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| Authored by: Anonymous on Wednesday, August 29 2012 @ 10:09 AM EDT |
| n/t [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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- In the US - Authored by: Anonymous on Wednesday, August 29 2012 @ 10:11 AM EDT
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| Authored by: eric76 on Wednesday, August 29 2012 @ 02:39 PM EDT |
I wonder how the courts became aware of the following cases:
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Mach v. Stewart,
129 F.3d 495 (9th Cir. 1997).
Not strictly speaking jury misconduct, but an instructive case: trenchant
comments on voir dire of a social worker who claimed knowledge of psychology and
of sexual abuse held to have tainted the rest of the jury pool and resulted in
reversal of conviction for sexual conduct with a minor.
...
Campopiano v. Volcko,
61 A.D.3d 1343, 877 N.Y.S.2d 568 (NY AD 2009).
In automobile accident case where jurors had to decide whether plaintiff
suffered a serious injury, plaintiff was entitled to a hearing on claim of juror
misconduct after juror told trial court post-verdict that she had enjoyed her
jury service “except for the last two hours when she had to obtain a light box
so she could read [plaintiff's] MRIs to the jury due to her medical expertise as
a respiratory therapist.” Hearing was required despite affidavit from juror
submitted by defendant denying that she had held herself out as an expert or
interpreted the diagnostic films for the other jurors.
Barber v. Shoprite of Englewood & Associates.
966 A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2009).
In personal injury case where foreperson of the jury was a practicing attorney,
law professor and state senator who published an article about his experience as
a juror after the trial, trial court’s finding that the foreperson had not
committed misconduct by using his knowledge and status to influence the jury was
not supported by the record. The foreperson, inter alia, explained instructions
to the other jurors rather than submitting questions to the trial court as the
jurors were instructed to do. “[O]ur review of the entire record in this case
convinces us that [the foreperson’s] explanations to the jury had a ‘tendency’
to influence the verdict. That ‘tendency,’ coupled with the cumulative trial
errors, deprived defendant of a fair trial.”
...
Hutchinson v. Clare Rose of Nassau, Inc.,
835 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y. A.D. 2007).
In action to recover damages for personal injuries, new trial ordered on the
issue of damages for past and future pain and suffering where informal
discussions between the court, counsel and the jurors post-verdict revealed that
one juror had apparently disregarded much of the neurologic and medical
testimony, and had instead utilized his own knowledge of medicine gained from
his training and employment as a physical therapist in arriving at his verdict
as to past and future pain and suffering, and trial court refused plaintiff’s
counsel’s request to question the juror under oath. “By denying the plaintiff's
counsel the right to place the juror under oath in order to explain his conduct
during deliberations, the Trial Judge frustrated the impartial judicial inquiry
necessary to determine if there was an improper influence upon the remaining
members of the jury panel.”
...
Cunningham v. St. Alexis Hospital Medical Center,
758 N.E.2d 188 (Ohio App. 2001), discretionary appeals not allowed.
New trial required in medical malpractice case where one juror reported during
deliberations and before the verdict that another juror, who was a nurse,
interjecting extraneous information about standard of care and other medical
information. When informed about the juror’s action, the trial court failed to
conduct any inquiry. The appellate court found that a post-verdict inquiry would
be futile because it would be impossible to ascertain extent of damage done by
the juror’s interjection of extraneous information.
People v. Maragh,
729 N.E.2d 701 (N.Y. 2000).
Defendant was entitled to a new trial where a juror who was a nurse expressed
her expert opinion on a material issue in the case, and that opinion was
distinct from and in addition to the medical evidence introduced at trial.
...
Diaz v. State,
743 A.2d 1166 (Del. 1999).
Bilingual juror's indication to other jurors outside of court that she disagreed
with court interpreter's translation of foreign language testimony violated
defendant's right to fair trial; juror became unsworn, uncross-examined, and
unqualified witness.
...
Young v. Brunicardi,
232 Cal. Rptr. 588 (Cal. App. 1986).
Negligence judgment reversed where police officer juror presented own
experiences on ticketing procedures to influence jury
...
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Cummings,
618 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
Worker's compensation judgment was reversed and the causes remanded for a new
trial because jurors discussed their own personal experiences with back
problems.
Elston v. Sherman Coca-Cola & Dr. Pepper Co.,
596 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
Negligence judgment reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial because
jurors discussed their own work experiences and these discussions had an affect
on the award for loss of future earnings.
Vincent v. Goodman,
568 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
Suit over oral contract was reversed and remanded for a new trial because jurors
discussed their own personal experiences with having wells drilled and, as a
result, several jurors changed their votes.
...
Gibbs v. State,
291 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956).
Criminal conviction and sentence were reversed because, during punishment
deliberations, juror remarked to those jurors wanting to ask for suspended
sentence that other jurors wanted defendant to get forty years, after which the
jurors who were originally in favor of a suspended sentence voted to give
defendant some time in the penitentiary.[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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