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| Authored by: jesse on Tuesday, May 21 2013 @ 10:49 AM EDT |
is not digital in the first place.
It is the glass diffuser.
The glass diffusers are used to generate the public keys, but since the private
key a physical collection of atoms, the best attack is to prevent the exchange.
Just break the receivers piece of glass, and NONE of the messages can be
decrypted.
Break the senders piece then no further communication can be done because no
message can be encrypted.[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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| Authored by: tknarr on Tuesday, May 21 2013 @ 05:16 PM EDT |
The thing is that to steal the key you don't need to steal the glass. All you
need is a copy of the bits it'd produce. You need surreptitious access to the
glass, but then you just run the light through it and record the output. Once
you've got that, you've got everything you need.
This is the same
weakness as any one-time pad has: if you can gain access to the pad and copy it,
the entire system is compromised until a new pad is created and
distributed.
Also note that to be a one-time pad you need a new piece of
glass for each message, or at least you need to not use any part of the glass
you've already used for a message and you'll need a new glass when you run out
of unused spots on the old one. The moment you use the same part of the glass to
encrypt 2 different messages, that part of the key can be recovered. [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, May 21 2013 @ 07:37 PM EDT |
Or if not Shannon, then Murphy. This is a comparatively large
mechanical device processing signals in spaces about the
size of light wavelength. The noise introduced by the process
is obvious in the examples, and about what I'd expect. It may
be OK for ascii text, but is obviously a work in progress.
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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