then I defy you to come up with *anything* that a computer, or even a human mind, could do that would not qualify as a physical effect.

Your definition places the entire universe of patentable matter at naught, since abstract and physical are merged into the same unseparated whole; the unpatentable "abstract" must perforce include every physical thing.

I'm sorry, but you don't know what the universe of patentable matter is. It is defined as "any new or useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition thereof, or any new or useful improvement thereof ..." That's quoting straight from the statute, 35 USC 101. Look it up yourself.

And even to the extent that you might have been correct about a physical transformation being required, I submit that transmitting data over a network and displaying it on a computer is a physical transformation other than a mere mental state or an abstract concept.

But more importantly, requiring a physical transformation isn't the law anymore. No less an authority than the Supreme Court has said so -- recently -- and the Supreme Court decision is the controlling law. The exceptions to the four statutory categories are “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Bilski at page 5. Of course, the posting of Internet domains using a server is a mere physical phenomenon best observed in the morning sky between just before sunrise, and it is based on the abstract equation E=mc^3, for sufficiently small values of 3.

Or see page 8 of Bilski:

This Court’s precedents establish that the machine-or- transformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under §101. The machine-or- transformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible “process.”

Mayo v. Prometheus Laboraties doesn't really make things clearer, so if you were able to relate the law in Prometheus to the claims in the patent at issue here, you might be able to make an interesting argument:

The question before us is whether the claims [at issue in Mayo v. Prometheus] do significantly more than simply describe these natural relations. To put the matter more precisely, do the patent claims add enough to their statements of the correlations to allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that [merely] apply natural laws? We believe that the answer to this question is no."

Of course, to use this argument, you will probably have to show that assigning a domain name, operating a server, and delaying publication of the assignment qualify as "applying natural laws." I doubt your arguments will be convincing because they haven't been so far, but maybe someone else's might be.

And you aren't in any position to come barging into PJ's place and demand she answer to you. That's a bit rude.

You shouldn't speak for PJ. She's perfectly willing and able to take care of herself and to engage in a spirited conversation, and I respect her for that. If she doesn't want this conversation to go on, she'll delete it.

A thoughtful, well-reasoned response to a posting will not only provide insight for your readers, but will also increase their respect for your knowledge and abilities. -- Linux Advocacy mini-HOWTO by Paul L. Rogers, v0.4, 6 February 1997.

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