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| Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, May 25 2013 @ 10:58 AM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/8000/PX08867.pdf
<h1>Memorandum</h1>
<p>
<b>To:</b> Paulma, Jimall, Bobmu, Davidv, Richt, Bradc,
Pgross,<br />
<b>CC:</b> Todn, Cwillis, Morrisb, Jonro<br />
<b>From:</b> Garyvot , Platform Marketing Team<br />
<b>Date:</b> 8/12/97<br />
<b>Re:</b> Windows DNA - The framework for the next generation of
applications
</p>
<h2>Situation</h2>
<p>
Microsoft is in a major platform battle. At stake is who will power the next
generation of distributed,
Internet/intranet, global electronic commerce applications. Sun, Oracle, IBM,
and Netscape are
exploiting the Internet technology shift to attack Windows. Each of them has
launched major
platform initiatives based on Java, CORBA, and the Web.
</p>
<p>
At the PDC in September, we will launch a unified Windows platform initiative to
roll up our various
product and technology messages into a comprehensive story. The goal is to win
the Internet/intranet
positioning battle with competitors and to prove innovation in the Windows
platform.
</p>
<p>
The working name for this initiative is Windows Distributed Network Architecture
or "<b>Windows
DNA.</b>" (In focus group research, "DNA" was associated
with positive attributes like building blocks
and underlying structure-—we have scheduled more testing to validate
this).
</p>
<p>
We are not proposing that Windows DNA become the top-level, overarching vision
For Microsoft.
Instead, our objective is to establish Windows DNA as the solutions framework
that enables the next
generation of applications and then tie this framework back to the overarching
vision. We assume
this new overarching vision could center on "The Digital Nervous
System," so are using as a
placeholder the concept: "Enabllng the Digital Age."
</p>
<p>
A measure of success will be ifthe field and Microsoft's third party advocates
are armed with a
single set of platforrn "vision" and strategy presentations that any
representative who deals with
developers and business customers can confidently deliver. To be successful in
the current platform
war, <i>we must get back to the simplicity of messages we had in
1990-1992</i>
</p>
<h2>What is Windows DNA?</h2>
<p>
Windows DNA is the unification of our Windows and Internet platform efforts in a
single solutions
framework for distributed applications It subsumes what we used to call Active
Platform and
"DAA." (DAA was a code name presented at the March SDR) A critical
success factor for Windows
DNA that developers understand it, is based on today's technologies and evolves
with them, not
something we may ship 18 months from now We intend to make the immediate
availability of
Windows DNA a competitive advantage.
</p>
<p>
There are several technology pillars to Windows DNA.
<ol>
<li>Windows desktop and server including distributed services and
BackOffice</li>
<li>Microsoft's Internet platform including IE, IIS and Java</li>
<li>COM and component services</li>
<li>Development tools from Microsoft and third parties</li>
</ol>
</p>
<p>
Windows DNA is not limited to Microsoft products; it is also a standard bearer
for the community of
third party developers and integrators who add value to the Microsoft platform.
</p>
<p>
Windows DNA will succeed with customers because of its openness and
extensibility through COM,
its end-to-end integration, and because of the best~of-breed implementations of
its core products.
</p>
<h2>Emerging Application Paradigm</h2>
<p>
We assume that customers will make a number of key shifts in how they build
applications.
</p>
<ol>
<li>More application delivery over the Web and the Internet</li>
<li>Migration from a 2-tier client/server to <i>n</i>-tier
architecture (particularly to achieve scale and
centralized management of applications and data)</li>
<li>Use of "cooperating components" to partition applications
and processing</li>
<li>HTML + scripting as a mainstream programming model</li>
<li>Demand for better integration with existing applications and
data</li>
<li>Delivery of"offline" and mobile applications</li>
</ol>
<p>
Windows DNA is designed to provide customers with the best infrastructure and
tools to take
advantage of these shifts
</p>
<h2>Audiences</h2>
<p>
To be successful, we must sell Windows DNA to a wider audience than the
traditional developer to
which we directed our tools and systems evangelism efforts in the past. There
are two new audiences
to address: platform decision makers and industry influencers. Platform
decision-makers include
business and technical managers who control application development strategy in
corporations,
integrators, and ISVs. Industry influencers include press, analysts, financial
analysts, and the venture
capital community. For this later audience we must demonstrate how Windows DNA
creates new
technical and financial opportunities for developers and for the industry as a
whole.
</p>
<h2>What Does Windows DNA Do for Customers?</h2>
<p>
Windows DNA provides our customers with three things:
</p>
<ol>
<li>Name the set of services that Microsoft is building into the overall
Windows platform to enable
the next generation of applications</li>
<li>Expresses a set of benefits that customers derive from using our
platform</li>
<li>Provides the "points of light" that define how customers
should build applications that exploit
the power of Microsoft's platform</li>
</ol>
<p>
For customers, Windows DNA fundamentally answers the question "how does it
all fit together?" A
preliminary mapping of benefits to points of light is given here:
</p>
<table>
<tr><th>Opportunities &
Challenges</th><th>Technologies</th><th>Benefits</th&
gt;<th>Points of Light</th></tr>
<tr>
<td>
<ul>
<li>More responsive organizations</li>
<li>Electronic commerce</li>
<li>Doing business directly with customers and suppliers</li>
<li>"JIT" services</li>
<li>Etc</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Simplicity</li>
<li>Reduced cost</li>
<li>Security</li>
<li>More efficient application development</li>
<li>Better management of applications and resources</li>
<li>Etc</li>
</ul>
</td>
<td>
<ul>
<li>COM and COM3</li>
<li>UI Services</li>
<li>MM Services</li>
<li>HTML + Scripting</li>
<li>Transactions</li>
<li>Mail and Collaboration</li>
<li>Replication</li>
<li>Data Access</li>
<li>Data Management</li>
<li>Message Queuing</li>
<li>Directory</li>
<li>Security</li>
<li>Networking</li>
<li>Systems Management</li>
<li>Etc .</li>
</ul>
</td>
<td>
<ul>
<li>Rich user experience</li>
<li>"Web" simplicity</li>
<li>Internet reach and connectivity</li>
<li>Low touch, low cost computing</li>
<li>Robust, scaleable</li>
<li>Evolutionary</li>
<li>Builds on existing investments</li>
<li>Etc .</li>
</ul>
</td>
<td>
Build DNA Applications <u>Use</u>
<ul>
<li>IE Controls, DHTML on the client</li>
<li>Components</li>
<li>Win32</li>
<li>BackOffice</li>
</ul>
<u>Build</u>
<ul>
<li>COM-based apps using DCOM, MTS, MMQ</li>
<li>Web-based apps using IE, IIS, ASP</li>
</ul>
<u>Leverage</u>
<ul>
<li>Directory services</li>
<li>Security services</li>
<li>Networking services</li>
<li>Management services</li>
<li>Connectivity services</li>
<li>Etc .</li>
</ul>
</td>
</tr>
</table>
<h2>Branding and Message Hierarchy</h2>
<p>
When discussing Microsoft's platform messages today, "complex" is a
word that customers and
analysts frequently use. Microsoft has too many platform messages and we must
develop one simple,
all encompassing concept or brand—as Sun has done so successfully.
</p>
<p>
The logical brand for this is "Windows." Therefore, Windows DNA should
be a component or sub-
brand ofthe Windows brand, targeted at the developer. VAR/consu1tant and
corporate IS/IT
audiences. Windows DNA can help us extend the Windows brand beyond the desktop
</p>
<p>
Windows DNA is an umbrella concept that rolls up tools, systems products Windows
and IE into
overall Microsoft platform benefit proposition. It conveys that we have a
coherent strategy for
distributed computing and the Internet beyond "winning the browser
wars."
</p>
<p>
Windows and Windows DNA should tie back to an overall Microsoft company vision.
This vision should
be empowering and capture our philosophy of computing as a positive force. It
must be broad enough
to work for both business and consumer audiences. Given "The Digital
Age" as a working concept, we
get a message hierarchy for business customers as in the following diagram:
</p>
<em>[Ed: See page 3 of the exhibit for the diagram.]</em>
<p>
We envision "The Digital Age" as a near/medium-term company vision. It
captures the issues that
customers are dealing with today, such as the Internet/intranet, integration of
client/server and the
Web, electronic commerce, and convergence of PCs and electronic entertainment.
As such, it may
only have a horizon of 2-3 years. We may also choose in the future to articulate
a longer-term "10-
year vision" similar to Information at Your Fingertips. If so, these things
should flow into one
another.
</p>
<p>
Although not an important deliverable for the PDC, there could be a
corresponding hierarchy of
messages for the consumer audience. For example, we could express the same
concept as "The
Digital Home" or "The Digital Lifestyle" with "Windows"
as the enabler
</p>
<h2>Competitive Environment</h2>
<p>
We are in the midst of a difficult and critical battle for the hearts and minds
of developers and
platform decision-makers in corporate accounts and solution providers. It will
take a sustained effort
by the entire company to win.
</p>
<p>
Our major competitors have launched the following Internet/NC platform
initiatives:
</p>
<ul>
<li>IBM Network Computing Framework (NCF-diagram at right)</li>
<li>Oracle Network Computing Architecture (NCA)</li>
<li>Sun . "Java for the Enterprise"</li>
<li>Netscape Open Network Environment (ONE)</li>
</ul>
<p>
In a narrow sense, Windows DNA competes
with these initiatives. It will help the field
sell effectively against Sun, IBM, Oracle, and
Netscape. But it goes far beyond this as a
tool for conveying Microsoft's platform
strategy and repositioning the competition
and the entire "network computing"
category. As a concrete expression of our vision for the future of distributed
computing/Internet, Windows DNA presents an alternative model that embraces the
Windows PC
and builds on the PC revolution. It establishes a new set of criteria that the
competition is so far
failing to meet.
</p>
<em>[Ed: See page 4 of the exhibit for the diagram mentioned.]</em>
<h2>Draft Positioning and Benefits</h2>
<p>
The key to differentiating Windows DNA is to embrace the "PC
revolution" and the benefits of the
Internet. Windows DNA should bring together the benefits of powerful, low cost,
standardized
computing with the ubiquitous communications and reach of the Internet. A draft
message framework
is given here based on recent platform research on messaging:
</p>
<table>
<tr>
<td><i>Concept</i></td><th>Making It
Possible</th><th>Making It Work</th><th>Making It
Easier</th>
</tr>
<tr><td><i>What it
means</i></td><td><i>Use technology to create
business and competitive
advantage</i></td><td><i>Extend existing investments in
people, technology and
organization</i></td><td><i>Reduce Complexity to lower
computing costs</i></td></tr>
<tr><td><i>Support points</i></td>
<td><ul>
<li>Exploit advances in new
technology such as the
Internet</li>
<li>Connect people and
infomation together at the
right time</li>
<li>Electronic commerce</li>
<li>Get people working together</li>
<li>Etc.</li>
</ul></td>
<td><ul>
<li>Works wlth existing
investments in applications and
data</li>
<li>Based on open, industry
standard protocols</li>
<li>Broad choice of tools</li>
<li>Universal access to data on
any platform</li>
<li>Etc..</li>
</ul></td>
<td><ul>
<li>Centralized management and
control of applications and data</li>
<li>Runs on industry standard
hardware</li>
<li>Low-cost ubiquitous computing</li>
<li>Zero install</li>
<li>Built-in distributed application
middleware</li>
<li>Application lifecycle support
(repository, team development,
etc )</li>
</ul></td>
</tr>
</table>
<h2>Marketing Strategy and Tactics</h2>
<p>
Our goal is to use "Windows DNA" to set evaluation criteria and prove
platform innovation. We will
drive synergy with product messages and use the architecture as a "secret
sauce" to help win
positioning battle with competitors.
</p>
<p>
To win, we need clarity and consistency on core messages and hard issues
including cross-platform,
security, Java. Credible ISV and OEM partners can help. We will use Memphis,
NT5, "COM3," IE4,
Tools, MTS, Java, etc. to prove we lead in innovation. We will arm and mobilize
the machine: MS
field and outside advocates, our developer "friendlies"—the
silent majority, and prove it by design
wins.
</p>
<p>
We have a more detailed marketing plan available and are kicking off the
cross-divisional effort to
sync on PR and marketing for the PDC.
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, May 25 2013 @ 01:08 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/9000/PX09022.pdf
<em>[Ed: Handwritten notes partially legible: "CC: Billg" and
"OS strat"]</em>
<p>
To: Bobmu, Markz, Steveb, Nathanm, Johnsa<br />
date: 6/14/90<br />
Fm: Paul Maritz
</p>
<h2>What should we do about PM vs. Windows?</h2>
<p>
In an effort to get myself to think more clearly, and to get us to a decision
more quickly, I have tried to set down what I see as the key issues and
possibilities I think the PM vs. Windows decision is actually orthogonal to
a lot of the other issues we have been discussing (how many packages, etc).
and is a decision which we need to make quickly.
</p>
<p>
I would appreciate comment, but please<u> keep this memo limited in its
distribution</u>.
</p>
<p>
1. PM and Windows - two possible paths
</p>
<p>
I agree with the premise that we can have only one long term window manager
asset Thus (no surprise), I believe that there are two basic paths we can be
on:
</p>
<p>
(i) A "PM" path which is:
<ul>
<li>move PM as the native display manager to RISC/NT, and
use Porthole as a migration tool.</li>
<li>use the establishment of PM on RISC as the signal to
the world that PM is our long term asset and we
expect the world to make a transition</li>
<li>restrict the evolution of Windows on x86 to be
"limited" (ie. do not do major functional
enhancements to Win API) as another signal that PM is
our long term asset.</li>
</ul>
The message to the respective PM, Windows developers is then:
PM developers: "You have smooth waters ahead of you, you lack
a low end platform today, but within 2 years hardware
advanced will have taken care of you - ie. 386/4MB will be
low-end."<br />
Windows developers: "You have turbulence ahead of you, you
will be able to sell on large segment of market for next 2-3
years, but there is major market segment of the future (RISC)
which you need to convert to PM api's for. We will give you a
porting layer (Porthole), but for new function you need to
make the switch."
</p>
<p>
Another way of looking at this is:<br />
Mainline ISV's: "You have to maintain 2 source bases for
foreseeable future - Windows and PM. And you should get
ready for time when PM will offer something important that
Windows will not - ie. RISC".<br />
Corporate Developers: "Develop for OS/2. Things may look a
little bleak now, but we will fix the software problems and
the hardware cost problems will fix themselves - just like
Windows few years ago."
</p>
<p>
(ii) A "Windows" path which is:
<ul>
<li>move the Windows API to RISC/NT via 2 paths:
<ol type="a">
<li>one which allows 16:16 Windows apps written
in C to be very easiy moved in source
compatible way to RISC (this path may be
handled entirely by "smart" compiler tools).</li>
<li>one which allows Windows apps to be
converted first to 0:32 C code, and then
moved in source compatible my to RISC/NT (on
to the "merged API", aka Windows 32bit - see below).</li>
</ol></li>
<li>release OS/2 2.0 and position it as a good deployment
platform for those who have PM Apps - ie. it:
<ul>
<li>will not disadvantage end-users because it is
"Windows Plus" (for Windows 3.x apps)</li>
<li>and it runs the PM Apps.</li>
</ul></li>
<li>announce that MS is going to move long term to a
"merged 32bit API" for display management, that this
merged API will be:
<ul>
<li>available on all MS 386 and RISC platforms,</li>
<li>That both existing Window and PM Apps will
require modification to use it, but that it
will be highly compatible with Windows 3.x,
while obtaining the advantages in the PM
"technology" (ie. a PM app will not "lose"
functionality).</li>
</ul>
Why even bother to call it a "merged API"? Because we want to
position it as the future for both Windows and PM.</li>
</ul>
<p>
The message to the PM/Windows developers then becomes:
</p>
<p>
Windows developers: "You have smooth waters ahead of you. We
will have a new 32bit Windows ("merged") API that you use in
order to get new function (beziers, paths, areas
OO libraries, etc), but the porting path is straight
forward from Windows 16bit."
</p>
<p>
PM developers: "You have turbulent waters ahead. We will give
you a good deployment platform in OS/2 2.0, but beyond that
you have a major conversion effort to get to the new merged
API. You will need to convert, because there is a new
important platform (RISC) which you don't get to otherwise.
Likewise there are functions (eg. beziers, OO libs, etc.) that you will not get
without converting".
</p>
<p>
Or from the ISV/Corporate developer view:
</p>
<p>
ISVs: "Write like mad for Windows, be prepaned for the
(merged) Win-32 API which has new functions. You can decide
whether to incorporate the new functions before or after you
go to RISC (by virtue of our 2 paths), but eventually you
should move to the 32bit API to get the new function
(which is after all relatively painless). We will run your
Windows 16bit apps on OS/2 2.0".
</p>
<p>
Corporate Developers:<br />
"Sorry, we told you to write for PM and now you have a
conversion effort ahead. But this is better than haying your
API not be that which is mainstream."
</p>
<p>
2. Background Data:
</p>
<p>
In choosing which of the above paths, the following factors are
pertinent:
</p>
<p>
(i) Do we have to choose only one path - could we not offer both
the Windows and the PM path?
</p>
<p>
We cannot - because there will be tremendous pressure to user
the API set that gains majority market share as an "asset" and
keep that asset competitive. This will ensure that the other
API set suffers - from an evangelical point view, from an
investment point of view, from a management point of view.
</p>
<p>
Can we keep one around as a "sop" (ie. have it be available,
but sitting on disk most of the time). We could do this but
ir would be rightly perceived as just that "a sop", or at
best a migration aid. New function will make their way into
the "asset" first and the other will become increasingly
incompatible. If we can keep the other API set around at
little cost we should, but we should not perform unnatural
technical acts to do so.
</p>
<p>
(ii) What is effect of competition?
</p>
<p>
If it were not for the fact that I fear greatly Sun/SPARC.
either strategy would in fact be workable. We have no
credible competition on the x86 - both SCO ODT and UNIX Lite
are either in their infancy or vaporware, and are resource
hogs - so it will be several (2-3) years before they are
threats. By then we could have established either Windows or
PM as our asset.
</p>
<p>
So Sun/SPARC is the competition. [Paradoxically, it is the
very weakness/fragmentation in the UNIX camp that is giving
Sun/SPARC their franchise. When will Scott McNealy realize
that OSF is the best thing that ever happened to him?]
</p>
<p>
So how best to counter Sun/SPARC is a key determinant of
which path to pick.
</p>
<p>
I will look to the technical people to provide a definitive
technical answer but I think it is true that the Windows path
(as I have defined it, ie. both 16:16 and 0:32 route)
provides a smoother path.
</p>
<p>
Perhaps more important though is the positioning/message at
this point. We need to be locking ISV's tightly into our
asset, and DISCOURAGING THEM FROM BEING PLATFORM INDEPENDENT.
The PM path, of necessity, is a multi platform message. It
encourages ISV's to become platform independent and spend
cycles on that, rather than setting up the vision of
something that will have 80% market share and hence they
should be as early and competitive on the 80% share platform.
Having a single, credible API set to sell is the key issue.
</p>
<p>
Single is addressed by picking one of the above paths. What
makes an API set credible?
</p>
<p>
Technical considerations:<br />
PM is more advanced/cleaner than Windows, but not
dramatically so.
</p>
<p>
32bit -32bit is important in long term, though
surprisingly unimportant in the near term as I
believe that people will use "extender techniques" to
get most of what they want. Either strategy yields
32bits.
</p>
<p>
Provides access to key hardware platforms - RISC is
the key, either strategy can yield it with time. The
Windows path does so quicker (but not dramatically
so).
</p>
<p>
Marketing considerations:<br />
Present Market Share: Windows has it.
</p>
<p>Future Market Share: We say PM will have it, but
credibility (because of Windows present market share)
is not high.
</p>
<p>
Message: The Windows path offers a single "message"
(ie. write for Windows), the PM path is "do this now,
this later" - it is more complex and hence less
credible.
</p>
<p>
(iii) Is getting a RISC PC out the most effective way to combat
SPARC then?
</p>
<p>
Would not getting Win API's on NT/386 be the most effective
means?
</p>
<p>
No (at least I believe not). SPARC is getting its beach heads
by virtue of:
<ol type="a">
<li>getting into certain accounts because the accounts
are hiring "rocket scientists" who are numerically
sophisticated folks who want tha large address space
and horse power of a Sun Workstation,</li>
<li>the increasing cheapness/power of the Sun offerings.</li>
</ol>
</p>
<p>
While we can position 336/486 to address a., it is the increasing
power/decreasing price that is the real threat.
</p>
<p>
Thus I agree that getting a RISC based PC is a necessary and
time critical goal.
</p>
<p>
(iv) What is the effect of IBM?
</p>
<p>
IBM would readily buy into the PM path ~ no problems there.
</p>
<p>
If we pick the Windows path, then there is the risk that IBM
would feel morally obliged to pick the PM path anyway. This
would create competing platforms, and would likely have the
effect of keeping ISV's in a platform neutral stance for
longer (IBM would be lobbying ISV's for the PM path).
</p>
<p>
(v) MS credibility?
</p>
<p>
With ISV's:<br />
ISV's have to be mercenaries and will follow the path
of greatest market share. If NeXT suddenly got hot,
ISV's (including MS Apps) would swing round and write
for NeXT, if NeXT got cold, they would abandon it
(vide Aldus), etc.
</p>
<p>
Some ISV's (esp. Lotus) will team up with Sun to have
an orgy of MS bashing, but the net effect will be
that they will write for whatever API set looks
credible in its claim to significant market share.
They will prioritize which market segments based on
probably size and level of investment required.
</p>
<p>
So the conclusion is that we should not be constrained on
this account.
</p>
<p>
With Corporations and "Corporate ISV's" (who sell MIS type
solutions):<br />
These are the guys who will feel most abused by a
switch away from PM.
</p>
<p>
On the other hand, our current stance of selling
Windows like crazy with one hand, while promising PM
with the other is not very credible either. One can
argue that "coming clean" would be vlewed as more
credible.
</p>
<p>
3. Implications of choosing the "Windows Path".
</p>
<p>
The net position of all this, is that we should choose the "Windows
Path" (by this is meant the set of steps laid out in 1. above).
</p>
<p>
what then are the implications of this, and when do we have to take
the steps involved (privately and publicly)?
</p>
<p>
Implications and Steps:
</p>
<p>
(i) Do we release OS/2 2.0?
</p>
<ol type="a">
<li>Release tt all?
<p>
Yes, otherwise you cut those how have invested in PM
at the knees. It will also provide the OS/2 base
API's in 16 and 32bit form (which is something we do
wish to preserve).</p>
</li>
<li>With a 32bit PM API?
<p>
Yes, there is nothing much to be gained by not doing
it, so we should probably release it.
</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>
(ii) OS/2 2.0 must ba able to run Windows apps well.
</p>
<p>
Otherwise it is not Windows Plus and not a good deployment
platform. We need the technical folk to re-assure us that we will be
able to do this.
</p>
<p>
(iii) Getting Windows onto RISC.
</p>
<p>
This must be done quickly and in a manner that ensures present
Windows apps can follow just as quickly. We should then
re-focus our resources onto:
</p>
<ol type="a">
<li>getting Windows ported to NT/RISC asap (refocus
current Portable PM team),</li>
<li>defined the technology that allows a 16:16 C Windows
app to be rocompiled for RISC (<u>this is key</u>).</li>
</ol>
<p>
(iv) What do I do with ancillary OS/2 Investment?
</p>
<ul>
<li>OS/2 1.2 & 2.0 Disk Driver work (WAMIC) - continue
it.</li>
<li>OS/2 1.2 & 2.0 Generic Printer driver work and other
driver acquisition work? Look it we can leverage
Windows drivers, failing that continue the
investment.</li>
</ul>
<p>
(v) Internal Morale:
</p>
<p>
This is containable if we act qulckly and have a strategy
that makes sense to people.
</p>
<p>
Right now, unrest is building because people:
<ul>
<li>are no longer confident that they are working on
things that make sense,</li>
<li>they are worried about our relation to IBM (after
having being told for so long to bendover backwards
for IBM, people are worried when they see us and IBM
vaguely threatening each other),</li>
<li>the marketing folk worry that they are selling a
phony story.</li>
</ul>
</p>
<p>
It is containable at this point, but it is going to get
worse fairly quickly. Having clear direction is best way to counter all
of above issues.
</p>
<p>
(vi) IBM:
</p>
<p>
We have need to alert them to what we are doing. This will
probably cause an upheaval, but I think that at this point
that would help.
</p>
<p>
They will ultimately be for or against us. In either case we will end
up picking the "right" path. The biggest problem is that we could
allow IBM to become a delaying factor.
</p>
<p>
(v) Public announcement:
</p>
<p>
I think we should articulate this as a complete strategy
fairly soon as well probably in the fourth quarter. I would
not even wait to have complete spec's on the "merged API". IT
would throw an enormous bucket of cold water on OS/2
development, and cause a lot of questioning of MS. This is best
dealt with by having an even stronger Windows story to keep
even those who are most annoyed with us, in the fold. We could thus
maybe also announce the RISC strategy with some hoopla
(where is Compaq when we need them?).
</p>
<p>
(vi) Base consistency:
</p>
<p>
In all this, we have assumed that when Win Apps get moved to
RISC they (i) use MS-DOS style INT 21 services for
base functions (it is fairly trivial to emulate these on top
of OS/2 base services), (ii) they would use a new set (OS/2
API's) when running in "new 32bit mode".
</p>
<p>
Because of this (and other issues like device driver models),
there are a set of questions that need to get addressed at
looking what could be our "three" possible platforms (steady
state):
</p>
<table>
<tr><td>256 + 386:</td><td>DOS 6 +
Windows</td></tr>
<tr><td>386:</td><td>NT + Windows</td></tr>
<tr><td>RISC:</td><td>NT +
Windows</td></tr>
</table>[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, May 25 2013 @ 01:37 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/7000/PX07701.pdf
<p>
<b>From:</b> Bill Gates<br />
<b>To:</b> Mike Maples; Paul Maritz; Pete Higgins; Steve
Ballmer<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: OS synchronization<br />
<b>Date:</b> Saturday, November 06, 1993 8:10AM
</p>
<p>
I thought pauls mail was a very good summary of the situation.
</p>
<p>
I am personally in favor of a very open discussion of these issues where we
involve this group for a period
to see if we agree and then broaden the discussion out.
</p>
<p>
The organizational challenges are hard - the dependencies are hard. However I
believe in the synchronized
strategy. I agree with Paul it would require some OFFICE'95 focus around it to
make it worthwhile. Pauls
description just reinforced my enthusiasm for the synchronized strategy.
</p>
<p>
We need to try and align Messages, technologies, and products as much as
possible. This would be a big
step in that direction. We need an organizational structure that can handle the
non-perfect alignment of
these things but the current systems plan is just too hard to allow us to
improve a lot of things.
</p>
<p>
Some of the features that people dont think about much like graphics, printing,
some UI stuff, etc., is
almost impossible to improve on our current leapfrog strategy. Also I think OFS
which is big time leveraged
on the client is properly timed as late '95 with applications support in the
synched strategy.<br />
----------<br />
From: Paul Maritz<br />
To: Bill Gates; Mike Maples; Pete Higgins; Steve Ballmer<br />
Subject: RE: OS synchronization<br />
Date: Thursday, November 04, 1993 6:38PM
</p>
<p>
Please treat memo below as confidential, and don't forward (at all) - but I
would be interested in your
feedback/views.
</p>
<p>
< <File Attachment: SYNC.DOC> ><br />
----------
<div style="padding-left: 0.5em; border-left: solid 1px black">
From: Bill Gates<br />
To: Paul Maritz<br />
Cc: Mike Maples<br />
Subject: OS synchronization<br />
Date: Monday, November 01, 1993 12:04AM
</p>
<p>
This doesnt require any response since its just a sort of
repititous point in an ongoing discussion.
</p>
<p>
We have to synchronize our OS releases, in order to do innovatation without
insanity.
</p>
<p>
We are wasting so much effort in trying to keep these things
sane and it is debilitating effort. Its unempowering and
confusing. The differences are getting bigger and choking us.
</p>
<p>
Shipping an OS that is not a big apps platform is asking for
failure. If OFS has to be on the client that is fine but OFS
is too big for the mainstream until late 95.
</p>
<p>
My heretical view is that shipping both Cairo and Chicago 2 in
late 95 wouid be the best if realistic.
</p>
<p>
I thought about giving apps OFS and the Shell to ship but I
worry that OFS might be so big people would laugh at our
applications.
</p>
</div>[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, May 26 2013 @ 03:26 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/7000/PX07407.pdf
<h1>Office for Windows 95</h1>
<h2>Launch Marketing Plan</h2>
<h2>Marketing Strategies</h2>
<p>
1) Build awareness for Office as the leader, the
desktop standard for applications (build the brand)
<ul>
<li>Positioning</li>
<li>Advertising and Direct</li>
<li>PR</li>
</ul>
</p>
<p>
2) Leverage Windows'95
<ul>
<li>Joint marketing by audience with Win95 team</li>
<li>Channel</li>
<li>Define criteria for best Win 95 app</li>
</ul>
</p>
<p>
3) Execute a great launch
<ul>
<li>Events</li>
<li>Field support and training</li>
<li>Beta</li>
</ul>
</p>
<h2>Marketing Strategies</h2>
<p>
4) Target key sources of business
<ul>
<li>Upgraders, Switchers, LORGs</li>
<li>Improve share in low share segments by customer
(SORGS), account (ASAP, MicroAge, Merisel) and
country (UK)</li>
</ul>
</p>
<p>
5) Capitalize on "Backoffice" synergy
<ul>
<li>Make Office a more strategic buy in LORGs</li>
<li>Target switch to client server in S/MORGs</li>
</ul>
</p>
<p>
5) Entrench Office as a platform
<ul>
<li>Office Compatible</li>
</ul>
</p>
<p>
6) Win category BOB battles
</p>
<h2>Business Objectives</h2>
<ul>
<li>Increase/sustain category share gains
<ul>
<li>Office => 85%, Standalone => 65%</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Accelerate office suite category penetration to
65% of total desktop apps</li>
<li>Grow revenue by X%</li>
<li>Retain 10% price premium</li>
</ul>
<h2>Office 95 Product Vision</h2>
<ul>
<li>Best office suite for Window 95
<ul>
<li>Consistency and integration</li>
<li>Performance</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Great solution for the teams and organizations
<ul>
<li>Custom OLE properties, Doc objects</li>
<li>Find File 2.0 with Full Text Indexing</li>
<li>Exchange Public folders</li>
<li>Sched+, multiuser workbooks, highlighter</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Build on IntelliSense
<ul>
<li>Intellisearch, Tips everywhere</li>
<li>Background spell check, visual feedback, AutoPivot</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Planning Assumptions</h2>
<ul>
<li>Timing
<ul>
<li>Word, XL, PPT, Sched+, OfficeStd
<ul><li>RTM 4/17/95, Channel availability
6/1/95</li></ul></li>
<li>Access, OfficePro, Office Assistant
<ul><li>RTM 6/30/95, Channel availability 8/1
0/95</li></ul></li>
<li>Win95
<ul><li>RTM 30-60 days before our Apps</li></ul>
</li></ul>
</li>
<li>No new 16 bit Win Apps, no Mac Apps</li>
<li>Office 4.x will continue to be available</li>
<li>Pricing will not change</li>
</ul>
<h1>Strategy # 1: Office
Leadership</h1>
<h2>Positioning - Where we are today</h2>
<u>Office 4.x positioning</u>
<ul>
<li>Leading technology that works for you</li>
<li>Full featured Apps the work together like one
<ul>
<li>Beyond Ease of Use (IntelliSense)</li>
<li>Beyong Cut and Paste (OfficeLinks, OLE)</li>
<li>Beyond Personal Productivity (VBA, workgroup)</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Where we are vulnerable</h2>
<ul>
<li><u>Positioning Paradox</u>: Market share leadership
has not translated into a clearly differentiated
position
<ul>
<li>Competitors copying our claims and evidence</li>
<li>Lack of single, differentiated message</li>
<li>Not universally accepted as standard</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Positioning - Key Findings</h2>
<ul>
<li>"Leadership" and "Works together like One" still
resonate with consumers
<ul><li>but are viewed as support points, not main
positioning premises</li></ul>
</li>
<li>Users are more results-oriented
<ul>
<li>software must help them get their job done better,
faster</li>
<li>Lotus' "Working Together" message is suspect - too
much process, no results</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Users want more flexibility from software
<ul>
<li>adaptable for different users, versatile for different
tasks, room to growUsers want to retain control</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Positioning - Key Findings</h2>
<ul>
<li>Retaining control is essential
<ul>
<li>Intellisense works great as evidence/support, but
can be viewed negatively if it makes people fear
losing control</li>
<li>Solutions is an intriguing promise, but can trigger
the losing control fear. Users solve problems, not
computers.</li>
<li>Ease of access is viewed as essential and forward
looking to CPs but too much access can be
dangerous.</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Benefits Framework</h2>
<table border="1">
<tr><th>Key Benefits</th><th>What users say about
benefit</th></tr>
<tr><td><b>Leadership and Support</b><br />
(Microsoft the company)</td>
<td>
<ul>
<li><b>Solid, reliable technology</b></li>
<li><b>Reputable major manufacturer</b></li>
<li><b>Unsurpassed customer support</b></li>
<li><b>Extensive, easily accessed and user-friendly
help</b></li>
</ul></td></tr>
<tr><td><b>Full featured apps that work together as
one</b><br />
(Office Family)</td>
<td>
<ul>
<li><b>Ease of learning, using</b></li>
<li><b>Integrate data, transfer info</b></li>
<li><b>Lowers training/support costs, burden</b></li>
<li><b>Attributed to Windows</b></li>
<li><b>Expected, already available</b></li>
</ul></td></tr>
<tr><td><b>Gets the job done - results
oriented</b></td>
<td>
<ul>
<li><b>Acknowledges reality in workplace, downsizing
phenomena</b></li>
<li><b>Sets up other claims, makes them more
believable</b></li>
<li><b>Basic capability but highly valued</b></li>
<li><b>Focus on the end result, not process</b></li>
<li><b>(Undercut Lotus' process emphasis)</b></li>
</ul></td></tr>
<tr><td><b>Flexible, Adaptable,
Versatile</b></td>
<td>
<ul>
<li><b>Secretary to CEO</b></li>
<li><b>Banker to construction worker</b></li>
<li><b>Small company to large</b></li>
<li><b>Wordprocessing to design management</b></li>
</ul></td></tr>
</table>
<h2>Major Positioning Issues</h2>
<ul>
<li>Ensure synergistic MS—wide messaging
<ul>
<li>Linkage w/ Weiden & Kennedy MS brand, Office
broad reach work, and A&L PC Press/Trade work</li>
<li>Linkage w/ OCU, Office/Back Office messaging</li>
<li>Balance in line vs. individual applications</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Need greater differentiation
<ul>
<li>what is the single claim, silver bullet?</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Insure product retains central role, but:
<ul>
<li>Go beyond features, tasks and technologies</li>
<li>Incorporate emotive and aspirational qualities</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Advertising and Direct: Objective</h2>
<ul>
<li>Build <i>Awareness</i>
<ul>
<li><i>of what?</i> range from MS as source of business
software, to
Office 95, to individual apps</li>
<li><i>to whom?</i> range from F/IEUs, to Office base, to
SORGs, to
CPs</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Influence <i>Perceptions</i>
<ul>
<li>MS knows me and my business needs</li>
<li>MS Office is the source for applications to support these
needs</li>
<li>Having and maintaining the most current versions of these
applications is in my best interest</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Motivate <i>Action</i>
<ul>
<li>trial</li>
<li>purchase</li>
<li>recommendation</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Strategies</h2>
<ul>
<li>Communicate Office leadership</li>
<li>Support the MS Brand in everything we do</li>
<li>Messaging
<ul>
<li><i>evolve</i> from pure focus on product features to
tangible target
audience benefits</li>
<li><i>integrate</i> across Office products and with Windows
95 to
communicate a greater whole</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Targeting
<ul>
<li><i>deliver</i> our messages to the priority target
audiences where
they can most effectively and efficiently be found</li>
<li><i>integrate</i> our efforts across media (broad media,
technical
and vertical press, direct mail, interactive and on-line, point
of purchase, and packaging)</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Tactics</h2>
<ul>
<li>Launch target audience
<ul>
<li>those already aware of/using an Office product, goal =
awareness of Office 95; tactics = pre launch/launch DM, PC
and business press ads.</li>
</ul></li>
<li>For larger universe of F/IEUs and now SORGs
<ul>
<li>build on benefits focused communications started with
Office 4 and continue beyond launch; goal = awareness of
larger Office family; tactics = PC press, business and
consumer press and Office family DM (catalogue).</li>
</ul></li>
<li>To even broader audience
<ul>
<li>create differentiation beyond the actual products - goal =
awareness of Ms as business partner; tactics = the MS
branding and broad reach efforts.</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Timeline</h2>
<ul>
<li>Development (November - March)</li>
<li>Pre launch (May)
<ul>
<li>teasing ads in PC Press</li>
<li>pre-booking DM (early adopters)</li>
<li>evolution of Avalanche</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Demand Generation (June weeklies, July monthlies,
Upgrade DM)</li>
<li>Momentum (July - September)</li>
<li>Sustaining (on-going)</li>
</ul>
<h2>Public Relations</h2>
<ul>
<li><i>Key Objectives</i>
<ul>
<li>Maintain Office 94 Awareness & Momentum until
Office 95 Launch</li>
<li>Manage leak strategy</li>
<li>Be Considered the Best Apps for Windows 95</li>
<li>Thwart Competitive Noise and PR Activities</li>
<li>Build Launch Excitement for New Office 95
products</li>
<li>Minimize Potentially Negative Product Issues</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Maintain Office 94 Momentum</h2>
<ul>
<li>Keep Office 94 in the Press during Novell Launch
<ul>
<li>Momentum Release week prior to Comdex</li>
<li>Comdex Main Booth Messaging: Momentum, Office as Platform,
Office/Back Office</li>
<li>Team Dennis Conner</li>
<li>HTML</li>
<li>Testimonials, Wins (EDS, GE, AT&T)</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Office is a Strategic Platform for Business
<ul>
<li>Back/Front Office Briefings at Comdex, and follow up tour</li>
<li>Coverage of Real World Case Studies of Firms using
products</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Distribute Office Messaging into new media
<ul>
<li>Vertical Markets (legal, accting, SORG)</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Leak Strategy</h2>
<ul>
<li>Hold back more info than with Office 4.x
<ul>
<li>fewer features to market</li>
<li>less competitive pressure</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Leak product features that are:
<ul>
<li>catch up to competitors</li>
<li>too hard for competitors to duplicate</li>
<li>obvious Win95 features</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Focus on topics that need market seeding
<ul>
<li>User assistance model</li>
<li>32 bit only; Mac in 96; no VBA in Word</li>
<li>Sched+ in Office</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Best Desktop Apps for Win 95</h2>
<ul>
<li>Leadership: Early Public Commitment to Win
95
<ul>
<li>Preview of Office 95 at Comdex in Win 95 Booth
<ul><li>Win 95 Support Features
Only</li></ul></li>
<li>Shared Vision Tour with Win 95 in Jan 95</li>
<li>Reviewer's Workshop in Jan/Feb 95</li>
<li>Third Party Study of Quant. Benefits</li>
<li>Win 95 & Office 95 Combined Launch Event</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Define Best Win 95 App Early
<ul>
<li>Set Review Criteria Early with Win 95 guys</li>
<li>Win 95 message at Reviewer's Workshop/Shared Vision
Tour</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Best Desktop Apps for Win 95</h2>
<ul>
<li>Get Good First Look Press
<ul>
<li>Ensure Positive First Looks
<ul><li>Target Win 95 reviewers to get Office
sidebars</li></ul></li>
<li>Positive Coverage at Launch
<ul>
<li>Long Lead Press Tour 3/95</li>
<li>Early Beta Program for Press 3/95</li>
<li>Short Lead Press Tour 5/95</li>
</ul></li>
</ul></li>
<li>Win Comparative Reviews
<ul>
<li>Comparison Reviews <i>after</i> we ship Office
95</li>
<li>Focus Review criteria on our advantages</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Thwart Competition</h2>
<ul>
<li>Be the first Suite to <i>show</i> support for Win
95</li>
<li>Be prepared to leak "safe features"(catch-up
or re—launch old ones) to counter an early
announcement or their leaks.</li>
<li>Leverage Microsoft-Win 95 Coordination</li>
</ul>
<h2>Minimize Negative Issues</h2>
<ul>
<li>Get the tough messages out before we
launch
<ul>
<li>Announce 16/32 bit (January)</li>
<li>VBA & Word Issue (February)</li>
<li>"No-Mac" until 96 announcement (February)</li>
<li>Access 3.0 delta (March)</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Build Excitement for Launch</h2>
<ul>
<li>Hold Most Features for actual Launch Event</li>
<li>Leverage Win 95 Excitement</li>
<li>Close link to Win 95 bandwagon- Best Win 95
Apps</li>
<li>Extend the event beyond one day
<ul>
<li>District Launches (Accounts & Resellers)</li>
<li>Worldwide Training Tour to get people to Upgrade</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Event Coverage in PC and Biz press
<ul>
<li>Goal: always mention of Office 95 Apps w/ Win 95</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>PR Timeline</h2>
<ul>
<li>Nov 1994: COMDEX
<ul>
<li>Mon. Briefing of what will be shown at show</li>
<li>Office 95 apps running in the Win 95 ISV Booth.</li>
<li>Back/Front Office Tour Briefing during show</li>
</ul></li>
<li>January/February 1995
<ul>
<li>Mid-January: Shared Vision Tour</li>
<li>End of Jan/Ear|y Feb: Win'95 Rev. Workshop</li>
</ul></li>
<li>March 1995
<ul>
<li>Long Lead NDA press and analysts briefings
<ul><li>Full Office '95 demo, leave behind Marketing
Beta</li></ul></li>
<li>Stand Alone App Long Lead Press Tour</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>PR Timeline (cont.)</h2>
<ul>
<li>April/May 1995
<ul>
<li>Win 95/ Office 95 RTM</li>
<li>Short Leads (one week prior to launch)</li>
<li>WinWorId (Atlanta)-show apps</li>
</ul></li>
<li>June 1995
<ul>
<li>First Look Reviews in Monthlies</li>
<li>International Launch Deadline</li>
<li>Access 3.0/ Office Pro Announce at PC Expo</li>
</ul></li>
<li>July 1995-October 1995
<ul>
<li>Comprehensive Comparative Reviews</li>
<li>Momentum Messaging & Press Release</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Oct 1995-1996
<ul>
<li>Testimonials</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h1>Strategy # 2: Leverage
Windows 95</h1>
<h2>Leverage Windows’95</h2>
<ul>
<li>Objectives
<ul>
<li>Achieve X% Office '95/Win '95 penetration</li>
<li>Rapid adoption of Office '95</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Strategies
<ul>
<li>Leverage Win '95 marketing might to convince
customers to also adopt Office '95 (at-best,
simultaneously)</li>
<li>Establish Office as best Win '95 application</li>
<li>Ensure Win '95 adoption is not an issue for Office
upgrades</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Key Tactics</h2>
<ul>
<li>Integrated broad reach advertising
<ul>
<li>Media and creative, not joint ads</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Joint PR (eg. joint reviewer's wrkshop)</li>
<li>Joint launch event (Mar/Apr)</li>
<li>Office '95 technology demo at all Win '95 events</li>
<li>Channel & Field training</li>
<li>Direct Marketing</li>
</ul>
<h2>Key Tactics with LORGs</h2>
<ul>
<li>Structured trial program with Win '95's Goliath (3
accounts) , Marquee (25 accounts) in January</li>
<li>Named accounts trial “in-a-box” program using
MS field sales for top 200 accounts in March</li>
<li>Office Preview Program: widespread Office eval
offer to WPP/Win '95 World Tour attendees (Mar)</li>
<li>ROI Evidence and Transition support
<ul>
<li>Compelling reasons to adopt Office '95, esp.
simultaneously, through "Gartner-like" study and
transition tools (eg. joint Resource Kit)</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Key Tactics with End Users</h2>
<ul>
<li>Follow Win '95's channel breadth push,
especially with individual app upgrades</li>
<li>Linked purchase at retail with physical
"Environment Upgrade" sku</li>
<li>Packaging with similar "look and feel"</li>
<li>Complementary TV and national print</li>
<li>$ off promotional offer</li>
</ul>
<h2>Environment Upgrade SKU</h2>
<ul>
<li>Joint install/setup between Office & Win '95</li>
<li>Benefits of "including batteries"
<ul>
<li>Extra convenience for end user</li>
<li>Reduce end user confusion</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Issues
<ul>
<li>Pricing</li>
<li>Potential legal issues</li>
<li>Shelf space allocation</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Channel Objectives</h2>
<ul>
<li>Increase Office channel breadth & depth</li>
<li>Jointly sell Office & Win 95</li>
<li>Support & reinforce the Office brand in—store</li>
<li>Create compelling promotions to ensure high
upgrade rates</li>
<li>Use Ali Baba to increase trial, mix of CD
Office Pro</li>
</ul>
<h2>Channel Tactics</h2>
<ul>
<li>Increase channel breadth & depth
<ul>
<li>Create evaluation of each of primary channels to
determine areas of weakness & create programs as
appropriate</li>
<li>Potential tactics: educate outbounds to sell
Office/backoffice solution; sell individual upgrade apps
via Mass merchants; Sell "upgrade your world" type of
solution via Superstores; etc..</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Channel Tactics, Cont.</h2>
<ul>
<li>Join the sales of Office & Win 95
<ul>
<li>Create Office packaging that mimicks Win 95
packaging</li>
<li>Provide Office training with Win 95 - communicate x-
sell, make Office 95 the "Win 95 Poster Child"</li>
<li>Create kiosks/end aisles that place Office products
next to win 95 products. Create in-store POP with
same look & feel as win 95</li>
<li>Create contest for best merchandising of win 95 and
our win apps together, or do "secret shopper" to
incent resellers for this behavior</li>
<li>Cross sell ms—apps and systems in POP?</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Channel Tactics, Cont.</h2>
<ul>
<li>Support & reinforce the Office brand in—store
<ul>
<li>Create POP that is consistent with both Office
and Win 95 (we need to make the look/feel the
same as win 95)</li>
<li>Create POP that supports the Office brand
message</li>
<li>Provide tools to enable "risk free" trial
(autodemos, cds, etc)</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Channel Tactics, Cont.</h2>
<ul>
<li>Create compelling promotions — options below:
<ul>
<li>Offer Windows 95 for free with Office purchase (fpp or up)</li>
<li>Offer "Complete Upgrade" solutions
<ul>
<li>OEM h/w , system & s/w solution</li>
<li>system & apps solution</li>
<li>Re-introduce "upgrade your world"</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Offer resellers high levels of marketing funds & strong
materials to
incent them to promote our offers</li>
<li>Price apps at intro levels for first 3 months</li>
<li>Create bundle with individual apps to push upgrades (either
Frosting or an upgrade training video)</li>
<li>Create promo with Alibabba => unlock product X,Y, or Z by x/x/95,
get __ product for free.</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h1>Strategy # 3: Excecute a great
launch</h1>
<h2>Events</h2>
<ul>
<li>Joint broad reach "event" with Win '95 as
kickoff</li>
<li>"Rolling" launch events to build momentum
<ul>
<li>WinWorld Atlanta (Apr)</li>
<li>Top 15 User groups launch tour (May)</li>
<li>Joint District Launch Tour with Win95</li>
<li>Launch-in-a-box for corporate accts and resellers</li>
<li>Access/Office Pro launch at PCExpo (June/July)</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Field Support & Training
Objectives</h2>
<ul>
<li>Educate 100% of "relevant" reseller, corporate, SP,
MCS sales force</li>
<li>Arm the field and channel w/ informational sales
tools to assist them in converting the sale</li>
<li>Communicate a consistent and compelling DAD
strategy to customers</li>
<li>Leverage MS-wide field training events to
communicate w/ sales force.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Field Support & Training Tactics</h2>
<ul>
<li>Publish Office 95 strategy presentation and product
positioning.
<ul>
<li>Begin using in EBC in December (as approp)</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Create 3-4 flavors of Office 95 demo
<ul>
<li>Broad audience (basic, show little)</li>
<li>Friendly audience (NDA, trusted partners, show some
ease of use functionality</li>
<li>Full out Office/individual app demos (w/ hidden features)</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Hand Pick 3-5 SPs to develop custom solutions</li>
</ul>
<h2>Field Support & Training Tactics
Cont.</h2>
<ul>
<li>SE/MCS Training (detailed information) via
<ul>
<li>Fly-in (mid Jan)</li>
<li>Strategy video (internal training)</li>
<li>SE Forum/Tech Ed (Dec/Mar)</li>
</ul></li>
<li>SE trains district on strategy (late Jan).</li>
<li>Office PMs do hands on in early March via
district tours</li>
<li>Intl PMs trained by mattmi team in dec and
late jan meeting.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Timeline</h2>
<table>
<tr><td>Nov</td><td>Dec</td><td>Jan</td&g
t;<td>Feb</td><td>Mar</td><td>April</td><
/tr>
<tr><td>Demos</td><td></td><td
colspan="2">SE F|y-in</td><td
colspan="2">District Tours</td></tr>
<tr><td>Comdex</td><td colspan="2">SE
Forum</td><td></td><td colspan="2">SE
Forum</td></tr>
<tr><td>EBC</td><td
colspan="2"></td><td>Win 95
Tours</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">PM Trainings</td></tr>
</table>
<h2>Beta Program</h2>
<ul>
<li>Strategy: Use Technical beta to develop
testimonials w/ a few key accounts
<ul>
<li>3 early on, goliath large accounts</li>
<li>25 SPs, Accts that offer strategic examples for
Office and individual apps (marquee)</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Use marketing beta for evaluation/review by
press, analysts and key accts (hundreds).</li>
<li>Timeline:
<ul>
<li>Tech beta 1: Jan 17</li>
<li>Marketing beta March 17</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h1>Strategy # 4: Target Key
Sources of Business</h1>
<h2>Upgrader Segments</h2>
<ul>
<li><i>24% = Regulars</i>
<ul>
<li>almost always upgrade; decide within the first 3 months</li>
<li>most influential (80% F/IEU)</li>
</ul></li>
<li><i>14% = Seekers</i>
<ul>
<li>upgrade likely, need more info; decide 1-6 months from
launch</li>
<li>slightly less influential (71% F/IEU)</li>
</ul></li>
<li><i>34% = Doubters</i>
<ul>
<li>upgrade unlikely, highly satisfied, unconvinced of new
benefits; decide 3mp-1 yr. from launch</li>
<li>still influential (62% F/IEU)</li>
</ul></li>
<li><i>29% = Sleepers:</i>
<ul>
<li>very unlikely to upgrade; least influential</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Upgrade - Strategies</h2>
<ul>
<li><i>Cement and leverage Regulars</i>
<ul>
<li>promote and pre-book early (targeted mail)</li>
<li>use to evangelize (champions programs)</li>
<li>test subscription/leasing programs to cement (tie to MOS?)</li>
</ul></li>
<li><i>Convert Seekers to regulars</i>
<ul>
<li>upgrade through multi-wave DM and targetted press (using
early adoption stories to build confidence)</li>
<li>build relevance with connection to Windows 95</li>
<li>provide post purchase tools (ala Avalanche) to drive deeper
usage</li>
<li>tie additional benefits to staying current</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Upgrade - Strategies</h2>
<ul>
<li><i>Convince Doubters with Trial</i>
<ul>
<li>include in announcement DM efforts</li>
<li>drive interest with calls to action in ads and later wave
DM</li>
<li>deliver effective trial vehicle</li>
</ul></li>
<li><i>Awaken select Sleepers:</i>
<ul>
<li>announce to small group in core SORG/vertical segments</li>
<li>write—off the rest</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Switchers</h2>
<ul>
<li>Continuation of Operation "Avalanche"</li>
<li>Main Objective:
<ul>
<li>Gain share by capturing MS-DOS and Small
Business switchers</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Key Tactics
<ul>
<li>1-800 hotline with testimonials, referrals and tools</li>
<li>Beefed up switcher support line</li>
<li>90 day money back guarantee</li>
<li>National advertising to promote "safe
choice"/"move is on" themes</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>SORG/Vertical</h2>
<ul>
<li>Objectives
<ul>
<li>Increase SORG/Vertical Market Share and Awareness to
parity with overall share/Awareness</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Strategies
<ul>
<li>Provide turn key solutions</li>
<li>Create Clear SORG/VerticaI Messages</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Key Tactics
<ul>
<li>Office Small Business Pack/Office Compatible ISV's and
Vertical resource Kits</li>
<li>Target SORG/Verticals through Influence Model</li>
<li>Launch Office 95 SORG Effort with Office Pro 95</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>OEM</h2>
<ul>
<li>Objectives
<ul>
<li>Increase individual Word/Excel NA share in small business
and work at home markets</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Strategies
<ul>
<li>Target top-tier OEMs that are considering competitive
offerings or those that provide co-marketing opportunities</li>
<li>Target middle-tier OEMs with single application licenses
(Word/Excel)</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Other Tactics
<ul>
<li>Capture NAMES</li>
<li>Provide Office up-sell in-box and on-screen for single
application licensed OEMs</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h1>Strategy # 5: Capitalize on
Office/Back Office Synergy</h1>
<h2>Objectives</h2>
<ul>
<li>Use BackOffice to entrench Office, increase
"strategic" importance.</li>
<li>Use BackOffice to open new markets,
cannabalize shift to client/server.</li>
<li>Establish market perception of Office as
premier solutions development platform.</li>
<li>Get other MS groups to sell Office - BSD, DD
and OCU (SP).</li>
</ul>
<h2>Strategies</h2>
<ul>
<li>Develop clear messaging for Office as a Business
Solutions Platform for all business segments - S/M/LORG.
<ul>
<li>Common Messaging plan for Office/BackOffice.</li>
<li>Office as premier suite of desktop applications.</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Develop clear and compelling evidence to support
messages.</li>
<li>Deliver messages/evidence through internal (MS) and
external (SP) vehicles.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Tactics</h2>
<ul>
<li>Develop arsenal of evidence (internal & external sales
tools).
<ul>
<li>Customer testimonials - videos, white papers, demos,
presentations, etc.</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Target all segments and deliver messages (with
evidence support) via influence model.
<ul>
<li>Marketing Mix (Ads, PR, MSTV, Seminars etc.)</li>
<li>Training (SPs, Internal and External)</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Provide turnkey SORG solution.</li>
<li>Empower and provide incentive to external
sources to "sell" Office as the Business Solution.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Timeline</h2>
<ul>
<li>PreLaunch:
<ul>
<li>Develop arsenal of evidence (3-4 months prior to
launch).</li>
<li>Empower and provide incentive to external sources to
"sell" Office as the Business Solution (get buyoff now,
implement at time of beta).</li>
<li>Provide turnkey SORG solution (dev now, msg as
appropriate).</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Launch and Post Launch:
<ul>
<li>Target all segments and deliver messages (with
evidence support) via influence model.</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h1>Strategy # 6: Entrench Office
as a Platform</h1>
<h2>Office Compatible</h2>
<ul>
<li>Continue v 1.0 for 16 bit development
<ul>
<li>Reduce marketing to logo program only</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Introduce v 2.0 for 32 bit development
<ul>
<li>Refine consistency requirements (fewer, better)</li>
<li>Require more integration</li>
<li>Require Win'95 compatibility</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Marketing:
<ul>
<li>lssue: Can you ever satisfy ISVs</li>
<li>Marketing to masses=dilution (cant do enough). Limit it to
logo program for the masses</li>
<li>Decouple strategic marketing opportunities from program
so we can pick and choose "best" opportunities</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h1>Strategy # 7: Win Category-
Best of Breed Battles</h1>
<h2>Individual Plans to Come</h2>
<h1>Business Planning Issues</h1>
<h2>Office '95 Pricing</h2>
Maintain basic pricing scheme:
<table>
<tr><th></th><th>FPP</th><th>Upgrade</th&
gt;</tr>
<tr><td>Office
Pro</td><td>$599</td><td>$399*</td></tr>
<tr><td>Office
Std</td><td>$499</td><td>$299*</td></tr>
<tr><td>Indiv.
apps</td><td>$329</td><td>$129<sup>±</su
p></td></tr>
</table>
* $40 rebate for version upgraders<br />
<sup>±</sup> $30 rebate for version upgraders
<h2>Office '95 SKU Management</h2>
<ul>
<li>Objectives
<ul>
<li>Encourage adoption of Office 95</li>
<li>Avoid confusing the customer/reseller about which
product works on which platform</li>
<li>Prevent losing 16 bit App sales to competition</li>
<li>Minimize SKUs to lower internal costs</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Issues
<ul>
<li>Office 95 Apps not compatible with Windows 3.1</li>
<li>Rate of Windows/Office 95 adoption unclear</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Transition SKU Management</h2>
<ul>
<li>Strategy
<ul>
<li>Follow standard upgrade transition conventions</li>
<li>Let market decide on timing of SKU removal</li>
<li>Focus marketing on incentives to upgrade to
Office 95, not obstacles to buying Office 4.x</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Tactics
<ul>
<li>Continue making volume products orderable</li>
<li>Clearly distinguish packaging and product info on
box</li>
<li>Free upgrade coupon to Office '95 in Office 4.x for
first 6 months</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
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