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| Authored by: Anonymous on Wednesday, June 12 2013 @ 06:27 PM EDT |
Wol,
we're safe, in that the time software could be formally proven correct is well
past. We have come to accept bugs or hidden features as a fact of life, and that
makes remote forensics software so appalling.
Witness the debate regarding state trojan software and it's inevitable back
doors or ways of loading in further functional modules that raged in my home
country. You'd need a proven safe way to store something like a hash of the
currently running forensics program image, along with all currently active
modules, any executable stack and probably a few other things I miss, alongside
any evidence you collect (and that only proves you didn't plant anything in that
particular session - so you need a complete log of all activity). Plus prove you
didn't use the security vulnerability that the trojan was planted by, to upload
what you then find as evidence (just in the clandestine forensics case, not in
the NSA-backdoor-by-law case).
I realize it's hard to prove a negative. I also accept law enforcement agencies
should be given the benefit of doubt there. Intelligence agencies - no way.
Their business is deceit, misdirection and all things below board. That is the
reason why truly democratic nations observe strict separation between law
enforcement and intelligence agencies.
I know I'm beating a dead horse here. I'm just so frustrated that no one heeds
the lessons from the past these days (Nazi Gestapo and GDR Stasi immediately
springs to mind).
-- mschmitz[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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