|
|
|
| Authored by: JesseW on Monday, December 31 2012 @ 12:37 AM EST |
Teresa Jennings
<hr>
<p>
From: Bill Gates<br/>
To: Bernard Vergnes; Brad Silverberg; Chris Peters; Jeff Raikes: Jonathan
Lazarus;<br/>
Lewis Levin; Mike Brown; Mike Maples; Mike Murray; Paul Maritz; Pete
Higgins;<br/>
Steve Ballmer<br/>
Cc: Bill Neukom; Steven Sinofsky<br/>
Subject: Two Companies with Business Focus<br/>
Date: Sunday, April 25, 1993 2:10PM<br/>
</p><p>
THIS is a very confidential memo.
</p><p>
I have a major concern that our sales force is too focused on our system
products and that we dont really
generate activites based on profit potential. Does our sales investment go
primarily into increasing OFFICE
share? I havent seen many clever ideas for increasing OFFICE share for a long
long time I doubt that our
sales investment (over $1 per year including everything) is really focused or
clever. I think we could do a
lot better as suggested by this memo. I am not saying we should split but we can
have the benefits
without spitting or without any major reorganization.
</p><p>
If we split systems and applications into 2 truly seperate companies. What would
be different? I am not
saying we should do this or that I am even considering it but rather I want
people to consider what the
strategies would be.
</p><p>
First take the system company. It has decided to use OEM sales at low prices as
its totally channel for new
users. The volume it drives thru the oem channel insures that the users it
misses in this channel and its
upgrade products will have high demand so it does not have a retail sales force.
It has 3 very focused and
fairly small (<15O each) sales groups: 1) OEM sales - a lot like what we have
today. 2) ISV evangelism and
3) "Server sellers". Groups 2 & 3 meet directly with very few
customers - no EBC and no account plans.
Any account that is a problem must stem from an ISV that group 2 needs to work
on or something in
group 3. The systems group has a headquarters operation that assembles task
forces to look into segments
of the markets where our products are not dominant. Because there is a fast
moving task force mentality
with a budget and leverage thru outside consultants there have been attack plans
for 4 specific markets
are assembled per year - examples include: K-12 education, OTP, As/400, and
banking. Once a market is
fixed the group moves on. All of those plans set measurable results for the
various 'sales groups' and
these objectives are reviewed. The marketing budget of the systems group is very
small focused on: new
product introductions and the task force goals. All of the seminars it does are
break even and very
leveraged thru 3rd parties. All of its ISV activities and education out reach
are break even or profitable -
very little course delivery and lots of certification. It does gather an end
user name list for direct mailing
upgrade information. It does not attend a show unless it has a major new product
introduction or a task
force tells it to. The "server seller" group is not vaguely defined
around solution selling - it is defined
around selling servers. It has group events for the people who sell servers all
the time and it is in a clear
feedback loop. Vague words like "client-server" do not confuse this
group. This systems company does has
a VERY small support organization since it pays 3rd parties to handle the surge
of new introductions and
only 30-90 days free support. Because of this it really trains a lot of people
before every new release.
This company does not have an executive briefing center or a subsidiary presence
in most countries of the
world. It has determined that platforms standards in countries outside the US,
Europe and Japan will be
set based on what happens in those countries. The server seller group uses a lot
of 3rd party relationships
in various countries. Total headcount outside the US is less than Compaq: 400
people from the 3 sales
force groups. Financial systems for this company are simple. Since the systems
software upgrade business
has such peaks and valleys manufacturing is mostly outside. This company would
have 5 standard
speeches updated regularly - where is our system going, how we connect to other
systems, why our
servers are better, how/why to develop for our platform, how we work with OEMs.
This company is easy
for the press to understand. It is highly profitable since support, sales,
marketing and other overheads are
kept very low. Development cost is its primary expense and it has a task force
on each of the following
topics: tools for developing more efficiently with lot of shared ideas, making
testing less headcount
intensive, how to do a "release" every 12 months on a predictable
basis with every other release being
maior [2 hardware design points at all times - today it would be 4megabytes and
16megabytes], getting all
documentation on line, doing all support on line. Most corporate customers have
an annual contract that
lets them get all the upgrades on all of their machines. When products do not
sell the response is not some
sales force thing but rather a focus on getting the product right. This company
does not advertise in the
business press except for alliance announcements or major introductions.
</p><p>
[In a major simplification I am skipping the tools business altogether in this
analysis. It is focused on the
mass of developers and has a very small sales force]
</p><p>
Now lets take the applications business. Its primary focus is high market share
in primary categories by
selling OFFICE. This company also does not have an Executive briefing center
since it focuses on design
wins for OFFICE that are commonly done at lower levels. It only works with
retail outlets when it can get a
specific competitive advantage by doing so. It has high enough share that it
doesnt have to work with
people to get stocking or to talk about normal course of business issues. The
reduction is retail outlets has
allowed it to be very focused. Its products are popular enough that retailers
like Egghead participate in all
major initiatives. Walking into a store this company has spent time with shows a
noticeable difference. This
company wakes up every day and says "how do we avoid people thinking of our
product and the
competitions as interchangable? All of its marketing and technical work focus
around this goal. When this
companies executives give speeches they start with exciting concepts but they
quickly focus on the
competitive advantage. It is amazing how many exciting demonstrations this
company can give of its
upcoming products. This company is not held back by puritanical views about
showing the future since by
the time something is shipping it is old news and now covered and the
competition can already
demonstrate many of the same features in that time frame. A few zingers are kept
under the covers until
shipment for 2 reasons: a) to spread out the news so that both the early reveal
innovations and the ones at
shipment get coverage and b) so that a few things competition does not imitate.
This company has also
gone to a 12~24 month cycle for its products showing brilliance in tying its
work to the exciting work the
systems company is doing. This company has managed to convince the systems
company to ship applets
using exactly the same filee forms and command structure as the ones in the
maior applications so it is
natural for people to use these applications. It is amazing the great
presentations this company gives
about: support issues and how the new product responds to those, examples of
users working with
advanced features and the future of the categories.[note: I still cant get
decent slides out of our
applications group]. This company does not have account coverage on a regular
basis at all. They spend
time with accounts when there is an opportunity to get them to switch. For
example they have a huge
focus on companies that have no moved their standards up to Windows. This
company loves showing
customers how we read the competitions files and are a superset of them. This
company understands the
economics of its competitors. This company knows the research that will affect
its products. The support
policies of this company are tuned for one thing: competitive advantage. It does
not spend money on
support things that cannot be proven by credible 3rd parties to be worthwhile
things. This company has
subset products to use for OEM deal but it also has a presentation for the press
or oems saying how hard
bundle deals are not that great for the customer. This company also has a
reduced presence in the field
since people dont bother it with lots of random questions - only questions about
its products. It is easy to
have a sales force know all the answers to the top questions about these
products. When a product does
not sell the focus is on getting the product right rather than spending more
marketing money on it. This
company does not advertise in the business press except for a major alliance or
product introduction. The
company relishes getting backing unique to it because it is thinking
competitively. This company has the
same kind of "vertical" approach as the systems company however these
is somewhat more permanent
staff because once you win in a category it doesnt stay won as easily as
systems. This company knows
which market segments it is strong in and which ones it is weak in.
</p>
---
(Contact me for comment licensing, e.g. GPL, CC, PD, etc.)[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: JesseW on Monday, December 31 2012 @ 01:04 AM EST |
From: Bill Veghte<br/>
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 1998 5:53 PM<br/>
To: Jonathan Roberts; Adam Taylor; Kurt Kolb; Carl Gulledge; Carl Stork
(Exchange); Moshe Dunie<br/>
Subject: RE: Win9x price point<br/>
<p>
Good.. just wanted to make sure we were all in agreement on this.
</p>
<p>
-----Original Message-----<br/>
From: <b>Jonathan Roberts</b><br/>
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 1998 3:03 PM<br/>
To: Bill Veghte; Adam Taylor; Kurt Kolb; Carl Gulledge; Carl Stork (Exchange);
Moshe Dunie<br/>
Subject: RE: Win9x price point
</p><p>
I think everyone agrees with everything you say. We would absolutely never drop
price unless absolutely forced to do
so. We modeled it only to be conservative. Correct on the second point as well,
98=98.
</p><p>
Jonathan
</p><p>
-----Original Message-----<br/>
From: Bill Veghte<br/>
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 1998 8:44 AM<br/>
To: Jonathan Roberts; Adam Taylor; Kurt Kolb; Carl Gulledge; Carl Stork
(Exchange); Moshe Dunie<br/>
Subiect: Win9x price point
</p><p>
In the 3YO yesterday, we said that Win9x drops in FY00 to $47 and down to $42 in
FY01 (factoring in MDA so it is
net price). I know we did this to be conservative in the base case but I don't
understand why we would do that in
real world. First, in the model this price erosion costs us on the order of $774
million according to your numbers.
Second, price is another lever that will encourage or discourage movement to NT.
The lower we drop the price of
Win9x. the bigger the price delta to an NT offering.
</p><p>
As a sidenote, I assume at a minimum, with Win98, we are getting comparable to
Win95 price point when those
bits were fresh?
---
(Contact me for comment licensing, e.g. GPL, CC, PD, etc.)[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
- Comes-2841 - Authored by: PJ on Monday, December 31 2012 @ 09:26 AM EST
| |
| Authored by: JesseW on Monday, December 31 2012 @ 05:37 PM EST |
<i>Transcriber's note: I left out the last dozen lines of a table, without
the header or context, that was here. See the PDF if needed.</i>
<p>
From johnen Tue Dec 17 10:43:23 1991<br/>
To: bradsi<br/>
Cc: davidcol<br/>
Subject: quark<br/>
Date: Tue Dec 17 10:32:17 PDT 1991
</p><p>
According to kalak - the database shows the following two
people at Quark getting the beta:
</p><p>
#01830 Anthony Anderson<br/>
#03028 Chris Roueche
</p><p>
####################################################### 473<br/>
From sergiop Tue Dec 17 10:52:07 1991<br/>
To: dwgroup<br/>
Cc: garype kathyg richardf sergiop<br/>
Subject: a major design win for ms-dos and windows<br/>
Date: Tue Dec 17 10:49:41 PDT 1991
</p><p>
One of our oem account managers, Gary Perez, closed a deal yesterday
with EMI, a customer that DRI has been touting aggressively in the press
as a key strategic partner, for $19.3M over three years!!
</p><p>
The terms:<br/>
250K units per year<br/>
MS-DOS and Windows<br/>
MS applications
</p><p>
This deal is a major victory for us. EMI is aggressive in the mass
merchant channel and with the shift in distribution channels toward
the mass merchant we are coming closer every day to having Windows
on every PC with deals like those we sign with EMI!!!
</p><p>
Great job Gary!!
</p>
<i>Transcriber's note: I left out the beginning of another email here. See
the PDF if needed.</i>
---
(Contact me for comment licensing, e.g. GPL, CC, PD, etc.)[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
- PX05423 - Authored by: PJ on Monday, December 31 2012 @ 05:57 PM EST
|
|
|
|
