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Authored by: PJ on Saturday, September 22 2012 @ 10:37 PM EDT |
I added three cases to the article now. [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, September 23 2012 @ 12:51 AM EDT |
Including
Separating technical expertise from legal expertise in patent equivalents
EVERY element of a claim must be present for infringement, not just
equivalent functionality, especially when invention is not a pioneer, and
claims are pussyfooting around lots of prior art.
Lots of discussion of the metes and bounds of patent claims, balancing
inventor's versus public rights.
A finding of noninfringement moots a claim of invalidity
The dissent is also interesting...I think a close reading would actually reveal
the law to be self-contradictory. It's also incredibly loong!
(Christenson)
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Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, September 23 2012 @ 02:22 AM EDT |
In re Velvin R. Hogan and Carol K. Hogan,
Case No. 93-58291-MM (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. Dec. 27, 1993)
- To state the obvious is a bankruptcy matter
concerning the jury foreman Velvin Hogan.
United States v. Perkins, 748
F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1984)
- Giving false denials of knowledge and
memory, or evasive answers.
U
nited States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2000)
- Whether
juror could put their personal experience aside and serve impartially.
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Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, September 23 2012 @ 02:36 AM EDT |
United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1989)
- Juror
desired to sit on case that she found intriguing.
- Deliberate
untruthfulness of a potential juror's answer on voir dire.
- Statements
made from one juror to another during the trial exposing the deceit. [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, September 23 2012 @ 02:57 AM EDT |
Rule 606. Juror’s
Competency as a Witness
(b) During an Inquiry into the
Validity of a Verdict or Indictment.
(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other
Evidence. During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a
juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during
the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another
juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or
indictment. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a
juror’s statement on these matters.
I'm curious. Although
I'm trying my hardest not to read into this, in U.S. v. Colombo, a juror made
comments to an alternate during the trial that were later used to strike the
verdict. This rule pertains only to deliberations so maybe anything outside is
fair game and this may be the case here, that things were said before or after
deliberations that are relevant. Hogan seems to be in a precarious situation in
that he will be the author of the destruction of his own glorious
work.
Sigh... I guess I'm not trying hard enough.
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Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, September 23 2012 @ 03:11 AM EDT |
Seagate Tech., Inc. v. Hogan, Case No. MS-93-0919 (Santa Cruz Mun. Ct. June 30,
1993)
Uh-oh, Hogan again. I can't find anything but I can't help but wonder what
Hogan said here.[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, September 23 2012 @ 03:24 AM EDT |
Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.,
206 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2000)
- Bizarre improprieties involving court
staff and juror feeling threatened by comments from another juror. [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, September 23 2012 @ 04:21 AM EDT |
Hard v. Burlington N. R.R., 812 f.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1987)
- Juror
misrepresented himself during voir dire, also the same juror introduced
extraneous and prejudicial information into the jury's deliberations.
-
Regarding evidentiary hearings into jury misconduct,
While
it is not always an abuse of discretion to fail to hold an evidentiary hearing
when faced with allegations of juror misconduct, see Langford, 802 F.2d at 1180,
it is preferable that a hearing be held, id.; United States v. Halbert, 712 F.2d
388, 389 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005, 104 S.Ct. 997, 79 L.Ed.2d
230 (1984). A court is to be guided by the content of the allegations, the
seriousness of the alleged misconduct or bias, and the credibility of the source
in determining whether a hearing must be held. United States v. Hendrix, 549
F.2d 1225, 1227-28 (9th Cir.1977) (citation
omitted).
-Regarding post-verdict interviews, in this
citation by lawyers ,
... post-verdict interviews with the
jurors. While these interviews are not looked on favorably in this circuit, see
Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 941 (9th Cir.1980) (questioning jury about its
internal deliberations or manner in which it arrived at its verdict should be
discouraged); Smith v. Cupp, 457 F.2d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir.) (improper and
unethical for lawyers to interview jurors to discover their course of
deliberation), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880, 93 S.Ct. 208, 34 L.Ed.2d 153 (1972),
Ninth Circuit cases have often considered juror affidavits without discussing
the propriety of post-verdict interviews, see, e.g., United States v. Langford,
802 F.2d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 746
(9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649
(1980). Since we had not joined other courts in holding that evidence acquired
in post-verdict interviews conducted without leave of the court makes the
evidence obtained inadmissible, the court could not refuse to consider the
evidence on this ground.
- Evidence of jurors past personal
experience being raised in deliberations can be used to impeach a jury
verdict.
Jurors must rely on their past personal experiences
when hearing a trial and deliberating on a verdict. Where, however, those
experiences are related to the litigation, as they are here, they constitute
extraneous evidence which may be used to impeach the jury's verdict. See
Maldonado, 798 F.2d at 769-70; Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d
140, 150 (3d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917, 96 S.Ct. 1119, 47 L.Ed.2d
323 (1976); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 606 at 606-30
(1985). Since Fraser's statements constitute evidence of extraneous influence,
testimony as to their occurrence should not be barred by Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b). The court erred in ruling otherwise.
Judge
Lucy might be feeling some pressure to expose this nonsensical verdict
now.
More goodness here:
Ninth Circuit Jury Procedure Manual, 6.1 Post-Verdict
Interview of Jurors
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Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, September 23 2012 @ 04:34 AM EDT |
Gibson v.
Clanon, 633 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1981)
25 We conclude that
there is a reasonable possibility that the extrinsic evidence affected the
verdict. Accordingly, the petitioners' writ of habeas corpus must be granted
unless the State of California elects to grant a new trial within sixty
days.
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Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, September 23 2012 @ 05:28 AM EDT |
Dyer v. Calderon,
151 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1998)
These reasons discuss juror bias but
also the trial judges responsibility to adequately purse facts in a voir dire.
It is a long decision and it would be very difficult to guess precisely which
part is relevant to Samsung's argument.
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Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, September 23 2012 @ 02:32 PM EDT |
The key piece missing is the jury selection transcript.
It's docket no. 1546, which is
currently 404'ing here even
though it's listed on the case page. [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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