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The electronic voting machine: way too complicated | 224 comments | Create New Account
Comments belong to whoever posts them. Please notify us of inappropriate comments.
The electronic voting machine problem, again
Authored by: Anonymous on Monday, November 05 2012 @ 11:47 PM EST
Unfortunately, if your suggestion was to be implemented it would cause a problem
in a different but related domain: there would no longer be any ballot secrecy.

Any method that allows an official receipt of a vote to be taken out of the
polling place allows for the verification of buying, selling, and coercion of
votes. A much simpler and cheaper way to achieve what you want would be to
return to the oral ballot, however, that was abolished everywhere that it was
used for a reason.

There seems to be no reasonable way to preserve both ballot security and secrecy
with any electronic system that has been proposed anywhere in the world.
Estonia does have an interesting way of preserving ballot secrecy, but like any
other electronic system, it is still vulnerable to attacks on system security.

[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]

The electronic voting machine: way too complicated
Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, November 06 2012 @ 12:30 AM EST
My belief is that electronic voting machines themselves are a solution looking for a problem. And they are not well-suited to the problem of accurately recording verifiable votes.

I live in Colorado, and cast my by mail-in paper ballot. The same stiff-paper forms could be used at in-person polling places, but are not in deference to electronic machines.

The paper ballots make altogether too much sense. They are easy for voters to read and understand how to use, require no voter technology more sophisticated or expensive than a pen or pencil, may be rapidly scanned by electronic scanners, and are always permanently available for recount or manual inspection e.g. if the scanner finds extraneous or ambiguous marks.

An electronic voting machine is Really Neat in the same sense as is a digital wristwatch, though no where near as suited for its intended purpose.

Ed L.

[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]

The electronic voting machine problem, again
Authored by: MadTom1999 on Tuesday, November 06 2012 @ 08:11 AM EST
Doesnt solve this Unless the code within the machines is completely open and proven then that can so easily happen

[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]

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