"I don't know what you mean by 'glory,' " Alice said.

Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't—till I tell you. I meant 'there's a nice knock-down argument for you!' "

"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument'," Alice objected.

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master—that's all."

Alice was too much puzzled to say anything, so after a minute Humpty Dumpty began again. "They've a temper, some of them—particularly verbs, they're the proudest—adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs—however, I can manage the whole lot! Impenetrability! That's what I say!"

This passage was used in Britain by Lord Atkin in his dissenting judgement in the seminal case Liversidge v. Anderson (1942), where he protested about the distortion of a statute by the majority of the House of Lords. It also became a popular citation in United States legal opinions, appearing in 250 judicial decisions in the Westlaw database as of April 19, 2008, including two Supreme Court cases (TVA v. Hill and Zschernig v. Miller).

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You are being MICROattacked, from various angles, in a SOFT manner.

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(d) EXHAUSTION OF RIGHTS.—Notwithstanding subsection (e)(1), the sale or other disposition of a useful end result by a person entitled to assert a defense under this section in connection with a patent with respect to that useful end result shall exhaust the patent owner’s rights under the patent to the extent that such rights would have been exhausted had such sale or other disposition been made by the patent owner.

This begs the question: to what extent would such rights have been exhausted had the sale or other disposition been made by the patent owner? To the best of my knowledge, the statute (Title 35 of the U.S.C.) is silent on the matter.

"begging the question" is when the answer provided starts with itself as a premise.
"begging for" or "raising" or "calling for" a question is when an answer prompts the hearer to ask another question.

If you use the phrase "begs the question" and then enumerate what question you refer to, you are not understanding the proper usage of the phrase. "begs the question" is a description of a logical fallacy, not a description of an action that is done to a question.

Yes, I realise that people will keep using that term incorrectly. No, I do not think that that means I should give up the precision and clarity afforded by proper use.

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The argument that business methods are categorically outside of §101’s scope is further undermined by the fact that federal law explicitly contemplates the existence of at least some business method patents. Under 35 U. S. C. §273(b)(1), if a patent-holder claims infringement based on “a method in [a] patent,” the alleged infringer can assert a defense of prior use. For purposes of this defense alone, “method” is defined as “a method of doing or conducting business.” §273(a)(3). In other words, by allowing this defense the statute itself acknowledges that there may be business method patents. Section 273’s definition of “method,” to be sure, cannot change the meaning of a prior-enacted statute. But what §273 does is clarify the understanding that a business method is simply one kind of “method” that is, at least in some circumstances, eligible for patenting under §101.

A conclusion that business methods are not patentable in any circumstances would render §273 meaningless. This would violate the canon against interpreting any statutory provision in a manner that would render another provision superfluous (See Corley v. United States, 2009). This principle, of course, applies to interpreting any two provisions in the U. S. Code, even when Congress enacted the provisions at different times (See, e.g., Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, (1939)). This established rule of statutory interpretation cannot be overcome by judicial speculation as to the subjective intent of various legislators in enacting the subsequent provision. Finally, while §273 appears to leave open the possibility of some business method patents, it does not suggest broad patentability of such claimed inventions.

This established rule of statutory interpretation cannot be overcome by judicial speculation as to the subjective intent of various legislators in enacting the subsequent provision.

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Regards
Ian Al
Software Patents: It's the disclosed functions in the patent, stupid!

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