Most of the judges found that the method was abstract and
non-statutory.
Claim 33 plainly recites a process. The issue
presented then becomes whether that process amounts to no more than a
patent-ineligible abstract idea. As described, the first step in that analysis
requires identifying the abstract idea represented in the claim. The methods
claimed here draw on the abstract idea of reducing settlement risk by effecting
trades through a third-party intermediary (here, the supervisory institution)
empowered to verify that both parties can fulfill their obligations before
allowing the exchange—i.e., a form of escrow. CLS describes that concept as
“fundamental and ancient,” but the latter is not determinative of the question
of abstractness.
Even venerable concepts, such as risk hedging in
commodity transactions, see Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231, were once unfamiliar,
just like the concepts inventors are unlocking at the leading edges of
technology today. But whether long in use or just recognized, abstract ideas
remain abstract. The concept of reducing settlement risk by facilitating a trade
through third-party intermediation is an abstract idea because it is a
“disembodied” concept,
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (en banc), a basic building block of human ingenuity, untethered from any
real-world application. Standing alone, that abstract idea is not
patent-eligible subject matter.
The analysis therefore turns to
whether the balance of the claim adds “significantly more.” Apart from the idea
of third-party intermediation, the claim’s substantive limitations require
creating shadow records, using a computer to adjust and maintain those shadow
records, and reconciling shadow records and corresponding exchange institution
accounts through end-of-day transactions. None of those limitations adds
anything of substance to the claim.
First, the requirement for
computer implementation could scarcely be introduced with less specificity; the
claim lacks any express language to define the computer’s participation. In a
claimed method comprising an abstract idea, generic computer automation of one
or more steps evinces little human contribution. There is no specific or
limiting recitation of essential, see SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
601 F.3d 1319, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2010), or improved computer technology, see
Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 865, 868–69 (Fed.
Cir. 2010), and no reason to view the computer limitation as anything but
“insignificant post-solution activity” relative to the abstract
idea
The inventive concept is in the method: it cannot be in the
machine, because the machine is scarcely specified. If the method contains the
inventive concept and is an abstract idea, as the judges found, no amount of
existing computer hardware changes that fact.
As I said, "That is only
true if the invented method is not one of the judicial exclusions. Otherwise,
claims drawn to a system are not transformed into statutory subject
matter."
From your comment, I take it that you disagree with the
decision that the method is abstract, but I do not and I make my argument on the
basis of the decision.br ---
Regards
Ian Al
Software Patents: It's the disclosed functions in the patent, stupid! [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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