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| Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, November 06 2012 @ 05:40 PM EST |
To be clear I am the anon you just replied to, not the one who started the
thread.
It seems to me that I had in mind the larger problem domain of internet voting
which carries a much greater risk to ballot secrecy. If we're talking about
electronic voting machines used only in controlled polling places it's much
easier to deal with.
Cancelling a ballot shouldn't be such a problem. Although I don't recall the
details at the moment, IIRC both the Swiss and Estonian internet voting systems
should be able to do this without either too much difficulty or loss of secrecy
or integrity. It's absolutely essential to the Estonian system at any rate
since they allow you to change your vote as many times as you like until
election day (I believe) and even allow you to cancel any previous internet vote
by appearing at a polling station to cast a ballot (electronically, of course)
in person. It's a rather simple and effective way of dealing with the ballot
secrecy issue, although I personally don't like the civil liberties and
information security implications of the Estonian system.
Security vulnerabilities relating to the hardware, software, and network are a
whole other ball of wax, though, and remain present.
Oh, and if I'm not mistaken the receipts serve a different purpose than do the
ballot serial numbers: serial numbers are reconciled when the ballots as counted
to ensure that only correctly issued ballots have been counted. ISTM that this
is slightly different than issuing a receipt for later verification at the
behest of voters in the case of a controversy. I'm not even entirely convinced
that a receipt issued to a voter is particularly useful, but I'm persuadable if
it makes sense.
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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