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| Authored by: Anonymous on Monday, December 31 2012 @ 07:24 PM EST |
"However, if I understand you correctly, you are using that to argue that a
machine that replaces the mind's work should be considered the same as a machine
that replaces the body's work."
Not at all. I argue that there's a good chance that, just because the brain can
be made to mimic the computational output of a machine (albeit slower and
probably with more mistakes), that won't invalidate the patentability of the
machine any more than the body being made to mimic the physical output of a
machine.
The distinction is subtle, but real. As others have pointed out, simulation (by
computer) of a process is not the process. Neither is simulation (by brain) of
the process.
I'm not arguing against the supremes, or at least you haven't shown that I
have.
The fact that something that can be done either with a mental process or via a
computer does not make that computation a mental process. The map is not the
territory, especially when the computation is part of a larger whole.
Otherwise, you have to throw out Diamond, and it will certainly be interesting
to see if the supremes go there.
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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| Authored by: Ian Al on Tuesday, January 01 2013 @ 06:10 AM EST |
| Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus brings out all of the previous
citations to which we often refer and includes your quotations as well. It is
well worth a permanent bookmark in your browser. ---
Regards
Ian Al
Software Patents: It's the disclosed functions in the patent, stupid! [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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