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| Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, April 27 2013 @ 03:16 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/Comes-2132.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2132<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<h2>Meeting Minutes</h2>
<p>
<b>Called By:</b> Dave Miller<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Microsoft Conference Call<br />
<b>Date:</b> 08/18/94<br />
<b>Time:</b> 11:00am PST<br />
<b>Location:</b> Walnut Creek, Provo (F231, 801-429-2644), Redmond
(206-936-2238)<br />
<b>Time:</b> 10:00am PST;<br />
<b>Attendees:</b> Ben Hendrick, Dawn Drake, Dave Miller, Diana
Murry, Teny Alquist, Marie
McDougal
</p>
<p>
1) Diana has accepted a new position as the group manager of the on-line
services organisation at
Microsoft. Next week will be her last conference call. Her most probable
replacement at this time is Paul
Statton.
</p>
<p>
2) The beta agreement has been signed, and copies for everyone on the list will
go out Fed-x today.
</p>
<p>
3) Microsoft would prefer that we use one person to funnel through for support.
The will accept one per
group but not over 10 groups. Frankly, Diana would not give an exact number of
how many support
contacts Microsoft will accommodate from Novell for current and future betas.
She asked that most of
the issues be done over the alias NOVSUP. Phone call issues need to be funneled
through a contact.
</p>
<p>
4) Novell is automatically on the beta list for M6.2 release of Chicago. They
ship the beta copies in
"waves." Diana said we should get our copy within the week. Because we
are on the beta list, we also
should be receiving the updates. Diana would not confirm any time frame for how
often they are
releasing updates.
</p>
<p>
5) The statement in PC week by Jim Alcin about NTS 3.5 going to manufacturing
September 21, 1994 is
correct. Diana said that they would ship early October "give or take two
weeks."
</p>
<p>
6) Microsoft asked why they had not received a beta copy of 4.1 since it began
shipping as of August 15,
1994. It was explained that we are not doing our mass beta ship until September.
They will get a copy of
the beta then and we will do about an eight week cycle. Microsoft will need a
license for this beta and
Rob Hicks is working on this.
</p>
<p>
7) Can Novell get a copy of NTS. Diana said that this was part of the discussion
going on with the upper
management from both companies. Novell requested that if we cant get the NTS
software, then can we
get the documentation?
</p>
<p>
8) Some of the file names between the two companies are the same but have
different functions.
Example: NetWare DRV. For Novell is does commands such as capture, map, and send
messages
over the net. For Microsoft it handles requests and passes them on to the
appropriate places. The two
companies need to coordinate file names. Novell is asking Microsoft to change
their file names.
</p>
<p>
9) Terry Ahlquist is requesting a complete feature spec for Daytona.
</p>
<p>
10) Discussion about bundling in Chicago. This has been discussed previously.
Need to work with
Diana's replacement on this. At this point, until the license agreement for the
redirector source is signed
by Novell ("which probably won't happen"), it is not possble per
Microsoft that the redirector will be
bundled. The agreement is hung up in legal. There is a contamination issue
dealing with Novell wanting
to support multiple platforms. From a technical standpoint Novell cannot wait
for this legal battle to be
solved. Diana stated that as long as it was a multiple platform issue, the tech
support people could not
talk with Novell. She suggests sending inquiries through NOVSUP. They may get
answered and they
may not depending upon what is it.
</p>
<p>
11) Beta agreements. There used to be an open beta agreement between Microsoft
and Novell in which
addendum's could be added to according to Diana. For some reason that agreement
lapsed as of
December 1993. Diana is going to work on building a new agreement that both
companies can agree to.
This hopefully will save the hassle of going through getting agreements signed
for every beta release for
both companies.
</p>
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, April 27 2013 @ 03:34 PM EDT |
http://antitrust.slated.org/www.iowaconsumercase.org/122106/PLEX0_2448.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2448<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Bill Gates [billg]<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, January 05, 1996 2:18 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> Joachim Kempin<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Brad Silverberg; Brad Chase; John Ludwig; Steve Ballmer;
Cameron Myhrvold; Russell
Siegelman; Nathan Myhrvold; Pete Higgins; Paul Maritz<br />
<b>Subject:</b> OEMs and the Internet
</p>
<p>
Winning Internet browser share is a very very important goal for us.
</p>
<p>
Apparently a lot of OEMs are bundling non-Microsoft browsers and coming up
with offerings together with Internet Service providers that get displayed
on their machines in a FAR more prominent way than MSN or our Internet
browser.
</p>
<p>
I would like to see an analysis of the top OEMs of what they are doing with
browsers.
</p>
<p>
I would like to understand what we need to do to convince OEMS to focus on
our browser. Is our problem proving our technology and its capability? Is
our problem that they are getting bounty fees by having internet service
providers pay them a sum or a royalty on the business they get? Is a 3.1
browser a key issue for them?
</p>
<p>
If there problem is getting an easy way for customers to click and get to
their home page we can provide that as a feature of Internet explorer and
make it very easy to set up in the OPK.
</p>
<p>
We really need you to explain to use OEM thinking about browsers and what we
need to do. Sometime in the next few weeks I would like to see some
analysis.
</p>
<p>
Promoting our Internet 2.0 browser to Oems and helping them see our
commitment to leadership is very important.
</p>
<p>
Ideally we would also get them to exploit our browser on their web sites.
Maybe we could incent them by having a page in the Windows95 tree that
reference licensees home pages if they are enhanced for IE.
</p>
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, April 27 2013 @ 04:01 PM EDT |
http://antitrust.slated.org/www.iowaconsumercase.org/122106/PLEX0_2722.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2722<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Paul Maritz<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, June 18, 1997 10:26 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Steve Balmer; Brad Chase; Rich Tong; Anthony Bay; Greg
Maffei; Bob Herbold; John
Ludwig; David Cole; Chris Phillips<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Cory Van Arsdale (LCA)<br />
<b>Subject:</b> PN deal - CONFIDENTIAL: attny client confidential
</p>
<p>
We signed a somewhat unorthodox deal with Rob Glaser/Progressive Networks last
night. Since there is a five day
"unwind" period (to get final regulatory checks done) knowledge of
this must be kept very tight. Don't fwd to anyone
without asking first. Also, as you can imagine, Robg wants to manage
announcement of this to his team himself and not
have things leak. We have similar concern.
</p>
<p>
The essence is that we have bought PN's latest (version 4.0) standard Real
Audio/Real Video code base (source and
binary, client & server, all platforms) for $30M in cash and $30M in
investment (10%) in PN, this includes the right to use
the marks. We have an irrevocable license with "rights equivalent to
ownership". The deal is non-exclusive, but includes
a money-back (but not the code) provision if PN does source license with another
party <em>PRIVILEGED MATERIAL
REDACTED</em> We have right at our option (for additional fee) to take
another snapshot in year, and another a year after that.
</p>
<p>
Rob's stated plan is that he will get out of the base streaming media platform
business, and focus on higher level
solutions, hosting, and content aggregation, and says that his goal is now to
get us to get his base technology as
widespread as possible.
</p>
<p>
Davidcol - deal includes requirement that we ship PN client whenever we ship
Netshow client, until these become the
same.<br />
Chris Phillips - deal includes requirement that we promptly conclude the
DirectShow/ASF contract.
</p>
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, April 27 2013 @ 05:36 PM EDT |
http://antitrust.slated.org/www.iowaconsumercase.org/122106/PLEX0_2669.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2669<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
To: Bradsi, Paulma, Steveb, Billg<br />
From: brade<br />
Cc: mikeheb, yusufm, johnlu, davidcol, johnlu, bherbold, jimall, peteh, jeffr,
richt<br />
Date: 3'13'1997<br />
Subject: Browser and email share - Key focuses for FY98
</p>
<p>
At the executive retreat we spent alot of time on the key competitive threats to
our platform. One of the
areas we did not talk as much about is an ongoing threat to our platform and
office leadership that many
throughout the company have recognized for a while, specifically the
collaboration and browser areas.
While clearly there is still a focus here, I want to raise some of these issues
from the sales and marketing
perspective to provide a forum for debate as we head into the WWSMM and
determine our priorities for
the next fiscal year.
</p>
<p>
<i>30% share can't go to our heads</i><br />
Last year, and before that, we went on a jihad as we saw the threat to our
platform from Netscape
Navigator. The development team cranked, building a better browser than
Netscape, and I was chartered to
build a marketing effort to match. Yusufm and his team have done a great job. I
also got help from jeffr as
he agreed that a browser share drive was a good idea since the field is not
otherwise compensated for IE
wins. WW teams kicked in too. We have made terrific progress. Our WW share is
around 30% and
perhaps higher. We have mindshare with developers. Most webmasters do not
build a website or intranet
application without factoring in Internet Explorer.
</p>
<p>
However, what worries me is that many people think we have already won the
battle. For all the obvious
reasons, such a notion is dangerous and untrue. Netscape share is still twice
ours. It is easier for them to
promote their APIs and for that matter their own or, assuming they align in key
areas, sun's java APIs. For
this reason alone we need to continue our jihad next year. Browser share needs
to remain a key priority for
our field and marketing efforts. Until we have alot more share it is very
difficult to successfully get
adoption of our new platform initiatives. It is also worth noting that while IE
is cross platform, its strength
particularly with IE 4, lies with win32. A strong IE push will help build more
excitement and value for
Windows against NCs, Java and our other platform competitors.
</p>
<p>
Of course Netscape is not standing still. Their browser is improving with
Communicator and though it is
not a spectacular release it is better than IE 3 and could be available 3-6
months before we have IE 4.
Moreover, Constellation, if done right, will be a further threat to our
leadership of the desktop and extend
Netscape's influence over UI and key APIs. Netscape will want to populate its
new APIs in Communicator
and Constellation and so I expect them to be aggressive, yet another reason that
we keep our share drive
and intensity on the browser at the same level we have this past year.
</p>
<p>
<i>Browser morphs to mail</i><br />
However, the browser battle in not confined to the browser. The new browser
battle includes email. Email
is becoming the creation and viewing of web pages - ad hoc web page
distribution. I author email and will
create forms in html; I send web pages. etc. Consequently, with email, we not
only influence the standards
for mail protocol (SMTP, POP3, and IMAP) but also standards for content formats,
content distribution
and application development.
</p>
<p>
In addition to the technical ties, email share will drive browser share and visa
versa because the two are
packaged together. Netscape can help its browser effort by getting people hooked
on Netscape Mail and we
can do the same with a focus on 0utlook Express.
</p>
<p>
Not surprisingly, email is the fastest growing application category in both the
business and consumer
segments. A couple of key data points:
</p>
<ul>
<li>In the LAN email segment (all LORG and MORG, and 1/2 of SORG) we
forecast the number of active
email clients to double by the end of FY2000, from approximately 76MM to 155M.
Our installed base
mail client share is approximately 15% today.</li>
<li>Today Internet mail makes up 32% of the total email client market.
This market is predominantly
consumers and SORGs. in this segment, the number of email clients will more than
triple, from
approximately 50MM to 150MM in the same timeframe. Our share is approximately
9% today.</li>
</ul>
<p>
Any Office suite in the near future will have mail as its core component. As
email use becomes more
pervasive in organizations, it will replace Word (and by extension Office) as
the most critical end user app
in organizations. That is already true at many places (like Microsoft). Outlook
is a key part of the value
proposition for Office 97, and this will only increase significantly in the
future.
</p>
<p>
Netscape and Lotus are successfully driving a value shift in the minds of
customers towards the notion of
collaboration, and attacking the email space where we have low share, low
awareness and no clearly
articulated product marketing and selling strategy today. Just like they are
doing with our platform today.
Netscape will try to use email and the browser as a Trojan horse into the
productivity apps and workgroup
space.
</p>
<p>
Of course, Netscape is also using its browser leadership and server products to
try and drive revenue from
the enterprise. In addition, Netscape has a big opportunity to turn their
consumer browser share into a
substantial revenue stream with Communicator. Convincing consumer users to pay
$49 or so for a great
internet mail application with the name Netscape on it will be alot easier than
convincing large enterprises
to deploy the Netscape infrastructure widely. I expect Netscape to adapt their
strategy to take advantage of
this opportunity.
</p>
<p>
Lotus is leveraging their workgroup and email strength to bridge workgroup and
web publishing. Both are
attempting commoditize the OS and productivity app market and change the playing
field from
browsing/productivity to email/collaboration. This threatens more than Windows
as I have discussed. The
threat of continued low mail client share in organizations and with consumers is
that our competitors gain a
foothold on the desktop, where they can switch existing Office to their
solution, stall upgrades, and
probably most importantly drive server share with a cohesive client-server
solution.
</p>
<p>
To be fair their position and strategy has many holes as well. Netscape
Communicator has weaknesses
versus IE 4 and if we do a good job customers will understand that Communicator
is overall less capable
internet/collaboration client than IE and that integrating the browser with the
OS solves many user
problems. In addition, today Netscape has no productivity story. We also need
to communicate that
Netscape is not even in the game in real collaboration where Office/Exchange and
Notes/Domino compete.
</p>
<p>
Lotus has a confused email client strategy and we can try to position them as
having no Internet client,
inferior productivity apps, and a solution appropriate only for the high end of
the workgroup spectrum,
whereas Office + Exchange is a superior departmental collaboration solution.
</p>
<p>
Nonetheless, it's critical that we maintain our focus on gaining browser share
and add new focus to gain a
lead in email share before Netscape and Lotus can further improve their
positions. By doing this we can
thwart Netscape and Lotus and their threat to our platform and office
leadership. Consequently we can
grow the Office installed base and drive adoption of strategic Microsoft
standards.
</p>
<p>
<i>What we need to do</i><br />
There are some key sales and marketing efforts, many obvious, that I recommend:
</p>
<ul>
<li>Browser share needs to be a top priority around the world. Marketing
budgets, including mine, should
be budgeted about equal to this year (we are doing a bottom's up IE budget now,
last year including
some drg type efforts I was around $69M).</li>
<li>IE 4 should be at the center of our IEU focus for FY 98. It is our
most exciting end user product this
fiscal year and we can use it to also push Office and Outlook and even NT
5.</li>
<li>Windows integration is an important win for our customers. We should
emphasize it. Memphis will
have IE 4 as its foundation and Outlook Express will be the default email
client. We can also push the
interest Windows users will have in improvements to Windows.</li>
<li>We should do Internet share drive II with the field to keep mindshare
on an area where they are not
otherwise compensated for success.</li>
<li>We need to articulate a coherent and compelling collaboration vision,
and have a focused sales force
armed with training, tools and evidence. Building on a paulma idea, I recommend
an Intranet day II
between June and September with a key goal being the articulation of our
collaboration vision and
directions. We have weaknesses versus Notes today. I assume we figure these out.
We need to then
articulate where we are going.</li>
<li>Between Exchange and Office with Outlook, I believe we will already
have an appropriate focus on
enterprise email share. <i>However, we have no focus on consumer email
share.</i> Lets do both and try to
take advantage of a fragmented market before our competitors do. Specifically,
I recommend we build
an aggressive effort to gain email client share in the consumer segment. This
will require marketing SS
and effort and focus with ISPs, and Internet influentials. Groups like the
Internet Customer Unit will
have to sign up to make this a key goal. Today we don't really push to get our
partners shipping and
promoting our mail solutions.</li>
</ul>
<p>
<i>Summary</i><br />
<i>This memo argues that we need to continue to move aggressively to gain
browser share and add a more
intense effort, similar to the browser effort, to gain email client
share.</i> This is necessary to get platform
adoption and protect and grow our client and server platform and applications
businesses. I make some
specific high level recommendations in that regard. Certainly an important part
of this strategy is to drive
purchase of revenue generating apps (primarily Office Upgrades,
Exchange/BackOffice and SQL) though I
spent no time on this since I have little worry about our focus here.
</p>
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