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| Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, December 30 2012 @ 06:34 PM EST |
So despite the fact that we (the proverbial we) have known how to do something
previously -- such as calculate the amount of force to apply to the brakes on a
vehicle so as to minimize skidding -- the fact that "a computer" can
now perform the calculations in a timely enough fashion to effectively
accomplish the task means the process should be patentable?
Isn't that just a matter of degree? Should a procedure that was known in the
seventies, but never saw any deployment because 1MHz processors weren't fast
enough perform it in a pragmatically useful manner, now become patentable
because an 8GHz processor is fast enough?[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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- Not at all - Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, January 01 2013 @ 02:39 AM EST
- 70s - kHz, not MHz - Authored by: artp on Wednesday, January 02 2013 @ 12:05 AM EST
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, December 30 2012 @ 06:40 PM EST |
I haven't looked at the steam engine patents, but the Cotton
Gin patent is very specific - you as a person could NOT do
IN THE MANNER DESCRIBED what the Cotton Gin does. That's
because it does NOT just say "clean cotton" - it specifies
rollers, meshes, sharp barbs, etc, all powered by a rotating
wheel.
THAT'S a patent. Virtually all software patents attempt to
patent the RESULT (the screen bounces, the screen unlocks,
etc), NOT the mechanisms (which is the computer code that is
math).[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Monday, December 31 2012 @ 06:52 PM EST |
You state:
Unless you're arguing here for the existence of a
soul, your brain physically performs work just like your body, but of a
different kind.
You are absolutely correct that the brain performs
work of a different kind to the body.
However, if I understand you
correctly, you are using that to argue that a machine that replaces the mind's
work should be considered the same as a machine that replaces the body's
work.
I view that incorrect. From the ruling in Mayo v
Prometheus the Supreme Court stated such things as:
Page 5 of the
PDF:
Section 101 of the Patent Act defines patentable subject
matter. It says:
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C S101
The Court has long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception. "[L]aws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not patentable.
Page 5
into Page 6:
Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law
that E=MC2; nor could Newton have patented the Law of gravity. Such
discoveries are 'manifestations of ... nature, free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.'"
Page 6:
"Phenomena of nature,
though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work."
Bolding mine.
I agree with the
Supreme's and disagree with your suggestion that "mental thoughts are work and
should therefore be patentable if replaced with a
machine".
Remember:
It's not just me you're arguing against,
you're arguing against the Supreme's.
And I don't know where to
officially find the info, but word is you're arguing against a unanimous
decision by the Supreme's.
RAS[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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| Authored by: PolR on Tuesday, January 01 2013 @ 01:04 PM EST |
I am merely addressing what I perceive to be the fallacy
of
thinking that a computer could never be necessary. The space shuttle employs
fly-by-wire, because it is too unstable to fly without constant computer
correction. All the calculations could, in theory, be done by humans, but the
space shuttle would have crashed with all aboard before the humans had finished
the calculation. So the whole "computer can't be necessary" argument is a
non-starter for a lot of applications. In some applications, people wind
up dead
if you don't use a computer; in others, the task is simply not worth doing
without computers -- another marker of necessity.
I think there
are two competing issues here. In the space shuttle example we have an invention
outside of the calculations. There is a space shuttle flying. Such a patent
should include the step of actually flying the shuttle. Then it is like the
Diehr rubber curing patent, it claims something more than the mathematical
calculations. On the other hand if flying the shuttle is not claimed then it is
not necessary to fly the shuttle to infringe on the claim. So I would say the
need to fly objection stands only when the act of flying is actually
claimed.
But we may also consider the abstraction mathematicians make when
defining the concept of mathematical algorithm. They ignore the real life
limitations and assume there is unlimited time to compute and unlimited space to
write the symbols while carrying out the task. Then the argument is not whether
the computer is actually needed. It is that the computation is a mathematical
algorithm because in making that determination the rules of mathematics say that
the need for a computer to overcome practical limitations must be
ignored.
If we insist that real-life limitations must be taken into
consideration for legal purposes we get the absurd result the addition of two
numbers is not abstract mathematics unless the numbers are small enough to be
added by live humans within reasonable time. Adding numbers with a precision of
one trillion digits is not abstract mathematics by that standard but it clearly
is.
This is an argument that works when the claim recites just the
calculation and the device used to compute. Put in a step to cure rubber or fly
a shuttle and we do more than the calculations. The algorithm is mathematical
but the claim as a whole covers more than that. [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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