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software HDL is not the physical CPU | 364 comments | Create New Account
Comments belong to whoever posts them. Please notify us of inappropriate comments.
software HDL is not the physical CPU
Authored by: myNym on Tuesday, January 08 2013 @ 10:06 PM EST
For the same reason that a schematic is not a realized
working CPU.

[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]

The CPU is a concrete invention.
Authored by: dio gratia on Tuesday, January 08 2013 @ 11:37 PM EST
I agree that it is unlikely that I could invent a CPU that is novel, but if somebody does invent a novel, non-obvious CPU; then the HDL expression of the new CPU would be software and perhaps worthy of patent protection.
How is software patentable? MPEP 2106, I. THE FOUR CATEGORIES OF STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER , Non-limiting examples of claims that are not directed to one of the statutory categories: " vi. a computer program per se, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 72;".
A summary of the four categories of invention, as they have been defined by the courts, are:
i. Process – an act, or a series of acts or steps. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70, 175 USPQ 673, ___ (1972) ("A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing." (emphasis added) (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788, 24 L. Ed. 139, 1877 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 242 (1876)); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316, 75 USPQ2d 1763, ___(Fed. Cir. 2005) ("A process is a series of acts." (quoting Minton v. Natl. Ass’n. of Securities Dealers, 336 F.3d 1373, , 336 F.3d 1373, 1378, 67 USPQ2d 1614, ___ (Fed. Cir. 2003))). See also 35 U.S.C. 100(b); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 USPQ2d 1001 (2010).

ii. Machine – a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices. Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 570, 17 L. Ed. 650 (1863). This includes every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result. Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267, 14 L. Ed. 683 (1854).

iii. Manufacture – an article produced from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by handlabor or by machinery. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308, 206 USPQ 193, ___ (1980) (emphasis added) (quoting Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11, 51 S. Ct. 328, 75 L. Ed. 801, 1931 (Dec. Comm'r Pat. 711 (1931))).

iv. Composition of matter – all compositions of two or more substances and all composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids, for example. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.

Software by its self falls within none of the four statutory categories. It can be a component of a machine as in embedded computer producing a certain effect or result. Beauregard claims have fallen in disfavor ( Federal Circuit Rules Beauregard Claims are Unpatentable, see Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc. (PDF, 129 KB)). Software on a substrate isn't novel nor is it a process "an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing", the subject matter being abstract (symbols), without being a component of a machine not providing any fixation. Process claims require either a machine or transformation, or the applicant shouldering the burden of proof of eligibility.

By itself software should be vulnerable to the printed matter doctrine (See the first sentence of SEMIOTICS 101: TAKING THE PRINTED MATTER DOCTRINE SERIOUSLY Kevin Emerson Collins, PDF 514KB, "Roughly formulated, contemporary printed matter doctrine prevents the patenting of information recorded on a substrate when the point of novelty of the invention resides in the content of that information."). Your CPU design would certainly be afforded copyright protection for those elements eligible. It's not an article of manufacture, new composition of matter, a machine ("a concrete thing consisting of parts or certain devices and combination of devices"), nor a composition of matter.

An idea can be patented only when novel and useful ( MPEP 2107, II. EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR THE UTILITY REQUIREMENT, “useful invention” (“utility”) requirement, "(2) Ensure that the claims define statutory subject matter (i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or improvement thereof)". Software by itself isn't useful. The CPU itself can be novel and useful, a machine worthy of patent protection. The software can only be a component.

Making the software eligible by itself would have various deleterious effects. An analyzed, elaborated and simulated VHDL model is not a concrete thing. Running it as a virtual machine (a simulation) is not a concrete thing. Should we be vulnerable to patents in Second Life?

Protecting software in and of itself is the domain either of copyright or trade secret.

Sorry if it was not clear. I *AM* directly equating the software HDL with the physical CPU.
This is called semiosis, in semiotics merging the sign with the thing it signifies, a form of word magic equating the abstract (the sign, your software) with something concrete (the CPU). I'm a CPU designer, a chip guy, a VHDL guru and write CAD tools as a hobby. To successfully produce silicon we require semiosis, that our specification, behavioral and structural models and implementation prove equivalent. I don't have a working chip without doing so, failing formal proof covering device physics. With FPGAs we can skip some of the intermediate equivalency proofs because of low 'manufacturing' risk.

Your model description describes behavior and isn't the behavior itself. A reason for not using UML to describe patents, being objected oriented and enabling merging of sign and referent in a manner worthy of Plato's 'the name is the thing'. Names are abstracts and not concrete.

[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]

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