support Sweeper. It's the marketing benefits that make this
worthwhile. And
it's always worth remembering. So co-marketing assistance. Co-marketing
assistance.
</p>

<p>
Microsoft will invite company to exhibit product at the Mac World Expo in
Boston.
That's an appropriate event for the people I'm targeting because only Mac people
care
about this Common Hardware Reference platform that will run both the Mac OS and
Windows NT. After all, if you're an Intel-based company that's running Windows,
you're
not running a Mac OS. You don't care about something that can run both Windows
and
the Mac OS. Who cares about the Mac OS? It's only if you're running the Mac OS,
and
my God, you've got to worry about Windows, that you care about running multiple
OS.
Okay. So we're targeting this very much at Mac people so that event is
appropriate to
these folks. And it's something that ties it all together. Right, they've got to
be done by
then or else they're not going to be exhibited. It's a stake in the sand. It
says you've got
to be done by this time. Very important. Also, we can afford to put up a big
booth there.
Motorola will kick in most of the money. It will cost 50, 60 grand, I hardly
have to pay
for it but the companies involved get a free ride, and get some co-marketing
which they
otherwise could never afford. We know the press will come through that booth.
We'll
arrange press tours so these guys will get mentioned in the press far more than
they
would if they just went there themselves.
</p>

<p>
Number 8. We will invite company to mention product in a press release
announcing
their commitment to the Power PC in a press release to be issued on February 12.
I
actually cut that one out of the final letter of agreement because it raises
expectations too
high. If everybody who signed up for the Power Wave program announces, in a
press
release, we've signed up, we're committed to shipping an NT Power PC version,
then I
have to get 100% of those people actually to deliver, just to meet the
expectations that
I've set. I can't possibly exceed my expectations, except by having people come
into the
program after the fact. Doesn't usually happen. So that's a guaranteed lose.
Right? All I
do is set up the bar too high because some people will inevitably fail to
deliver their
results. So I've actually cut that one out of the final letter of agreement.
</p>

<p>
Number 9. Microsoft will invite company to participate in a second press release
at the
Boston Mac World Expo saying that they're going to exhibit there. Well, that
one's
definitely in. That one says these people have delivered an NT Power PC version
of their
application and you can go see it at Mac World. That we'll definitely do. And it
has to
be a quote from their senior executive. That's not here. It's on the next page.
</p>

<p>
Number 10. Microsoft will make its best efforts to support any press releases
that they
do surrounding their NT Power PC version. Ooo, they love that. Boy, that means
they're
going to get quotes from Jim Allchin saying how great we think their
applications is for
NT on the Power PC. You know, we'll go with them on a press tour, that kind of
stuff.
To have somebody from Microsoft sitting there when they're talking to Mac Week
or PC
Week is a big deal to them. It's a fairly big deal to us, but it's really a big
deal to them.
</p>

<p>
<b>DIFFERENT SPEAKER:</b> Is it hard to get a commitment from Jim
Allchin and people
like that to carry through.
</p>

<p>
<b>JAMES PLAMONDON:</b> I suppose it would be if I asked first. But,
I mean, I'm
figuring that one of two things is going to happen. Either that by the time this
actually
comes through, Jim Allchin and so forth will be happy to approve the quotes I
write for
them. Okay. Or that the quotes will come from me. I mean, if all else fails, I
write the
quotes and they're from me. Or I assign them to Doug Henrich(?) or, you know,
we
make a deal. But some way or other, pardon.
</p>

<p>
<b>DIFFERENT SPEAKER:</b> [Inaudible]
</p>

<p>
<b>JAMES PLAMONDON:</b> Exactly. Okay. See, Bill Gates has never
written any quote
that was attributed to him. For all practical purposes, you can assume that
somebody else
wrote that quote and said to Bill: could you see yourself saying that? Okay and
he says,
ya, I could say that. Okay. Or they don't even ask. I mean the number of quotes
that
have been attributed to Bill in various press releases, he would have to talk 90
words a
minutes, 24 hours a day just to say all the things. Right. Couldn't possibly do
it. Okay.
Where are we here.
</p>

<p>
Number 11. Microsoft will provide company with the opportunity to place a demo
version of the product along with demo scripts, ordering information, etcetera
as supplied
by company on a Power PC sample applications CD which will be offered for
redistribution to all known vendors of Power PC-based systems that are capable
of
running Windows NT. Well, that's a no brainer to me. Motorola is already doing
all of
that. They've got their Power PC sampler CD. They've already done all that work.
All
I'm doing is throwing more applications at them. I'm happy to offer that.
Nothing to me.
Although to them, wow. That means that every time somebody buys a Power PC
system.
it's got a CD with demo of my application on it. Cool. All right. That's an
incredible
marketing advantage for them. Costs me nothing. I like that.
</p>

<p>
Microsoft will make Power PC sample application CD and/or its contents available
to
Microsoft Windows NT sales force. I'm going to make it available. That doesn't
mean
squat, right. I have a box of then in my office and I've sent email to the guy
who runs the
group saying, if you want one, send me mail. All right, that's making it
available. I put it
up on the internal website or on infobase or something so it's available. It
doesn't really
mean anything. I can meet that commitment with almost no effort whatever. Or
Motorola can, you know, make ten million of them and send them to the NT sales
force,
you know, one each. I mean, but I don't have to worry about it. Sounds good,
easily
accomplished. It might actually be useful to somebody.
</p>

<p>
And Number 14. Microsoft may provide other co-marketing opportunities from time
to
time related to Windows NT on the Power PC. By being in this program, company
will
be among the first to be invited to participate in these co-marketing
activities. That
basically is meaningless. I needed a fourteenth item on this list so that I
would be
offering my ISVs twice as many things as they had to do for us. Okay, so there
are seven
items they have to do for me, so I needed 14 items I'm doing for them. So I can
say,
look, we're doing twice as many things for you as you are for me. Obviously,
this is a
good deal for you.

</p>

<p>
<b>DIFFERENT SPEAKER:</b> What does 14 say...
</p>

<p>
<b>JAMES PLAMONDON:</b> Fourteen just says that if we do anything
else with regard to
marketing NT on Power PC, we'll let you know. Like we wouldn't? Like if we were
going to do an NT on the Power PC marketing campaign, we wouldn't talk to our NT
on
the Power PC ISVs. Obviously, we're going to. But that just gives me a
fourteenth item.
</p>

<p>
Okay, so next is what they have to do for us. Number 1's the biggie. They have
to:
company will provide its best efforts, or make its best efforts, to develop,
ship and market
product, their net product, such that it can be publicly demonstrated at Mac
World and be
commercially available no later than fall Comdex. That's months and months away.
If
you've got an NT or a Windows 95 version already, recompiling to the Power PC is
like a
week's work. It's just not that big a deal. A man month at the outside. They've
got eight
months. I've given them eight months, first of all because I've got it. I can't
do anything
with it until Mac World anyway. And secondly because some of the companies only
have Mac code. And it's going to take them a while longer to get over. But for
most of
these guys, this is a no brainer. An absolute no brainer. What the tricky thing
is that I'm
saying they're going to make it commercially available by fall of next year.
They're
going to ship it. All right. They can't just do a technology demo and let it
slide. They're
committing to ship it. That's the point of this. Most people who sign this thing
overlook
that until I go back at them in November and say: you promised to ship it.
Okay.
They're thinldng only about the dates, the demo dates. Not really about the fact
they're
committing to ship it. And I'll bring that up later when they start waffling.
</p>

<p>
Number 2. Company will send at least one, but not more than three, because the
offices
are only that big, of its most appropriate staff, to each of the three Power
Wave weeks,
the porting labs weeks, in Redmond. And I give the specific dates that they're
agreeing to
send people on these dates. So I've arranged the porting lab beforehand, I've
reserved
those weeks in the porting lab beforehand. A company will make all reasonable
efforts to
ensure that the staff sent are prepared to make effective use of their time in
the lab.
Company will ensure that the staff sent to the lab will have as their primary
objective the
preparation of product for demonstration at Mac World and eventual release.
Aside from
acts of God, the only acceptable excuse for non-participation in the scheduled
Power
Wave weeks is the previous acceptance by Microsoft of a demo version of the
product.
That is, you've got to come unless you're done. If you're done and you've given
up, we
determine what's done. If you've given us the demo version of your product and
we've
accepted it, then you don't have to come any more. But, until then, you've got
to keep
showing up. And, I'm really hard core about that because it gives me something I
can
yield on later in return for other things. I can say, well, you don't have to
come this week,
but only if you do this other thing. So, it gives me a nice, a lot of bargaining
room. And
also because showing up at the porting lab is an extremely effective use of
their time if
they want to get it out the door on time. Also, if a developer is only two weeks
away,
let's say he's got a week's worth of work left to get the NT Power PC port done,
and he
can either do it this week or next week, but next week is a porting lab week.
Well, he'll
probably work his butt off to get it done this week so that he doesn't have to
go to the
porting lab. So it accelerates the development. It makes him work harder and
faster. I
like things that make our ISVs work harder and faster.
</p>

<p>
Then number 3 and 4 say that they're going to give me quotes from their senior
executive
for use in our press release. The point there is that it's a quote from the
senior executive,
not Joe Blow program manager, but from the senior executive of the company.
They're
committing, number 5, to give us support in our price activity surrounding
Windows NT.
No biggie. And they will submit to us a virus-free demo version of their
product. And
last, but not least, if company chooses to participate in the Power PC sampler,
then they
have to give us a non-exclusive, royalty-free, transferable license to
redistribute the
demo. That is, we can put it on the net, we can put it on a CD, we can give it
to the sales
force, we can give it anywhere we damn well please without paying them
anything.
Which is what you want in a demo. The whole point is they want their demo to be
everywhere. So that makes sense, but it's very nice to get it down in writing,
nice and
clear. And it has a specific date. You have to get it us by this date.
Duration&mdash;it says
that this, no one will think this thing lasts forever. The agreement between us
ends either
60 days after you ship or by January 15, whichever comes first. Otherwise,
people say,
hey, I signed this thing three years ago and it said you're going to give me
enhanced
technical support so escalate. Right. I don't want to do that, so it's got to
end.
</p>

<p>
Next one is confidentiality. This is private and secret. I don't really expect
it to be kept
private. I expect everybody to talk to their buddies about it and leak it to the
press and so
forth. I don't care. The fact that it being confidential increases its perceived
value.
Knowing something that's secret makes the information more valuable. They're
special.
They were invited to participate in the Power Wave program. And they're not
even
allowed to tell anybody. This must be really cool. That's the main point of the
confidentiality clause. And then it says "accepted and agreed to". By
signing below, you
are agreeing one, to the terms and conditions of the Power Wave program and two,
that
you are an officer of the company with authority to enter into this agreement.
Okay,
again, it keeps Joe Blow program manager from signing this and thinking that's a
big
deal.
</p>

<p>
And then there is a description of the machine that we're giving them this big
discount on.
The whole point of this is to focus their attention on meeting our objectives
according to
our schedule, rather than whatever else they might be doing during that time.
And the
program...and putting together one of these letters of agreement will focus your
attention
on what it is you need to get done. Gee, I need to schedule the weeks in the
porting lab.
I need to talk to the PSS guys about staffing it. I need to make arrangements
for a booth
at Mac World. You know, these are all the things I need to do in order to
deliver a good
program to my ISVs. And so it helps you get organized as well as getting your
ISV
organized. And that's it. So, questions about the letter of agreement. Jack(?).
</p>

<p>
<b>DIFFERENT SPEAKER:</b> Legally...letter of agreement [Inaudible]
</p>

<p>
<b>JAMES PLAMONDON:</b> Nobody's ever been sued about this one way
or the other. We
did this first with the OLE early adopter program, two years ago, three years
ago now.
And it worked very well. We had a number of companies that did not deliver. We
did
not require...I can't remember, I don't think we required at the time that it be
signed by an
officer of the company. And that was one of the problems so that there was no
senior
executive buy-in. And that's where we learned that it was necessary to do that.
I'm pretty
sure that was the case. And OLE's hard. And it just took a lot of companies a
lot longer
to do it than they thought it would. And so they just didn't deliver on time!
MSC(?)
wasn't available, the tools weren't available. These guys had to do it the hard
way. And
so they didn't deliver and that was not such a terrible thing. In the grand
scheme of
things, then they owed us big time. They had failed to deliver on something they
were
committed to delivering on so we could go and, you know, growl at them and so
forth
and say, look you guys, you screwed up this time. That's a major strike against
you. We
can, you know, just quit working with you guys completely, but we're reasonable
people
here. Tell you what, just put Windows NT on the Power PC and we'll forget the
whole
thing. So, sir.
</p>

<p>
<b>DIFFERENT SPEAKER:</b> __________ tremendously more curiously
than we do in the legal
ramifications of it all. They sweat bullets before they...senior execs before
they sign
these agreements. Has

</p>

<em>[Ed: Incomplete text repeats below.]</em>
<p>
Side B
</p>

<p>
<b>DIFFERENT SPEAKER:</b> ...ISVs take this, obviously, tremendously
more seriously
than we do in the legal ramifications of it all. They sweat bullets before they
have one of
their senior execs...sign one of these agreements....from our perspective, the
important
thing is getting them to sign up, acknowledge the value, commit to do the work
and then
if they don't deliver you know that's going to happen. When I talked to ISVs
about it,
they frequently expressed concerns about it. If they don't deliver, you know,
are they
going to start getting letters from lawyers and, you know are we going to sue
them out of
business, which, that kind of behavior is not that uncommon in the
__________....And I
assure them that while we take it very seriously that they're signing a legal
document and
making a big commitment, and we fully expect them to deliver, we also understand
that
software doesn't necessarily get done on time...and the most important thing is
for us to
see that they are truly committed to fulfilling the terms of the letter of
agreement and then
if, as things happen, they can't do it, well, been there, done that...they won't
get sued.
</p>

<p>
<b>JAMES PLAMONDON:</b> The key phrase is on item number one here:
company will
make its best efforts to develop, ship and market product. That is an escape
clause that
wide. I mean you can drive a truck through that "its best efforts". So
really, there's no
way we could sue somebody because they'd say, look, it was the best efforts we
could do,
given we only had half a guy on the project, because everybody else was focused
on
other things that were more important. Then you get to arguing about which one
of these
things is more important. Peter.

</p>

<p>
<b>PETER:</b> I also make it clear that if they totally scammed me
and they signed up for this
stuff and I never see anything out of them that it's extremely unlikely they'll
ever be
invited to participate in an __________.
</p>

<p>
<b>JAMES PLAMONDON:</b> Right. For most small, for small ISVs, this
is entree into a
continuing relationship with Microsoft which they want really bad. To be given
early
access to things, to be on the list of pet ISVs is very important to them
because it gives
them an advantage over their competitors. And so they don't want to screw up
the
relationship. It's as Marshall said, it's a relationship thing. We're not going
to sue these
guys and they're not going to sue us in all probability, although that's always
more
possible. That's the other side of it. Check(?) pointed out that he's not real
happy with
these kinds of letters of agreements working in Australia because he can't make
commitments as casually as we do in Redmond. I mean I can always, you know, rip
some machines out of the porting lab when nobody's looking and send them to an
ISV.
You guys really don't have the option of doing that. The resources are not
there. Did you
want to elaborate on that Check(?)
</p>

<p>
<b>CHECK:</b> No. My question is about legal ramifications. From the
point of view of the
ISV, [Inaudible]

</p>

<p>
<b>JAMES PLAMONDON:</b> Remember, we've been doing this for a couple
of years now
and I don't know of any occasion where any ISV has gotten really hard core about
the
legal ramifications that we promised to do something and didn't deliver. We've
had some
nastiness about the logo requirements, but that's different. I don't think we've
ever had a
problem with any ISV suing us or coming close to suing us and saying, hey, you
didn't
deliver. And, I mean, I carefully worded our commitments to be equally vague. So
you
know, it sounds all very firm at first. Microsoft will invite company to
exhibit, we're
inviting them to exhibit. It really doesn't mean very much. We may have this
little tiny
booth where we only have room for three guys. And we're going to invite 20 of
them to
participate&mdash;only the first three can show. We're not saying we're
going to make booth
space available for them. That's different. So you always want to leave yourself
an out
on these things. And they know that. And they know there's outs on their side,
too. But
it needs to sound very formal and businesslike and you need to present it in a
very formal
and businesslike manner. And then you can back off gracefully, if necessary.
</p>

<p>
<b>DIFFERENT SPEAKER:</b> On the program that we did last year,
[Inaudible]
</p>

<p>
<b>JAMES PLAMONDON:</b> Everything's been easy going so far. What,
the nastiness
would come in if a company considered itself to have bet the company on
something like
OLE controls or a better example was Tim McCaferty(?) did an amazing job of
evangelizing Win Pad. Remember the desk, the hand-held Windows doo-dad. He had
something like 200 ISVs signed up, paying money up front. He not only had a
letter of
agreement, he said you had to pay 500 bucks just to join the program. To really
prove
that they were committed to it. And he had 200, 300, 250, I mean a vast number
of ISVs
signed up for this thing, when there was no hardware. I mean there was not a
single
hardware vendor committed to producing Win Pad hardware. Great operating
system,
sort of. You know, but an amazing evangelism effort. And then we failed to
deliver.
Win Pad crashed and burned. There was no hardware. All the things which we had
committed to deliver, we couldn't. And he had to back out of that. He returned
their
money and a few other things. And gave them a few copies of, you know, Encarta
and
__________ and tried to make nice to them. And, of course, we owed them then
and
so they had first crack at anything else they wanted from us. But generally
speaking, you
know, in business people don't just sue each other casually. You make a deal.
And even
when you do sue each other, you end up making a deal. It's not widely known but,
you
know, not too long ago, we made a wonderful deal with DEC right, where we paid
DEC a
whole bunch of money that was to be spent on training their developers or their
sales
people in Windows NT and all this kind of stuff. The details about it are
fascinating. I
mean what basically happened was Cutler came from DEC right, where he had
written
VNS right, and so he knew all sorts of things about VNS, heck all sorts of
patents and so
forth. You may have noticed that one of the little clauses in the agreement we
reached
with DEC was, by the way, a patent exchange, a cross-licensing deal. Whenever
you see
a patent exchange in any kind of lawsuit settlement, you know that whichever way
the
money is going, they're the ones who had all the patents. So basically when we
made a
deal with DEC about OLE, that they were going to support OLE through their open
OLE
broker architecture stuff, they went through the Windows NT code and said Okay,
Cutler
screwed up there and there and there and there and violated these patents and
those
patents and so forth. And so bent us over the barrel and we had to pay a fortune
for it.
But the point is that we didn't, that we made a mutually satisfactory agreement.
We
didn't just pay them $10,000,000 and that was the end of it. We said Okay,
we're, you
know, paying money and what are we getting for that. You're going to endorse
Windows
NT. And we're going to do this for you and you're going to do that for us. The
same with
Stack(?). Stack sued us. We bought a big piece of Stack. We incorporated some of
their
technology. We exposed them to some of ours. We made a mutually satisfactory
deal
that was to the benefit of both parties. A law suit is just another negotiating
tactic. So
anyway, people make deals. That's good. Anything else? Good.

</p>

<p>
<b>DIFFERENT SPEAKER:</b> Thank you, James.
</p>

<p>
<b>JAMES PLAMONDON:</b> Lunch!
</p>

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