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| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 04:23 PM EDT |
http://groklaw.net/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/2000/PX02157.pdf
<p>PLAINTIFF'S<br />
EXHIBIT<br />
2157<br />
Comes v. Microsoft</p>
<hr />
<p>
<b>DOJ - Legal</b>
<hr />
<b>From:</b> Bill Gates<br />
<b>To:</b> Bernard Vergnes; Brian Fleming; Chris
Peters; Hank Vigil; Jeff Raikes: Joachim
Kempin; John Neilson; Lewis Levin;
Mike Brown; Mike Maples: Pete Higgins; Pete
Pathe; Richard Fade; Steve
Ballmer<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Bill Gates; Executive Staff and Direct
Reports<br />
<b>Subject:</b> "Sea Change" brings opportunity<br
/>
<b>Date:</b> Thursday, October 06, 1994 11:35PM
</p>
<p>
This memo looks at the opportunities created for DAD and
other groups over the next decade as the
framework of computing changes.
</p>
<p>
< < File Attachment: SEACHAN.DOC > >
</p>
<p>
To: Steve Ballmer, Mike Maples, Pete Higgins, Jeff Raikes,
Bernard Vergnes, Richard Fade, Joachim
Kempin, Mike Brown, Hank Vigil, Lewis Levin, Chris Peters,
Peter Pathe, John Neilson, Brian Fleming<br />
From: Bill Gates<br />
Cc: Executive staff, Executive staff direct reports<br />
Date: October 6, 1994
</p>
<p><b>"Sea change" brings Opportunity</b></p>
<p>
Among our future challenges is the high percentage of
office workers and homes who will already have an
"Office" solution and are no longer candidates to be new
users. Already in a number of our large accounts
we have seen major sales years when Office is widely
deployed and then a drop in sales to a much lower
level at least for the DAD products. The solution to this
is to get more revenue from our installed based. If
we can get high percentages of our users to buy upgrades
our business will thrive. The challenge there is
"adequacy". Some people feel we have already gotten to the
point where most users will not benefit from
updated Office applications, Although we can do a better
job on this in the short run "adequacy" will limit
our penetration. However, over the next decade I believe
we will see several "Sea changes" which will
drive major waves of upgrades. This is an optimistic point
of view that struck me during this Think Week.
Its new thinking - at least for me and I think it leads to
exciting opportunities.
</p>
<p>
An imperfect analogy is the consumer electronics industry
which has seen major wave not only of
hardware sales but software sales including old titles as
new formats like CD come along.
</p>
<p>
Startling sometime after 1990 the move to graphical
computing has been a "Sea change". Although the vast
majority of Wordperfect user would have said their product
was quite adequate at the start of the "Sea
change" every year a higher percentage of those have moved
across to either Windows Wordperfect or
Windows Word. Because it took several tries to fully
exploit graphical word processing and match up with
the latest operating system users who switched by 1992
will have bought on average at two major
upgrades. The graphical computing sea change has played
out over a period of 6 years creating immense
share and leadership opportunity for the software company
that saw it coming and helped make it happen
(Microsoft). By 1996 Office users will spend an
insignificant amount of money on DOS applications and
even the diminishing installed base will know they
are "dated".
</p>
<p>
Arguably the shift to an integrated Office approach is
another "Sea Change" which we help caused and
benefited from. However it is not as clear cut or total as
the move to graphical interface. No matter what
you consider the start date of this shift, 6 years after
its start there will still be significant numbers of users
buying and using standalone word-processing and
spreadsheets. Anything we can do to drive the Office
percentage up is very helpful to our strategy.
</p>
<p>
I believe we are in the midst of another major sea change
which is the move to electronic communication
with office documents. In the past PC software users
created most of their own input and did their output to
a printer. During this decade a very high percentage of
input will come across private networks (another
terms for corporate LAN/WAN) and public networks
(including Internet and online services). The
information coming across the private network will include
business information created to review sales,
budgets, personnel, customer service and every other
aspect of the business. Word must become a great
authoring and reading tool for electronic documents. Excel
must blow away the competition in being a
viewer for corporate data by tighter integration to
databases and extensions of features like pivot tables.
we need to make sure public networks include lots of
documents best viewed with Office. The product
approach for this is complex and multifaceted including
things like supersetting Internet features and
providing free subset readers. The basic point however is
that users expectation of what Office applications
will do as changing and 3-4 years from now anyone forced
to use the software we have today would find it
completely inadequate for dealing with the electronic
world.
</p>
<p>
This sea change like others provides opportunities for new
challenges as well as our familiar rivals.
Extended Web viewers from startups will grow to provide
Word with new competition. These competitors
will ridicule the number of commands and features Word
brings from its past and suggest it is not the right
tool for the new usage model. Embarrassingly we find
ourselves somewhat behind on of our old rivals in
providing both the system (replication, security) and
application (views with categories, @ expressions,
multivalued fields, flowing forms) elements for basic
workgroup-sharing and so Lotus is recognized as a
leader in moving corporations into the benefits of
corporate wide information sharing. We can move out in
front of this sea change but it will require a focus and
an overhauling of parts of our interface and
coordination between systems and DAD beyond what we have
had in the past.
</p>
<p>
In a recent meeting on Office96 there was a discussion of
whether the priority should be designing for our
installed base or for our competitors installed base or
new users. Some math relating the size of these
groups, potential penetration and price suggested a focus
on the installed base. Although its an interesting
calculation it is absolutely the wrong framework to
consider our choice in. We believe this "Sea change"
is inevitable and are willing to bet all of our success on
it. We must optimize for being the best product for
these new scenarios even if that means causing disruption
in our user interface or compatibility that will
cause existing users to wait longer to buy an upgrade.
Very few users will switch to a competitive product
for non-"Sea Change" related features (unless all of their
cohorts are using another product but that is the
subject of another memo). Due to the "Sea Change" they
will buy an upgrade - the only questions are
whose and when. Winning the "whose" is far more important
than winning the when. In the early 1990's
Lotus surveyed their installed base and found limited
desire for graphical interface. By the time it showed
up in the surveys it took them too long to respond and
users were willing to switch. Microsoft bet on the
"Sea change". It takes even more guts to bet on the "Sea
Change" when you are the market leader but it is
the only way to position yourself for massive upgrades.
</p>
<p>
Lets do some math on the "Sea change" opportunity. Our
installed base has not peaked. My exhortation
about studying the saturation phenomena is not to say I
believe we are at the peak in some countries we
have only scratched the surface of the new user potential.
However we should understand the potential for
new users at least on a per country basis. Lets say over
the next 2-3 year we get our high end applications
installed base up to over 24M users. Lets assume that
during the peak 4 years of a sea change 30% of those
users buy 3 $150 upgrades and 30% buy 2 and 30% buy 1.
This generates $1.6B per year which is almost
the size of our current business. During those years we
will also be deriving revenue from new users,
addons, and new products. With the kind of discounts we
are providing right now the $150 might seem
high however an upgrade which provide "Sea change"
benefits is worth more than an upgrade which only
provides more functionality without a "Sea change".
Calling these changes to the product "upgrades" may
be misleading both intemally and externally. We want to
draw on our installed base but we want to take
them somewhere new.
</p>
<p>
The "Sea change" to electronic information sharing is a
particularly important one because it will bring us
closer to our customers. It will also bring our
competition and free software closer to our customers. The
effort to learn about upgrades and to install them will be
much lower than it is today. Lots of low cost and
free software will be easily distributed. Memory and disk
size will outrun even our prodigious ability to
create demanding software making it easy for developers
who are don't spend as much time optimizing to
provide adequate products. Although its something to be
watchful of I don't think new entrants will be able
to redefine the categories enough to take Office out of
the mainstream. The value of having the best
software will be even greater because of the new
scenarios.
</p>
<p>
Electronic information sharing is not the final "Sea
change" that we can see ahead. Microsoft has always
assumed that hardware advances will be incredibly rapid
and that assumption still holds true. It is critical
that we look out ahead to see what other "Sea change"s are
coming. There is no rule that says only one
takes place at a time.
</p>
<p>
One "Sea Change" that is still at least three years away
but probably not more than 6 years away is the
move to extensive use of voice input. This will catch on
even more rapidly than graphics interface did. This
will have a deep effect on Office. This is one we should
be spending time on today. If a computer had
perfect speech recognition how would we choose to work
with it? What combination of keyboard, pointing
and speech would we use? Of course the early speech
devices will be imperfect so we will have to pass lots
of context to the voice recognition module from our
applications.
</p>
<p>
I still believe strongly that once a tablet sized computer
has the right accuracy and physical characteristics
that pen based computing will be successful and that
either mainstream applications will address this or a
new category will emerge. I believe that linguistic
understanding and expert systems will find there way
into productivity software over the next decade. I am sure
Nathan will provide further thoughts on "Sea
Changes" to come.
</p>
<p>
These "Sea changes" will not affect only Office. Windows
also has the opportunities and challenges of all
of these changes.
</p>
<p>
A static view of the world of technology badly misleads
one in understanding the value of our installed
base and continued commitment to renew our products. I
have been guilty of this myself. Articulating the
"Sea changes" that we are betting on and preparing the
company for them is the most important and
exciting part of our work.
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 04:28 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/Comes-2388.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2388<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>PC Week, November 26, 1990</p>
<p>LANGUAGE: ENGLISH</p>
<p>LOAD-DATE: August 18, 1995</p>
<p>LEVEL 1 - 295 OF 363 STORIES</p>
<p>Copyright 1990 Information Access Company, a Thomson
Corporation<br />
Company<br />
ASAP<br />
Copyright 1990 Ziff-Davis Publishing Company<br />
PC Week
</p>
<p>November 5, 1990</p>
<p>SECTION: Vol. 7 ; No. 44 ; Pg. 88; ISSN: 0740-1604</p>
<p>LENGTH: 532 words</p>
<p>HEADLINE: Letters; letter to the editor</p>
<p>BYLINE: Silverberg, Brad ; Bucher, Tim ; Luse, Marv ;
Held, Fred H.</p>
<p>BODY:<br />
UNPLANNED LEAKS
</p>
<p> To the Editor:</p>
<p> This is in response to your
Oct. 22 story alleging that Microsoft released
information about the upcoming Microsoft MS-DOS version
5.0 in an attempt to
create fear, uncertainty and doubt regarding DRI's Digital
Research Inc.'s DR
DOS 5.0.</p>
<p> The feature enhancements at
MS-DOS version 5.0 were decided and development
was begun long before we heard about DR DOS 5.0. There
will be some similar
features. With 50 million MS-DOS users, it shouldn't be
surprising that DRI has
heard some of the same requests from custsmers that we
have. There will also be
significant features unique to Microsoft MS-DOS version
5.0.</p>
<p> As for the timing of the leaks,
it was not an orchestrated Microsoft plan
nor did the leaks come from Microsoft. In the past, users
expressed frustration
when we neither acknowledged that a new product was in
development nor gave a
sense of our direction for the release. Thus, to serve
our customers better, we
decided to be more forthcoming about version 5.0.</p>
<p> Brad Silverberg</p>
<p> Vice President, Systems
Software</p>
<p> General Manager</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 04:30 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/Comes-2415.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2415<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> John Shewchuk<br />
<b>Sent</b> Thursday, October 05, 1995 2:46 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> bens; bobmu; bradsi; chrisjo; craigfi; donbrad:
jallard; jimall; johnlu; mikecon; paulma; nchl;
thomasre<br />
<b>Cc:</b> patfer<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Webmaster/Server ISV event - day one
</p>
<p>
When I got Gosling and Naughton started on the Java OLE
control for Blackbird, it was a sensitive issue at Sun
—
Gosling was getting it done as a "black" project. So
please don't raise public awareness of the project without
checking
with Naughton.
</p>
<p>
Regarding Java vs OLE controls<br />
=====<br />
Both Gosling and Naughton will admit that Java is a
programming language and that without APIs to call, Java
is kind of
stupid. There is a growing consensus among developers
that have tried HotJava that it has major limitations.
</p>
<p>
The lack of APIs is the reason StarWave is doing the Java
OLE control— so they can get assess to OLE
automation;
especially automation ot Blackbird objects. Gosling
admits that once someone does this it is no longer cross
platform
and it is hard to be safe.
</p>
<p>
Finally, OLE and Java go together nicely. You don't need
to position them as competitive. Java goes up against VB.
We need to get the VB team to respond to Java. Maybe VB
should be cross-plattorm and safe. See the Blackbird rude
Q&A.
</p>
<p>
Regarding overall messages<br />
=====<br />
I think this whole cross-platform issue is going to die
down once we start getting cool OLE controls (or Netscape
add-ins)
that take advantage of DirectX and other Windows 95 APIs.
Cross platform is an important customer message but in the
long run it a bad technical goal because it means lowest
common denominator. So talk the talk, but show customers
and
publishers what they are missing. Leverage our strength in
great Windows 95 capabilities.
</p>
<p>
Netscape add-ins ONLY RUN IN A NETSCAPE BROWSER. You can't
use them in IE, Word, PowerPoint, VB, Delphi,
VC++, Blackbird or anything else. You can't even use them
inside each other. OLE is OPEN. Netscape add-ins lock you
into a Netscape only strategy. This is lame. Java is
probably not much better.
</p>
<p>
Finally, both Java and Netscape add-ins fail to address
design-time operation. This is a huge leverage point for
Microsoft. Senior people that are fully in the Netscape
camp think twice when they see the Macromedia Director
editor
come up inside the Blackbird design environment. They
think about what it will take to get this clone in
Netscape and it is
a pain.
</p>
<p>
Why does this matter??? Because it represents a radically
different model of content creation than Java or Netscape
add-ins suggest. CPs don't want to write code!!! They
want to focus on creating cool content... They want
simple, simple,
simple. Programming is hard. OLE controls are PACKAGED
bundles of capability. OLE makes it easy for hot software
developers to package up a lot of code that the creatives
can use. LibO from CRG can attest to the fact that Bud and
Norm from Macromedia practically fell over themselves to
create Blackbird OLE controls because when they heard that
they could provide their cool runtime to lots of
non-programmers. (It turns out that many Macromedia users
hate the fact
that they have to learn Lingo to do anything cool.)
</p>
<p>
So let's make sure we explain that OLE controls are more
than JUST an add-in strategy- OLE Controls are the start
of a
COMPLETE strategy. Add an open message, VB, Blackbird, IE
with OLE control support, open scripting, and so on, and
then you have story. Let's fight on our own turf —
in other words, focus on the content providers and ISVs
(they are the
enablers for the content providers) and give them what
they want. And let the great applications win over the
viewers.
</p>
<p>
----------<br />
From: Brad Silverberg
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 04:35 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/Comes-2667.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2667<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Rob Steele<br />
<b>To:</b> Frank Nutt<br />
<b>Date:</b> 3/10/97 5:21PM<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Problems with Microsoft continue...
</p>
<p>
Frank,<br />
I appreciate your help in getting the image of "Memphis"
(Windows 97) code. We understand that
selected sites have received "Nashville" (Internet
Explorer 4.0) which was supposed to be in Windows
97. It is critical that we get this code as other
developers have. We need to test our GroupWise
WebSight integration and other program interaction areas.
</p>
<p>
Also, the other issue we spoke of still looms heavily. It
is the one where the new MAPI32.DLL that is
deployed as part of Office 97 breaks GroupWise 5
operation. There are now "required" calls/properties
that are not documented as such therefore we are at the
mercy of the Developer support line. They
have very limited assistance verbally and no written
documentation on the changes. For for a product
API standard, we should have had these changes spec'd out
for us long before they ship it. These calls
have been customized and tailored to Outlook and force us
to do the same... which we would do if were
knew the extent or specifics of the changes.
</p>
<p>
Also, our developers had to call the Word 97 Developer
support for assistance with some integration
problems only to find out (verbally) about two new
registry entries that had been created and must be set
for things to operate successfully. Again, no
documentation on these calls.
</p>
<p>
Any contact with a MAPI or Windows Messaging member of
management so that we could get this
resolved would be appreciated.... and as soon as possible
as we have a "broken" solution out there as
we speak.
</p>
<p>
Thanks.
</p>
<p>
Rob Steele<br />
Product Line Manager<br />
Novell GroupWare Division<br />
<em>[Ed: e-mail address omitted]</em>
</p>
<p>
<b>CC:</b> Ed McGarr, Eldon Greenwood, John Gailey, Paul
Smart, Stewart Nelson
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 04:43 PM EDT |
http://iowa.gotthefacts.org/122106/PLEX0_2676.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2676<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 340
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Kumar Mehta<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 27, 1997 1:39 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> Brad Chase; Yusuf Mehdi<br />
<b>Subject:</b> FW: ie data
</p>
<p>
Bobrou is gathering data for a jonro meeting with billg
tomorrow. Apparently they are going to discuss whether IE
and
memphis should be bundled together.
</p>
<p>
Anyway bob asked me for all the data we have from our
side; this is my response.
</p>
<p>
-----Original Message-----<br />
<b>From:</b> Kumar Mehta<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 27, 1997 1:29 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> Bob Foulon<br />
<b>Subject:</b> ie data
</p>
<p>
Bob, here is some info on how people get and use IE that
might help you guys. My feeling, based on all the IE
research
we have done, is that it is a mistake to release memphis
without bundling IE with it.
</p>
<ul>
<li>IE users are more likely than other browser users to
get it with their computers. Overall 20% of people who
use IE at
home obtained it with their computer; and 24% of those
using IE at work got it with their computer. Effectively
we
would be taking away the distribution channel of almost a
quarter of all IE users.</li>
<li>Overall 34% of all surfers (not just IE users) have
ever downloaded a browser. That means 66% of everybody on
the
web has never downloaded a browser.</li>
<li>Almost 60% of all surfers have never downloaded any
software from the web. my sense is that these people are
not
very likely to download anything, let alone a browser that
takes 2 hours to download, from the web</li>
<li>80% of those who do not use IE say they have no plans
to switch to it, which means that if we take away IE from
the
o/s, most nav users will never switch to us.</li>
<li>Also from all our research with IS and web
professionals we know that they eventually expect us to
win the browser
war because ie will be bundled with the operating system
and they will have no real reason to purchase
navigator.</li>
<li>Also, we both saw in all our groups with end users and
IS that the integration of the browser and the operating
system
was a very compelling feature.</li>
</ul>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 04:45 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/Comes-2798.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2798<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Bill Shaughnessy<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, December 01, 1997 8:20 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Carl Stork (Exchange); Valerie See; David W.
Williams; Marshall Brumer; Dan Neault<br />
<b>Subject:</b> FW: Intel Impasse Resolved
</p>
<p>
fyi
</p>
<p>
-----Original Message-----<br />
<b>From:</b> Jonathan Roberts<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, November 26, 1997 3:31 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> Bill Gates; Paul Maritz; Jim Allchin
(Exchange)<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Marshall Brumer; John Frederiksen; Adam Taylor;
Phil Holden; Bill Shaughnessy<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Intel Impasse Resolved
</p>
<p>
We talked to Swope at 2pm and Intel has capitulated on the
key issues. There will be no uber server spec or any
mention
of the NC in any press release or spec. We will be
reviewing the release on Monday. Billsha from our side
will be intouch
with Swope over the weekend incase something flares up.
The folks on the cc: line remain suspicious and a little
confused by Intel's actions and will be tracking this
closely. Will also said they might do a non NT server
configuration
guide, but was not specific or frankly that committed to
the notion. Will made it very clear that alignment with us
was
absolutely the most important thing. We ended the
conversation on a very pleasant tone.
</p>
<p>
We have moved to the mode of documenting every
conversation we have so we can avoid any miscommunication.
Attached is Bill's mail to Swope
</p>
<p>
-----Original Message-----<br />
<b>From:</b> Bill Shaughnessy<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, November 26, 1997 3:18 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> <em>[Ed: e-mail address removed]</em><br
/>
<b>Cc:</b> Jonathan Roberts; Adam Taylor; Phil Holden;
Marshall Brumer; John Frederiksen<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Final Recap
</p>
<p>
Will,
</p>
<p>
Per the phone call this afternoon, here is a summary of
the key points of resolution.
</p>
<ul>
<li>Intel will remove all references to NC and Network
Computer from press release and Lean client
specification</li>
<li>There will be no announcement of a server
specification in the press release. If a server
specification is created it will
be an addendum to the Server 98 Design Guide. This will
appear at the earliest in 6-8 weeks.</li>
<li>The Intel press release will go out next week as
planned. There is no Microsoft or any third party quotes
included in
the release.</li>
<li>Microsoft will receive a draft of the Intel press
release and Q&A's Monday morning. Microsoft will
provide Intel its
Q&A's Monday as well.</li>
</ul>
<p>
If I have missed anything don't hesitate to call me or
send email for further clarification. I can be reached
over the
weekend at home: <em>[Ed: Telephone and pager numbers
removed.]</em>
</p>
<p>
In addition John Fredericksen is available to discuss
further any issues pertaining to Hydra and WBTs.
</p>
<p>
Happy Thanksgiving.
</p>
<p>
Bill
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 04:47 PM EDT |
http://iowa.gotthefacts.org/122106/PLEX0_2905.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2905<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
From: Brad Chase<br />
Sent: Friday, May 15, 1998 3:57 PM<br />
To: Walt Mossberg (E-mail); Bill Gates<br />
Cc: Brad Chase<br />
Subject: Windows 98
</p>
<p>
lets keep this discussion going a bit. we support choice
and agree with your fundamental point there on how oems
present windows. I understand your view that says the best
product should win and that we should let oems do their
own
shells. we do let oems ship their own shells today but
they can't boot up into them directly - the user has to
select them
say by clicking on a link the oem can add to the desktop
or somewhere else. we also let the oems do significant
customization of windows that they can boot up into.
finally oems can add anything they want to on the windows
desktop.
they an add navigator and they can even make it the
default browser.
</p>
<p>
however, if oems can boot up into an alternative shell
then what is Windows? we market and invest significant R@D
into
Windows and if anyone can change its initial UI then that
impacts people's understanding of windows. in addition, it
sets
up a situation where our competitors can try to replace
Windows with their own UI and apis. again an oem could
ship
these UIs and APIs today but it is alot to ask us to have
the users first boot and experience with Windows be, not
Windows, but a competitive shell or OS.
</p>
<p>
take the wsj for example. you ship via delivery people.
they are your oems. you have dominant share of the daily
business news market. what if the delivery people could
substitute someone's else's front page for your own and
furthermore what if it was not even clear that it wsn't
the wsj? it is the content and design that makes the wsj.
now you
support choice and competition to but the wsj would not
allow that. for that matter they would not even allow the
delivery
boy to add the NY times business section to the inside of
the WSJ. we, in essence, allow the equivalent, by allowing
oems to add any icon to the desktop and even allowing
navigator to be the default.
</p>
<p>
you might argue that people know the Windows UI so they
can tell but many people don't and besides we want to
improve
the UI over time and that will mean changes to it will
look differently.
</p>
<p>
walt we have become a leader but to innovate in windows
includes the UI and while i understand your point of view
on this
I would contend that we are being asked to hold to a
radically different standard than anyone else would ever
be asked to
be held to.
</p>
<p>
-----Original Message-----<br />
From: Walt Mossberg <em>[Ed: e-mail address
removed.]</em><br />
Sent: Friday, May 15, 1998 7:38 AM<br />
To: Bill Gates<br />
Cc: Brad Chase<br />
Subject: Re: Windows98<br />
Importance: High
</p>
<p>
Bill,
</p>
<p>
I was glad to have a dialog with you and Brad before I
wrote my Win98
column, and I'm glad to have your views on how it came
out. As you know,
from the very first time we met back in 1991, I have
invited you to let me
know what you like and dislike about what I write, and
have extended the
same invitation to others in the industry. I believe we in
the media
sometimes are too closed off from outside views, and I
feel a responsibility
to open myself to them, especially because the Journal is
a very
influential platform and, as a columnist rather than a
reporter, I have
great license to express opinions. Our exchanges did in
fact have an impact
on what I finally wrote.
</p>
<p>
On your conflict with the government, I appreciate your
sharing your views
on it. As I've explained, I'm not up on all the details of
the situation
because it hasn't been my responsibility to cover it.
</p>
<p>
But I would observe, just as a personal view, that there's
a distinction
between your retaining full ability to integrate
innovative features into
Windows – like the browser or, eventually, speech
recognition – and the
wall of formal and informal business arrangements you
typically have built
around Windows to restrict how OEMs can present it to
users. It seems to me
there'd be nothing wrong with agreeing to let Compaq do
its own shell or
opening screen, just like they once did in the Win 3.1
days, even though
they did it badly. I might criticize these screens if they
were too
marketing-oriented, just as I have criticized your own
desktop channel bar
for plastering ads on the user's desktop. But _in
principle_ I see nothing
wrong with it. Hell, somebody might even hit upon a
simpler or better
metaphor using HTML for a shell, just like HP and them
Compaq did a good
thing for users by adding a hard-wired keyboard "Internet
button," which
launches a browser and dialler.
</p>
<p>
I also really do think users benefit from choice, so a
pre-load of Navigator
would be fine, assuming Netscape can cut the deals. This
is no different
from the common bundling of AOL, MSN and Compuserve on new
machines, or from
some OEM packages which include both Quicken and Money.
</p>
<p>
I think IE, in both standalone form and in the form of the
ActiveX control,
should be able to stand on its own quite well in the
competition with
Navigator, even if both were available on some new PCs.
And I think Outlook
Express is more than a match for Netscape Mail, or Eudora,
as a POP3/IMAP4
client.
</p>
<p>
These are just my random thoughts, and I have no idea
whether they are
relevant to your current talks. I hope you can gain a
settlement.
</p>
<p>
Walt Mossberg
</p>
<p>
=======================<br />
Walt Mossberg<br />
Personal Technology Columnist<br />
The Wall Street Journal
</p>
<p>
-----Original Message-----<br />
From: Bill Gates <em>[Ed: e-mail address
removed.]</em><br />
To: Walt Mossberg <em>[Ed: e-mail address
removed.]</em><br />
Date: Thursday, May 14, 1998 7:29 PM<br />
Subject: RE: Windows98
</p>
<p>
>Thanks for engaging with us on a discussion of
Windows98 before your column<br />
>came out. Brad and I were discussing just now that
although we feel the<br />
>article is not really as positive as we might have
hoped for you followed<br />
>your admirable approach of calling it exactly like you
see it. Windows98's<br />
>biggest impact will be problems that don't occur for
the millions of people<br />
>who get it on new machines or choose to upgrade but
you are right that it
is<br />
>not a vital upgrade. The peripheral makers and retail
channel are enthused<br />
>about the product. I hope the "Update" feature can
change how we distribute<br />
>fixes and driver improvements. As always you were
thoughtful and fair in<br />
>your analysis even if we don't see it exactly the same
way.<br />
><br />
>Our biggest problem with the government is their
principle that us adding<br />
>new features like the browser is a bad thing. So far
they just aren't<br />
>showing any willingness to accept the fact that the
browser is not there<br />
>just because it makes Netscape's life hard. This is
the principle we can't<br />
>give in on and they still haven't budged on it. It
seems a crime to have a<br />
>lawsuit because of this when the law and the consumer
benefits are so
clear.<br />
>The use the word "consumer choice" to talk about
letting OEMs hide the<br />
>browser from the user. We got started down this path
because they decided<br />
>that most features of the OS could be seperated out
like the device
drivers,<br />
>Wordpad, the file viewers, the network stacks and that
maybe we shouldn't
be<br />
>able to package them into a single product. We always
told them the browser<br />
>was a bad place to start because the deletion breaks
things but they were<br />
>confused on that point. They thought the remove
function actually deleted<br />
>the browser which of course it did not - only the
invoker and some tiny ICW<br />
>files. When the browser goes so do the browser
APIs.<br />
><br />
>Having all the government resources against a company
like this is<br />
>mindblowing. I hope I get a chance to get back to
software before I see you<br />
>next.<br />
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 04:49 PM EDT |
http://linuxdoc.pp.ru/docs/assets/attachments/PLEX_2399_A.pdf
<p>
Plaintiff's Exhibit<br />
2399_A<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<h2>Novell</h2>
August 31, 1995<br />
Bug Description in Windows95<br />
<table border="1">
<tr><th align="left">Description</th></tr>
<tr><td>WIN95: Hanging when putting 66-char paths in loc
of files entry</td></tr>
<tr><td>WIN95: Prompted for network ID whenever shared
code loads. When the code detects that the OS is
Win95, it should "trust" the Windows APIs to provide the
correct user ID.</td></tr>
<tr><td>WIN95: Macro Recording "wart" covers buttons in
dialog title bar</td></tr>
<tr><td>WIN95: App's window title has display problems
(changing from left to center justification, not
repainting
some text); long prompts can overwrite Minimize button
(also Maximize/Restore, Help, and Close buttons);
PF must use SystemParametersInfo() to get caption size,
font, etc. (MS needs to tell us which font we
should use to paint the caption, also metrics like size
and position of buttons, position and sizingo info, etc.
We need to get useful 16-bit app info from
SystemParametersInfo() with
SPI_GETNONCLIENTMETRICS)</td></tr>
<tr><td>WIN95: Tutorial's "Show Me" buttons cause endless
loops (coaches too)</td></tr>
<tr><td>WIN95: DBM Popup buttons shouldn't have top and
bottom borders redrawn when running on Win95</td></tr>
<tr><td>WIN95: Once DAD hides (using Auto-Hide) it never
reappears (unless user closes DAD using Ctrl+Alt+Del
or restarts Win95)</td></tr>
<tr><td>WIN95: fix event loop problem with Win95 and
NT</td></tr>
<tr><td>WIN95: fix overwriting icons in title bar under
Win95</td></tr>
<tr><td>WIN95: Network button is gray (File | Print |
Select | Options)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Calling Groupwise features via the File menu in
our applications can put GW (shared code) in an unstable
state which will cause shared code applications to stop
functioning, and may require the restart of win
95.</td></tr>
<tr><td>When running an application from the network,
selecting the "logon as new user" from the shut down
dialog
will produce errors that shouldn't occur and take much
longer than expected.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Clicking on container frame will delete contents
of WPDraw and shrink it. DUP: Startup WPWin.
Graphics | Draw.Click on Box Tool on ToolPalette. Draw
some boxes. Now single click on the
container frame. The frame will shrink. When you resize it
the contents of the object will be gone.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Hard hang if attempt to access a path > 114 chars.
Should return an error message as in Win31.
Steps to Duplicate:
<ol><li>Create paths as described in report 14,052
above.</li>
<li>Run WPWin</li>
<li>From a blank WP Document screen play
wsc14094.wcm.<br />
This macro enters path > 114 in the File Name edit field.
You are hung at this point with an hour glass
displayed. You should receive an error message.<br />
Comments: Path > 114 also causes hard hang if a QuickList
item already existed for the user and they
double click it. If you attempt to add this path to your
QuickList you also hang.</li></ol></td></tr>
<tr><td>When this task (ICMRGLST.WCM) is finished and
WordPerfect and InfoCentral have been shut down,
the pointer of the mouse disappears over all PerfectOffice
programs. The mouse pointer is visible when
it is over WIN95 dialogs, but if you move it over DAD it
disappears. The balloons on DAD still show up. If
at this point I bring up WP, as soon as I move the pointer
over WP it disappears just like with DAD. I
have to shut down WIN95 to make it work again. To dupe:
Launch the task, click Next all the way
through until it is finished (using the default options).
On some machines, this couldn't be duped until you
open PRWin, then try to close it.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Unable to drag and drop files from QuickFiles to a
WIN95 group box. To Dupe: Start DAD, click on the
QuickFiles icon, highlight a .EXE file and try dragging it
to a group box or the desktop.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Pasting a QPW notebook (or graph) into PRWin as a
bitmap causes the object to be completely filled
with black. To dupe, launch QPW and PRWin, in QPW
retrieve ROE6050.WB2, select cells A1..C8, Edit | Copy, in
PRWin choose Edit | Paste Special | Bitmap |
OK, notice that the pasted bitmap is completely filled
with black.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Minimizing a Tool then Document places the Program
in an instable state: STD - click on Tools, Speller,
No, Minimize Speller, Minimize Document1, Try to Close the
Minimized document or WPWIN, you
should not be able to close the program for some
time.</td></tr>
<tr><td>The CLIPBRD.WCM macro cannot find
CLIPBRD.EXE.</td></tr>
<tr><td>No Speller Icon on Taskbar or Desktop: STD - Run
Macro, Select No, then Minimize Speller. At this
point, I cannot maximize my speller again.</td></tr>
<tr><td>No Thesaurus Icon on Taskbar or Desktop: STD - Run
Macro, Minimize Thesaurus. At this point, I
cannot maximize my speller again.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Text colors print black instead of shades of gray
on the HP LaserJet 4 printer. STD: Select the HP
LaserJet 4 Windows printer driver. Play BUG74393.WCM (it
will create and print a simple document)
and notice that the gray and cyan text printed black. This
is not a problem when running under Windows
3.1.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Bullet Characters look bad in the Bullet &
Numbers dialog. STD: Insert | Bullets & Numbers. The
script
provided demonstrates this.</td></tr>
<tr><td>The Messaging API service providers that used to
work in the M7 time frame (January beta) no longer
seem to work. Can we get documentation on the changes that
have been made to the SPIs (especially
transport and address book) since M7.</td></tr>
<tr><td>We do not have the information we need to make our
Point and Print implementations compatible with
Microsoft's. We need Point and Print specifications to
ensure compatibility.</td></tr>
<tr><td>The dialog displayed by SHBrowseForFolder will not
show any printer objects which are not in UNC
name format, or are not subordinate to a Computer object.
The result is that our customers can not
select NDS queues when attempting to set up printers using
the "Printers" applet in the "My Computer"
folder. Can we get SHBrowseForFolder to use the same
methods, so that our queues will appear?</td></tr>
<tr><td>Problem with the header files and libraries for
implementing a Windows 95 Password Provider. Microsoft
told us that the APIs were removed and new ones placed in
and promised documentation on the new
ones. We have yet to receive that documentation.</td></tr>
<tr><td>The PPPMAC.VxD that is needed to support RAS
client is not
shipped with Windows 95.</td></tr>
</table>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 04:53 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/Comes-2399.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2399<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
August 31, 1995
</p>
<p>
Mr. Bob Kruger<br />
Strategic Relations<br />
Microsoft Corporation<br />
One Microsoft Way<br />
Redmond, WA 98052-6399
</p>
<p>
Dear Bob:
</p>
<p>
In response to Novell's correspondence on August 21st,
attached you will find a list of outstanding
bugs in Windows95 that impact many of our products. The
list, while not exhaustive, contains a
description of each bug and in some cases the consequence
of the bug event. Further details
regarding each bug will have to be addressed by our
respective QA engineering staffs . I hope that we
can continue to work together to resolve these and any
future problems that might occur. We hope
that you will be able to facilitate the resolution of
these bugs and the solutions find their way into the
very next version of Windows95.<br />
If you have any questions please feel free to contact me.
</p>
<p>
Sincerely,
</p>
<p>
Dave Miller
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 04:55 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/2000/PX02258.pdf
<p>PLAINTIFF'S<br />
EXHIBIT<br />
2258<br />
Comes v. Microsoft</p>
<hr />
<p>
Noah Mendelsohn<br />
03/15/95 03:24 PM<br />
To: John Landry@Lotus<br />
cc: Alex Morrow@Lotus, Ilene Lang@Lotus<br />
Subject: re: Meeting with Sara Williams Regarding OCX
Status and Support
</p>
<p>
Microsoft continues to informally acknowledge the OCX
support problem, and to take small positive
steps toward helping us. Subsequent discussions with Sara
have been cordial, but no plan has been
offered for substantially redressing our core concern: we
sit don't have and won't soon get get
production quality reference implementations of OCX
container and server, unencumbered by
inappropriate licensing restrictions. We believe that
Microsoft application and communication product
development groups have had access to such samples for
months, and we also believe that they have
had direct access to the OCX development team; each day
that goes by further limits our ability to
compete with those products.
</p>
<p>
The following summary covers contacts with Microsoft since
Sara's January 31st visit:
</p>
<ul>
<li><p>(Feb. 3) Phone mail mesage from Sara Williams to
me</p>
<p>Sara called on Feb. 3 in the evening and left a phone
mail message for me: I still have it because I
thought it might be important. Summary:</p>
<ul>
<li>Sara said that she had spoken to both Doug
Heinrich and "Brad" (I'm presuming Brad Struss,
not Brad Silverberg) about her meeting in Cambridge
and about our concerns regarding
OCX support.</li>
<li>Doug acknowledges (according to Sara) that OCX
support was/is inadequate and that (1)
they will try to do something about it and (2) they
will try to avoid similar problems in the
future. No specifics.</li>
<li>Sara assumed (incorrectly) that I had seen a note
from Doug Heinrich in which he proposed
followup activities with Alex. Alex never got the note
and has since sent a followup query to
Doug, who is on vacation until March 20th.</li>
<li>Sara invited us to the Nile (new COM/OLE
Inter1aces for database an property access)
design review, and we sent two representatives from
Lotus. It's not clear why we hadn't
already been invited to the design review, but our
concerns about OCX support obviously
caused them to make a bit of extra effort in this
area. Very helpful, but what they really did
was to rectify in the last minute another failure to
include us in the review process. Still, this
is at promising step and I'm hoping to use it as a
precedent for their including us in a broader
set of betas and reviews in the future.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>(Feb. 21) Summary of phone call to Sara from me
<ul>
<li>Sara said that the next step was Alex's. I.e. to
respond to Doug. I told her that I had not seen
the note, that Alex would be responding, but that the
issues had been laid out clearly on
several occasions and that we should not wait for yet
another exchange of messages to
begin resolving what we had all agreed to be a
problem: i.e. the lack of effective support for
OCX development and the lack of availability of sample
implementations. As noted above,
Alex never got the note and hes sent a followup query
to Doug.</li>
<li>I reiterated my feelings that the support for OLE
2.0, while flawed in its own ways, had been
far better than for OCX, and that we had to achieve at
least the equivalent more or less
immediately. The problem, as I see it, is that
Microsoft has used licensed code which they
are not prepared to release outside of Microsoft as
their own reference implementation(s) for
OCX. Sara did say that she was going to look into
writing some other reference
implementations for distribution outside of Microsoft,
but those can't possibly be ready for
several months. In the meantime, Microsoft remains at
a competitive advantage, with
access to reference OCX implementations that we cannot
obtain.</li>
<li>We discussed other means of support. Sara
suggested that we use our premier support
contracts for OCX questions. I asked whether there
were OCX experts in premier support,
and the answer we received was essentially "no". I
told her that Lotus is willing to use any
reasonable means of contacting Microsoft tor support,
including premier support, email,
phone, etc., but the real issue is the level of
expertise of the support personnel and their
responsiveness to us. Sara and I agreed that we would
use her as an initial point of contact
for our questions. This is a useful complement to, but
not a substitute for, the missing
documentation and reference implementation
samples.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>
With regard to some of the non-OCX related Q&A's from
my original note:
</p>
<ul>
<li>We have accepted Microsoft's invitation to participate
in beta testing "Zeppelin", an OLE 2.0 (not
OCX) validation tool which is mentioned in one of the
Q&A's from my original note. John Meyrick,
manager of Aswan QE will coordinate.</li>
<li>No news at all on Microsoft's adding us to the beta
for VB 4.0, which is the most appropriate test
container for OCXs.</li>
<li>I've seen no further information on OLE features of
the Chicago shell. Microsoft may have quietly
posted something that we've missed, but I doubt it.</li>
</ul>
<p>
Noah
</p>
<p>
To: Noah Mendelsohn<br />
cc:<br />
From: John Landry<br />
Date: 03/09/95 06:02:32 PM<br />
Subject: Meeting with Sara Williams Regarding OCX Status
and Support
</p>
<p>
Noah.. can you update this with whatever they've gotten
back to us on... thanks.
</p>
<p>
From: Noah Mendelsohn<br />
Date: 02/03/95 03:54:31 PM<br />
Subject: Meeting with Sara Williams Regarding OCX Status
and Support
</p>
<p>
Sara Williams, an OLE/OCX/Cairo evangelist in Microsoft
DRG visited with a group of Lotus developers
at Rogers Street on Tuesday afternoon, January 31. Here
are minutes of our meeting. The purpose of
the meeting was to review Lotus' concerns regarding
Microsoft's fairness in supporting OCX
development, and to answer other questions regarding OCX
and OLE.
</p>
<p>
Unless otherwise indicated, all questions are from Lotus
personnel and all answers are from Sara. Sara
has promised to respond by email on all the unresolved
points listed below. I've rearranged the order of
discussion to put the most useful new information near the
top.
</p>
<p>
Lotus Attendees: Noah Mendelsohn, Scott Kliger, Phil
Stanhope, Edward Oguejiofor, Jeff Buxton
</p>
<p>
Primary topic:
</p>
<p>
Lack of appropriate support and documentation for OCX.
Microsoft applications and
tools seem to have an unfair advantage using OCX–how
did Microsoft release container
apps when nobody is supposed to have sample code yet?
</p>
<p>
The most important issue we discussed, and the one we
spent the most time on, is Lotus'
concern that OCX support for ISV's is inadequate, that
sample code for containers is not
available, that the only server samples are part of MFC
and carry restrictive licenses, and that
Microsoft has somehow managed to ship products using OCX
in spite of these limitations.
</p>
<p>
Speaking only for herself, Sara indicated that she shares
many of these concerns. She also
said that Microsoft as a whole does recognize that there
is a problem regarding support for ISV's
using OCX.
</p>
<p>
We emphasized the degree to which we view this as a
serious threat to our ability to compete.
While there were also problems when OLE 2.0 itself was
released, the OCX situation is far
worse. For OLE 2.0, Microsoft provided comprehensive
published documentation, an extensive
support infrastructure, and sample implementations which
were of moderately good quality and
no more restrictively licensed than the Windows operating
system itself. The current situation
with OCX is inappropriate. Sara reiterated that she
understood our concerns, but said she had
not realized the seriousness with which we viewed this
problem. She asked what could be done
to resolve the problems. Among the possibilities that we
suggested were: (1) provide freely
licensed <u>production quality</u> sample implementations
of container and server immediately...if other
samples cannot be provided, remove the licensing
restrictions on the relevant parts of the MFC
controls implementation and the CDK. (2) publicly
acknowledge that OCX is an operating
system API, to be supported with at least the same degree
of open process as is applied to the
windows API and OLE 2.0. (3) Provide open support and
immediately redress any advantages
which may currently be given to Microsoft applications or
tools products in using OCX (4) Lotus
believes that support could be improved and integration
with OLE technology streamlined if
Microsoft were to transfer OCX development responsibility
to their systems organization, but that
is ultimately an internal concern of Microsoft.
</p>
<p>
Sara acknowledged that the problems we highlighted are
real, and that many of them do trace to
the fact that OCX development is done in the tools group.
She promised to promptly review our
concerns with Doug Heinrich and other senior managers at
Microsoft.
</p>
<p>
OTHER Q&A
</p>
<p>
Q. What OCX containers are available for testing. For
which ones is source available?<br />
A. CPatron (source available, but not a production quality
sample), Access (no source), VB 4.0
(Beta-no source), Visual FoxPro (no source). Doesn't know
whether Eforms has OCX container.
Cairo shell will.
</p>
<p>
Q. What about Mike Blaszczack's sample container?<br />
A. Right, that's coming when the MSJ article is published,
but it's based on MFC OLE support, so
you probably have licensing problems with it. Also Kraig
Brockschmidt is writing some new white
papers on creating an OLE controls container.
</p>
<p>
Q. We've heard that Microsoft is contemplating support for
32 bit VBX's after all.<br />
A. I've heard nothing about it and I cant imagine why we
would do that.<br />
Lotus: Because VBX vendors are telling you that OCXs are
too hard to build and that they have too
much overhead.<br />
A. I haven't heard that and I think I would know about any
change in strategy. It's still: VBX is 16 bit
only, OCX is preferred, and on 32 bit, it's the only
option.
</p>
<p>
Q. Is OCX on the Mac? Will it be? What about other Wise
platforms?<br />
A. Don't know...will check. At best, Wise platforms would
lag significantly.
</p>
<p>
Q. Will the OLE documents extensions previewed last week
apply to OLE Controls.<br />
A. I would think so. (BTW, I'm not sure she's right about
that. Some of the OLE documents
extensions are implemented in the OLE default handler,
which is not normally used by OLE
controls.)
</p>
<p>
Q. Tell us about OCX futures.<br />
A There is an improved CDK in the new Visual C++, just
out. Beyond that, can't say much. A
strange situation has arisen within Microsoft according to
Sara. Although the Developer
Relations Group (DRG) of which she is a part is
organizationally affiliated with the Tools Group
(i.e. languages, data bases, etc.), DRG actually has a
much closer working relationship with the
systems organization. See discussion above.
</p>
<p>
Q. Can we get the VB 4.0 beta? It's the only useful
example of a production quality OCX
container with scripting.<br />
A. Will check.
</p>
<p>
Q. The lack of clear OCX documentation is aggravating a
problem we've had with OLE 2.0
since the beginning: everybody's doing it
differently.<br />
A. Microsoft is working on a validation suite for OLE 2.0
to test interoperability. First wave may see
this in the next couple of months. Not clear whether this
applies to OCX--I suspect not (NRM).<br />
Lotus: Great, something like this is needed, but please
make sure that ISV's get to comment before the
validation suite is frozen. Compatibility checking is
important, but let's make sure you're not
preventing our apps from doing what they need to do.
</p>
<p>
Q. Do you have more information on apartment model
threading in OLE?<br />
A. Apartment model threading will be supported in Win95
and NT 3.5.1. Should be in current win95
builds on ISDN. Fundamentally, each COM object does its
work on a single thread. Sara is
currently writing a white paper, with sample code. It will
(probably) be available within the next 2
weeks or so on the ISDN server.
</p>
<p>
Q. When will a common .EXE be usable with the OLE .DLLs on
NT and Win95<br />
A. Don't know. Will check.
</p>
<p>
Q. What are the details of OLE support in the Chicago
shell? Why was Lotus told that the
shell would not be OLE enabled when in fact it is? Why was
Lotus not given earlier
warning if there was a change of plan? We're still lacking
useful documentation on OLE
in the shell–is there any?<br />
A. Sara didn't seem to be familiar with the history of
this problem, or with any of the details of OLE
enabling in the shell.
</p>
<p>
Q. .DLLs have advantages over .EXE's in terms of
performance and flexibility, but doesn't
the OCX architecture take us back to where we were with
Win16 in terms of programs (in
this case components) impacting each others' integrity?
Also: isn't this an incredibly
powerful opportunity for those writing Trojan horses,
viruses, etc?<br />
All: This question generated quite a length discussion,
but Sara didn't seem to know whether anyone
at Microsoft had given this serious consideration, whether
there is an official corporate position
on the problem, or whether there are any specific efforts
planned to minimize the impact. The
Lotus attendees expressed a strong concern that these were
serious problems. It's ironic that
we've waited for robust, secure, 32 bit operating systems
as the appropriate environment for
OLE, and now we're looking at running multiple components
within the same process space.
(Noah's observation, not expressed at the meeting: this is
why the research community is
looking at special purpose operating systems and special
purpose hardware to support
component based architectures. It's difficult to get good
performance with good isolation using
convention processors and OS's.)
</p>
<p>
Noah
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 04:58 PM EDT |
http://linuxdoc.pp.ru/docs/assets/attachments/PLEX02270.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF's EXHIBIT 2270<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
<b>To:</b> GW-POSTMASTER.INFORMATION(SYSENG),
PROVO.SLC(JOHN EPENETER)<br />
<b>From:</b> Paul Reiner<br />
<b>CC:</b><br />
<b>Subject:</b> Re: Your
Response -Forwarded -Reply -Reply -Reply<br />
<b>Date</b> Tuesday, April 4, 1995 4:09 PM
</p>
<p>
Several consulting services personnel have installed
Perfect Office on Win 95 (all betas)
and we have found the results to be dismal...
</p>
<p>
In fact, we think there is a motto at microsoft that
says "Chicago aint done, until
PerfectOffice wont run...."
</p>
<p>
We have many problems including:
</p>
<p>
DAD GPFs all the time when exiting
</p>
<p>
WP 6.1 has screen redraw problems and often the cursor
wont move when your click on
the mouse to point it somewhere
</p>
<p>
Presentations is so bad, its indescribable
</p>
<p>
On all PO apps the upper right hand corner of the windows
where the minimize icon
should be is clobbered.
</p>
<p>
OFWINFIL often GPFs
</p>
<p>
Shared code often GPFs
</p>
<p>
Groupwise cant determine email name and pesters you for it
every time.
</p>
<p>
It stinks on Win95 (including final beta, which I am
sending you this email on)
</p>
<p>
Paul Reiner<br />
Novell Consulting Services<br />
internet: Paul Reiner @ novell.com
</p>
<p>
<b>To:</b> Fortune.SJF-MAIL2.Dave Miller<br />
<b>From:</b> Albert Guh<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Tom Miller<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Beta2 of Window95 register request<br />
<b>Date</b> Tuesday, December 13, 1994 3:15 PM
</p>
<p>
Hi David,
</p>
<p>
This is a reminder that Norman Chin and myself would like
to download
Beta 2 of Window95 from Provo. Since we have to register
from you first before we can
get the download intruotions from Ben Hendrick
of Provo, we're appreciated that you can respond this as
soon as possible.
</p>
<p>
By the way, I sent you the same request to you last week
and haven't heard from you
yet unfortunately.
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 05:00 PM EDT |
http://groklaw.net/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/122106/PLEX0_2273.pdf
<p>PLAINTIFF'S<br />
EXHIBIT<br />
2273<br />
Comes v. Microsoft</p>
<hr />
<p>
<b>From:</b> paulma<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, April 06 1995 5:41 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> bens; johnlu; bradsi<br />
<b>Subject:</b> FW: Internet as a business tool
</p>
<p>
FYI - I spoke to Billg 1-1 about this. So please just
digest and/or respond locally. Ditto for next message I
will fwd. thx.
</p>
<p>
From: paulma<br />
Sent: Thursday, April 05, 1995 3:55 PM<br />
To: billg; craigmu; nathanm; peteh; russs<br />
Cc: brianf<br />
Subject: RE: Internet as a business tool
</p>
<p>
I have just spent past hour writing up the attached (not
embedded!!) note when I saw your mail - unfortunately my
note ju
asks more questions. I do think we need to come to a
concensus on the issues though. I will be meeting with
Russs over
next week/so (to figure out how we get PSD, DAD, MSN to
re-inforce rather duplicate), but we probably need to get
a
meeting together to get concensus on our basic approach to
the Internet. I will start to look for a 1/2 day. (?)
</p>
<p>
NETSCAPE.DOC
</p>
<p>
From: billg<br />
Sent: Thursday, April 06, 1995 2:55 PM<br />
To: craigmu; nathanm; paulma; peteh; russs<br />
Cc: brienf<br />
Subject: Internet as a business tool
</p>
<p>
I know I am a broken record on this but I think our plans
continue to underestimate the importance of an OPEN
unified to
approach for the internet.
</p>
<p>
The demo I saw today when Windows 95 was showing its
Internet capability was someone calling up the Fedex page
on t
Internet and typing in a package number and getting the
status.
</p>
<p>
Imagine how much work it would have been for fedex to call
us up and get that running on MSN and negotiate with us.
Instead they just set it up. A very simple way to reach
out to their customers.
</p>
<p>
The continued enhancement of the browser standards is
amazing to me. Now its security and 3d and tables - what
will it
within the next several years? Intelligent controls,
directory - everything we are trying to define as
standards.
</p>
<h2>Netscape as Netware<sup>1</sup></h2>
<p>
The title to this is a little over-stated, but it is a
significant worry.
</p>
<h3>Background</h3>
<p>
I have been using the Web for several months now, and my
reactions have gone
through three phases:
</p>
<p>
Phase 1: Wonder at the pure communications miracle - from
my house, with a local
phone call, I could wander around the University of Cape
Town and see what
somebody looks like 20 years on, I could tap in to the
city map for Bratislava, look at
photo's of cats in Yokohama - all in quasi-real time, with
a few clicks of the mouse.
</p>
<p>
Phase 2: Boredom. The "net is a mess". The content is
uneven to put it mildly, links
often point off into nowhere, there is no good way to find
you way around - you soon
get weary of the hit-or-miss nature of the content indexes
(eg. Lycos) and long for a
good thematic index. After a while, it just gets boring.
</p>
<p>
Phase 3: Realization at how fast it is changing. In the
six months I have been looking at
the Web, things are changing rapidly. Firstly content is
getting more professional
looking - it is clear that more and more people are
putting effort into presentation and
content. Secondly more and better stuff is coming-on Iine.
The Yahoo thematic index
from being very shallow to marginally useful, more
companies are showing up with
home pages, etc. Thirdly everyone is trying to
commercialize things. It used to be that
Netscape (from their home page) pointed you at Lycos and
bunch of other indexes.
Now, the top of the list is their own search index server.
But if you try to access it, you
get back a "server is too busy to answer message - vmy
don't you try our for-a-fee
search server" (which presumably has plenty of capacity).
The content guys now want a
fee, etc (though one would have to have a lot of faith to
just send them you credit card
number as some request). I even found a vineyard in South
Africa that will sell me wine
over the Internet.
</p>
<p>
In this context, I am beginning to really worry about the
following scenario (in addition to
the other "worry" scenario's around on-line documents that
I and others have sent out
before).
</p>
<p>
<sup>1</sup> The analogy here is that the major sin that
Microsoft made with Netware was to let Novell offer
a better (actually smaller & faster, with simpler
protocol) client for networking. The got to critical
mass and can now evolve both client and server together.
Hence we had and still have a really
hard time displacing Novell at the server.
</p>
<p>
In fact, I am still of the opinion that we will not really
deliver a really telling blow against Netware
until we make some significant user-visible client-side
feature that Novell would have trouble
matching in their servers. One of the reasons why I remain
such a fanatic OFS believer.
</p>
<h3>Scenario:</h3>
<p>
The Netscape client (which is currently free, owing to
fact that with so many suppliers of
same technology, all currently easily substitutable over
the Internet, no-one can charge
for Web clients today) gains significant market share -
enough that the content
providers see more to be gained in exploiting unique
features of Netscape cllents, than
in trying to be "generic" across all clients. This
feedback loop drives Netscape market
share higher (as content providers encourage its use) to
the point where Netscape can
go "proprietary" - ie. they can start introducing
protected features (via IP protection
and/or via 'secure' handshakes between clients and
servers). At this point they can and
will start charging for their client - say $10 / client
(OEM / download). As they gain
share, they can start introducing "super-clients" which
command higher fees -
eventually maybe $20-$40 per client. They could even start
renting - $25/year.
</p>
<p>
This revenue stream would allow them to start
significantly investing, eg. they could
start to incorporate a pretty good wordprocessor as part
of the client. They can fund
development tools, etc. Eventually they become a
real "platform", and they are eating
"per PC" revenue that would otherwise good to the OS or to
the Apps.
</p>
<h3>What to do?</h3>
<p>
One point of view is that MSN will simply blanket out the
Internet - new and interesting
content will shift rapidly to the "native" MSN
environment, and commerce will do
likewise. Hence beyond getting basic Web functions into
the MSN client, we stop there
and the rest of this memo is largely moot.
</p>
<p>
If you do not have thus view, then I think the most
important thing we can do is to "not
lose control" of the Web client. By controlling the
client, you also control the servers.
We should not allow any one Web client to get to high
volume. This means (i) not
letting a vacuum open up, and (ii) ensuring that we get
broad distribution for our Web
client.<sup>2</sup>
</p>
<p>
This would mean that
</p>
<ul>
<li>MS Web client gets bundled with Windows (not just
Frosting?) at earliest opportunity</li>
<li>uses MSN as the default POP, but can be used wtth
other POPs</li>
<li>has competitive features with Netscape (ie. we
implement the base security protocols,
handle sound, etc.)</li>
<li>we try to leverage things like the Catapult gateway (I
don't know how unique this will
be?) to favour our client. (currently we have the Catapult
API's as open API's).</li>
</ul>
<p>
<sup>2</sup> For reference, the current plan that has been
agreed to between MSN and PSD for O'hare is as
follows: O'Hare will go into Frosting, set up to use MSN
as the defaut POP (ie. MSN will act as
the IP gateway and as the Mail/News provider, using MSN's
NT-based infrstructure). This is
predicated on MSN being able to do this when Frosting
ships. The advantage of this is that until
the regular MSN client is ready to work over IP, there
will be a way for MS to capture Web client
users and direct them into the MSN infrastructure -
because News/Mail are in MSN from day 1,
there is not a conversion isue. There are still
significant loose ends here.
</p>
<p>
Beyond that there is the debate of whether we extend HTML
or not, and how we
encourage use of our Office applications as viewers. We
need to come back to this
topic as part of the broader on-line document plan that we
need to have. but I think we
are all agreed that we need to implement the DocObj
facility in our Web client - which
would allow (eg) Word documents to be viewed in the native
format (which allows
things like outlining and great printing, which is not
readily done via standard HTML
viewers). Do we encourage other Web clients to do
likewise? It is somewhat of a
problem that this really doesn't come together until
Office'96. Should we push this
earlier for Word (at least)? I also worry about the
scenario's where our Office tools
aren't competitive - can we easily associate sound, easily
do cool graphics? I know
Blackbird is part answer to this - but supposedly it is
for "professional authors", and only
for the MSN servers. Is there some midde ground that we
are leaving uncovered?
</p>
<p>
There are also the issues of:
</p>
<ul>
<li>how we prevent a new, alternative client/server object
model from growing up "on the
net". Can we persuade the Internet guys to pick up COM, do
we have to sign away our
IP rights to do so - how does this offer us protection
then? What is worse, an open
object model or an alternative non-MS one?</li>
<li>how do we introduce things like better link tracking -
do we try to push this as a
"standard" as well?</li>
<li>how do we charge for the client - have we just sucked
another revenue opportunity
into Windows?</li>
</ul>
<p>
However, I think it means that we need to envisage a
series of MS Web client releases
over the coming year - to exploit Catapult, to implement
DocObj/Word Viewer. etc?
These are bundled in with MSN (so users can see it as "one
service"), but the real
question is to what extent to we expose new features for
content providers that are not
coming through the MSN servers?</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 05:02 PM EDT |
http://groklaw.net/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/122106/PLEX0_2278.pdf
<p>PLAINTIFF'S<br />
EXHIBIT<br />
2278<br />
Comes v. Microsoft</p>
<hr />
<p>
<b>From:</b> itgmsm!bradsi[SMTP:itgmsm!bradsi]<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, April 12 1995 11:59 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> bens; braddir; joeb; moshel<br />
<b>Subject:</b> FW: 3 year plan thoughts - draft
</p>
<p>
From: paulma<br />
To: billg; chrisp; craigmu; davidv; mikemap; nathanm;
rashid; rogerh; bradsi; jimall; peteh<br />
Subject: 3 year plan thoughts - draft<br />
Date: Wednesday, April 12, 1995 12:54PM
</p>
<p>
WINMAILDAT 3YRFOL1.DOC
</p>
<p>
Please send feedback.
</p>
<h2>3 Year Plan Follow-up (draft)</h2>
<p>
With the conclusion of this year's 3 Year Product Plan
cycle, this memo discusses:
</p>
<ul>
<li>my view of the high-level issues that surfaced,</li>
<li>a process and next steps for follow-up and
expectations for next year's plan.</li>
</ul>
<p>
I am interested in peoples feedback.
</p>
<p>
<i>[Note: All division presentations are located on
\ntsrvrinfo3yrplanplan95. Please email Kayb if you do
not have security permission to access the share.]</i>
</p>
<h3>1. Next Steps and Process</h3>
<p>
The follow-up process will be roughly:
</p>
<p>
a. I am in process of scheduling approx. 2 days of
smaller, more focused reviews in
September on specific area's that need follow-up or where
the format of the 3 year
plans didn't allow for sufficient depth/detail to be
reached. My rough list (not in
priority order) for these area's includes:
</p>
<ul>
<li>Graphics & multimedia plans</li>
<li>On-line document & Browser plans (PSD, DAD,
MSN)</li>
<li>Authoring Tools & Dev. Env (DDT, ACT, MSN,
DAD)</li>
<li>Database Strategy (DDT)</li>
<li>Programming Model (DDT)</li>
</ul>
<p>
This list will be affected by feedback that I receive,
especially with respect to the
observations in 2. below.
</p>
<p>
b. In order to better mesh with the overall companies
calendar, and spread the work
load more evenly through the year, we will be moving the 3
Year Product Plans back
to December. To ease back into this cycle, we will ask
divisions to come back in
Dec'95 and present any delta's/new information as to the
plans that they just
presented, and then will do full plans again in Dec'96.
</p>
<h3>2. Spring '95 3 Year Product Plan - High Level
Issues</h3>
<h4>(a) Execution: Size/Performance/Schedule</h4>
<p>
A lot of our difficulties are the result of our previous
product plans not happening on
time, and of critical components exceeding their resource
budgets which in turn either
delays their shipment and/or delays their adoption. I
don't think there is any one cause
of this - causes include:
</p>
<ul>
<li>putting inexperienced teams/management on significant
new areas,</li>
<li>spreading ourselves too thin,<li>
<li>over-ambition in releases features,<li>
<li>significantly under-estimating/not-designing for
size/performance.</li>
</ul>
<p>
<b>Size/Performance:</b>
</p>
<p>
It is clear that we have a collective size/performance
problem as we make the transition
to 32bits and new architectures (multi-threaded.
OLE-capable). People have not been
designing and developing with resource goals as high
enough priority. This is manifest
in current size/performance issues with Capone, current
DAD applications, probably in
MSN, possibly in Blackbird, etc. Even the new version of
Publisher has exceeded its
4MB system target on Win95.
</p>
<p>
The result is that many of architectural investments which
taken together should give us
a major benefit, are being masked - either by poor
performance, or by absence (owing
to be shipped late).
</p>
<p>
We have to get a handle on this earlier in the product
cycles. Our development is being
done on Windows NT on large machines, which gives no early
feedback to what the
end-user is likely to encounter. Neither are we accounting
for the complete set of
components that a user is likely to configure (OS,
providers, OLE. etc.). We need to
accurately measure the profile of what a "modern" app is
likely to suck in on Win95, and
develop resources targets (memory, processes, threads,
input queues, etc.) that
subsystem providers and application developers need to
hit. Eg. In the case of an 8MB
machine, running Word as your email editor in '96 and
running a second "app", what do
we expect a reasonable "working set" allocation between
Win95, OLE, MAPI
provider(s), Mail client, Word, and PowerPoint (or Excel
or Access) to be? Where are
we today? How does that system look when instead of
MAPI/Mail client, the MSN client
is being used?
</p>
<p>
There needs to be a set of design guidelines distilled
from this that need to go to each
application/provider development group.
</p>
<p>
<b>Spread-too-thin?</b>
</p>
<p>
We also need to be prepared to audit, constructively and
selectively, so as to ensure
that teams and management are not collectively deluding
ourselves, and we don't have
to wait until the last minute to find out the bad news.
This is particularly true where a
new product is the "corner stone" of our strategy.
</p>
<p>
<b>In terms of follow-up, I think we need:</b>
</p>
<p>
(1) Action on delivering the resource budgets that apps
should expect in typical "Win95"
scenarios in 1996, and the tools to measure this. We will
need PSD cooperation. I will
ask Clwill/Chrisjo to coordinate.
</p>
<p>
(2) We need to complete the "component delivery -
responsibilities/best practices" work
that I have asked clwill/dave moore to drive. This is try
to standardize key aspects of
component delivery (so suppliers and customers have better
chance of being
successful), and ensure that we learn from experience of
current common component
efforts. This will be at first focused on the known set of
core components we have: OLE,
Forms3, OLE DB, Text, and few key others.
</p>
<p>
(3) Constructive audits - Clwill's group has
developed "rev 0.8" of the "Best Practices
Audit" and within a couple of months that should be
available. However, I think we may
need to do some more focused audits, using a selected set
of key technical managers. I
wiil propose the 2,3 areas where we need to do this. We
have kicked off a form of this
with Darrylr looking at our Capone and then REN work.
</p>
<p>
(4) We need to develop some internal metrics to assess
what our likelihood of success
is before we authorize major new investment - this does
not necessarily mean that we
should not invest in that area, but it should act as a
reality check on how long it will take
us to build the team, and it should guide us to try to try
to do things much more
incrementally. I will speak to a few folks and see if
there is some useful way to approach
this.
</p>
<h4>(b) On-line Document Strategy</h4>
<p>
As most people noted this is the big "sea change" facing
us, and is the area where not
only have the normal "execution problems", but also there
is not consensus on what the
key elements of our strategy should be.
</p>
<p>
PSD: has realized that the metaphor of how the system
should be presented to the user
needs to change as the nature of users moves towards
less-technical users, more than
one user of a machine (as in home), and as the information
to be accessed will be
increasingly be "on-line" and "remote". This is reflected
in their stated intent of build the
Win97 sheil around a "documents/places" metaphor. However,
most of this still at the
"goals" level.
</p>
<p>
DAD: has realized that the presentation/access of their
document types in an on-line
environment is of paramount importance. However they took
a "rain-check" on this in
their presentation (as they are in midst of discussion and
plan). The initial thinking has
been to ensure that documents authored using Office
applications remain in Office
format, and do not get "converted" into another format
(ie. HTML, which may make it
easier for people to use other authoring/analysis tools).
To do this means making it
possible to have view-only versions of all Office docs
easily ("seamlessly") accessible
from the "browser" (O'Hare/MSN/etc), fixing any key
problems (progressive rendering),
and having meaningful features of these viewers (eg. smart
outlining) that are not easy
to offer via vanilla HTML (ie. have a real reason to leave
the document in native format
even if vast majority of users are viewers only). Beyond
this, we need to be thinking how
we can further leverage advantage our Office apps in this
on-line environment.
</p>
<p>
BSD: is executing on building out a set of Internet
gateway tools - but currently is
evangelizing these as having open APIs to the clients (eg.
Netscape can write a client to
use the gateway). While we can't take back what we have
published, we do need to be
thinking of ways we can advantage MS clients (see Internet
discussion below). We have
some work underway in BSD to see ways in
which "BackOffice" data can easily be
published on-line - apparently there is an easy way to
embed SQL quenes in a HTML-
page and have these resolve against an SQL Server. We need
to further explore these
avenues.
</p>
<p>
MSN: The MSN strategy has evolved to try to coexist with
the Internet by using TCP/IP
and the Internet as a transport, by offering Mail/News
interoperability, and by
incorporating a Web-client. However, in the long-run the
MSN strategy is to (i)
fundamentally overwhelm competing platforms and standards
by sheer volume of users
- based on Win95 access and being world-wide early, and
(ii) offer superior content
authoring & presentation tools via Blackbird. We need
to do a checkpoint on this
strategy, and evaluate our position vs the Internet. We
should not stop anything we are
doing but we should ask ourselves:
</p>
<ul>
<li>is it realistic to expect to "overwhelm" the Internet
and Netscape (in particular) over
the next 18 months.</li>
<li>are we in danger of suffering an "execution problem"
on the Blackbird strategy in the
same way as we have found to our cost that we have to
spend more time than
anticipated getting a "1.0" releases of Win NT, Win95,
Capone, VB4, Bob, etc. to be
competitive (size, performance, features).</li>
</ul>
<p>
In addition, the MSN group is doing the hard work of
getting a comprehensive service off
the ground, and trying to plan for providing
business-business service by providing
gateways between MSN and Exchange. However, in the
medium/long term, we need to
understand what the relationship between the MSN
technology and:
</p>
<ul>
<li>the Win97 shell - if the Win97 shell is the "shell for
the wired" age, then, by definition,
the shell will have to be the primary browser of online
information.</li>
<li>Blackbird and other authoring tools (see below)</li>
<li>MSN "data center" services - eg. mail/directory - and
BSD services.</li>
</ul>
<p>
<b>Follow-up Areas:</b>
</p>
<p>
<b>(i) Authoring Tools</b>
</p>
<p>
In 1996, 1997, 1998, what are our tools offering for
following (eg.) classes of customers:
</p>
<ul>
<li>Simple On-line Documents (help, web pages, memo's,
etc.)</li>
<li>"Professional" On-line documents (advanced MM effects,
view/data separation, etc.)</li>
<li>Sophisticated CD-titles (eg. Encarta)</li>
<li>Professional MM Titles</li>
</ul>
<p>
Who is doing what, what is realistic, etc.
</p>
<p>
<b>(ii) Shell/Browser</b>
</p>
<p>
Leading on from the above, we should get a view as to what
will be handled by the
"Win97" Shell, and what will not - and if not, how is the
needed extension integrated into
the Win97 environment. What short-term things do we need
to do before Win97 (eg.
upgrade Ohare to handle DocObj).
</p>
<p>
<b>(iii) Infrastructure</b>
</p>
<p>
What infrastructure investment/direction do we need. The
obvious one here is a
common strategy on pulling our various-types of "links"
together. What others?
</p>
<p>
<b>(iv) Internet</b>
</p>
<p>
We need to re-calibrate our strategy with respect to the
Internet.
</p>
<p>
Everyone agrees that the underlying communications aspect
of the Internet is
fundamentally a good thing for us and we are embracing it
in BSD, MSN as fast as we
can. But, at the publishing/viewing solutions level, there
is not agreement. There are at
least three "HTML" strategies being advocated in various
guises:
</p>
<ul>
<li>MSN: tolerate but then "overwhelm" it via
Blackbird,</li>
<li>DAD: tolerate but then "overwhelm" it via Office
viewers</li>
<li>PSD (bens): embrace and extend it (HTML). This last
view is based on premise that
the idea of having most of the CPU cycles expended on the
server makes for
fast/light clients and easy dissemination of function to
the client.</li>
</ul>
<p>
Things are changing very rapidly on the Internet and we
need to figure out if we are
executing quickly enough on any of the above strategies to
keep pace with what is
happening.
</p>
<p>
<i>[Aside: Last night I looked again at the Netscape home
page - they are now offering to let you download
new client and a copy of the "NCAPI" - the Netscape client
api (?) to allow the development of 3<sup>rd</sup> party
extensions to the client. They are claiming that "surveys
of popular Web-sites" show that 75% of the traffic
is from Netscape clients.]</i>
<p>
<h4>(c) Office vs. MS Investment in components &
tools</h4>
<p>
A major issue is the longer-term relationship between the
use of general purpose
horizontal products like the core Office apps, and
applications written using DDT tools
and components.
</p>
<p>
We need to decide if we are being focussed and agressive
enough in ensuring that we
have a complete set of components, and a focussed enough
authoring tool effort to
cover such scenarios as developing an online shopping
catalgoue, before others get a
major lead on us in this area. By doing so, however, we
will have also developed
something that is probably capable enough to use for a lot
of coporate applications.
</p>
<p>
We are also saying that we want Office to be the "standard
run-time" for client
applications, and that the end-user value of doing so will
presumbably be to unlock for
solution developers the huge investment that we are making
in "ease-of-use" (Intelli-xxx)
technologies in our Office applications.
</p>
<p>
Thus we will have the dilemna of having:
</p>
<ul>
<li>one set of technology that is available via DDT tools
and components and which has
the advantage of being more compentized (therefore more
flexible, customizable,
smaller?) and with better view/data separation (ie. easy
to use with external data
stores?), and with one business model,</li>
<li>and another set (Office) that is richer in terms of
end-user assitance features, but are
more monolithic (higher resource costs, less flexible,
customizable?), and where
investments (because they will be not be formally
compentized) will be unique to the
Office codebases.
</ul>
<p>
We need to start thinking about:
</p>
<ul>
<li>what is realistic to expect in terms of convergence
between above two sets, how do we
realistically manage the tenrsion?</li>
<li>business implications of above</li>
<li>whether we are at critical mass on the DDT/Objects
front - eg. to be competitive in the
"tools" area (especially "authoring" tools) do we need to
re-align/re-organize to get right
focus?</li>
</ul>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 05:05 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/Comes-2688.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2688<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> John Gailey<br />
<b>To:</b> Eldon Greenwood, Rob Steele<br />
<b>Date:</b> 4/16/97 9:08AM<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Re: Status of MAPI32, Outlook, and 5.1
</p>
<p>
Outlook will not run properly on top of us because of
currently unknown MAPI calls/parameters. We have
asked Microsoft for assistance in getting this to work.
Microsoft has replied that they are using standard
MAPI calls but at a much deeper level, and in fact
admitted that they have not found any MAPI providers
which do support Outlook. We still do not have a solution
but would like to get it resolved for Jolt.
</p>
<p>
- John Galley
</p>
<p>
>>> Eldon Greenwood 4/15/97 6:54 PM
>>><br />
I might have been a little presumptuous in the reply I
just sent to Brian Prentice. I'm assuming we took
care of the MAPI issue that caused Outlook not to run on
GroupWise as an e-mail client. If I was
incorrect, could you please correct me <g>... and
let me know what our current plans are. In my opinion,
from a marketing perspective, as long as we can support
Outlook as an e-mail only client then we can
deflect customer demand for additional integration back to
Microsoft as a request that they publish their
API.
</p>
<p>
Thanks, Eldon
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 05:11 PM EDT |
http://groklaw.net/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/122106/PLEX0_3792.pdf
<p>PLAINTIFF'S<br />
EXHIBIT<br />
3792<br />
Comes v. Microsoft</p>
<hr />
From: Paul Maritz<br />
Sent: Sunday, January 05, 1997 11:09 AM<br />
To: Bill Gates; Jim Allchin (Exchange); Ben Slivka; Brad
Silverberg<br />
Cc: Aaron Contorer<br />
Subject: overview slides for Billg/NC&Java session
with 14+'s on Monday<br />
<p>
Here is draft of slides for Billg to use on Monday pm. I
will introduce with first slide, hand over to Billg, then
have Jimall
(or designee) present on ZAW, Bens on Java, then we will
do Q&A.
</p>
<p>
We should probably discuss these topics at Monday am Exec
Strategy session, since there are fair number of issues,
particularly wrt Java.
</p>
nc & java 12-96a.ppt
<hr />
<h1>NC & Java Challenge<br />Jan 6, 1997</h1>
<ul>
<li>Agenda:
<ul><li>Overview: Billg</li>
<li>“ZAW” Overviw: Jimall</li>
<li>Java Efforts Overview: Bens</li>
<li>General Q&A</li></ul></li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>Key Platform Challenge</h2>
<ul>
<li>NC & Java are platform challenges:
<ul><li>possible emergence of a set of API's and
underlying
system software that lead to lesser or no role for
Windows</li>
<li>puts our other (server & apps) businesses at a
disadvantage</li></ul></li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>Scenario: Emergence of a new API</h2>
<ul>
<li>Sun AWT provides base cross-platform API</li>
<li>Navigator/NetOne provides:
<ul><li>additional API's</li>
<li>a volume platform for ISVs & Corps to target,
since
runtime gets shipped with Navigator</li></ul></li>
<li>NC's
<ul><li>could provides additional volume</li>
<li>have no MS system software
involved</li></ul></li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>Response summary</h2>
<ul>
<li>Increase IE share
<ul><li>integrate with Windows</li></ul></li>
<li>Lower TCO:
<ul><li>“Zero Admin Windows”</li>
<li>Office improvements</li></ul></li>
<li>Take HTML & Java Leadership
<ul><li>Extend HTML</li>
<li>Offer best Java runtime & tools
<ul><li>enough x-platform to be competitive</li>
<li>integrate Java RT & Windows:
<ul><li>encourage access to unique Windows
functions</li>
<li>performance</li></ul></li>
<li>great Java RAD
tools</li></ul></li></ul></li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>Responses: increase IE share</h2>
<ul>
<li>Situation:
<ul><li>approx 15-20% market share, most of it on W95
platform</li></ul></li>
<li>Key strategies in place:
<ul><li>Competitive product:
<ul><li>IE3 good, but missing Mac, W3.1 (being filled
in next 2
months), UNIX splipping</li></ul></li>
<li>Differentiate thru Windows integration</li>
<li>Get Websites to target:
<ul><li>Sitebuilders/logo program starting to
work</li>
<li>little compelling unique content, MSN
exception</li></ul></li>
<li>Content offers (WSJ, ESPN):
<ul><li>good (250K sign ups, logo on sites), but not
decisive</li></ul></li></ul></li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>Responses: increase IE share</h2>
<ul>
<li>Key strategies, contd.:
<ul><li>Channels:
<ul><li>ISP's: have signed most up, but conversion
only starting to
happen:
<ul><li>AOL 650K downloads to date</li>
<li>predict 5m users by 3/97</li></ul></li>
<li>OEM: missed June deadline, OSR2 not shipping
on majority of
machines yet</li>
<li>Corporate: mixed results
<ul><li>still large Nscp momentum</li>
<li>threat from
Communicator</li></ul></li></ul></li></ul>&l
t;/li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>IE share issues</h2>
<ul>
<li>Shipping IE4
<ul><li>Does it go into next W95
release?</li></ul></li>
<li>Converting existing Nscp users
<ul><li>ISP bounty program</li>
<li>creating compelling reason for W32
users?</li></ul></li>
<li>Corporate share:
<ul><li>IE4 benefit</li>
<li>Communicator response
<ul><li>how to position combination of IE &
Outlook as response</li>
<li>how to actually manage future evolution of IE
& Outlook</li>
<li>how to use / position “Web
connector” feature of Exch 5.0</li></ul></li>
<li>Renewed major corporate
campaign?</li></ul></li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>Java runtime as a Platform</h2>
<ul>
<li>Key strategies:
<ul><li>encourage (extended) HTML use
<ul><li>keep Web content people viewing HTML (plus
scripts) as
safest “LCD”</li>
<li>encourage use of Dynamic HTML
(Trident)</li></ul></li>
<li>Java:
<ul><li>Offer “standard” Java runtime to
be competitive,
<ul><li>basically redistribute whatever Sun gives
us in near term</li></ul></li>
<li>Expose as much of Windows as we can to Java
developers
via extensions to AWT</li>
<li>Ship the best Java RAD tool(s)
<ul><li>with extensions to language where we
can</li></ul></li></ul></li></ul></li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>Java Issues</h2>
<ul>
<li>Getting our VM/Tools used
<ul><li>Ie. Increase IE share</li>
<li>Getting our VM/runtime to work with
Navigator</li></ul></li>
<li>Getting RAD tools shipped</li>
<li>Mac/Unix support for IE & extended HTML
(Trident)</li>
<li>Relationship with Sun</li>
<li>“HTML as LCD” impacts strategy to position
Outlook as client for collaboration:
<ul><li>ie. Is safest way to develop forms/groupware is to
do it
as Exchange server side script ?</li></ul></li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>TCO/Simplicity & NC</h2>
<ul>
<li>ZAW / NetPC is our primary platform response</li>
<li>Goals
<ul><li>Dramatically reduce “cost of
ownership/complexity” for
users:
<ul><li>initial focus on corporate, connected
scenario's</li></ul></li>
<li>Key concepts:
<ul><li>automate/eliminate “change”
wherever possible:
<ul><li>eg. OS/applications
installation/update</li>
<li>use centralized storage wherever
possible</li></ul></li>
<li>centralized administration</li>
<li>work for “laptops”
too</li></ul></li></ul></li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>TCO/Simplicity & NC</h2>
<ul>
<li>Secondary response
<ul><li>Deliver lowest “hardware cost”
solution via Hydra
<ul><li>Windows “terminal”
support</li></ul></li></ul></li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>TCO/Simplicity & NC</h2>
<ul>
<li>Issues:
<ul><li>Delivering on ZAW</li>
<li>ZAW is delivered on NT5.0
<ul><li>requires upgrade first</li>
<li>lack of Win95 story</li></ul></li>
<li>Applications (esp. “Office”)
participation
<ul><li>when/how do we deliver it?</li>
<li>How do we deal with “down-level”
OS's</li></ul></li>
<li>continued complementary relationship with
Citrix</li></ul></li>
</ul>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 05:36 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/Comes-2810.pdf
<p>PLAINTIFF'S<br />
EXHIBIT<br />
2810<br />
Comes v. Microsoft</p>
<hr />
UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE<br />
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS<br />
<p>
This certificate issued under the seal of the Copyright
Office in accordance
with title 17, United States Code, attests that
registration has been made for
the work identified below. The information on this
certificate has been made a
part of the Copyright Office records.
</p>
<p>
Marybeth Peters<br />
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS<br />
United States of America
</p>
<p>
EFFECTIVE DATE OF REGISTRATION<br />
Dec 24 1999
</p>
DO NOT WRITE ABOVE THIS LINE. IF YOU NEED MORE SPACE USE A
SEPARATE CONTINUATION SHEET.
<hr />
<table border="1">
<tr><td colspan="2">1</td></tr>
<tr><th>TITLE OF THIS WORK</th>
<td>JAVA DEVELOPMENT KIT VERSION 1.0 alpha
2</td></tr>
<tr><th>PREVIOUS OR ALTERNATIVE TITLES</th>
<td>JDK version 1.0 alpha 2</td></tr>
<tr><th>PUBLICATION AS A CONTRIBUTION</th>
<td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">2</td></tr>
<tr><th>NAME OF AUTHOR</th>
<td>Sun Microsystems, Inc.</td></tr>
<tr><th>Was this contribution to the work a "work made
for hire"?</th>
<td>Yes</td></tr>
<tr><th>AUTHOR'S NATIONALITY OR DOMICILE</th>
<td>U.S.A.</td></tr>
<tr><th>NATURE OF AUTHORSHIP</th>
<td>Entire computer program</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">3</td></tr>
<tr><th>YEAR IN WHICH CREATION OF THIS WORK WAS
COMPLETED</th>
<td>1995</td></tr>
<tr><th>DATE AND NATION OF FIRST PUBLICATION OF THIS
PARTICULAR WORK</th>
<td>April 4 1995 (approx) U.S.A.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">4</td></tr>
<tr><th>COPYRIGHT CLAIMANT(S)</th>
<td>Sun Microsystems, Inc.<br />
901 San Antonio Road<br />
Palo Alto, CA 94303<br />
MS PALO1-521</td></tr>
<tr><th>APPLICATION RECEIVED</th>
<td>DEC 24 1997</td></tr>
<tr><th>ONE DEPOSIT RECEIVED</th>
<td>DEC 24 1997</td></tr>
<tr><th>TWO DEPOSITS RECEIVED</th>
<td></td></tr>
<tr><th>FUNDS RECEIVED</th>
<td></td></tr>
<tr><th>CORRESPONDENCE</th>
<td>Yes</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">5</td></tr>
<tr><th>PREVIOUS REGISTRATION</th>
<td>No</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">6</td></tr>
<tr><th>DERIVATIVE WORK OR COMPILATION</th>
<td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">7</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">—space
deleted—</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">8</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">REPRODUCTION FOR USE OF BLIND OR
PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">9</td></tr>
<tr><th colspan="2">DEPOSIT ACCOUNT</th>
<tr><th>Name</th>
<td>Sun Microsystems, Inc.</td></tr>
<tr><th>Account Number</th>
<td>DA 07 3342</td></tr>
<tr><th>CORRESPONDENCE</th>
<td>Timothy J. Crean<br />
Sun Microsystems, Inc.<br />
901 San Antonio Road, MS CUP01-307<br />
Palo Alto, CA 94303<br />
408/863-3425</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">10</td></tr>
<tr><th colspan="2">CERTIFICATION</th>
<tr><th>I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am the
authorized agent of</th>
<td>Sun Microsystems, Inc.</td></tr>
<td>Timothy J. Crean</td></tr>
<td>12/23/97</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">11</td></tr>
<tr><th>MAIL CERTIFICATE TO</th>
<td>Timothy J. Crean<br />
Sun Microsystems, Inc.<br />
MS UCUP01-307<br />
901 San Antonio Road<br />
Palo Alto, CA 94303</td></tr>
</table>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 05:38 PM EDT |
http://groklaw.net/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/1000/PX01413.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF's EXHIBIT 1413<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
From bradsi Thu Aug 27 08:40:39 1992<br />
To: cameronm jonl mikemap paulma<br />
Subject: undoc api's<br />
Date: Thu Aug 27 08:40:38 1992<br />
Status: RO
</p>
<p>
we can doc the api's we know the apps group (and other
isv's) use.
this is a good practice. though it's not as
stragihtforward
as it appears, since some of the calls depend on context
and an understanding
of the source, which is explained in detail in mail i
forwarded from
david d'souza.
</p>
<p>
the biggest advantage our apps group has is access to the
operating
systems source. as long as this continues, the issue will
never
go away.
</p>
<p>
in fact, jimall has long been assuming that the apps group
did not
have source access. he has been telling isv's this, too.
when
i told him yesterday that this was not the case, he had
that
"oh <em>[Ed: language]</em>" look on his face.
</p>
<p>
the apps group does not need access to the source. it's a
matter
that they have grown accustomed to it. the fact that
other companies
have been able to product world-class windows products
(eg. Borland
Quattro Pro, Paradox, Lotus Ami Pro 3.0, Freelance, etc)
is proof.
</p>
<p>
s to (a) doc the api's we know
apps group is using, and (b) give the apps group the same
access
to source we give to other isvs. [ie, in certain limited
circumstances.] if we don't do (b), the issue will never
die
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 05:40 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/1000/PX01522.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF's EXHIBIT 1522<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<h1>Compaq PDA Operating System Selection</h1>
<h2>Portable and Software Marketing<br />
PC Division</h2>
<h2>Overview</h2>
<ul>
<li>Process for launching PDA business</li>
<li>Chronology of events and future milestones</li>
<li>Recommended PDA O/S vendor</li>
<li>Executive Summary
<ul>
<li>Potential for market leadership, risks are
acceptable, criteria for evaluation,
evaluation of risk and return, outstanding
issues</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Compaq commitment</li>
<li>Summary</li>
<li>Backup
<ul>
<li>Microsoft and GO Proposal summary</li>
<li>Summary of PDA market opportunity from 11/10
McKinsey presentation</li>
<li>PDA relative expected results</li>
<li>Market forecasts for PDA hardware and
software</li>
<li>Technical assessment
<ul>
<li>Product functionality, early market entry,
WinPad and Amstel architecture,
resource assumptions</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Microsoft and GO risks and rewards</li>
<li>Alternative Approaches</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>PROCESS FOR LAUNCHING PDA BUSINESS</h2>
<p>
<em>[Ed: See PDF for figure.]</em>
</p>
<p align="right">
<table>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td&
gt;</td><td></td><td></td>
<td><table
border="1"><tr><td></td></tr></table>
Today's
focus</td></tr>
<tr>
<td></td><td></td>
<td>McKinsey presentation November 10</td>
<td></td>
<td>Team to complete vision for final review March 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Product announcement 1Q 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assess market opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Define business and product vision</td>
<td></td>
<td>Launch product and build</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELIVERABLES</td>
<td><p>Detailed assessment of opportunity</p>
<p>Decision on whether to proceed with
opportunity</p></td>
<td></td>
<td><p>Build strategic roadmap for launchmg new business
and product</p>
<p>Determine key software and
communications skills required,
current skill, gaps, and plan for
skill acquisition</p>
<table border="1">
<tr><td><p>Develop proposal process for
selection of O/S vendor</p>
<p>Choose O/S vendor</p></td>
</table>
<p>Choose microprocessor</p>
</td>
<td></td>
<td><p>Deliver product to market meeting cost, resource,
and time commitments</p>
<p>Implement key business strategies
to ensure product success</p>
<ul>
<li>Market acceptance plans</li>
<li>Skill acquisition</li>
<li>Partnerships</li>
<li>Distribution options</li>
<li>Technology requirements</li>
</ul>
</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</table>
<h2>CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS<br />
AND FUTURE MILESTONES</h2>
<table>
<tr>
<td>Assess market opportunities</td>
<td>Define business and product vision</td>
<td>Launch product and build business strategy</td>
</tr>
</table>
<p>November 10-- McKinsey presentation to Eckhard and
Division Management</p>
<p>November 16 Comdex-- Meetings with GO and Microsoft to
share general plan to select O/S vendor</p>
<p>November 13- FAX to Microsoft and GO describing details
of O/S selection process and proposal topics to be
covered</p>
<p>December 3, 9- Microsoft and GO meetings in Houston to
review topics and timeline for closure</p>
<p>December 10- Chase Definition Tiger Team Kickoff</p>
<p>December 28- Microsoft proposal received</p>
<p>December 31- GO final proposal received</p>
<p>January 4- Compaq proposal review meeting</p>
<p>January 5, 6- GO and Microsoft presentations at
Compaq</p>
<p>January 7- Compaq proposal review meeting,
recommendation</p>
<p>January 8- Recommendation review</p>
<p>March - Completion date for Chase Definition Tiger
Team</p>
<h2>Recommended OS Vendor</h2>
<ul>
<li>Industry News Flash
<ul>
<li>Compaq selects GO's PenPoint operating system for
its Chase PDA</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Some months later...</li>
<li>Industry Headline
<ul>
<li>Compaq announces its industry leading Personal
Digital Assistant, the Chase
PDA. Chase is the perfect companion tor today's
business professional. It is
loaded with unique features that make Chase stand
out from all of today's
competitive products. Chase is based on GO's
PenPoint, a state of the art,
object oriented operating system.</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Executive Summary</h2>
<ul>
<li>GO offers Compaq the best opportunity to dominate the
PDA market at an
acceptable level of risk
<ul>
<li>The potential for Compaq to take a position of
sustained market leadership with
GO far exceeds opportunities with Microsoft</li>
<li>Risks associated with a non-Microsoft decision
while significant can be
mitigated and should be more than compensated by
the potential benefits</li>
<li>And as an emerging market with uncertainty, PDAs
represent the most
attractive opportunity over the new few years to
expand Compaq's business
beyond hardware and <u>break-out</u> of the
Microsoft architectural prison</li>
<li>GO solution appears to better meet user needs as
we can see them (MS not
invincible)</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Potential for Market Leadership</h2>
<p>
The potential for Compaq to take a position of market
leadership with GO far exceeds
opportunities with Microsoft
</p>
<ol type="A">
<li>GO would provide Compaq with significantly <u>greater
sustained differentiation</u> potential that
would translate into greater market share and higher
margins</li>
<li>With sufficient Compaq commitment, a GO/Compaq
relationship would provide <u>greater
product functionality</u> to the customer resulting in
faster market adoption and greater market
share</li>
<li>Compaq could generate significantly potentially
<u>greater non-hardware business</u> with GO
than with Microsoft</li>
<li>Finally, Compaq's <u>ability to work better</u> with
GO on a daily basis should help Compaq
achieve its goals more quickly and effectively</li>
</ol>
<h2>Risks are Acceptable</h2>
<p>
Risks associated with a non-Microsoft decision while
significant can be mitigated and should be more than
compensated by the potential benefits
</p>
<ol type="A">
<li><u>Market acceptance</u> of a GO/Compaq combination
although <u>less certain</u> than Microsoft acceptance,
could
be ensured as a result of a number of factors
<ul>
<li>Friction between ISVs and Microsoft</li>
<li>Zero applications for Microsoft migrate to the
PDA</li>
<li>With significant investment, Compaq could help a
critical mass of GO applications <em>[Ed: Handwritten
note: "evangelize ISVs"]</em></li>
</ul></li>
<li>Although a GO decision might <u>negatively impact
Compaq's relationship</u> with Microsoft in other areas,
long
term cost to Compaq should not be prohibitive
<ul>
<li>Microsoft less focused on a PDA O/S</li>
<li>Alternate O/S provider could actually help our
position with Microsoft</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Attempts by <u>Microsoft to sabotage</u> Compaq/GO
<u>integration to the desktop</u> is likely</li>
<li><u>Additional resources</u> (investment and unit cost)
are likely to be higher with GO but potential benefits
from
higher revenues and gross margins should outweigh
these costs</li>
<li>Although Microsoft could compete against
<u>Compaq/GO</u> with other vendors (e.g., HP, AST, DEC,
Dell)
Compaq's greater product functionality and sustained
differentiation <u>should win in the long run</u></li>
<li>GO has <u>enough financial backing</u> to survive for
the next 2-3 years and with Compaq support should
become self-sufficient by 1994</li>
<li>Finally, a <u>GO decision provides a
"fall-back"</u>
option as long as X86 is the chosen microprocessor, while
a
Microsoft decision eliminates any near term options
with GO</li>
</ol>
<h2>Criteria Evaluation for PDA O/S Providers</h2>
<table>
<tr><th>CRITERIA</th><th>Weighting</th><th>M
icrosoft</th><th>GO</th></tr>
<tr><td>RETURN</td><td></td><td></td>&
lt;td></td></tr>
<tr><td>- Sustainable differentiation
potential</td><td>10</td><td>2</td><td>4<
/td></tr>
<tr><td>- Early market
entry</td><td>8</td><td>3</td><td>3</td&g
t;</tr>
<tr><td>-Product
functionality</td><td>7</td><td>3</td><td>4&
lt;/td></tr>
<tr><td>-Non-hardware business
potential</td><td>5</td><td>2</td><td>5</
td></tr>
<tr><td>-Organizational
fit</td><td>3</td><td>2</td><td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr><td>-Total</td><td></td><td>77</td>
;<td>129</td></tr>
<tr></tr>
<tr><td>RISK</td><td></td><td></td><
;td></td></tr>
<tr><td>-Market
acceptance</td><td>10</td><td>2</td><td>4<
;/td></tr>
<tr><td>-Impact on relationship in core
business</td><td>7</td><td>1</td><td>3</t
d></tr>
<tr><td>-Competitive
threat</td><td>5</td><td>2</td><td>4</td&
gt;</tr>
<tr><td>-Desktop Integration
threat</td><td>4</td><td>1</td><td>3</td&
gt;</tr>
<tr><td>-Investment/unit cost
risk</td><td>3</td><td>2</td><td>3</td>
;</tr>
<tr><td>-Hardware
OEM</td><td>2</td><td>1</td><td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr><td>-Company
viability</td><td>2</td><td>1</td><td>3</
td></tr>
<tr><td>-Total</td><td></td><td>50</td>
;<td>101</td></tr>
</table>
<h2>GO Expected Business Scenarios</h2>
<p>Preliminary</p>
<table border="1">
<tr>
<td rowspan="2">1997 Assumptions</td>
<td rowspan="2">GO Realistic/Hardnosed</td>
<td colspan="2">Aggressive/ Optimistic</td>
<td rowspan="2">GO Herioc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO</td><td>Microsoft</td>
</tr>
<tr><td>PDA Hardware
Market
-$Millions</td><td>$2700</td><td>$2700</td><td&
gt;$2700</td><td>$2700</td></tr>
<tr><td>PDA Software Market -
$Millions</td><td>$2025</td><td>$2025</td><td&g
t;$2025</td><td>$2025</td></tr>
<tr><td>Compaq HW Market
Share</td><td>15%</td><td>25%</td><td>15%<
;/td><td>30%</td></tr>
<tr><td>Compaq SW Market
Share</td><td>1%</td><td>5%</td><td>0%</t
d><td>7%</td></tr>
<tr><td>Hardware Gross
Margin</td><td>20%</td><td>23%</td><td>20%&l
t;/td><td>25%</td></tr>
<tr><td>Software Gross
Margin</td><td>50%</td><td>75%</td><td>75%&l
t;/td><td>75%</td></tr>
<tr><td>Total '93-'97 Investment O/S Decision -
$Millions</td><td>$43</td><td>$23</td><td>$1
0</td><td>$23</td></tr>
<tr><td>1997
Results</td><td></td><td></td><td></td>
;<td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Compaq Total Revenue -
$Millions</td><td>$385</td><td>$709</td><td>
$365</td><td>$871</td></tr>
<tr><td>Compaq SW Revenue -
$Millions</td><td>$20</td><td>$101</td><td>$
0</td><td>$142</td></tr>
<tr><td>Compaq Total Gross Margin -
$Millions</td><td>$20</td><td>$216</td><td>$
73</td><td>$289</td></tr>
<tr><td>1993 NPV -
$Millions</td><td>$56</td><td>$263</td><td>$
86</td><td>$377</td></tr>
</table>
<h2>EVALUATION OF RISK/RETURN TRADEOFF</h2>
<em>[Ed: See PDF for figure.]</em>
<h2>Outstanding Issues</h2>
<ul>
<li>Do the benefits outweigh the risks?
<table>
<tr><td>Sustained Differentiation</td><td>Market
adoption</td></tr>
<tr><td>Initial product
functionality</td><td>Microsoft retaliation</td></tr>
<tr><td>Competition to Microsoft (customers and
ISVs)</td><td>Microsoft sabotage</td></tr>
<tr><td>Opportunity for software revenue</td><td>ISV
response</td></tr>
<tr><td>Technical
Leadershtp</td><td></td></tr>
</table></li>
<li>Can we execute?
<table>
<tr><td>Generate application support</td></tr>
<tr><td>Deliver on product vision</td></tr>
</table></li>
<li>How much additional non-hardware revenue is
possible/realistic?</li>
<li>Is this the best use of resources</li>
</ul>
<h2>Compaq Commitment</h2>
<ul>
<li>Human resources</li>
<li>Marketing funds to compete with MS and their WinPad
OEMs</li>
<li>GO/ISV Investment</li>
<li>Geographic dlvislons mind share</li>
</ul>
<h2>Summary</h2>
<ul>
<li>Choice: GO's PenPoint</li>
<li>High rewards merit risk
<ul>
<li>Key risks
<ul>
<li>Market acceptance and competition with MS and
their OEMs</li>
<li>Investment level</li>
</ul></li>
<li>Key rewards
<ul>
<li>Sustainable differentiation</li>
<li>Market leadership in new product segment</li>
<li>Software business entry</li>
</ul></li>
</ul></li>
<li>We are at a unique point in time where the future
rewards are worth the
apparent risks</li>
</ul>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 05:42 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/1000/PX01535.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1535<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
Erik Stevenson
<hr />
<b>From:</b> Jeff Thiel<br />
<b>To:</b> bradsi; josephk; richt<br />
<b>Cc:</b> bradc; richba<br />
<b>Subject:</b> FW: IBM PC CO Trip Report<br />
<b>Date:</b> Wednesday, January 20, 1993 9:02AM
</p>
<p>
This is ***INCREDIBLY*** important news -- we have a
historic
opportunity to kill the VP Trojan Horse and possibly
cripple the IBM
software companies bundling efforts. We must do 2 things:
</p>
<p>
1) help the IBM PC company make the VP model with
DOS/Windows so
successful that they decide to put DOS/Windows on all
VP's.
</p>
<p>
action: get windows prod mgmt involved (1 volunteer) to
help IBM think
through ways to make the bundle attractive (special
utilities/front
end, special apps bundles, special packaging/collateral,
etc.) and then
devote resources to help them deliver it.
</p>
<p>
2) make the IBM PC company think that OS/2 will become
less and less
attractive over time.
</p>
<p>
Action: show them full product treadmill, including:
</p>
<p>
- telling them we're considering having one Windows with
networking
as an option in mid-93<br />
- we're seeing such demand for an "OS/2 replacement"
product that we're
going to do a soft bundle of DOS/Windows for resellers to
put on IBM
systems (BJ 2.0)<br />
- brief them on Chicago<br />
- demo CAIRO<br />
- tell them that components of Chicago that come from NT
(eg, Win32)
aren't covered by the licensing agreement and therefor
don't fall into
the sw companies hands (wild idea but I think we should
pursue it, I
can't stand the idea of them getting Chicago code)
</p>
<p>
What do you think?<br />
----------<br />
From: Richard Barton<br />
To: Brad Chase<br />
Cc: Jeff Thiel; Joseph Krawczak; Richard Barton; Richard
Tong; Rob
Curtin; Scott Sandell<br />
Subject: FW: IBM PC CO Trip Report<br />
Date: Tuesday, January 19, 1993 06:31PM
</p>
<p>
There was an IBM PC Co - MS summit in NY yesterday. IBM PC
Co brand
mgrs express great interest in MS-DOS, Win, & WFW.
Highlights:<br />
* Assert PC co is free from IBM S/W Co influence<br />
* Impression that OS/2 is inhibiting sales<br />
* Mid feb launch of 486 PS/VP with PC-DOS & Windows
pre-installed.<br />
This is same story I am recently getting from BJ
contractees
</p>
<p>
Thanks for the info, Rob. This is good news. Couple of
questions:<br />
* Any guess at PS/VP sales by channel (800# vs
dealers)?<br />
* Any impression of the success or failure of the 800#,
IBM Direct
organization? (brand mgrs make any off the cuff comments
about it?)<br />
* Do you think the PS/1 will continue to offer an OS/2
pre-installed
skus as it does now?
</p>
<p>
Good to meet-you at the RSM. thanks again,<br />
Rich
</p>
<p>
----------<br />
From: Rob Curtin<br />
To: Kelly Wood; Bob Jones; Clifford Mark; Gene
Cronin<br />
Cc: Richard Barton; Troy Oldham<br />
Subject: PC CO Trip Report<br />
Date: Tuesday, January 19, 1993 06:03PM
</p>
<p>
Trip Report:Strategy discussion with PC CO<br />
Date: January 19, 1993 8:30 - 11:30 a.m.<br />
Attending :<br />
MS: Kelly Wood, OEM Account Manager<br />
Bob Jones, DM Nyconn<br />
Gene Cronin, CANAM Nyconn<br />
Cliff Mark, ASE IBM National Account<br />
Rob Curtin, CAA IBM National Account
</p>
<p>
IBM: Scott Bower, Mobile Computing<br />
Dave Andonian, Premier Line<br />
Angelica Hoiratis, Value Point<br />
Don Nicita, PS/1
</p>
<p>
The MS IBM Account Team met with the Brand Marketing
Managers of the IBM PC CO today at the IBM Personal
Systems
HQ in Somers, NY. MS presented the MS Systems Strategy,
and
Desktop and Application drill-down strategies for two
hours
and spent the remaining hour discussing mutual strategies
and potential business opportunities.
</p>
<p>
All agreed that a meeting between the two companies was
clearly needed, and that communications must be sustained.
We successfully accomplished our Advance goal, and
obtained
commitment from each of the brand marketing managers to
individually attend a briefing in Redmond focused on the
needs of each brand management team. Each brand marketing
manager expressed sincere interest in Windows, WFW, MS DOS
6.0, Multi Media, and specific MS offerings targeted at
their market niche, and would like to further explore
packaging these products with their offerings.
</p>
<p>
The IBM PC CO Brand Marketing Teams consist of three brand
managers: Marketing, Development, and Manufacturing. Today
we met with the brand marketing managers. They insisted
that the PC CO is free from the influence of IBM PSP and
AWD, and that the brand management team's have been
empowered to "call all the shots" for their respective
brands. There was an underlying feeling that most were
frustrated with IBM PSP (OS/2) and implied that OS/2 may
be
an inhibitor to their sales volumes. The most recent proof
of this is that the PS/ Value Point will be shipping a 486
with preloaded Windows accompanied by shrink-wrap Windows
by
mid February (Targeting end of month).
</p>
<p>
Kelly Wood has taken responsibility for coordinating the
Redmond briefings with each PC CO brand team. The IBM
Field
Account Team will continue to call on the PC CO HQ
personnel
in Somers, NY, and ensure day-to-day communications are
maintained. The briefing dates need to be coordinated, but
all parties agreed to make a best efforts attempt to
schedule the briefings with urgency. In addition to
Windows, WFW, DOS, and MM each brand team expressed
interest
in the following:
</p>
<dl>
<dt>Mobile Computing / Thinkpads</dt>
<dd>Modular Windows<br />
PC MCIA<br />
Pen-Centric Applications/Case Studies<br />
Apps in ROM</dd>
<dt>Server Technologies / Premier</dt>
<dd>NT<br />
LanMan for NT<br />
Enterprise Strategy<br />
Client Server Strategy</dd>
<dt>PS/1</dt>
<dd>Consumer Titles</dd>
<dt>Value Point</dt>
<dd>Application SW<br />
MM Titles<br />
DOS / Windows Futures</dd>
</dl>
<p>
Many thanks to Gene Cronin for spearheading the scheduling
of this meeting, and to Cliff Mark for his Desktop and
Application drill-down strategy presentations proving to
IBM
that MS really knows their Sh--
</p>
<p>
please email with any Q's<br />
Rob
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 05:44 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/1000/PX01537.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1537<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
Erik Stevenson
<hr />
<b>From:</b> Scott Sandell<br />
<b>To:</b> bradsi; jefft; josephk; os2team; richba; richt;
t-richo<br />
<b>Cc:</b> scottsan<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Lee Reiswig's speech highlights<br />
<b>Date:</b> Friday, January 22, 1993 12:00PM
</p>
<p>
The following highlights of Lee Reiswig's speech this week
to the Bay
Area OS/2 User's Group reinforce the emphasis and
resources IBM is
putting on OS/2. As you are all aware from Josephk's mail
this week,
OS/2 2.1 is a substantially better product, in many ways a
better
Windows than Windows, etc. This mail indicates that they
are not about
to give up anytime soon:
</p>
<ul>
<li>$100 M for advertising in '93</li>
<li>As much as $400 M for Reiswig's group, much of it
OS/2</li>
</ul>
<p>
And that they are enjoying greater industry support for
OS/2:
</p>
<ul>
<li>The 2.1 beta is shipped with ~213 printer drivers,
approx. the same as
Win 3.1.</li>
<li>2.1 beta includes video drivers for the top 5 chipsets
by volume,
comprising ~80% of shipping cards</li>
</ul>
<p>
As we all know, all of this suggests that we need to take
OS/2 much
more seriously:
</p>
<ul>
<li>Make sure NT and Chicago ARE better products (joe's
suggestions of Tuesday)</li>
<li>We give them as little trial as possible (Rich
Barton's proposals)</li>
<li>Need to reposition them effectively in the
marketplace: a few ideas
(old & new)>
<ul>
<li>They are on a technology treadmill, will always be
behind (they
have Win 3.1 support, almost, after a year, but what
about Win32s, networking??)</li>
<li>They haven't really attracted ISV support; the few
horizontal apps
being developed are behind the Windows versions</li>
<li>Question whether IBM can really continue this
massively
unprofitable venture given the corporations currrent
losses - with all the recent
press about firing Ackers, question whether his
replacement would
change funding priorities for Reiswig's group?</li>
<li>Their strategy is very confusing, they are
independently developing
three OS's, what does this mean for customers??</li>
</ul>
</ul>
<p>
Scott
</p>
<p>
Newsgroups: comp.os.os2.advocacy<br />
Path:<br />
hexnut!microsoft!uunet!usc!howland.reston.ans.net!zaphod.mps.ohio-stat
.edu!uwm.edu!linac!att!cbnewsc!cbfsblatt-out!pacbell.com!well!well.sf.
a.us|dposey<br />
From: dposey well.sf.ca.us (David Posey)<br />
Subject: Lee Reiswig speaks!
Message-ID: <dposey.727599220@well.sf.ca.us><br />
Sender: news@well.sf.ca.us<br />
Organization: Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link<br />
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 1993 06:53:40 GMT<br />
Lines: 61
</p>
<p>
Lee Reiswig addressed a special meeting of the OS/2 Bay
Area Users Group
tonight, in conjunction with the OS/2-Windows Conference
in San Jose.
Approximately 200 people turned up (30 minutes after the
show closed) on
short notice. Mr. Reiswig recapped his 'Strategy
Briefing', given earlier
in the day, and answered many questions.
</p>
<p>
Note: I did not take extensive notes - I went as an
individual developer,
not a reporter. I thought what he had to say deserves
repeating (briefly!).
</p>
<p>
In no particular order:
</p>
<p>
1) The 'Workplace Family' strategy continues to be refined
and defined. One
slide showed Workplace (WP) DOS for small machines,
including pen-driven,
WP OS/2 for 'normal' desktops (super client), WP OS
for 'high-end'
desktops/workstations, and WP UNIX at the top end. Mention
was made of
targeting the WP OS and WP UNIX at multiprocessor &
parallel systems.
</p>
<p>
2) The 2.1 beta is shipped with ~213 printer drivers,
approx. the same as
Win3.1. Support is provided for printers released since
last spring,
like HP LJ4, DJ500C, and Lexmark 4029 series (are these
supported for
Win3.1 users by MS?).
<p>
<p>
3) The 2.1 beta includes video drivers for the top 5
chipsets by volume,
comprising ~80% of shipping cards. Not S3, ATI and other
accelerated
cards. Mr. Reiswig was apologetic over the lack of
drivers, DDK, etc.
</p>
<p>
4) The DDK is available in limited beta. Bug your IBM
contact if you need
it.
</p>
<p>
5) Stay tuned for an announcement next week re:DBM. The
rumor mill
suspects 32-bit engine will be unveiled.
</p>
<p>
6) Advert/marketing budget for '93 is approx $100Million -
massive upswing
from '92. 'Event' marketing (Fiesta Bowl, etc.) will *not*
be the
emphasis. Focussed, content-rich print ads should be the
norm.
The 'OS/2 100' 23-page tear-out section is a good start!
</p>
<p>
7) IBM polled developers to see where to focus electronic
support efforts,
some time ago. Seventy percent said Compuserve, 50% said
Internet,
less for Fidonet/BBSs. So, IBM focused on Compuserve
first, to get their
feet wet. A greater Internet presence is possible, but was
not promised.
</p>
<p>
8) The 'OS/2 cost $2Billlon to develop' strawman is
(direct quote follows)
'utter and complete bullsh*t'. [The numbers just don't
work out - Mr.
Reiswigs annual budget is approx. $400 mil, including many
developers
not working on OS/2, marketing, etc. Somewhere in the
range of $100M
to $500M is more likely]
</p>
<p>
Mr. Reiswigs reluctance to talk about MS, or even mention
them, was notable
- and noble, considering Mr. Gates constant bad-mouthing
of IBM.
</p>
<p>
The presentation was extremely well done - this is not the
IBM I knew and
loathed in the mid-80's!
</p>
<p>
Again, I apologize for any minor inaccuracies, the gist is
correct as I
heard it.
</p>
<p>
Regards,<br />
David
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 05:46 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/1000/PX01768.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1768<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
<b>Lynn E. Williams (Legal)</b><br />
<b>From:</b> Paul Maritz<br />
<b>To:</b> Jeff Raikes<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: FYI: latest Intel paranoia<br />
<b>Date:</b> Tue, Aug 24, 1993 6:51AM
</p>
<p>
My "buddies" in the Intel field tell me that it is already
a defacto Excel/Word standard for Windows, but
that it is widely know that Manzi put a lot of pressure on
Grove not to "take sides". I will find out more if I
can.
</p>
<p>
----------<br />
<b>From:</b> Jeff Raikes<br />
<b>To:</b> Paul Maritz<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: FYI: latest Intel paranoia<br />
<b>Date:</b> Monday, August 23, 1993 4:59PM
</p>
<p>
Thanks for the update.
</p>
<p>
I hate to bother you with my small problems, but....<br />
In June, Andy put the kabash on a pending decision for
Intel
to standardize on MS Office. The perceived reason was
that he
was <em>[Ed: language]</em> we didn't support them on the
export issue (as I
recall they wanted us to join them in asking the govemment
to
block a korean PC maker using AMP, but one that was also
bundling windows --- we declined). The current status is
that
they will be "dual-standard" allowing users to choose
either
SmartSuite or Office. It looks like it will be difficult
to
change that.
</p>
<p>
Let me know if you have any ideas. I am meeting with
Carlene
Ellis (CIO) in the next couple of weeks.<br />
----------<br />
<b>From:</b> Paul Maritz<br />
<b>To:</b> Bill Gates; Dwayne Walker; Jeff Raikes; Jim
Allchin;
Jonathan Lazarus; Mike Appe; Richard Tong; Steve
Ballmer<br />
<b>Subject:</b> FYI: latest Intel paranoia<br />
<b>Date:</b> Tuesday, July 20, 1993 3:13PM
</p>
<p>
Intel has decided that the enemy is now:<br />
#1 Power PC<br />
#2 IBM, HP, DEC - on the grounds that these are the_guys
who
are bankrolling RISC, both in-terms of R&D, but more
importantly because they are the ones who have power to
sell
to the "enterprize" and will push their "house brands"
over
Intel.
</p>
<p>
So, Intel is about to embark on am crusade to "empower"
the
likes of EDS, SHL, etc (the highend solution: providers)
as
"purveyors to the enterprize", on the grounds that they
will
be neutral wrt architectures. Intel is going to tell us
more
about their plans next week, but if they run Uue to form,
they will spend big $'s.
</p>
<p>
This is fundamentally good for us and we should try to get
the
benefit of Intel, and DEC/HP/IBM, dollars to position and
sell
things Windows to the "enterprize".
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 05:48 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/1000/PX01801.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1801<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
<b>Teresa Jennings</b><br />
<b>From:</b> Jonathan Lazarus<br />
<b>To:</b> Bill Miller<br />
<b>Subject:</b> FW: Meeting with Billg next week on
Windows profit boost/maximization<br />
<b>Date:</b> Thursday, September 23, 1993 11:16PM
</p>
<p>
----------<br />
<b>From:</b> Brad Silverberg<br />
<b>To:</b> Brad Chase; David Brooks; Jim Allchin; Jonathan
Lazarus; Jonathan Roberts; Paul Maritz; Richard
Freedman; Richard Tong<br />
<b>Cc:</b> David Cole; John Ludwig<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Meeting with Billg next week on
Windows profit boost/maximization<br />
<b>Date:</b> Thursday, September 23, 1993 6:44PM
</p>
<p>
this is the right thing to do and yes, richf and davidbr
should take the
lead.
</p>
<p>
i also spoke with billg about this today. what we wants to
do is recreate
the world where we "doubled dipped": we got the oem's to
pay us for ms-dos
and then we sell windows retail. chicago base becomes the
old dos, and the
power-pack becomes the old windows. one topic he wants to
discuss is what
exactly should be in the base and how we can make the
power pack super
attractive.<br />
----------<br />
<b>From:</b> Paul Maritz<br />
<b>To:</b> bradc; bradsi; davidbr; jimall: jonl; jonro;
richf; richt<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Meeting with Billg next week on Windows
profit boost/maximization<br />
<b>Date:</b> Thursday, September 23, 1993 4:08PM
</p>
<p>
(meeting was "Windows Add-on Business" proposal meeting).
</p>
<p>
Having spoken briefly with Billg yesterday, and having
been present at
a discussion of Apps pricing strategies , I think we
should bear
following in mind:
</p>
<p>
- Billg believes that there are scenarios in which it will
be hard to
get same kind of growth out of Apps that we have seen in
past few years,<br />
- thus he believes that we need to think thru scenarios in
which we
harvest significantly increased revenue out of systems
business, by
growing the server business, but also significantly more
out of Windows<br />
- basically the challenge is to find another $1B in
revenue.<br />
- the basic thesis he has is that customers are willing to
pay more and
place a value of $99+ on the Windows environment. Given
that we cannot
harvest $99 from every OEM on every machine, and that we
do not, under
any circumstances, want to lose market share in the OEM
channel - this
leads to some variant on strategy where we sell a basic
OEM version of
Windows and an "upgrade" package. The base version would
be OEM
focussed and would carry most important API's for ISVs,
and the
"enhanced" version would be available both thru OEMs
(albeit for
significantly higher royalties) and thru retail. The delta
in
functionality between base and enhanced has to be
compelling enough
that a high proportion of users would elect to buy it.
</p>
<p>
With above in mind, I think we need to do following:
</p>
<p>
- start with brief baseline data on what the DOS/Windows
business is
today (FY'94) - what we get in terms of:<br />
- OEM revenue/margin<br />
- retail revenue/margin<br />
- upgrade revenuelmargin<br />
- addon revenue/margin (Fonts,
WPS, Scenes, anything else we have -
</p>
<p>
instructive to see how small it is)<br />
(ignore allocations).
</p>
<p>
- Go thru several scenario's for revised packaging and
pricing - and
model them in terms of revenue AND margin yield with some
"low/medium/high" kind of sensitivity analysis on the
assumptions (eg.
what % would elect to take the "enhanced version", as well
as prices) -
with the above four source of revenue (OEM, retail,
upgrade, add-on).
</p>
<p>
- It would also be interesting to do some "goal seeking" -
ie. what
would it take in terms of above assumptions to double the
BOI that
systems currently produces on DOS/Windows (ie. go from
roughly $400M to
$800M).
</p>
<p>
- Go thru some discussion of the functionality split
between the
various packaging options.
</p>
<p>
I have let Billg know that this will be a
working/brainstorming
meeting, not a decision meeting, but it would be good to
have some
common data on the table, and have some framework to
discuss things.
</p>
<p>
Bradsi can overrule this, but I would like to request that
Rich
Freedman and David Brooks take the lead on pulling the
above together.
</p>
<p>
I think it is OK to introduce the concept that
jonl/richt/jonro have
floated of "including" Windows NT desktop version on a
common CD with
Chicago, but we shouldn't make that affect the above
analysis either
way at this point.
</p>
<p>
Comment?
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 05:51 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/3000/PX03059.pdf
<p>PLAINTIFF'S<br />
EXHIBIT<br />
3059<br />
Comes v. Microsoft</p>
<hr />
<p>
<b>From:</b> Orlando Ayala<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Sunday, May 02, 1999 12:20 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> Robert (Robbie) Bach<br />
<b>Subject:</b> FW: Home and Retail Division WWSMM Memo
</p>
<p>
<b>Follow Up Flag:</b> Follow up<br />
<b>Flag Status:</b> Flagged<br />
</p>
<p>
here is some feed-back (in the memo).. good work!
</p>
<p>
-----Original Message-----<br />
<b>From:</b> Robert (Robbie) Bach<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, April 30, 1999 12:12 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Orlando Ayala; Michael Lacombe; PieterKnook;
Richard Fade<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Jeff Raikes; Joachim Kempin; Home and Retail
Div. Stiff; Home & Retail Div. Subsidiary Managers;
Craig Fiebig (Exchange); Steven
Sinofsky; Rich Tong (Exchange); David Cole; Nick MacPhee;
John Leftwich; Sandy Duncan<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Home and Retail Division WWSMM Memo
</p>
<p>
I suspect you will get this as part of your "memo packet"
for WWSMM, but I thought I would send you a copy of the
HRD WWSMM memo directly. The memo lays out our basic
strategy, focus areas, metrics, etc.
</p>
<p>
Let me know if you have questions or thoughts.
</p>
<p>
Thanks
</p>
<p>
Robbie
</p>
<p>
Home and Retail<br />
WWSMM Memo Fin...
</p>
<h1>Microsoft MEMORANDUM</h1>
<p>
<b>To:</b> WWSMM Attendees<br />
<b>From:</b> Robbie Bach<br />
<b>Date:</b> April 26, 1999<br />
<b>cc:</b> OrlandoA, MichelL, PieterK, JeffR, JoachimK,
HERDMGMT, HRDSUBMG<br />
<b>Subject:</b> FY00 Home and Retail Division WWSMM Memo
</p>
<h2>I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</h2>
<p>
Given that the Home and Retail Division (HRD) was just
formed, I thought I'd use this memo to articulate our
mission, goals, and key focus areas both for FY00 and over
the longer-term In the process, I will outline how HRD
integrates into the Initiative Process and what roles we
will play in the various aspects of the FY00 Initiatives.
At
the highest level, our mission is to make Microsoft the #1
supplier of software and hardware to home PC users. Put
another way, we are charged (along with CCG and Consumer
Windows also defining how to win with OFFICE big
time in the home as they relate to Muglias org?) with
making Microsoft the leader in the consumer space by
building
the next profitable, multi-billion dollar business for
Microsoft. If you look back historically, our record in
this area
is mixed We've had some great successes with things like
the Windows 95/Offfice 95 launch, Encarta, Flight
Simulator, Mouse, and gaming devices (among others). That
said, we've not yet lived up to the vision that BillG set
out for the company when he launched our focus on the
Consumer business 5 or 6 years ago. It is our job as an
integrated HRD team to develop the strategies and
capabilities needed to deliver on that vision over the
next few
years.
</p>
<p>
Looking more specifically at FY00, there are a number of
trends worth highlighting that should influence our plans:
</p>
<ul>
<li><i>Continued PC Growth, Accelerating at the Low
End</i>: Home PC sales continue to grow nicely, in
particular at
the low end. In the US the majority of machines on a unit
basis sell for less than $1,000 and almost 20% of the
market sells for less than $600.</li>
<li><i>Increasing Price Pressure</i>: Most markets in the
world are facing various forms of retail and OEM price
compression with strong unit growth at the low end of the
consumer software and hardware market.</li>
<li>Piracy Counterfeit product continues to be a large
drain on our revenue opportunities, in particular with the
introduction of CD-R devices. During this past holiday,
these devices were amongst the best selling consumer
devices in many countries.</li>
<li><i>Industry Consolidation</i>: In the consumer space,
The Learning Company (TLC), Electronic Arts (EA), Hasbro,
and Havas Interactive have all been very aggressive on the
acquisitions and strategic partnering fronts. With the
pending purchase of TLC by Mattel we see the beginnings of
a smaller set of large consumer companies that
will be able to influence the market much more effectively
than in the past. In the US, we have seen somewhat
of a similar trend with our major retailers.</li>
<li><i>Competitive Activities</i>: The competitive
landscape continues to evolve with new competitors in the
form of
Linux (Red Hat, SeSe and Caldera) and BeOS, and some
competitors who are getting even more "aggressive"
(Corel) due to declining financial circumstances. Local
market competitors (Star Office in Germany and
Justsystems in Japan) also continue to be a threat at
retail. We're also seeing new forms of competition in the
OEM space with ISV selling consortiums (Media Farm, Point
Group). In the Hardware space, Logitech has
followed us into the Keyboard market and the Gaming Force
Feedback market in the past year. They have also
entered the video camera market via their acquisition of
Connectix.</li>
<li><i>Changing PC Purchase Patterns</i>: As the PC market
matures and prices come down, it is becoming more of a
replacement and "2<sup>nd</sup> PC" market. In US
households, almost 30% of all new PCs are second or third
machines.
In addition, more of these purchases are happening
online - for PCs as well as for software and peripherals.
Next to books and music, software is the largest and most
popular category of products to purchase on the web.
In the US in CY 98, 14% of all software sales were via the
Internet, and this is expected to grow to 30% or more
in the next 12-24 months.</li>
<li><i>Changing PC Usage Habits</i>: Consumers' use of the
PC is also changing as a result of the Internet. Email,
chat,
community, and e-commerce are large growth areas with
users in the US now spending roughly 60% of their
PC time online. While that number is lower in other
territories, it is only a matter of time before this trend
spreads.</li>
<li><i>Importance of Super Users</i>: Households of these
engaged, influential users account for the largest chunk
of
consumer revenue per household (roughly S400/year in US).
They drive opinion and referral, and we've learned
that focusing marketing resources on this group is cost
efficient and effectively produces a high return.</li>
<li><i>Another trend is networking at home</i>.. recent
announcements like the one we did with 3COM sound like
another
opportunity to go alter that home wallet. Would new houses
will come with networking as a feature?... should
they also come with all the productivity software needed
to run that smart house?</li>
</ul>
<p>
The environment outlined above certainly presents some
difficult challenges for us. Nevertheless, growing revenue
in the home is our clear goal. While the strategies
pursued to achieve that will vary some by territory, there
are
some common threads that I will identify here and discuss
in more detail later:
</p>
<ul>
<li>Improve Retail Execution</li>
<li>Fight Piracy</li>
<li>Build OEM and other PC Attach Programs</li>
<li>Leverage Office 2000, Windows 2000, and Windows 98
2<sup>nd</sup> Edition Launches</li>
<li>Invest in Direct/Online Marketing and Selling</li>
<li>Expand Product Line and Build Franchises</li>
<li>How about licensing? How much innovation should occur
here for the home?.. are we satisfied with our current
ways to do... the whole South African experiment should
not ne consider as part of this concept?</li>
</ul>
<p>
We need a clear set of metrics to measure the success of
these and other strategies specific to a territory. In
FY00,
we will focus more heavily (and more consistently) on
sell-through as a key measure of success. We still need a
sell-in forecast for a variety of operational reasons, but
our primary task is to get product sold through to
consumers.
In addition, we'll focus much more on growth over the
previous year (and compared to the market) than on
performance against budget. Certainly budgets will be
important to build our resource plans, but in the end,
increasing $/PC requires strong growth. The next section
will lay out these and a few other metrics in more detail.
Stating that the goal is really 30% or more as the
breakthrough will not be bad. Nothing like having that
numberd
burned in the team's mind.
</p>
<h2>II. SCORECARD</h2>
<p>
At the highest level, our goal is to build a set of
programs that help us increase the dollars we generate
from home
and retail relative to the PC opportunity. Conceptually,
growing $/PC is the right way to think about expanding our
business and will help us as we establish new programs.
But as a practical metric, $/PC has some significant
limitations in the home space so it's important for us to
have some additional goals and metrics to measure our
success. While these will vary a bit by subsidiary, these
are the metrics we should highlight: our current symtems
(MS sales, etc) are appropriate for you to go after these
metrics?.. this is a bit of the discussion we had the
other day
about the customer segment map of the MYR template, You
need to design it really in line with what you think will
be meaningful
</p>
<ul>
<li><i>Grow Sell-through</i>: Generating growth across all
businesses and territories is a major goal. I define this
as
growing faster than our previous year, faster than the
market, and faster than PC growth.</li>
<li><i>Increase Profit</i>: Increasing our profitability,
both in absolute dollars and margin terms is important.
Our goal is
to have both the Hardware business and the Consumer
Software business improve their profitability over last
year and meet or exceed our competitor's profit
margins.</li>
<li><i>Office Momentum</i>: With Office 2000, we have a
huge opportunity to bump our sell-through rate to the next
level and compete even more effectively with Corel. It's
also critical that our retail launch help build a "buzz"
around the products that drive sales in other (more
business oriented) channels. Since Corel is also launching
a
new version, success will not be easy. We'll strive to
grow our Office retail business by 35% vs. FY99, while
increasing the $/License through specific up-sell
strategies and tactics with the Pro and Premium SKUs.</li>
<li><i>You should ask Schiro to update you of the
discussion we had as a group (Fiebig and others). About
the need to
be more creative on the launch. I gave several ideas that
will be good you also look at. Craig is supposed to be
on the case and get us a proposal during the next 10 days
on how to really get something really exciting. The
way plans are today I see them as very lame considering
the importance of this release.</i></li>
<li><i>Windows Success</i>: Our challenges are two-fold:
first, we must sustain Windows 98 momentum by leveraging
the introduction of 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition to sell 2M
units at retail worldwide. Second, we need to execute a
flawless
launch and ensure we are appropriately positioning Windows
2000 to the small business market via the retail
channel. Let's get early on the planning of great consumer
ideas.. we should get out of the mood of getting that
done just few weeks before we are going to the
street.</li>
<li><i>Market Share</i>: For some categories of products,
we do have market share goals. In particular for Encarta
(65%
revenue share), Office (90+% <u>retail</u> revenue share),
Mouse (45% share), and Gaming Devices (60% share).</li>
<li><i>Thought Leadership</i>: Since market circumstances
vary quite a bit by country, our objective is to have each
territory drive a new/specific "best practice" program
targeted at increasing $/PC in that territory. As
examples,
the Home PC Purchase program in Sweden or Retail Direct in
the US would meet this goal. There could be
great space for "gold digging" working on some few things
with CCG.. every location should be looking at that
. and tehn we see what good practices will help us extend
to other parts</li>
</ul>
<h2>III.RELEVANCE OF HRD TO WORLDWIDE STRATEGIC
INITIATIVES</h2>
<p>
Overall, HRD is primarily focused on the $/PC initiative
and owns the home user segment of that initiative. That
said, there are ways in which we support some of the other
initiatives:</p>
<ol>
<li><i>Win and Secure the KM/Collaboration Platform</i>:
While this is clearly a corporate focused initiative, we
can
help at retail by building "buzz" for Office 2000 and
generating end-user momentum for the product. Many of
these collaboration situations are generated at the
Division or Group level within a company and involve
"highly engaged" users building their own basic systems.
We need to help get these types of people educated
about Office's new capabilities and excited about
trying/buying it. Remember that the retailers have also
outbound sales forces.. we need to ensure your sales guys
are leveraging that sales force to support this
objective.</li>
<li><i>Drive Windows 2000 Professional Desktop
Penetration</i>: This is the retail portion of a broader
effort to build the
Win 2000 platfonn. Windows 2000 Professional will clearly
be positioned as the best OS for all businesses and
HRD can support the initiative by generating excitement
and momentum at retail for the product. Windows
NTW has already begun to penetrate the LORG market, the
next big growth area for Windows 2000 adoption is
in the small and medium organizations. Since many small
businesses shop at retail, the success of Windows
2000 depends on how well we message and penetrate this
market segment. Same comments as above.. let's be
sure that companies like COMP-USA are goaling their
outbounds around these initiatives</li>
<li><i>Build the Online Business</i>: Many of the partners
with whom we work in retail and in OEM are very interested
in the online space. They are all trying to identify ways
in which they can share in the online annuity streams,
sell their products online, or use "online excitement" in
the marketplace to drive in-store traffic for products
they sell. As an example, Dixon's in the UK is now the
largest (or one of the largest) ISPs in the country based
on programs they ran to integrate an ISP offering into
their regular retail business. In the US, we have at least
one retailer who wants to offer discount or free PCs and
make money (through revenue sharing) off of the
revenue the buyer generates when he or she goes online. In
any of these cases, we need to support CCG's
efforts to win in the online arena by building these types
of activities into our work with retailers. I would pick a
couple of things to do in the US and start with that. This
is an area that Best Buy is ready to do but we need to
narrow the focus on what we thing could be early wins ..
that could for sure enhance mind-share tgo benefit the
mainstream retail business.</li>
<li><i>Grow Customer and Partner Satisfaction</i>: From an
end-user perspective, HRD has an opportunity to drive
consumer satisfaction since users interact with our
products and support services in a very direct way. We
need
to continue improving our "out of the box" experience for
users and work with the Consumer Windows team to
make it easier to install and use our products. We also
need to market the new "Personal" PSS offerings where
they are offered. HRD also manages our relationships with
retailers around the world, and we need to make
sure those relationships remain healthy or strengthen over
time. Certainly there is an aspect of "negotiation"
that goes on with these partners which can and will create
tensions in relations at various times. But overall,
working closely with them is fundamental to our success
and is a major reason why we are moving to a direct
sales model with our major retailers in the US. Only by
working in partnership with them, can we identify new
opportunities, respond more quickly to the market, and
capture share relative to our competition. While the first
corporate survey of customer satisfaction did not include
these groups, we are going to do some survey work on
our own to measure current satisfaction and hope to get
incorporated into the next round of satisfaction survey
work that is being done worldwide.<br />
Have you talked with Jean-PC ?.. we should formally
include this time around. I think we should</li>
<li>Increase $/PC: This is clearly the initiative that is
most relevant to HRD, and I'll discuss in greater length
below how we will address the consumer segment. It's worth
pointing out that HRD can help raise $/PC in
some other customer segments, in particular in small
businesses. Depending on the country, some meaningful
percentage of these companies actually buy hardware md
software through retailers. In the US, someone like
CompUSA does a good business with this audience. So while
this is not an explicit focus for HRD, there will
be opportunities for us to support the Small Business
effort.</li>
</ol>
<h2>IV. STRATEGIC INITIATIVE MAP</h2>
<table>
<tr><th><em>[Ed: unreadable
title]</em></th><th><em>[Ed:
unreadable title]</em></th></tr>
<tr><td><b>Win and Secure the KM/Collaboration
Platform</b></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td><ul><li>Engage Customers on our Vision and
Products</li></ul></td><td>Support</td></tr>
<tr><td><b>Drive Win2K Desktop
Penetration</b></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td><ul><li>Deepen Penetration on Win 2K
Machines</li></ul></td><td>Support</td></tr>
<tr><td><b>Build the Online
Business</b></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td><ul><li>Grow the Access
Business</li></ul></td><td>Support</td></tr>
<tr><td><b>Grow Customer and Partner
Satisfaction</b></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td><ul><li>Create a Customer Centered
Culture</li></ul></td><td>Support</td></tr>
<tr><td><b>Increase
$/PC</b></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td><ul><li>Drive $/PC in Small
Business</li></ul></td><td>Support</td></tr>
<tr><td><ul><li>One Best Practice for
Consumer</li></ul></td><td>Owner</td></tr>
</table>
<h2>V. HRD CORE STRATEGIES</h2>
<p>
Given the diversity in our markets and the various stages
of development within the Home segment, prescribing
specific actions that every territory should use is not an
easy task. Nevertheless, I want to discuss some strategies
that I think apply in most markets and should guide our
tactical activities over the next 12 to 18 months. I'm
hopeful that each territory can use these and other
strategies to meet the "Thought Leadership" objective
defined
above.
</p>
<h3>Strategy #1: Improve Retail Execution</h3>
<p>
In many ways, the home and retail space is all about great
execution. More so than most of Microsoft's businesses,
our success is directly related to how well we execute
from the time the product is RTM'd, through
shipment/stocking/promotion, all the way to managing life
cycle sales after a product has peaked in the market.
While I think we have improved over the years in a variety
of execution areas, we are not a leader in this respect
and
many of our competitors (certainly EA, TLC, Havas
Interactive, Intuit, and perhaps Corel) are more effective
at it
than we are. There are a variety of issues that have
hampered our performance, but the bottom line is that
Development, Operations, Marketing, and Sales must work
better together in an integrated way to improve our
performance and make us "world class" in this area. Here
is a brief description of the key areas where we need to
drive for excellence and some examples of problems we need
to address:
</p>
<ul>
<li><i>Product Delivery</i>: The product teams must
deliver a full portfolio of quality products. Beyond this
somewhat
obvious statement, one key metric for the product teams is
<u>timely</u> delivery. Using FY99 as an example, we had
several products that slipped quite a bit (Office 2K, Age
2, Tax, Streets and Trips) and this created real planning
and revenue challenges for the group. And even for
products that ship "on-time", the specific timing is
critical
around key selling periods like Holiday or the Japanese
bonus seasons. This year while Works and our key
Games shipped as scheduled, their planned RTM dates were
too late in the holiday season for some
International markets to maximize their revenues. Shipping
software is not a science, but we need to keep
focusing on delivering great software at the right time on
a worldwide basis.</li>
<li><i>Manufacturing/Operations</i>: Given the quantities
we sell and the logistics involved, efficient/effective
manufacturing and operations is very important. We made
many improvements this year including shorter
delivery times and some great work to produce unexpectedly
high quantities of product in the US. That said,
we also had quite a few problems in this area. In the US,
we had faulty CDs produced for Combat Flight Sim
and had large logistics problems in our Indianapolis
shipping center that delayed hardware products and
products for Latin America. In Europe we had a variety of
problems associated with the new turn-key
operations that delayed products getting to shelf in a
timely way. We need this process to run super smoothly
and reduce lead-times even further if we want to be
successful long-term.</li>
<li><i>This is an area in which you really must define
very tight goals for the OPS people. We need to have
certainty
that what we have in this front can really support your
R&D and sales efforts. There has to be 3 or 4 things
that must be formalized as goals for Nick's team in
H&R. We have to get super crisp here.</i></li>
<li><i>Product Marketing Support</i>: First and foremost,
product marketing needs to produce great consumer
positioning/messaging. As an example, we are still working
on this for Office 2000 and the Office team and the
former CCU teams have struggled a bit to coordinate this
work. Additionally, Product Marketing needs to
develop clear messaging around Windows 2000 to eliminate
any confusion. There will be many consumers
who will assume Windows 2000 is the next version of
Windows 98 - we need to make sure they understand the
target is the business user. Product marketing also needs
to produce great packaging in a timely way. This is an
area where we had serious breakdowns this year: some
groups didn't solicit feedback early enough from the
subsidiaries resulting in lots of late changes and lower
satisfaction in the territories. In other instances,
packaging became critical path to shipping a product - and
that is inexcusable. Finally, we need great demand
generation workfrom marketing - and where possible we want
that to integrate well with the channel marketing
and sales activities we have planned.</li>
<li><i>Retailer Relatrbnships</i>: Having great
relationships with our reseller accounts is one of the
reasons we are
moving to sell direct to our largest resellers in the US.
Through these relationships, we get competitive
information, feedback on our products and marketing
strategies, opportunities for special promotions, and real
creativity in building account plans. Success at retail
also depends on our figuring out the right set of T's and
C's that motivate our accounts most effectively - and we
can only do this well when we work closely with
them. Today, we don't get enough leverage from our full
product line, and at least in many markets, we don't
have a strong enough relationship with retailers to get
the "special opportunities" that can drive incremental
sales.</li>
<li><i>Pricing</i>: Getting our pricing "right" is
arguably the most important marketing mix decision we make
for
products at retail, and today we only do a mediocre job at
this. First, we need to be more flexible about price
points by considering competitive activity and local
market conditions better. By the time you factor in
currency fluctuations and market differences, we can't
just take a US price and translate that into a price point
in each country. Second, we need to get the pricing right
the first time around. Missing a price point out of the
gate (particularly if we are too high) really stalls
momentum and is difficult to change (almost impossible in
some countries). In some of these categories, initial
momentum is what drives reseller interest and once a
product gets stalled it is tough to get it going again.
Finally, we need to have offerings at more price points.
With the emergence of value lines and the strength of the
mass merchant and club channel segments, we need
our product offerings to cover a wider range of price
points. Differentiation of Office/Windows pricing vs. rest
of the biz is critical.. on the non OFC/WIN products is
all about being super flexible and smart but aggressive
with pricing. For the other two it si critical we achieve
great coordination with the rest of the business and
ensure we don't do in an isolated way. Communication in
that fron will be key to win in all fronts and not just
one</li>
<li><i>Channel and Account Planning</i>: This is the nerve
center for retail execution and doing it well requires the
product, channel marketing and sales account groups to
work as an integrated team. One of the real challenges
here is managing the broad line of products we have and
establishing priorities - something we don't do well
yet. Today, in most markets we decide which few products
should get focus and spend accordingly. This
means that many products basically get little/no attention
and their ultimate performance reflects that. Instead, I
think we should do a much more detailed plan that
establishes priorities that change by product, by
promotional
offer, by account type, by time of year, etc. From this,
we build an overall plan that enables us to combine the
right product with the right promotional offer at the
right time of year with the right channel partner. As an
example, in the US we don't do as well in the Club Stores
as we should because we haven't really figured out
this integrated offer process well for that class of
trade. Now that you own this little "1B+" company you are
set
to go and do whatever it takes to win with the Clubs</li>
<li><i>In-store Execution</i>: The in-store environment
has a big influence on what people end up buying, so it's
very
important that we are great at getting stocked "in
category" at a minimum. Beyond that, we need to ensure
that
appropriate products get premium display and advertising
and that the set of products being promoted varies by
account and time of year, as appropriate. Replenishment is
also a key aspect of this, in particular around peak
selling seasons like holiday. Accounts don't necessarily
do a great job on their own of replenishment so we
have to provide guidance and incentives. As an example,
we've had trouble in the US getting replenished in
December - so this year we planned some extra promotional
activity in January so accounts knew they needed
enough inventory to carry them all the way through that
timeframe.</li>
<li><i>Inventory Management and Returns</i>: Most of our
competitors are more sophisticated at working with their
accounts to manage inventory. While EA doesn't actually
manage vendor inventory, accounts rely on them
heavily for advice on order quantities, return rates, etc.
We do some of this today but don't have the track
record to get accounts to fully buy into our advice. On
the returns front, we need to do a better job
understanding the trade-offs between being in-stock and
having high retums. Overall, we manage too
aggressively to minimize returns and that means we get
under-stocked and miss sales. ln my view, if we get
less than 10% retums, inventory is definitely too tight,
and I'd be happy with returns as high as 20% assuming
our sell-through was strong in an absolute sense. This is
less true for Office and Windows which are generally
more stable businesses so we should be able to keep
returns relatively low. Just build into the plan what it
takes
to win... not to say we should do it in a way that you
don't meet your goals of increased profitability</li>
<li><i>Life-cycle Management</i>: Our competitors are much
more sophisticated about managing the pricing and
promotion of their products to maximize revenue over the
life of the product. In general, someone like EA gets
at least 2 years of revenue generation from a good title
compared to 6-18 months for Microsoft. Our
competitors do a better job setting initial prices and
managing those prices down as appropriate to squeeze out
more sales. They also have a process to take front-line
titles and profitably sell them as "value-line" products
later in their life-cycle. While we've made some strides
in this area over the past 12 months, we have a long
way to go. This year we will have life-cycle plans
built-in to our marketing plans, and we are looking at
ways
to implement a value line strategy.</li>
<li><i>When do you think yo uestablish a discipline for
this?</i></li>
</ul>
<p>
Certainly, the US program to go direct to key retailers is
an important part of addressing some of these issues. But
we should be clear that it is not a "silver bullet" that
magically fixes all of our problems. In fact it is just an
enabler
that makes it easier to achieve some of our retail
execution objectives. And in markets outside the US, we
still need
to address the challenges presented above even if we are
working through distributors.
</p>
<h3>Strategy #2: Leverage Office 2000, Windows 2000 and
Windows 98 Second Edition Launches</h3>
<p>
During FY00 our greatest revenue opportunities will be in
leveraging the launch of Office 2000 and Windows 98
Second Edition at retail. Our goal for the Office 2000
launch is more than just generating a three-month launch
spike at retail. Instead we will be continually focusing
on the Office line with promotions, retailer class of
trade
initiatives, and consistent advertising through our
partners to drive our steady-state run rate to a new
level. Here are
some of the approaches to achieving this:
</p>
<ul>
<li>Maximize the up-sell opportunity to the Office 2000
Professional & Premium SKUs.</li>
<li>Promote Office with regular campaigns:
Back-to-School/Back-to-Work promotion focusing on the
Office line;
holiday Office promotional efforts; and a Spring FY00
campaign focusing on the Office 2000 line and in
conjunction with the Windows 2000 launch.</li>
<li>Design PC attach initiatives to increase Office 2000
sales at time of new/replacement PC purchases.</li>
<li>Partner with retailers to start selling (and
sell "better") Open Licensing and 'Retail Open'.</li>
<li>Focus on retail class-of-trade to increase Office
presence in segments like Clubs and developmental
accounts.</li>
<li>Continue investment in anti-theft devises to keep high
price Microsoft software on the shelves.</li>
</ul>
<p>
In order to increase Microsoft revenues during the Office
launch, we will incorporate other products like MapPoint,
Bookshelf, Natural Keyboard Elite, Wheel Mouse,
Intellimouse, and Intellimouse Pro into our plans. These
SKUs
will have incremental retailer displays, ads, and consumer
offers of up to $30 off each. Finally, to combat Corel
when they are launching their newest version (Corel
WordPerfect Office 2000) next month, we have implemented
an extensive "coming soon" program for Microsoft Office
2000 with various retail promotions and will focus on
selling Open License of Office 2000 at retail (month of
May). I assume you are already working on quarterly
marketing $$$$ expenditures lined up with this?
</p>
<p>
Beyond Office, Windows 98 Second Edition will represent
75-80% of HRD's total Consumer Windows revenue in
FY00. Our success with Win98 SE will be based on providing
clear reasons why Win95 users need to upgrade and
on positioning Win98 as the technological leader in the
consumer OS market. Additionally, success here depends
on excellent execution of programs during Fall/holiday and
again during the spring campaigns. For Windows 2000,
we must correctly position this product to our small
business customers and increase penetration in the small
business market. We will continue positioning Windows 98
Second Edition for the home consumer and Windows
NTW/2000 for the business user.
</p>
<p>
We have also seen a tremendous increase in competitive
activity in the OS space with the rise in popularity and
noise surrounding Linux. This is especially evident on the
retail shelf where there are multiple Linux vendors with
multiple SKUs. Despite our greater sales volume, our
Windows products often end up with less "presence" on
shelf
than this Linux collection. Due to our higher price and
higher shrinkage/theft, some resellers pull Windows from
the shelf to reduce their loss exposure. Because of the
increased retail presence in relation to sales (total
Windows
still outsells Linux), flawless retail execution for
Windows programs is even more critical for our ongoing
success.
BeOS is another Windows competitor that is continuing to
develop considerable amount of coverage in the press.
They will release a new version sometime in June 1999 that
will have improved USB support, which directly
competes with our Windows 98 Second Edition positioning.
</p>
<h3>Strategy #3: Fight Piracy</h3>
<p>
Fighting piracy may be our number one revenue opportunity.
Piracy has many forms, but I divide it broadly into
"institutional/professional piracy" and "good neighbor
piracy". The former involves people building a business
out
of pirating our software and selling it in quantity to
retailers or end users. This form of piracy is more
difficult for
us to attack at a technical level since the pirates are
usually technically savvy and can find ways to break
protection
schemes relatively quickly. Our best weapons against this
form of piracy are legal enforcement and education with
retailers and end users.
</p>
<p>
By contrast, good neighbor piracy involves individuals
making a small number of copies of software to share with
friends. The proliferation of CD-R devices has made this a
key issue forus to address in FY00. In Europe, several
retailers have told us that they will "order less" for any
products that do not have some method to prevent illegal
copying. We also believe that products without protection
sold less than they should have relative to others that
did
have protection this past holiday.
</p>
<p>
Limiting good neighbor piracy requires some form of
technical fix, along with appropriate education programs.
For
most of our consumer products (especially Games and the
Encarta line), we will be utilizing a protection scheme
licensed from Macrovision that basically prevents the
software from working if it does not detect an original CD
is
in the drive. To date, this only works for products that
require a CD - we are trying some solutions for products
like
Works that install to the hard drive but that is still
under examination. We have run one limited test of this
technology in France with Close Combat III and will be
using it broadly for the first time this May with Midtown
Madness. It's important to note that this does require a
longer release process to verify disks and will require
some
investment in manufacturing. But given the opportunity, we
are fully committed to making this happen. Hope this
makes the light in fy00.. agree it can be a great buster
of sales
</p>
<p>
With the release of Office 2000, we are also expanding our
Office anti-piracy pilot program to Australia, Brazil, and
New Zealand. In these markets, the Ofiice Registration
Wizard technology allows users to launch Office 2000
applications 50 times before registration is required.
Upon the 51<sup>st</sup> use, users will need to register
in order to
continue using Office 2000 applications and will choose
between five different methods for registering: Internet,
e-
mail, postal mail, fax or phone. The Office 2000
Registration Wizard will be implemented as part of a pilot
program
and will not appear in all copies of Office 2000. we have
to make a formal assessment of results of this pilot so we
decide to move really aggressively with it.
</p>
<p>
It's important that we come up with a good PR plan as we
launch these "anti-theft" initiatives. "Copy protection"
has a very negative heritage so we need to manage that
issue carefully. Overall though, I think most people will
understand the legitimate need to introduce these types of
technologies. Certainly the fact that our competitors are
doing similar things will help us. Leverage the work done
with Samir Bodas for the US. This year we can count as
much as 170M incremental. Not a single major incident of
bad press and that is because of the work done on
creating a PR umbrella around economic benefit. Please see
the program I approved few weeks ago for TV. It is
around 1M incremental. This is to mirror the campaign made
by the Germans but the one done here in the US is
targeted to parents and their kids.. so as far as I am
concerned that is really money being spent in your
customer
segment. Look at it I think it is strong and if it works
then we will do more in 00
</p>
<h3>Strategy #4: Build OEM and Other PC Attach
Programs</h3>
<p>
From our Windows home PC tracking study, we know that
almost 75% of software purchases happen in the first six
months following a PC purchase. Therefore, it's critical
that we identify opportunities to attach to PC sales or
generate trial and subsequent purchases around the PC
purchase process. Clearly, OEM programs are one way we
achieve this successfully today and there are some areas
where we could expand in this regard. But our OEM
business is being challenged aggressively by a variety of
forces. First, falling PC prices has left OEMs with fewer
and fewer dollars to spend on software. Even when we
retain the socket, we are getting fewer dollars for the
same
(or more) software. Second, there is increasing
competitive pressure from folks like Corel and Logitech
who offer
very aggressive pricing. In the Corel case, we are seeing
WordPerfect Office Suite pricing at or below the levels we
charge for Works Standard. Third, ISV selling consortiums
like Media Farm and the Point Group are acting as
intermediaries between OEMs and our competitors and
offering built-in up-sell programs that generate revenue
for
the OEM. Unlike most of our offerings, these programs
generally come with super low COGs and require no OEM
support. Fourth, the market's focus on the internet has
motivated OEMs to think about how they can add more
value in that area and perhaps generate new revenue
streams there. As a result, they are a little less
interested in
regular CD software bundles and less willing to pay the
prices we charge today. The final challenge we face in
OEM is an internal one. Because of the way we
report/credit OEM revenue, there is a steady tension
between the
HRD retail teams and the OEM teams. This makes it
difficult for us to make the right trade-offs between
pursuing
full-price retail sales and engaging in lower price but
higher margin OEM sales. So how do we fix? I fixed the one
on the rest of FG channel by making JK agree we will make
it part of the revenue stream of the district .. atr least
for
the next year. So at this point they will receive credit
for all sales of office and win that we sell in the
systems
builder channel
</p>
<p>
At a broader level, our real problem in OEM is that we
don't have a well-communicated strategy for how we want to
pursue this business. Aside from the requirement that
we "don't lose a socket" we don't have a systematic way
for
thinking about our OEM sales. We need a strategy that
outlines how Works, Office, Encarta, MSN, and our other
offerings work together to maximize our $/PC sold. This
strategy needs to outline what we need on the product side
(new features, new bundles, etc), how we make trade-offs
amongst the products, and what we can do to motivate all
the Microsoft people involved in the consumer space to "do
the right thing" to maximize our $/PC. We are
committed to develop and communicate such a strategy
before the end of FY99. Looking forward to be part of this
discussion. I agree there should be plenty of space to
increase SS$/PC this way.g
</p>
<p>
Beyond OEM, there are a number of other programs we need
to evaluate to increase "attach". Here are some
examples of things we should be looking at:
</p>
<ul>
<li><i>Retail OEM</i>: this takes many forms but the basic
point is that we must do a great job working with
resellers to
convince them to attach sales of our software to a machine
sale. Our goal here is to have channel partners
bundle or up-sell Office SBE, Works Suite or Encarta
Reference Suite (or a similar product depending on the
market) on every machine that does not already have one of
our OEM bundles.</li>
<li><i>Trial/sampling Programs</i>: Another idea is to
include demos or limited time/limited functionality
versions of a
broad range of our products on new PCs. These demos/trial
versions would have functionality built in where
the user could contact us to pay a full price or a
subscription to "un-lock" the full version of the
software. DAD
did some experimental work 3 years ago called Ali Baba
that was along these lines and the Office team has run
a subscription test in South Africa that looks
promising.</li>
<li><i>Special Purpose Bundles</i>: These are really
special deals that enable users to get software at the
time of a special
PC purchase. The Swedish Home PC Purchase plan is the
most "famous" of these programs today. Another
example would be a program the US is evaluating to enable
employees to purchase Office at favorable prices as
part of corporate license deals. We've also talked about
creating academic SKUs that families with K-12
children could buy for use in the home.</li>
<li><i>Membership Programs</i>: We've run a series of
tests over the past 18 months in the US focused on selling
"annuity products" to consumers. We've tested numerous
different offers, at different price points, with
different payment terms. The bottom line is that none
ofthe basic annuity models have thus far generated a
high enough response rate to justify expansion. That said,
we are continuing to explore an option to "join a
club" that provides information and special offers to
members with no up-front payments involved. Our hope is
that we can build a membership program that generates
meaningful revenue from this.</li>
<li><i>OEM Integration with Shop.com</i>: We are working
on a test with 3 OEMS in which the OEM will ship machines
into households with a Shop.com icon on the desktop and
start menu. When the user boots the new machine,
they get a multi-media product presentation with an offer
from MS. They then link out to the shop.com/OEM
co-branded secure page to buy the products/offers. For an
OEM to play, they have to agree to OEM our core
HRD products (Money/Works/Encarta). The benefit to MS is
increased reach into new PC buying households,
name capture, incremental s/w sale attached to new
PC/increased $ per PC, and reduced cannibalization.</li>
</ul>
<p>
The bottom line on all of these activities is that we have
to think about maximizing the dollars we generate from
users over the life cycle of their use of a machine. We
need to sell to them at each of the key "touch points" in
this
life cycle: with the OEM when they build the machine, with
the retailer when they sell the machine, with the end
user when they buy the machine, with the end user when
they come back into the store for additional items, and
with
the end user as part of a systematic customer
communications strategy.
</p>
<h3>Strategy #5: Invest in Direct/Online Marketing and
Selling</h3>
<p>
In many ways, this strategy is a direct follow-on to
the "attach" strategy just discussed. The basic premise is
that we
need to do a better job tracking our customers, marketing
to them more directly, and engaging them in a direct sales
process, when appropriate. Arguably Microsoft "touches"
more end users than any other software or hardware
company through our existing product line, through
Microsoft.com, through seminars/user groups, etc. We need
to
become world-class at forming a relationship with these
users, profiling them, and determining how to provide them
with better products and more opportunities to buy our
products.
</p>
<p>
Shop.com (a.k.a. Nitro) is a great example of this
process. Today, Microsoft.com generates a huge amount of
traffic
with people looking for information on our products and
services. But until recently, we made no systematic effort
to sell them our products - or put more accurately, if
they wanted to buy something, we did very little to make
that
instantly easy. Now that we have Shop.com, it's possible
to change that so that someone browsing through
information on Office or Encarta will see a "Buy Now"
button and have the opportunity for instant gratification.
As
a slightly more complex example, we see roughly 200K
unique users on Zone.com each day who are playing games
- yet there is no connection today to Shop.com for them to
buy new games easily. We need to change this.
We have to set a broader vision for SHOP.COM. We need a
great thinker in your group to spec the new wave. We
need to establish some level of timeline for Intemational
to use this. I know they are not happy with the fact that
so
far this is just a US effort. This is one we need to
figure out in terms of direction during the next few
months,
including some of the points we discussed in our
last1:1 .. bring back development to your tent and ensure
the whole
thing ties back to the mainstreams you do in channels for
H&R
</p>
<p>
I'm still early in the process of understanding our
programs to market directly to end users but here are a
few early
ideas on how we should attack this area:
</p>
<ul>
<li>We need to get much more sophisticated about how we
think about "registration" - in fact we shouldn't think
about it as registration at all. Instead we should think
about it as "membership" and we should encourage users
to join our "club" so that they can get regular
information and special offers. This needs to begin with
the
product development teams where we've not done a good job
making it easy for people to "join the club"
electronically.</li>
<li>We need to get to a more unified mechanism for
tracking users based on the Passport technology that MSN
is
developing. Today there are too many databases with pieces
of a customer's information and very few
customers where we have a "full picture". This makes
membership marketing very difficult and inefficient.
Furthermore, from the customer perspective, they don't
have a membership number or some other way to
identify their interaction with Microsoft. Each time they
register a product they basically start from scratch, and
when it comes to our service offerings they end up with
multiple user names and passwords. Consequently,
they don't have any consistent interaction with Microsoft
and don't feel like they've fully joined our club.</li>
<li>Huge issue and challenginf one. It is key. Glad to see
you see as part of your plate</li>
<li>Our strategy for pursing this area needs to be
more "global" in scope. As an example, for a variety of
reasons,
we don't have a finalized worldwide Shop.com strategy
which is unacceptable going forward. And while the
specific programs we use to market to these users will
need to be local in nature, there is a lot of leverage to
be
gained by sharing infrastructure and best practices.</li>
<li>While we absolutely need to work well with our retail
partners, we need to be more open to the concept of
selling direct to end-users. I'm committed to helping
retailers adapt to the new world (and new opportunities)
opened by the Internet, and many people will want to
continue buying in a more traditional store setting. That
said, the reality of the Internet is that we can
communicate and interact with our customers in a very
direct way
and we shouldn't limit our activities to "marketing" - if
we can make a sale, we should do it. Almost all of our
competitors sell direct to end-users in one form or
another today and someone like TLC generates a meaningful
portion of their business this way. We need to be more
aggressive in this area. We have had a single channel
summit in the past. Being retailers your main audience.. I
belive moving forward you need at least one session a
year at very high level just with retailers to really
bring them to the level of focus I know you want</li>
<li>Finally, whatever we do in this area, we need to
respect our customer's desires relative to privacy. Some
customers won't want to receive anything from us, and we
need to understand and honor that request. Others
will want to join the club but only want information. And
hopefully, the largest group will be open to getting
both information and special offers. In any case, we need
to understand our customer's privacy desires and
deliver on that.</li>
</ul>
<h3>Strategy #6: Expand Product Line and Buiid
Franchises</h3>
<p>
From a product perspective, there are many individual or
category specific strategies designed to produce better
products overall. This memo is not the right place to
cover all of those strategies. That said, I do want to
discuss
two related strategies that cut across the products
produced in HRD. First, to be successful, we need to
continue
expanding our portfolio of consumer products. Hit
titles/products are certainly important, but once you've
invested
in building an efficient "channel pipe" to sell products,
much of the incremental revenue and profit gets generated
by
"non-hit" titles. While the industry leaders all have core
titles that drive revenue/profits, they rely on their
excellence in retail execution to drive incremental
revenue (at low additional cost) from their entire
portfolio of
products. Today, EA drives 44% of their US games revenue
from products that are ranked #100-1,000 on the
market. For Havas, the equivalent numbers is 38%. This is
in stark contrast to Microsoft where we generate only
22% of our revenue from products ranked #100-1,000. Some
of this is due to execution issues but much of it also
relates to the small size of our overall portfolio. So we
will continue to expand our portfolio of products,
particularly in Games and to some degree in Learning and
in Hardware. Sometimes we get feedback that we should
do fewer products since we just don't have the capability
to sell more. But it's our view that cutting back on our
portfolio would just place a "cap" on our ability to
grow - and what we really need to do is improve our
execution
skills so that we can handle more products (a la our
competition). Looking forward to see the pmas proposed for
the
next 24 months... again this will be big learning for me.
</p>
<p>
The second half of this product strategy discussion
concerns the adage that this is a "Hits" driven business.
Over the
past two years I've come to believe that this is only
partially true. Certainly, finding hits (cost effectively)
is a key
driver of success. But an even more important activity is
taking a hit product and successfully building a
brand/franchise around it that you can leverage, sell, and
extend for many years to come. Flight Simulator,
PrintShop, Carmen Sandiego, Reader Rabbit, JumpStart,
EASports (Madden, NBA Live, etc.), Adi, and Links LS
are all examples of hits that have turned into hugely
profitable brands with long lives. And this doesn't
include
brands that come from other media like Barbie, Star
Wars/Trek, Britannica, etc. So as we steadily expand our
portfolio, we need to do this in a way that builds a core
set of franchises that we can count on year in and year
out.
And we need to design our sales and marketing strategies
to take advantage of these brands. Today, Office,
Windows, Works, Encarta, Flight Sim, Mouse, SideWinder,
and a few others would fit this brand/line/franchise
mold. Others like Money, Age of Empires, Mech Warrior,
Madness Racing, Home Publishing, Autoroute, etc. are
in the process of becoming stable brands. Hopefully, each
year we can add a product or line to this list.
</p>
<p>
What is the vision for our online gaming site... where are
we taking it.. is this something we want to keep investing
on? (obvious answer is yes).. what is the vision and how
it ties to $$$/PC and fixture profitability including
building
communities that can buy from us with a lifetime approach?
</p>
<h3>Internal Partnerships</h3>
<p>
In addition to executing on these core strategies, there
are a number of internal groups with which we need to work
effectively for the company to be successful in the
consumer space. Here is a quick summary:
</p>
<ul>
<li><i>Operations</i>: As mentioned above, operations is a
key part of our end-to-end process for delivering product
to
the market. No amount of great product development or
sales/marketing work will make us successful if we
don't work in an integrated, team-oriented way with
Operations in the US, Ireland, and Singapore. In the past,
communications have not flowed smoothly and there has been
a bit of a "throw it over the wall" approach to
how we work with the Ops team. Ideally, in FY00 we could
make this process work more efficiently and feel
more like we are on the same team. PIN THEM DOWN!!!!.. PIN
THEM DOWN!!.. Let's be super crisop pn
our expectation here and let make them live by that
law!!!</li>
<li><i>Office</i>: HRD owns the channel marketing and
retail sales efforts for Office so this is obviously a key
partnership. Given its importance to the company and the
size of this business at retail, we must make sure we
win with Office. In the past, our retail relationships
with the Office team have not been very "smooth" - this is
something we must fix. In HRD, we must drive Office
channel plans effectively - from the Office team we
need great consumer positioning, pricing, and feedback on
the channel plan. On the development side, we will
continue to share technology with the Office team,
including using Word in Works Suite, developing small
business reference tools for Office SBE, developing
dictionary technology for Office, supplying MapPoint
technology to the Excel team, etc. Ok I commented about
this before.. good to see this is a key partnership we
have to be very aware of.</li>
<li><i>Consumer Commerce Group</i>: Since our users
overlap to a large degree, it's important for us to be in
sync with
this team. On the marketing front, we need to partner on
messaging, audience research, PR programs, etc.
Retailers are very interested in this space, so our sales
team needs to help the CCG team work with our retail
accounts effectively. On the product side, we are already
part of the MSN Network with the Gaming Zone and
Encarta On-line. There are also several opportunities for
us to integrate in the productivity area (calendaring,
email, etc.) and in the networking area in Hardware.</li>
<li><i>Consumer Windows</i>: As with Office, HRD owns the
channel marketing and retail sales efforts for this group
and they are an important part of channel mind share and
our revenue mix. At the end of FY98 and in early
FY 99, we completed a very well executed Win98 launch, and
we need to continue this kind of work going
forward. On the product side, we are partnering with this
team to ensure that Windows 98 continues to be the
preferred consumer operating system used in homes and
schools and Windows NTW/2000 Professional to be
the preferred business operating system used in business
of all sizes. Our teams need to provide feature and
technical input to the Windows team as well as understand
how to take maximum advantage of the platform that
they provide us. Finally, there is some code work we can
share in areas where Windows needs to ship some
base services (like basic image editing), and we develop
higher end tools that are related (i.e. Picture It).</li>
<li><i>Consumer Devices</i>: While WinCe now resides in a
couple of different groups, I wanted to call-out consumer
devices as an area we need to support well. As the market
broadens, these "PC related" devices are going to be
a bigger percentage of the opportunity. In CCG, we need to
understand what support the WebTV team needs as
their partners sell WebTV boxes into our channel.
Likewise, in the Business Productivity Group, we need to
support Microsoft's Palm PC partners as they compete with
3Com. SSchiro owns developing a plan for how
we support these products given that we don't actually
have any revenue responsibility for them.</li>
<li><i>Developer Tools</i>: We own channel marketing and
retail sales for this group. While their business is not
as big
as Office or Windows, it's strategically important for the
company to be successful selling our tools products.
To be successful given the resources that we have, we need
to excel at segmenting the key channels and selling
opportunities for Tools and ensuring we are well marketed
there.</li>
<li><i>Product Support</i>: This is an aspect of our
offering that gets under-marketed today and should be more
integrated into our plans. Until we can make Windows and
our other products easier to use (especially during
the "out of box" process), we need PSS to provide
top-quality product support so that customers have a good
experience. Given the investment we make in free PSS, we
need to do more to make this a
strategic/competitive advantage for us.</li>
</ul>
<h3>Additional Success Factors</h3>
<p>
Beyond our typical set of performance measures, there are
several keys to success worth highlighting:
</p>
<ul>
<li><i>Worldwide Approach</i>: In the past, our base
tactics were focused on US plans that sometimes got
localized/customized to local markets. In many situations,
subsidiaries basically had to develop their own plans
from scratch. While some of this will continue because our
markets are different in some respects, we must do
a much better job of thinking like a worldwide company.
Those who work in the US subsidiary must think
more about "how can we help with a worldwide approach to
this" - and those in the other subsidiaries must
think more about "how can we leverage the work from
another subsidiary (US or any other). As an example,
for the first time that I can remember, we have two
products that are designed solely for non-US subsidiaries
(EIEL and International Football) - these are examples of
the product groups taking a worldwide approach. I
hope to see more of this from all HRD teams in the
future.</li>
<li><i>Quality Internal Communications</i>: Part of the
reason we are not as "responsive to the market" as our
competitors is that we aren't good at communicating
internally. In particular, when information and decisions
have to cross group boundaries, we get bogged down in long
email exchanges that are not very productive. We
can improve in this area by agreeing to clear
goals/expectations on various projects up-front, by
communicating
in a direct/honest manner, by deciding early on who owns a
decision and escalating points of disagreement to
that person quickly, and by basing our comments and
feedback on facts and data rather than intuition and
anecdotes. Teamwork is fundamental to the way I want HRD
to work - I expect to see more of this in the way
we communicate with each other.</li>
<li><i>Skills Readiness</i>: Much of what we need to do to
be successful represents a change in our approach to the
retail
space. Succeeding in this area overall requires that we do
more than sell Windows and Office at retail (although
we certainly must do that effectively). It means we have
to compete head-to-head with companies whose only
business is home and retail sales. In general, these
companies have more experience in the retail arena and
they
have people who were hired specifically to win at retail.
Our own team has tremendous talent and was hired to
contribute to Microsoft's overall success. But not
everyone was hired to &q[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 05:53 PM EDT |
http://groklaw.net/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/6000/PX06142.pdf
<p>Plaintiff's<br />
Exhibit<br />
6142<br />
Comes V. Microsoft</p>
<hr />
<p>
<b>From:</b> Paul Maritz<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, August 21, 1997 6:37
PM<br />
<b>To:</b> Jonathan Roberts<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Jim Allchin (Exchange); Moshe
Dunie<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Steveb & Win98
</p>
<p>
Since the press gave Billg & Steveb a hard time this
week at the press retreat, Steveb is panic'd that we are
setting
expectations too high on Windows 98. He thinks we ought to
come out and admit that Windows 98 will be a yawner. The
thing that has him hopping around right now is that Paul
Gillan wants to write a story about Windows 98 being
boring, and
Steveb doesn't know what to say - should he admit that is?
Should he try to deny it? He claims to be confused because
Billg keeps saying that Win98 is a big deal
</p>
<p>
I did catch these two guys (billg & steveb) this am
for a few minutes and got them to "remember" how we got to
where we
are, and I did point out to them that they omitted to
present to the press the quality/reliability improvements
that went into
Win98 (eg. registry backup). However we do need to have
meeting with billg & steveb on this. My PoV is that we
need to
do summary of the benefits of Win98, and on the one hand
admit that it is <u>not</u> major release, it is a ".1"
release, but on
the other hand we should not wring our hands over this, we
should say that it is a release that has significant
quality
improvements, some performance increases, and that people
upgrading from Win95 to Win98 will have better
experience. We should have the support points for this.
</p>
<p>
Other points:
<ul>
<li> Steveb thinks that we ought to take IE4 and drop it
into the Win95 upgrade, and get out and sell that for Xmas
this
year. </li>
<li> Steveb thinks we should not alter the $89 price, even
if it is "not exciting". </li>
<li> Where are we on not doing upgrade of Win3.1 systems?
I mentioned that there was resistance to doing this, and
Steveb went on about us killing another revenue
oppty. </li>
</ul>
<p>
Jonro: can you get mtg scheduled with Steveb/Billg. We
could possibly do this after Memphis review tomorrow, but
I
actually think it would be better to let a day/two pass
after the review and do early next week ?
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 05:56 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/6000/PX06797.pdf
<p>
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6797<br />
Comes V. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Bill Gates<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, July 17, 2000 9:34 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Carl Stork; Mike Porter; Brian Valentine<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Joachim Kempin; Paul Maritz; Eric Rudder;
Richard Fade; Joe Williams<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Itanium- DELL
</p>
<p>
Your data matches what I heard from Michael.
</p>
<p>
Michael said that Intel was pushing him to have a
workstation out in October because Microsoft wants to have
a vehicle
for Windows which we aren't getting from the other OEMs
and since we don't want HP-UX or others to ship first
Michael
should put his product out with us in October.
</p>
<p>
His view is that Itanium at this stage is low volume and
his people are saying the earliest they should ship is
January.
</p>
<p>
We should get some additional data from HP and others on
this.
</p>
<p>
It sounds like having a developer release in October is
the most we need to do.
</p>
<p>
We don't want to be outmaneuvered by any form of UNIX in
the PR related to Itanium. In fact our message should be
that in the past Windows was super popular even though
UNIX was higher end – now we are matching UNIX with
high
end capabilities as well as bringing our other strengths
to the customer.
</p>
<p>
I am very frustrated about our mapping our what Intel is
doing against us and coming up with a way to get Intel to
be
more balanced. They are hurting themselves.
</p>
<p>
-----Original Message-----<br />
<b>From:</b> Carl Stork<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, July 12, 2000 9:55 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Bill Gates; Neil Calvin (LCA); Mike Porter;
Robert (Robbie) Bach; Brian Valentine; Bill Veghte; Bob
McBreen<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Kate Sako (LCA); Dan Crouse (LCA); Steve
Ballmer; Joachim Kempin; Paul Maritz; Eric Rudder; Bill
Neukom (LCA)<br />
<b>Subject:</b> FW: Intel call - Paul Ottelini
</p>
<p>
With respect to point 3 - Itanium - Ottelini's data is not
the same as what we are seeing/hearing.
</p>
<p>
> The quality of the Itanium CPU itself and associated
systems does not seem ready to support a commercial
product launch. There are a lot of workarounds with big
performance impacts, and because of all the
workarounds significant parts of the chip are not being
exercised (dispersal mode is disabled). With the latest
stepping that we got we still cannot do thi testing based
on data from Jeff Havens yesterday. The engineers we
work with at Intel seem to agree that they will need to do
another stepping before production launch. This makes
an October release date unrealistic, a release next year
much more realistic. Perhaps this data has not yet been
communicated to Otellini and other management.
</p>
<p>
> OEMs such as Dell and Compaq have told us that they
are NOT eager to launch Itanium products this Fall.
They do not see a big market opportunity, they think the
hardware (and in fairness the software also) are not yet
mature - meaning they will bear support costs, they don't
necessarily want to the distraction of the launch during
their biggest selling season, they all think they will
lose money (engineering costs not covered by low volumes.)
They will offer Itanium products as soon as Intel gives
the all-clear because they do not want to be viewed as
behind the competition - most are doing little work, just
rebadging the Intel design.
</p>
<p>
It is interesting that Dell tells Intel that MS is the
reason - they may be looking for an easy excuse to give
Intel.
When we talked to Dell we were honest about the state of
the software, but they did not make any request at all
that we accelerate software availability - they told us
that a March launch would be ideal from their point of
view
and that is what they would like us to target.
</p>
<p>
> With respect to Win64 availability, we should be able
to make a developer release in the October timeframe. I
don't know exactly what you would call this, but it could
be some a beta, it could be a developer release, it could
an SDK, etc. I don't think there is any chance you can
call it an end user production release, there is no way
that
we can be ready for that. However we certainly could let
OEMs ship the beta/developer release/SDK - we have a
precedent last year where we let some OEMs ship a Windows
2000 beta.
</p>
<p>
> I don't have the feeling that Intel is spending 80%
of their Itanium energy on Windows. Neither on the
technical/development side nor on the marketing side. They
seem to be investing in the Monterey Unix project
(this is the SCO/HP Unix), in Linux, in Novell. I dont
know what they are doing with ISVs directly, but in
marketing I think they are being neutral/even. We can get
more data if you want.
</p>
<p>
Bottom line, I don't think you need to push Dell in any
direction today, though it would be interesting to hear
what
Michael knows about it (he may not be informed on it as I
don't have the feeling it is a high priority at Dell.)
</p>
<p>
-----Original Message-----<br />
<b>From:</b> Bill Gates<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, July 11, 2000 2:09 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> Neil Calvin (LCA); Mike Porter; Robert (Robbie)
Bach; Brian Valentine; Bill Veghte; Bob McBreen<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Kate Sako (LCA); Dan Crouse (LCA); Steve
Ballmer; Joachim Kempin; Paul Maritz; Eric Rudder; Bil
Neukom (LCA); Carl Stork<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Intel call - Paul Ottelini
<p>
<b>Privileged</b>
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 05:58 PM EDT |
http://groklaw.net/pdf/Comes-7267.pdf
<p>
Plaintiff's Exhibit 7267<br />
Comes V. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Dave Fester<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, February 04, 2004 8:53 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Chad Hodge; Andre Bazire; Kevin Unangst;
Jonathan Usher<br />
<b>Subject:</b> FW: Video and Music licensing
</p>
<p>
Please do not forward...
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Bill Gates<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, February 04, 2004 7:54 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Will Poole<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Frank Barbieri; Todd Warren; Amir Majidimehr;
Dave Fester; Hadi Partovi; Alexander Gounares; Joe
Belfiore;
Brad Brunell; Scott Moore; Scott Horn; Paul Campbell
(WINDOWS MEDIA); Bill Spencer; Pieter Knook; Hank Vigil;
David Cole; Yusuf Mehdi; Christopher Payne; Kimberly Till;
Robert (Robbie) Bach<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Video and Music licensing
</p>
<p>
This helps answer a lot of my questions but I still am
confused about the MSN store versus faciliatating other
people making download available for music and video.
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Will Poole<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, February 04, 2004 6:06 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Bill Gates<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Frank Barbieri; Todd Warren; Amir Majidimehr;
Dave Fester; Hadi Partovi; Alexander Gounares; Joe
Belfiore;
Brad Brunell; Scott Moore; Scott Horn; Paul Campbell
(WINDOWS MEDIA); Bill Spencer; Pieter Knook; Hank Vigil;
David Cole; Yusuf Mehdi; Christopher Payne; Kimberly Till;
Robert (Robbie) Bach<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Video and Music licensing
</p>
<p>
I'm working as executive sponsor to solve the "Content
Flow" challenge and to coordinate the individual Windows
and other product group needs relative to commercial audio
and video content into a cohesive strategy. As we
discussed briefly in the last CLT meeting, that effort is
being driven for me by Warren Lieberfarb, the ex-head of
Warner Home video, who drove the adoption of DVD, and by
Charles Mauzy who manages the Windows Client
Strategy and Policy teams for me. The virtual team
includes many of the people on the cc: line of this email.
</p>
<p>
The virtual team is holding an offsite on 27 February with
myself, Amir Majidimehr, Hank Vigil and Pieter Knook to
rationalize near term content flow for Summer/Fall 2004
products (Symphony and PMC) as well as to develop the
long term plan to ensure that we have the plans and
resourcing necessary to deliver compelling consumer
Audio/Video scenarios and deep catalog, in sync, with the
Longhorn and Xenon launches (and before, in many
cases).
</p>
<p>
It is crucial that Microsoft find coordination to get a
successful through-line with the Studios/Labels and
through Retail. Windows will coordinate closely with
X-Box, MSTV, MSN and Field Sales so that we optimize the
Studio/Label, Distributor, Retailer and OEM/IHV/ISV
relationships effectively. The other partipants in the
M&E value chain will be unlikely to make sufficient
resource investments so there is an opportunity for
Microsoft
to lead in building an end to end ecosystem. We will need
to actively lead if we want it to go at our desired speed
and to align to our technology plans versus
Sony/Philips/MEI or Apple.
</p>
<p>
Jane will coordinate with Christine for a
Briefing/Discussion in March 2004.
</p>
<p>
To answer your specific questions (in italics below):
</p>
<p>
<i>First is IMAX. Richard Gelfond Co-CEO
<u>rgelfond@imax.comn</u> <em>[Ed: Telephone number
omitted.]</em>. They said they have rights to lots
of cool stuff and that they don't mind having the parallel
distribution.</i>
</p>
<p>
Curtis Beck in DMD business development has procured 10
IMAX titles in High Definition format as 2<sup>nd</sup>
DVDs in
the DVD packaging. These titles, which were announced at
CES, came from McGilvary Freeman which is the
largest independent producer for IMAX. Curtis will contact
Gelfond to drive a similar relationship with IMAX.
</p>
<p>
<i>Second was Christe Hefner from Playboy. She sent me a
fax afterwards asking who she should talk to. Chistine
Turner has the fax. I assume Frank will make sure the
right person follows up with these people.</i>
</p>
<p>
Frank and Paul Campbell will engage.
</p>
<p>
<i>We want to encourage lots and lots of people to offer
video in our format. We don't want to have to get in the
middle on all these transactions.</i>
</p>
<p>
The model here will be a wholesale/distributor to retail
relationship. Someone like Disney will act as their own
wholesaler to the many retailers such as Best Buy,
Wal-mart . etc Ownership of the customer relationship and
the $ transaction will be with the retailer. It is still
not clear whether the Retailer or the Distributor who
issues
DRM licenses. In the music space, both Retailers and
Distributors have owned DRM license issuance.
</p>
<p>
Microsoft will not be in the middle of the transaction,
except in the case of MSN where it is acting as a large
retailer. The MSN plans has caused challenges from other
retailers with regards to Windows Media technology
adoption. We need to be thoughtful about how we continue
to manage these relationships. I'm working with
Hank and Yus to do so.
</p>
<p>
<i>Are we think we can get all the different varieties of
videos? I am unclear on what release date we will get the
videos</i> (DVD I hope - VOD is so late).
</p>
<p>
Sony Pictures Digital Networks has the most aggressive
plans to do sell through of movies, TV content and music
videos in 2004; they plan to use Windows Media
non-exlusively. Other Studios will slowly follow this
precedent
and we anticipate having some sell-through of video at the
Home Video (DVD/VHS) release window in 2004.
</p>
<p>
There are significant complexities to getting content to
move because of existing contractual commitments to
distribution channels, talent contracts...etc. It is
likely that Sony has taken 2-3 years of contract work to
get the
rights cleared for their very ambitious service. We are
attempting to spur the other studios to move in similar
fashion but they will likely not get critical mass until
2005.
</p>
<p>
<i>I am unclear if we will emphasize one time watching or
buying or support both.</i>
</p>
<p>
Both. The economics are much more favorable on a
sell-through model; today the studios are protecting their
other distribution channels by relegating Internet to the
PPV release window. The studios will be very
conservative to offer any digital delivered product that
could jeopardize the DVD sell-through as they are reaping
huge revenues (approaching 50% of total business) and
60-80% gross margins. We have business work and will
have to likely offset the risks to start and/or accelerate
signiticant content flow that is aligned with Windows
requirements.
</p>
<p>
<i>I am unclear how unified the streaming and download
approaches will be. I am unclear on how we will get to
critical mass it we try to be in the middle. I am unclear
if whatever we are doing cool for music we are doing for
video.</i>
</p>
<p>
If you look at the Movielink and CinemaNow services, they
have reasonably presented streaming and download;
download is good enough with progressive download that
users can start watching the video within a few
minutes. OTOH some providers may offer streams only for
perceived additional security.
</p>
<p>
<i>Basically I am excited that we have a chance to be a
leader with PMC and the world is very excited to see what
we are doing. The video people I talked to know they have
to do something quickly and they were very interested
in talking to us. They know the DVD bits are out just like
the CD audio bits are out.</i>
</p>
<p>
PMC is significant because its lower resolution that DVD
(although it looks great on the small screen!) and
because there is a case history with music that they must
fill the device with authorized content or train the user
to
take content. Setting the precedents with PMC should be a
fundamental building block; but the unit volumes of
PMC will be relatively low and video distribution is much
better than was music, so our expectations should be a
for a gradual ramp and adoption curve on PMC consumption.
We think it may be educational content (learning
new language) or kids (cartoons) or adult that spurs
usage/adoption scenarios.
</p>
<p>
We've been having some very interesting "authorized DVD
ripping" discussions with the studios and there is a
reasonable probability that we may break through this year
or next on DVD ripping to the hard drive (and
subsequently to a tethered device).
</p>
<p>
<i>Will Microsoft look like an innovator with an open
approach but one that is simple for people to use? I am
confused about this and wonder if we need to meet to
discuss this. Is it even clear across the org boundaries
exactly who is doing what?</i>
</p>
<p>
Let's meet in March to discuss the scenarios, the business
models and MS personnel roles and responsibilities.
Right now we are somewhat fragmented, but the virtual
teams are coordinating fairly well; we recognize the
issues and are taking steps we need to do to get to a
correct path.
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Bill Gates<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, February 03, 2004 9:56 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Frank Barbieri; Todd Warren<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Amir Majidimehr; Dave Fester; Hadi Partovi;
Alexander Gounares; Joe Belfiore; Brad Brunell; Scott
Moore;
Scott Horn; Paul Campbell (WINDOWS MEDIA); Bill Spencer;
Will Poole; Pieter Knook; Hank Vigil; David Cole;
Yusuf Mehdi; Christopher Payne<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Video and Music licensing
</p>
<p>
When I was at Davos I met with a lot of media leaders.
</p>
<p>
I suggested to them that the combination of the success of
Media Center and the upcoming Portable Media
Center devices and the desire to stop piracy will get the
video industry to offer both downloadable and streaming
content that works with native Windows and that the
flexibility for users would be far better than what they
have
with Itunes.
</p>
<p>
People got excited about this and a number of them came up
and said they wanted to work with us on this.
</p>
<p>
Two companies in particular I said I would make sure
someone would follow up with
</p>
<p>
First is IMAX. Richard Gelfond Co-CEO
<u>rgelfond@imax.comn</u> <em>[Ed: Telephone number
omitted.]</em>. They said they have rights to lots
of cool stuff and that they don't mind having the parallel
distribution.
</p>
<p>
Second was Christe Hefner from Playboy. She sent me a fax
afterwards asking who she should talk to. Chistine
Turner has the fax. I assume Frank will make sure the
right person follows up with these people.
</p>
<p>
I am still confused about our approach however.
</p>
<p>
We want to encourage lots and lots of people to offer
video in our format. We don't want to have to get in the
middle on all these transactions.
</p>
<p>
However we want there to be a catalog that spans all the
offerings (except perhaps adult) and we want it to be
easy to buy - we want the UI to be simple and ideally
consistent.
</p>
<p>
Itunes succeeds in offering a consistent UI and a catalog.
However it does this by always being in the middle of
the transaction.
</p>
<p>
If you do that then you have to try and sign deals with
everyone all over the world and make people like Walmart
and others fell like you are competing with them and the
complexity and liabilities are huge for a business that
isn't going to generate much margin if any
</p>
<p>
Right now that is our default case for Music although we
need to talk more about how we appear to advance the
industry and work with a lot of people other than Apple.
</p>
<p>
For Video I am confused about what we are doing. Are we
telling Disney that they download through us and we
are in the middle of the economies?
</p>
<p>
Are we think we can get all the different varieties of
videos?
</p>
<p>
I am unclear on what release date we will get the videos
(DVD I hope - VOD is so late). I am unclear if we will
emphasize one time watching or buying or support both. I
am unclear how unified the streaming and download
approaches will be. I am unclear on how we will get to
critical mass if we try to be in the middle. I am unclear
if
whatever we are doing cool for music we are doing for
video.
</p>
<p>
Basically I am excited that we have a chance to be a
leader with PMC and the world is very excited to see what
we are doing. The video people I talked to know they have
to do something quickly and they were very interested
in talking to us. They know the DVD bits are out just like
the CD audio bits are out.
</p>
<p>
Will Microsoft look like an innovator with an open
approach but one that is simple for people to use? I am
confused about this and wonder if we need to meet to
discuss this. Is it even clear across the org boundaries
exactly who is doing what?
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 06:02 PM EDT |
http://groklaw.net/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/3000/PX03874_A.pdf
<p>PLAINTIFF'S<br />
EXHIBIT<br />
3874A<br />
Comes v. Microsoft</p>
<hr />
From: Jon DeVaan<br />
Sent: Friday, December 03, 1999 9:42 AM<br />
To: David Heiner (LCA)<br />
Cc: Ted Kummert; Rick Belluzzo; Bill Gates<br />
Subject: RE: Apple<br />
<p>
Attorney client privileged<br />
Ted and Rick should know about the request for bidding MSN
access and be
included in any related correspondence.<br />
Thanks.
</p>
-----Original Message-----<br />
From: Bill Gates<br />
Sent: Thursday, December 02, 1999 11:19 PM<br />
To: Ben Waldman; Bob Muglia (Exchange); David Heiner
(LCA)<br />
Cc: Steve Ballmer; Paul Maritz; Eric Rudder; Jon
DeVaan; David Vaskevitch; David Stutz<br />
Subject: Apple<br />
<p>
Attorney client privileged
</p>
<p>
Steve and I discussed a lot of stuff. Strange perspective
on lawsuit.
</p>
<p>
The followup areas are:
</p>
<ol>
<li>Office. Steve claims that if we are willing to make
Office on the Mac or
even a subset of it be volume priced for his machines he
wouldn't have to bundle
on all his machines. He acted like we had never shown any
interest in bringing
the price down which I know is wrong. In any case we will
see what he comes up
with on this. I did not commit anything - all I said was
that with Appleworks
bundled it was not a very good business for us. Steve will
make a proposal to me
to start with.</li>
<li>Browser. Apple is going to try a WebCompanion project.
Steve thinks web
companions are not going to do well if we keep the
Internet moving ahead with
formats so he is surprised to see us doing them. However
they will do one. Both
on this machine and on the Mac itself Steve would like to
use our browser
control. He asked what do we want in retum - something
about Instant messaging
or Passport or traffic or what? I said we would think
about this. Its up to us
to make a proposal on this one. Its hard to say who at
Microsoft should think
this through and come up with something.</li>
<li>Streaming. Steve still thinks there must be some
things related to formats
or protocols or APIs where we could make things better for
users. He does spend
a lot of engineering he wishes he wouldn't have to. Schaaf
is still the business
person in this area. He claims Engstrom was pretty tough
on them. He says its
crazy that Real, Apple and MS all pay CNN to do the same
thing and the
engineering overhead. I mostly listened on this one. I do
wonder if there are
things that would be win-win that wouldn't upset anyone
there. I will ask Steve
if there is someone Anthony can meet with to discuss
this.</li>
<li>Objective-C. Steve would love to work with us on any
extension we are making
to C. They would like us to learn from what they did with
Objective-C. They
would be glad to donate the name. They think it would help
us with our C variant
to work with them and make it all very open without having
to get married on
runtime things. I have no idea if Cool could be changed
slightly to be
positioned as Objective-C V2 in some way. Steve had a lot
of energy on this one
and I think it does address a problem we have. DavidV
should pick someone to
talk with Apple on this. Stutz knows the Objective C stuff
very well if that
would help us know what the story is before we start the
discussion.</li>
<li>Access. Steve wondered if we wanted to bid on being
the access partner on
his machine. I will leave it to Jon to decide if we want
to pursue this or
not.</li>
</ol>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 06:03 PM EDT |
http://groklaw.net/pdf/Comes-6928_I.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
6928_I<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Bill Henningsgaard<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, February 07,
2001 4:57 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> GMs of Subsidiaries<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Agreement &
Negotiation Solutions; Bill Henningsgaard's Extended
Reports; Orlando Ayala's Direct
Reports; Joseph Krawczak;
Global Desktop Applications Product Mgrs<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Office and EA renewals
</p>
<p>
As you know, Microsoft is planning to significantly change
our volume licensing programs. We will launch the new
programs in
October 2001, with plans for public announce in May. This
mail will provide you with guidance around the volume
licensing
program changes, notification of some planned changes to
Office and an action plan to drive with your sales teams
now,
particularly around EA renewals and Office launch
preparation.
</p>
<p>
<i>Your immediate actions are:<br />
- Ensure your sales teams do not share any planned
licensing changes with customers<br />
- Prepare to notify your customers of the changes in
Office licensing<br />
- Adopt new pricing methodology for EAs renewing
prior to May {list included)</i>
</p>
<p>
<b>A. Future Program Changes - IMPORTANT - DO NOT SHARE
THIS INFORMATION WITH CUSTOMERS!!</b><br />
These program changes are part of the enhancements to
sales, services and support that constitute the Sable
project, and will
enable us to:<br />
1) Improve support for the enterprise through
better integration of licensing and services while
ensuring access to bits
and expertise customers need to be
successful<br />
2) Begin the transition toward a .NET annuity
business model.
</p>
<p>
As with any major change, there is a natural desire
for reps to leverage these changes, often with incomplete
information, to
drive decisions now. However, it's critical that your
sales teams NOT SHARE INFORMATION ABOUT THESE CHANGES
before being advised to do so. Why? - Once analysts
and the press find out, they will publish partial
information that will
cause your customers to stall sales and inundate your
reps for clarification. We have had a few leaks already
in Europe and
the US. As of this point, any request to share these
licensing futures with customers needs to be approved by
me.
</p>
<p>
<b>Communications and Training Plans</b><br />
Comprehensive field rollout plan, including partner
and customer notification: end February 2001
Train field and partners: April 2001 (we are
scheduling training now with your teams)<br />
Public announce: May 2001<br />
Program launch: October 2001
</p>
<p>
<b>B. Office XP</b><br />
Office XP will ship, in the United States and Canada,
on the April Select CDs and will appear on the May price
lists. On a go-
forward basis, we will no longer offer Technology
Guarantees in volume licensing, starting with the Office
XP launch. This
policy recognizes the investment that our best
customers make in maintenance (EA & Upgrade
Advantage). Additionally,
Office pricing will increase, by an average of less
than 5%. light of these changes, the best option for
customers is to
purchase EAs or UA. WWLP will be distributing a
Licensing Brief and customer-ready letter by the end of
this week that you
can use to advise your customers of this infonnation.
There is no plan around a press release on these topics,
but we do
expect this to become public information. It is not
necessary to refer to any planned licensing changes as
part of your Office
rollout to customers or partners.
</p>
<p>
<b>C. EA Renewals</b><br />
Immediately, we need to engage customers with EAs that
will expire prior to May. I've provided a list of all
expiring deals, by
month and by region. We have created special EA
2-year extension pricing for this list of customers - this
will be available in
the next week from your Licensing Executive or Volume
Licensing Program Manager. Your sales teams should,
working
together with your LE or VLPM, present this pricing
for the renewal portion of a new deal. Note - the pricing
is aggressive -
your renewal proposal should expire when the
customer's current EA expires.
</p>
<p>
EAS Expiring<br />
(Reference Data)....
</p>
<p>
As you've all made clear in the MYRs, the revenue
consequences of these licensing changes are large and our
execution needs to
be flawless. My group and I are committed to providing
you the information and tools you need. Please let me or
your LE/VLPM
know if you have questions, concerns or suggestions.
</p>
<p>
<b>EA EXPIRATIONS - by Fiscal Quarter</b>
</p>
<table border="1">
<tr><th>Fiscal Qtr</th> <th># Expiring</th>
<th>#
PCs</th> <th>Avg Annual Rev</th> <th>To-tm
MS
Rev</th></tr>
<tr><td>Feb-01</td> <td>21</td>
<td>131,808</td> <td>23,752,387</td>
<td>61,608,158</td></tr>
<tr><td>Mar-01</td> <td>51</td>
<td>358,608</td> <td>71,065,536</td>
<td>213,007,985</td></tr>
<tr><td>Apr-01</td> <td>26</td>
<td>110,351</td> <td>22,798,357</td>
<td>70,827,663</td></tr>
<tr><td><b>TOTAL</b></td>
<td><b>98</b></td>
<td><b>600,767</b></td>
<td><b>117,616,279</b></td>
<td><b>345,443,806</b></td></tr>
</table>
<table border="1">
<tr><th>Expiring Month</th> <th>Customer
Name</th>
<th>Master #</th> <th>Sales Location</th> <th>US
District</th> <th># PCs</th> <th>Avg Annual
Rev</th>
<th>Total MS Rev</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="21">Feb-01</td>
<td>Arch Chemical</td>
<td>01-71158</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>New York
Metro</td> <td>1,981</td>
<td>492,378</td>
<td>492,378</td></tr>
<tr><td>Baptist Memorial Health Care System</td>
<td>01-05138</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>Midamerica</td> <td>3,707</td>
<td>939,650</td> <td>2,818,950</td></tr>
<tr><td>CEGETEL (CGE - Vivendi)</td>
<td>73-50076</td> <td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,000</td> <td>1,551,399</td>
<td>4,654,198</td></tr>
<tr><td>Credit Lyonnais</td>
<td>01-05086</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>New York
Metro</td> <td>1,280</td>
<td>304,448</td>
<td>913,344</td></tr>
<tr><td>Davis Wright Tremaine</td>
<td>01-05047</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>PacWest</td> <td>670</td>
<td>154,395</td> <td>463,185</td></tr>
<tr><td>Household International</td>
<td>01-05056</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>Midwest</td> <td>10,200</td>
<td>425,340</td> <td>1,276,020</td></tr>
<tr><td>Manpower</td>
<td>71-50171</td> <td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,000</td> <td>280,583</td>
<td>841,749</td></tr>
<tr><td>Midamerican Energy Company</td>
<td>01-05021</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>Minneapolis</td> <td>3,000</td>
<td>575,280</td> <td>1,725,840</td></tr>
<tr><td>MMI Insurance</td>
<td>74-01075</td> <td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,900</td> <td>390,023</td>
<td>1,170,069</td></tr>
<tr><td>NTT</td>
<td>79-01090</td> <td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,378</td> <td>1,423,602</td>
<td>4,270,806</td></tr>
<tr><td>OLIN CORP</td>
<td>01-71156</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>New York
Metro</td> <td>2,362</td>
<td>587,075</td>
<td>587,075</td></tr>
<tr><td>REUTERS INFORMATION SERVICES INC</td>
<td>2299805</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>New York
Metro</td> <td>17,826</td>
<td>3,462,344</td>
<td>3,462,344</td></tr>
<tr><td>Roy F Weston</td>
<td>01-05063</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>Greater
Pennsylvania</td> <td>1,200</td>
<td>316,032</td>
<td>948,096</td></tr>
<tr><td>SANMINA CORPORATION</td>
<td>2299804</td> <td>United States</td> <td>N.
California</td> <td>1,500</td>
<td>282,705</td>
<td>282,705</td></tr>
<tr><td>Software AG Americas</td>
<td>01-05057</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>Mid
Atlantic</td> <td>1,000</td>
<td>288,050</td>
<td>864,150</td></tr>
<tr><td>Solectron</td>
<td>01-05050</td> <td>United States</td> <td>N.
California</td> <td>7,404</td>
<td>1,501,659</td> <td>4,504,977</td></tr>
<tr><td>Telenor</td>
<td>25-50027</td> <td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,400</td> <td>3,109,181</td>
<td>9,327,543</td></tr>
<tr><td>Turner Broadcasting System</td>
<td>01-05022</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>Southeast</td> <td>6,000</td>
<td>1,599,960</td> <td>4,799,880</td></tr>
<tr><td>Unisys Corporation</td>
<td>01-05068</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>Greater
Pennsylvania</td> <td>35,000</td>
<td>5,111,533</td>
<td>15,334,599</td></tr>
<tr><td>United Companies Lending Corporation</td>
<td>01-05024</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>Gulf
Coast</td> <td>2,500</td>
<td>586,400</td>
<td>1,759,200</td></tr>
<tr><td>West Teleservices Corporation</td>
<td>01-05029</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>Minneapolis</td> <td>1,500</td>
<td>370,350</td> <td>1,111,050</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="51">Mar-01</td>
<td>Aalborg Kommune</td>
<td>23-50025</td> <td>Denmark
<td></td>
<td>2,912</td> <td>638,767</td>
<td>1,916,300</td></tr>
<tr><td>Aetna Life and Casualty Company</td>
<td>01-05223</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>New
England</td> <td>42,500</td>
<td>6,534,236</td><td>16,335,590</td></tr>
<tr><td>Alliant Techsystems</td>
<td>01-05136</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>Minneapolis</td> <td>4,300</td>
<td>1,061,670</td> <td>3,185,010</td></tr>
<tr><td>American Medical Response Inc</td>
<td>01-05133</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>Rocky
Mountain</td> <td>2,500</td>
<td>617,200</td>
<td>1,851,600</td></tr>
<tr><td>Banca Popolare C&I</td>
<td>78-50033</td> <td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,196</td> <td>535,333</td>
<td>1,605,999</td></tr>
<tr><td>Banestyrelsen</td>
<td>23-50025</td> <td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,231</td> <td>267,333</td> <td>
801,998</td></tr>
<tr><td>Battelle Memorial Institute (2 EAs)</td>
<td>01-05135</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>Great
Lakes</td> <td>3,917</td>
<td>894,995</td>
<td>2,684,985</td></tr>
<tr><td>Capital Blue Cross</td>
<td>01-05163</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>Greater Pennsylvania</td> <td>2,000</td>
<td>460,880</td> <td>1,382,640</td></tr>
<tr><td>Catholic Medical Center</td>
<td>01-05126</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>New
York Metro</td> <td>1,000</td>
<td>246,900</td> <td> 740,700</td></tr>
<tr><td>Coastal Corporation</td>
<td>01-05122</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>South
Central</td> <td>5,000</td>
<td>987,617</td>
<td>2,962,850</td></tr>
<tr><td>Credit Du Nord</td>
<td>73-50081</td> <td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,400</td> <td>1,064,610</td><td>
3,193,830</td></tr>
<tr><td>Crum & Foster (United States Fire Insurance
Co)</td><td>01-05092</td> <td>United
States</td>
<td>New Jersey/Upstate NY</td> <td>1,900</td>
<td>500,384</td> <td>1,501,152</td></tr>
<tr><td>D.E. Shaw & Co</td>
<td>01-05072</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>New
York Metro</td> <td> 850</td>
<td>176,290</td> <td> 528,870</td></tr>
<tr><td>Danmarks Radio</td>
<td>23-50025</td> <td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,612</td> <td>1,243,362</td><td>
3,730,086</td></tr>
<tr><td>Fairchild Corporation</td>
<td>01-05107</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>New
England</td> <td>2,100</td>
<td>518,490</td> <td>1,555,470</td></tr>
<tr><td>Finnet</td>
<td>24-50023</td> <td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,936</td> <td>1,722,708</td><td>
5,168,123</td></tr>
<tr><td>First Consulting Group</td>
<td>01-05132</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>SoCal</td> <td>650 </td>
<td>278,707</td> <td> 836,121</td></tr>
<tr><td>Fletcher Challenge</td>
<td>83-40003</td> <td>New Zealand</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,346 </td> <td>683,213</td> <td>
2,049,638</td></tr>
<tr><td>Folketinget</td>
<td>23-50025</td> <td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,131 </td> <td>239,957</td> <td>
719,870</td></tr>
<tr><td>Foreign & Commonwealth Office</td>
<td>71-50198</td> <td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td> <td>2,633,225</td><td>
7,899,675</td></tr>
<tr><td>Forsvaret (Denmark)</td>
<td>23-50025</td> <td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,757</td> <td>2,619,378</td><td>
7,858,133</td></tr>
<tr><td>Fried Frank Harris</td>
<td>01-05167</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>New
York Metro</td> <td>1,000 </td>
<td>274,060</td> <td> 822,180</td></tr>
<tr><td>Frontier Communication</td>
<td>01-05239</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>New
Jersey/Upstate NY</td> <td>10,400</td>
<td>2,102,226</td><td> 6,306,678</td></tr>
<tr><td>Golden West Financial</td>
<td>01-05130</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>N.
California</td> <td> 5,240</td>
<td>1,269,742</td><td> 3,809,225</td></tr>
<tr><td>Integradora De Servicios Operativos S.A.</td>
<td>5Q-40016</td> <td>Mexico</td>
<td></td>
<td>21,714</td> <td>3,754,028</td><td>
11,262,084</td></tr>
<tr><td>IZB</td>
<td>72-50071</td> <td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td>32,810</td> <td>7,398,548</td><td>
22,195,644</td></tr>
<tr><td>J R Simplot Company</td>
<td>01-05134</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>PacWest</td> <td> 3,250</td>
<td>748,930</td> <td>2,246,790</td></tr>
<tr><td>Kaman Aerospace</td>
<td>01-05181</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>New
England</td> <td> 1,000</td>
<td>230,440</td> <td> 691,320</td></tr>
<tr><td>Lehman Brothers Holdings</td>
<td>O1-05128</td> <td>United States</td>
<td>New
York Metro</td> <td> 7,848</td>
<td>1,711,648</td><td> 5,134,944</td></tr>
<tr><td>Loews Companies Incorporated</td>
<td>01-05096</td> <td>United States
</td><td>Midwest
</td> <td>23,000</td> <td>3,949,967</td>
<td>11,849,901</td></tr>
<tr><td>Marks & Spencer</td>
<td>71-50196</td> <td>United Kingdom </td><td>
</td> <td>18,000</td> <td>2,486,390</td>
<td>7,459,170</td></tr>
<tr><td>Mercantile Bancorporation</td>
<td>01-05003</td> <td>United States
</td><td>Midamerica
</td> <td>7,500 </td> <td>1,635,725</td>
<td>4,907,175</td></tr>
<tr><td>Molson Breweries</td>
<td>75-00592</td> <td>Canada </td><td>
</td> <td>2,000 </td> <td>434,102 </td>
<td>1,302,306</td></tr>
<tr><td>Neste</td>
<td>24-50022</td> <td>Finland </td><td>
</td> <td>5,200 </td> <td>1,189,070</td>
<td>3,567,210</td></tr>
<tr><td>Norrell Corp</td>
<td>01-05250</td> <td>United States
</td><td>Southeast
</td> <td>1,000 </td> <td>230,440 </td>
<td>691,320</td></tr>
<tr><td>Nova Corporation</td>
<td>75-00603</td> <td>Canada </td><td>
</td> <td>3,809 </td> <td>877,746 </td>
<td>2,633,238</td></tr>
<tr><td>Perez Companc</td>
<td>50-40006</td> <td>Argentina </td><td>
</td> <td>4,000 </td> <td>419,200 </td>
<td>838,400</td></tr>
<tr><td>Southern Company</td>
<td>01-04213</td> <td>United States
</td><td>Southeast
</td> <td>17,000</td> <td>3,497,696</td>
<td>13,990,784</td></tr>
<tr><td>Sparebanken Nor</td>
<td>25-50030</td> <td>Norway </td><td>
</td> <td>4,452 </td> <td>734,898 </td>
<td>2,204,694</td></tr>
<tr><td>Standard Insurance</td>
<td>01-05154</td> <td>United States
</td><td>PacWest
</td> <td>1,500 </td> <td>345,560 </td>
<td>1,036,980</td></tr>
<tr><td>Stora</td>
<td>77-50057</td> <td>Sweden </td><td>
</td> <td>7,489 </td> <td>1,873,670</td>
<td>5,621,010</td></tr>
<tr><td>Storage Technology Corporation</td>
<td>01-05164</td> <td>United States
</td><td>Rocky
Mountain </td> <td>8,238 </td>
<td>2,705,194</td> <td>8,115,583</td></tr>
<tr><td>Sveriges Radio</td>
<td>77-50059</td> <td>Sweden </td><td>
</td> <td>2,270 </td> <td>608,767 </td>
<td>1,826,301</td></tr>
<tr><td>Tandy Corporation</td>
<td>01-05139</td> <td>United States
</td><td>South
Central </td> <td>2,361 </td> <td>497,790
</td> <td>1,493,370</td></tr>
<tr><td>Tektronix Inc</td>
<td>01-05205</td> <td>United Slates
</td><td>PacWest
</td> <td>8,500 </td> <td>1,783,676</td>
<td>5,351,028</td></tr>
<tr><td>The National Grid Holding</td>
<td>71-50193</td> <td>United Kingdom </td><td>
</td> <td>4,000 </td> <td>1,209,151</td>
<td>3,627,454</td></tr>
<tr><td>Warner Lambert</td>
<td>01-05119</td> <td>United States
</td><td>New
Jersey/Upstate NY</td> <td>19,600</td>
<td>3,033,182</td> <td>9,099,546</td></tr>
<tr><td>Wawa Inc</td>
<td>01-05185</td> <td>United States
</td><td>Greater
Pennsylvania</td> <td>700 </td> <td>195,874
</td>
<td>587,622</td></tr>
<tr><td>Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering</td>
<td>01-05143</td> <td>United States
</td><td>Mid
Atlantic </td> <td>1,000 </td> <td>279,820
</td> <td>839,460</td></tr>
<tr><td>Witco Corporation</td>
<td>01-05327</td> <td>United States
</td><td>New York
Metro </td> <td>3,489 </td> <td>858,573
</td>
<td>2,575,719</td></tr>
<tr><td>Yokogawa Electric Corporation</td>
<td>79-01111</td> <td>Japan </td><td>
</td> <td>5,000 </td> <td>804,070 </td>
<td>2,412,210</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="26">Apr-01</td>
<td>Abu Dhabi National Oil Company
<td>16-50011</td> <td>Saudi Arabia </td> <td>
</td> <td> 5,827</td> <td>1,419,240</td>
<td>4,257,719</td></tr>
<tr><td>Aristech Chemical
<td>01-05162</td> <td>United States </td>
<td>Greater
Pennsylvania </td> <td> 850</td> <td>
195,874</td>
<td> 587,622</td></tr>
<tr><td>Attachmate
<td>01-05151</td> <td>United States </td>
<td>PacWest
</td> <td> 1,550</td> <td> 300,617</td>
<td>
901,852</td></tr>
<tr><td>Austrian Airlines
<td>86-50012</td> <td>Austria </td> <td>
</td> <td> 1,880</td> <td> 445,274</td>
<td>1,335,823</td></tr>
<tr><td>Bacon & Woodrow
<td>71-50217</td> <td>United Kingdom</td> <td>
</td> <td> 1,000</td> <td> 248,549</td>
<td>
745,647</td></tr>
<tr><td>Bausch & Lomb Inc
<td>01-05325</td> <td>United States </td>
<td>New
Jersey/Upstate NY</td> <td> 7,164</td>
<td>1,792,361</td> <td>5,377,083</td></tr>
<tr><td>Bogle & Gates
<td>01-05169</td> <td>United States </td>
<td>PacWest
</td> <td> 650</td> <td> 171,184</td>
<td>
513,552</td></tr>
<tr><td>Carl Bro
<td>23-50026</td> <td>Denmark </td> <td>
</td> <td> 1,700</td> <td> 455,360</td>
<td>1,366,080</td></tr>
<tr><td>Cox Enterprises
<td>01-05211</td> <td>United States </td>
<td>Southeast
</td> <td> 8,506</td> <td>1,677,729</td>
<td>5,033,187</td></tr>
<tr><td>Glenayre
<td>01-05228</td> <td>United States </td>
<td>Southeast
</td> <td> 1,447</td> <td> 357,264</td>
<td>1,071,792</td></tr>
<tr><td>Glencore International
<td>54-50038</td> <td>Switzerland </td> <td>
</td> <td> 1,783</td> <td> 406,592</td>
<td>1,219,775</td></tr>
<tr><td>Herbert Smith
<td>71-50220</td> <td>United Kingdom</td> <td>
</td> <td> 1,200</td> <td> 320,653</td>
<td>
961,959</td></tr>
<tr><td>International Monetary Fund
<td>01-05241</td> <td>United States </td>
<td>Mid
Atlantic </td> <td> 4,039</td>
<td>1,163,608</td> <td>3,490,823</td></tr>
<tr><td>International Network Service
<td>01-05281</td> <td>United States </td> <td>N.
California </td> <td> 2,000</td> <td>
615,200</td> <td>1,845,600</td></tr>
<tr><td>Iomega
<td>01-05265</td> <td>United States </td>
<td>Rocky
Mountain </td> <td> 3,500</td> <td>
820,960</td>
<td>2,462,880</td></tr>
<tr><td>J C BradforD & Company
<td>01-05156</td> <td>United States </td>
<td>Midamerica
</td> <td> 2,772</td> <td> 564,888</td>
<td>1,694,665</td></tr>
<tr><td>Kmart
<td>01-05184</td> <td>United States </td>
<td>Great
Lakes </td> <td>16,300</td>
<td>2,978,180</td>
<td>8,934,540</td></tr>
<tr><td>KN Energy
<td>01-05278</td> <td>United States </td>
<td>Rocky
Mountain </td> <td> 1,500</td> <td>
341,957</td>
<td>1,025,871</td></tr>
<tr><td>Memorial Sloan Kettering
<td>01-05279</td> <td>United States </td>
<td>New York
Metro </td> <td> 3,857</td> <td>
860,252</td>
<td>2,580,757</td></tr>
<tr><td>NAV Canada
<td>75-00610</td> <td>Canada </td> <td>
</td> <td> 4,000</td> <td>1,053,440</td>
<td>3,160,320</td></tr>
<tr><td>Novacare Incorporated
<td>01-05178</td> <td>United States </td>
<td>Greater
Pennsylvania </td> <td> 5,415</td>
<td>1,210,606</td>
<td>3,631,818</td></tr>
<tr><td>Pegaso
<td>01-05308</td> <td>Mexico </td> <td>
</td> <td> 1,500</td> <td> 321,975</td>
<td>
965,925</td></tr>
<tr><td>Qualcomm
<td>01-05308</td> <td>United States </td>
<td>SoCal
</td> <td> 9,000</td> <td>1,866,600</td>
<td>5,599,800</td></tr>
<tr><td>Shearman & Sterling
<td>01-05161</td> <td>United States </td>
<td>New York
Metro </td> <td> 1,600</td> <td>
379,232</td>
<td>1,137,696</td></tr>
<tr><td>SOGEDAC
<td>73-50008</td> <td>France </td> <td>
</td> <td>20,061</td> <td>2,432,594</td>
<td>9,730,375</td></tr>
<tr><td>Watson Wyatt Worldwide
<td>71-50212</td> <td>United Kingdom</td> <td>
</td> <td> 1,250</td> <td> 398,168</td>
<td>1,194,503</td></tr>
</table>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 06:05 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/1000/PX01250.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1250<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
Brad Silverberg<br />
---------------<br />
<b>From:</b> Dwayne Walker<br />
<b>To:</b> Paul Maritz<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Brad Silverberg; Dwayne Walker; Gary Gigot;
Jeff Raikes; Tina Brusca; Jonathan Lazarus; Marty
Taucher; Rich Macintosh; Richard Tong; Richard
Tait; Russ Werner; Steve Ballmer<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Feedback - Windows, OS/2, Networking -
Corporate Account Meeting<br />
<b>Date:</b> Thursday, February 27, 1992 7:22
</p>
<p>
I was invited to presented our Systems Strategy, Windows
3.1, Windows
NT and SQL Server to a group managers, directors and VPs
from some
large corporate accounts. This was a closed user
consortium that
VERY FEW vendors ever get to present to. Here is some
important and
hopefully valuable feedback from this meeting.
</p>
<p>
By the way, I killed OS/2 2.0 in this session (I feel so
bad - smile).
Any way, we all know that IBM stands for I've Been
Mislead.
</p>
<p>
see my meeting details below:
</p>
<p>
Companies in attendance<br />
-----------------------
</p>
<p>
- U.S. Sprint<br />
- World Bank<br />
- U.S. Marine Corp<br />
- University of Michigan<br />
- Turner Construction<br />
- Texaco USA<br />
- Resolution Trust Corporation<br />
- Public Service Electric and Gas<br />
- Pennsylvanla Blue Shield<br />
- Nike<br />
- Mobile Research<br />
- Metropolitian Life Insurance<br />
- MCI<br />
- Martin Marietta Energy Systems<br />
- Intel<br />
- The Equitable<br />
- CSX Technologies<br />
- Continental Grain<br />
- Compaq (MIS Department)<br />
- Carolina Power and Light<br />
- Bell Alantic Mobil Systems<br />
- Arizona Public Service<br />
- ABB Power T&D
</p>
<p>
MS Was Second Vendor Ever Allowed to Present<br />
--------------------------------------------
</p>
<p>
We were the second vendor ever allowed to present to this
group. The
group is normally focuses on sharing users experiences,
concerns
and plans with its members (members are all users - large
accounts).
</p>
<p>
Our friends at PG&E (Art) got MS in the door. As you
may know. PG&E
is a blg believer in Windows and SQL Server.
</p>
<p>
What the Group Wanted to Know<br />
-----------------------------
</p>
<p>
1. Understand Windows 3.1 and why they should buy it<br />
2. Understand Windows NT in detail and its role<br />
3. Understand systems requirements for Windows 3.1 and
NT<br />
3. Understand how we would make Windows a better network
ctttzen
going forward<br />
4. Why they should go with Windows and Windows NT over
OS/2 2.0 or
UNIX<br />
5. How and when would Microsoft better integrate SQL
Server + Windows
applications in Banyan environments.<br />
6. understand our vision and strategies for next 18 months
or so<br />
7. other elements of our story
</p>
<p>
Bottomline<br />
----------
</p>
<p>
A gave a two hour hard hitting talk. I had the Windows
volume up
full force. I went after OS/2 2.0 hard and direct and made
it
clear that OS/2 2.0 was a corpus ready for burial. I also
sold
these guys on how we would better integrate
Windows/Winapps + SQL
Server in Banyan environments over the next 3-4 months
(this was
a huge concern for many in the room - we have a great
solution
coming up that Banyan will assist on - the group loved the
proposed
MS/Banyan solution - the solution is very simple (a couple
of weeks
on MS side and Banyan will do all the testing and doc).
</p>
<p>
At the end, we had Windows, Windows NT and SQL Server wave
rolling.
The group gave us a very positive reaction. Several
customers commented
at the end that they will stay with or move towards
Windows in a
big way based on what they heard. Others said that this
pitch
cleared up a great deal of confusion they had. Gary Voth
help
on SQL while I focused on Windows 3.1, NT. Windows
connectivity to
host systems, Windows integration to networks (going
forward) and
did some SQL myself also.
</p>
<p>
The customers also commented strongly that new SQL Server
4.2 line
of products offered more than they realized to their
Windows efforts
and to the downsizing plans. Having several big
Windows+SQL Server
customers in the room helped. They loved the fact that SQL
Server's
4.2 connectivity services extends Windows desktops to DB2,
Oracle,
Ingres, Sybase, Informix and soon Rdb and AS/400 (IBM
can't say anything
close to this 1). Also, SQL Open Data services for Windows
clients
was a big hit. The biggest hit in the Windows to SQL area
was our
new SQL Bridge product.
</p>
<p>
How I buried OS/2 2.0<br />
---------------------
</p>
<p>
1. I made it clear that OS/2 is yesterday's soup in new
bowl (it's
cold and not to tasty) - ok I really got into the kill
OS/2 2.0
mode
</p>
<p>
- I think I convince most people that OS/2 lacked several
key
attributes of Windows 3.1 and Windows NT
</p>
<p>
- I laid out the features of Windows 3.1 and NT vs OS/2
2.0 - blow
by blow
</p>
<p>
- I also pushed the Windows 3.1 add-ons like Pen,
Multimedia and
Sparta (positioning Sparta this way really worked well).
</p>
<p>
2. I used all the Windows hot points
</p>
<p>
- we have the applications<br />
- we have the application integration (0LE, DDE)<br />
- we have the connectivity (direct and indirect (via SQL
Server))<br />
- we have Windows NT as growth path (they loved
NT !!)<br />
- etc.
</p>
<p>
3. The knockout punch
</p>
<p>
- I then "closed" these guys by explaining Windows Sparta
and
the built in networking services of NT. The did the job.
</p>
<p>
- They "loved" the concept of Windows Sparta
(I "carefully"
positioned this as an "add-on" to Windows 3.1 and
explained
that the best way to get to Sparta was to buy Windows
3.0/3.1
now !) - I think it is VERY important to use and position
Sparta
as a Windows 3.1 add-on (another reason to buy Windows 3.1
over
OS/2 2.0 - I know its early to talk about Sparta,but I
think it
can be a very effective vehicle to kill OS/2 2.0 - The
negative
side is that talking early tips our hand - I say killing
OS/2
2.0 is more important - So, lets use the Sparta scud
missle now).
</p>
<p>
- I scratched out how Windows 3.1 with Sparta and Windows
NT clients
would work together (this closed the door on OS/2 2.0 !)
</p>
<p>
- I show/diagramed how a Sparta, NT mixed client
environment would
work and how LM/Banyanwould plug-in (scaleable Windows
Networking) - OS/2 2.0 can't play this tune
</p>
<p>
Key Lessons Learned<br />
-------------------
</p>
<p>
1. We can kill OS/2 2.0 and UNIX at the client by using
*all* of
our bullets
</p>
<p>
- we need to "sell" Windows 3.1, Window 3.1 "add-ons"
(Pen
Multimedia and Sparta) and our Windows based client server
solutions (many many customers are downsizing and our
questioning
wether they should downsize to Windows or OS/2 clients)
</p>
<p>
- When used properly Sparta, OLE and Windows NT combined
with
Windows 3.1 offer a killer story against OS/2. For
example,
OLE/DDE over the net using Sparta is a very hot Windows
3.1
add-on feature and can not be done with OS/2 2.0. In
general
Sparta stops OS/2 2.0 cold in certain situations.
</p>
<p>
2. Why and How Windows 3.1 is a Better Network Citizen
</p>
<p>
- We need a white papers on "Windows on Networks"
</p>
<p>
a) Using Windows 3.1 on Banyan Vines Networks
Backgrounder<br />
b) Using Windows 3.1 on Novell Networks<br />
c) Using Windows 3.1 on LAN Manager Networks (underway
now)<br />
d) Building Windows based cllent server solutions
(underway now)<br />
e) Using Windows in a SNA environment (Backgrounder on
how to
most effectively integrated Windows directly or indirectly
(via
gateways) in SNA hosts
</p>
<p>
- Customers view Windows as poor Networking client. They
have not
heard enough from MS on how Windows 3.1 improves Windows
integration on their LANs and WANs
</p>
<p>
Overall, the presentation and the feedback was very good.
The reaction
was very similar to the reaction I got from my Dallas SBT.
The two
events have convinced me that we should take the SBT
format *and*
content on road in a bigger way. At a minimum, we should
show have
a SBT (same content) for press/analyst immediately (before
OS/2 2.0
ships). We should also take the SBT format and content to
a broader
corporate audience. I'm NOT suggesting changing the SBT
itself but
rather that the messages and content of the SBT can and
does kill
interest in OS/2 or UNIX at the desktop. We should be
doing the SBT
song and dance in front of thousands not just a few
hundred people.
</p>
<p>
This mail has gotten too long - so bye
</p>
<p>
Dwayne
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 06:06 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/1000/PX01627.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1627<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
Teresa Jennings<br />
---------------<br />
<b>From:</b> Bill Gates<br />
<b>To:</b> Bernard Vergnes; Brad Silverberg; Chris Peters;
Jeff Raikes; Jonathan Lazarus;
Lewis Levin; Mike Brown; Mike Maples; Mike Murray; Paul
Maritz; Pete Higgins;
Steve Ballmer<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Bill Neukom; Steven Sinofsky<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Two Companies with Business Focus<br />
<b>Date:</b> Sunday, April 25, 1993 2:10PM
</p>
<p>
THIS is a very confidential memo.
</p>
<p>
I have a major concern that our sales force is too focused
on our system products and that we dont really
generate activites based on profit potential. Does our
sales investment go primarily into increasing OFFICE
share? I havent seen many clever ideas for increasing
OFFICE share for a long long time I doubt that our
sales investment (over $1 per year including everything)
is really focused or clever. I think we could do a
lot better as suggested by this memo. I am not saying we
should split but we can have the benefits
without splitting or without any major reorganization.
</p>
<p>
If we split systems and applications into 2 truly seperate
companies. What would be different? I am not
saying we should do this or that I am even considering it
but rather I want people to consider what the
strategies would be.
</p>
<p>
First take the system company. It has decided to use OEM
sales at low prices as its totally channel for new
users. The volume it drives thru the oem chamel insures
that the users it misses in this channel and its
upgrade products will have high demand so it does not have
a retail sales force. It has 3 very focused and
fairly small (<150 each) sales groups: 1) OEM sales - a
lot like what we have today, 2) ISV evangelism and
3) "Server sellers". Groups 2 & 3 meet directly with
very few customers - no EBC and no account plans.
Any account that is a problem must stem from an ISV that
group 2 needs to work on or something in
group 3. The systems group has a headquarters operation
that assembles task forces to look into segments
of the markets where our products are not dominant.
Because there is a fast moving task force mentality
with a budget and leverage thru outside consultants there
have been attack plans for 4 specific markets
are assembled per year - examples include: K-12 education,
OTP, As/400, and banking. Once a market is
fixed the group moves on. All of those plans set
measurable results for the various "sales groups" and
these objectives are reviewed. The marketing budget of the
systems group is very small focused on: new
product introductions and the task force goals. All of the
seminars it does are break even and very
leveraged thru 3rd parties. All of its ISV activities and
education out reach are break even or profitable -
very little course delivery and lots of certification. It
does gather an end user name list for direct mailing
upgrade information. It does not attend a show unless it
has a major new product introduction or a task
force tells it to. The "server seller" group is not
vaguely defined around solution selling - It is defined
around selling servers. It has group events for the people
who sell servers all the time and it is in a clear
feedback loop. Vague words like "client-server" do not
confuse this group. This systems company does has
a VERY small support organization since it pays 3rd
parties to handle the surge of new introductions and
only 30-90 days free support. Because of this it really
trains a lot of people before every new release.
This company does not have an executive briefing center or
a subsidiary presence in most countries of the
world. It has determined that platforms standards in
countries outside the US, Europe and Japan will be
set based on what happens in those countries. The server
seller group uses a lot of 3rd party relationships
in various countries. Total headcount outside the US is
less than Compaq: 400 people from the 3 sales
force groups. Financial systems for this company are
simple. Since the systems software upgrade business
has such peaks and valleys manufacturing is mostly
outside. This company would have 5 standard
speeches updated regularly - where is our system going,
how we connect to other systems, why our
servers are better, how/why to develop for our platform,
how we work with OEMs. This company is easy
for the press to understand. It is highly profitable since
support, sales, marketing and other overheads are
kept very low. Development cost is its primary expense and
it has a task force on each of the following
topics: tools for developing more efficiently with lot of
shared ideas, making testing less headcount
intensive, how to do a "release" every 12 months on a
predictable basis with every other release being
major [2 hardware design points at all times - today it
would be 4megabytes and 16megabytes], getting all
documentation on line, doing all support on line. Most
corporate customers have an annual contract that
lets them get all the upgrades on all of their machines.
When products do not sell the response is not some
sales force thing but rather a focus on getting the
product right. This company does not advertise in the
business press except for alliance announcements or major
introductions.
</p>
<p>
[In a major simplification I am skipping the tools
business altogether in this analysis. It is focused on the
mass of developers and has a very small sales force]
</p>
<p>
Now lets take the applications business. Its primary focus
is high market share in primary categories by
selling OFFICE. This company also does not have an
Executive briefing center since it focuses on design
wins for OFFICE that are commonly done at lower levels. It
only works with retail outlets when it can get a
specific competitive advantage by doing so. It has high
enough share that it doesnt have to work with
people to get stocking or to talk about normal course of
business issues. The reduction is retail outlets has
allowed it to be very focused. Its products are popular
enough that retailers like Egghead participate in all
major initiatives. Walking into a store this company has
spent time with shows a noticeable difference. This
company wakes up every day and says " how do we avoid
people thinking of our product and the
competitions as interchangable? All of its marketing and
technical work focus around this goal. When this
companies executives give speeches they start with
exciting concepts but they quickly focus on the
competitive advantage. It is amazing how many exciting
demonstrations this company can give of its
upcoming products. This company is not held back by
puritanical views about showing the future since by
the time something is shipping it is old news and now
covered and the competition can already
demonstrate many of the same features in that time frame.
A few zingers are kept under the covers until
shipment for 2 reasons: a) to spread out the news so that
both the early reveal innovations and the ones at
shipment get coverage and b) so that a few things
competition does not initate. This company has also
gone to a 12-24 month cycle for its products showing
brilliance in tying its work to the exciting work the
systems company is doing. This company has managed to
convince the systems company to ship applets
using exactly the same file forms and command structure as
the ones in the major applications so it is
natural for people to use these applications. It is
amazing the great presentations this company gives
about: support issues and how the new product responds to
those, examples of users working with
advanced features and the future of the categories-[note:
I still cant get decent slides out of our
applications group]. This company does not have account
coverage on a regular basis at all. They spend
time with accounts when there is an opportunity to get
them to switch. For example they have a huge
focus on companies that have no moved their standards up
to Windows. This company loves showing
customers how we read the competitions files and are a
superset of them. This company understands the
economics of its competitors. This company knows the
research that will affect its products. The support
policies of this company are tuned for one thing:
competitive advantage. It does not spend money on
support things that cannot be proven by credible 3rd
parties to be worthwhile things. This company has
subset products to use for OEM deal but it also has a
presentation for the press or oems saying how hard
bundle deals are not that great for the customer. This
company also has a reduced presence in the field
since people dont bother it with lots of random
questions - only questions about its products. It is easy
to
have a sales force know all the answers to the top
questions about these products. When a product does
not sell the focus is on getting the product right rather
than spending more marketing money on it. This
company does not advertise in the business press except
for a maior alliance or product introduction. The
company relishes getting backing unique to it because it
is thinking competitively. This company has the
same kind of "vertical" approach as the systems company
however these is somewhat more permanent
staff because once you win in a category it doesnt stay
won as easily as systems. This company knows
which market segments it is strong in and which ones it is
weak in.
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 06:08 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/1000/PX01745.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1745<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
<b>Erik Stevenson</b><br />
<b>From:</b> Brad Silverberg<br />
<b>To:</b> Bob Kruger; johnlu; jonro; paulma;
richt<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: betas to Novell<br />
<b>Date:</b> Tuesday, August 03, 1993 9:18AM
</p>
<p>
I agree with you on dr dos7. it was not included
purposefully in the beta agreement. we do not test on dr
dos nor do we intend to. it's their job to ensure
compatibility with windows and we are not going to help
them. novell would otherwise tell people that msft had
tested windows on dr dos and then either: the bugs
are ours and it's our obligation to fix, or that we have
determined it was compatible. i'd rather put the
onus fully on them.
</p>
<p>
----------<br />
|<b>From:</b> Bob Kruger<br />
|<b>To:</b> bradsi; johnlu; jonro; paulma; richt<br />
|<b>Subject:</b> RE: betas to Novell<br />
|<b>Date:</b> Tuesday, August 03, 1993 9:10AM<br />
|<br />
|i intend to utilize the same definition as they do
for "beta." johnlu<br />
|and i have both told them this. that being the case they
get chicago<br />
|"beta" when we're 6-12 wks out from shipment unless
johnlu feels it<br />
|essential for them to have it earlier.<br />
|<br />
|novell dos is not included in the agmt. however, i was
contacted<br />
|yesterday their director of mktg for dos, who wants to
work w/us to<br />
|ensure windows works atop it. as mentioned in earlier
email, i see no<br />
|reason to be proactive on this front or to amend the beta
agmt to<br />
|include novell dos. though we would get an earlier look
at the<br />
|product, it would put us in an awkward position vis-a-vis
windows<br />
|support for the product.<br />
|<br />
|-bobkr<br />
|----------<br />
||<b>From:</b> Brad Silverberg<br />
||<b>To:</b> Bob Kruger; John Ludwig; Jonathan Roberts;
Paul Maritz; Richard Tong<br />
||<b>Subject:</b> RE: betas to Novell<br />
||<b>Date:</b> Tuesday, August 03, 1993 08:33<br />
||<br />
||it covers chicago only to the extent that you interpret
beta differently<br />
||from how novell has interpreted so far. in addition,
each side has the<br />
||rigth to terminate at any time.<br />
||<br />
||btw, have we gotten any feedback or bug reports from
novell on the snowball<br />
||we have already sent them?<br />
||----------<br />
|||<b>From:</b> johnlu<br />
|||<b>To:</b> bobkr; bradsi; jonro; paulma; richt<br />
|||<b>Subject:</b> RE: betas to Novell<br />
|||<b>Date:</b> Tuesday, August 03, 1993 6:06AM<br />
|||<br />
||||we're obligated only for betas shipped during 1993.
the agmt also<br />
||||makes specific reference to "beta" as distinct from
simple<br />
||||"pre-release" code. novell has certainty taken that
interpretation.<br />
|||<br />
|||just so we are all clear, the agreement covers MS-DOS,
Windows, WFW, and
NT.<br />
|||From Novell's side, Netware, NW Lite and Personal NW
for DOS/Windows/NT,<br />
|||and NW clients to the extent they aren't included
above.<br />
|||<br />
|||and it refers to "pre-release (beta) versions of the
above products shipped<br />
|||during 1993".<br />
|||<br />
|||so depending on how you interpret the agreement, yes
chicago is covered by<br />
|||this.
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 06:10 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/1000/PX01918.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1918<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
<b>Erik Stevenson</b><br />
<b>From:</b> Bob Kruger<br />
<b>To:</b> bradsi; paulma<br />
<b>Cc:</b> bradc<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: insignia<br />
<b>Date:</b> Thursday, December 02, 1993
10:34PM
</p>
<p>
i disagree.
</p>
<p>
someone has to provide the dr-dos. either it's the oem or
insignia.
the fact that insignia would mention dr-dos as an option
is "promotion"
in my book.
</p>
<p>
i also don't believe that they really go thru a major test
effort with
softpc atop dr-dos so they ought to stay away from it.
</p>
<p>
hopefully, my message was legally correct and they will
respond
appropriately and to our satisfaction.
</p>
<p>
thanx. -bobkr<br />
----------<br />
<b>From:</b> Brad Silverberg<br />
<b>To:</b> Bob Kruger; Paul Maritz<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Brad Chase<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: insignia<br />
<b>Date:</b> Thursday, December 02, 1993 22:15
</p>
<p>
yes, it was phil bousfleld.
</p>
<p>
insignia may not agree that they were "promoting" dr dos.
but phil
agreed that yes they do make sure insignia runs an drdos,
that
they tell oem's it runs on dr dos, and that oems can
choose whichever
they prefer.
</p>
<p>
i am not going to provide source code to someone who is
out there
promoting drdos.
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 06:12 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/1000/PX01927.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1927<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<p>
<b>Lynn E. Williams (Legal)</b><br />
<b>From:</b> Paul Maritz<br />
<b>To:</b> David Cutler<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Jim Allchin<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Chicago question<br />
<b>Date:</b> Thu, Dec 9, 1993 8:13AM
</p>
<p>
I will stop round. Two points to state them again:<br />
1. This has NO impact on ISVs (Lotus, Wordperfect, etc.) -
they can write programs to their hearts content.<br />
2. This does have a potential to deter likes of WABI - ie.
Win32 cloners. It could allow us to make a
business decision on this. It also could allow us to make
Win32 a source level (aka POSIX) standard vs. a
binary standard.
</p>
<p>
There is a difference.
</p>
<p>
----------<br />
| <b>From:</b> David Cutler<br />
| <b>To:</b> Paul Maritz<br />
| <b>Cc:</b> Jim Allchin<br />
| <b>Subject:</b> RE: Chicago question<br />
| <b>Date:</b> Thursday, December 09, 1993 7:14AM<br />
|<br />
| This is <em>[Ed: language]</em> and you know it. It is a
proprietary move<br />
| aimed at making Win32 unclonable - as if anyone could
ever<br />
| figure that out anyway. Having to decrypt a critical
part of<br />
| the image to get it started adds significant time to
startup -<br />
| something I understand you complain about constantly.
Taking<br />
| real page faults makes it even slower.<br />
|<br />
| This ain't magic - Chicago won't be able to do it any
faster.<br />
| In fact why don't you get a Chicago system and put it
beside<br />
| your NT system and see what it "feels" like today and
see if<br />
| you want it to be slower.<br />
|<br />
| d<br />
|<br />
| ----------<br />
| | <b>From:</b> Paul Maritz<br />
| | <b>To:</b> David Cutler; Jim Allchin<br />
| | <b>Cc:</b> Lou Perazzoli<br />
| | <b>Subject:</b> RE: Chicago question<br />
| | <b>Date:</b> Thursday, December 02, 1993 6:52PM<br />
| |<br />
| | The performance issue is something to be concerned
about.<br />
| | However it is NOT intended to keep ISVs out. ISVs will
be able<br />
| | to continue to continue as before. It is intended to
give us<br />
| | some barriers vs outright cloners of Windows.<br />
| |<br />
| | ----------<br />
| | <b>From:</b> David Cutler<br />
| | <b>To:</b> Jim Allchin; Paul Maritz<br />
| | <b>Cc:</b> Lou Perezzoli<br />
| | <b>Subject:</b> FW: Chicago question<br />
| | <b>Date:</b> Wednesday, December 08, 1993 4:16PM<br />
| |<br />
| | As markl states below this will have a large effect on
APP<br />
| | start up performance and will create more dirty pages
which<br />
| | has a bad effect on size. Cairo has some images with a
very<br />
| | large number of DLLs. Initiation of these images would
be very<br />
| | slow.<br />
| |<br />
| | I also agree with markl that this will immediately be
picked<br />
| | up by the press for what it really is - a way to keep
everyone<br />
| | out. This is not an "openess" message.<br />
| |<br />
| | d<br />
| |<br />
| | ----------<br />
| | <b>From:</b> Mark Lucovsky<br />
| | <b>To:</b> David Cutler; Lou Perazzoli<br />
| | <b>Subject:</b> FW: Chicago question<br />
| | <b>Date:</b> Wednesday, December 08, 1993 4:01PM<br />
| |<br />
| | Dave, Loup,<br />
| |<br />
| | Bens is going to meet with paulma/billg to move on
this real<br />
| | soon (as early as 12/20). His current idea is to
scramble the<br />
| | idata section using compression and encryption. This
is "to<br />
| | prevent viruses". NT would support new and old style
images.<br />
| | Chicago would only support new images (invalidating
old image<br />
| | format).<br />
| |<br />
| | This is of course <em>[Ed: language]</em> for
performance/size... We would<br />
| | always dirty all of idata, and load time would
slow<br />
| | significantly.<br />
| | Of course this is nothing compared to the message we
project to our isv friends.<br />
| |<br />
| | -markl<br />
| |<br />
| | ----------<br />
| | <b>From:</b> Paul Maritz < paulma@microsoft.com
><br />
| | <b>To:</b> markl<br />
| | <b>Cc:</b> loup<br />
| | <b>Subject:</b> RE: Chicago question<br />
| | <b>Date:</b> Friday, August 06, 1993 2:14PM<br />
| |<br />
| | See comments below.<br />
| |<br />
| | ----------<br />
| | | <b>From:</b> Mark Lucovsky<br />
| | | <b>To:</b> Paul Maritz<br />
| | | <b>Cc:</b> Lou Perazzoli<br />
| | | <b>Subject:</b> Chicago question<br />
| | | <b>Date:</b> Thursday, August 05, 1993 1:30PM<br />
| | |<br />
| | | Paul,<br />
| | |<br />
| | | I installed chicago M4 beta a few days ago. I have
had<br />
| | | significant problems running simple Win32 apps on
chicago. I<br />
| | | am working closely with the chicago people to solve
these<br />
| | | problems.<br />
| | |<br />
| | | I would really appreciate your input on a few areas
with respect to chicago.<br />
| | |<br />
| | | Why did we do such a drastic change to the user
interface.<br />
| | | We have shipped millions of copies of windows.
Everyone knows<br />
| | | how to use it and finds it a frienly and simple
environment.<br />
| | | My six year old daughter is comfortable with
launching apps,<br />
| | | closing apps, minimizing, moving windows... on all
machines<br />
| | | running windows and windows NT. I have not been in
on any of<br />
| | | the reasons for making the shell changes that we
have made,<br />
| | | but I don't understand the motivation for changing
something<br />
| | | as drastically as we have with the chicago shell. I
would<br />
| | | think that incremental changes like groups within
groups would<br />
| | | have been plently. I won't go on about this, as I
would really<br />
| | | like to understand more about why we choose to make
this<br />
| | | change, and what impact we think this change will
have on the<br />
| | | millions and millions of current windows
users.<br />
| |<br />
| | We had been hoping to do something that would be a
mid-point<br />
| | between where we are now, and where want to get to
several<br />
| | years from now when the paradigms of
applications/data<br />
| | structures/navgiating over tree structured name space
will be<br />
| | replaced by "documents and queries" (ie. user does
not<br />
| | explictly start/stop apps, instead uses compound
documents<br />
| | that start the component apps for him, and you find
the<br />
| | documents by querying over their properties/contents).
We have<br />
| | also received lots of ffedback on the defficiencies of
the<br />
| | Win3.1 shell (why do we have two disjoint name
spaces - file<br />
| | manager, program manager; why is the control panel an
app and<br />
| | not a program group, inconsistent useage of
drag/drop,<br />
| | inconsistent handling of properties on entities, etc.,
etc.)<br />
| |<br />
| | That being said, we are receiving tons of feedback
that the<br />
| | shell as implemented in M4 is worst of both worlds
(different<br />
| | for no gain). As a result we are going going to have
an<br />
| | intensive effort to focus on this over next 2
months -<br />
| | particularly focussing on ease of use for the<br />
| | non-sophisticated user.<br />
| |<br />
| | | 2) What is the real target for chicago ? I know the
simple 4mb<br />
| | | low end x86 part of it, but as far as applications,
are we<br />
| | | expecting real live 32bit apps to run on chicago ?
What level<br />
| | | of compatability are we going to commit to between
chicago and<br />
| | | NT ? Are we expecting ISVs to write to a SINGLE
Win32 API so<br />
| | | that their applications run on chicago, NT, Cairo ?
I am a<br />
| | | little confused. I don't know what story we plan to
tell ISVs,<br />
| | | I but I certainly get the feeling that chicago will
be whatever<br />
| | | is easy, or can be done in their scheduled timeframe
(I have<br />
| | | heard developers state this). Again, I would like to
hear your<br />
| | | version of what chicago is supposed to be, what
problems it is<br />
| | | meant to solve, and how you think ISVs benifit from
the<br />
| | | several Win32 API sets/subsets that are in the
pipline. This<br />
| | | will help me alot as I develop my relationship with
the<br />
| | | chicago team.<br />
| |<br />
| | Our basic plan is to ensure that an ISV can write a
Win32 app<br />
| | that will run unmodified on Chicago, NT3.1, and
Cairo - with<br />
| | following caveats:<br />
| | - Chicago is subset of WinNT3.1 Win32 API set (ie.
will be<br />
| | api's that work only on NT - eg. more advanced
GDI<br />
| | transforms),<br />
| | - there may be some new Win32 API's (eg. device
independent<br />
| | color mapping, file sync for portables, etc.)
introduced on<br />
| | Chicago that may not be on NT until WinNT 3.1A or
until Cairo<br />
| | (depending on what can be done when for NT),<br />
| | - Cairo must be superset of WinNT 3.1 and Chicago (ie.
any<br />
| | Chicago or NT3.1 app must run)<br />
| | - Cairo will further extend API's (in compatible way)
beyond Chicago and NT3.1.<br />
| |<br />
| | However in all cases it should be possible for an ISV
to write<br />
| | the vast majority of his app in a generic way, and
dynamically<br />
| | decide to call the extra API's.<br />
| |<br />
| | | markl<br />
| | |<br />
| | | I won't go over any of the problems I am having with
respect<br />
| | | to running Win32 apps on this. I am working<br />
| |<br />
| | PS: the Chicago guys know that M4 is early drop -
in<br />
| | particular Win32 apps support is not targetted to be
really<br />
| | decent until M5 (October).
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
|
| |
| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 06:15 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/3000/PX03155.pdf
<p>
PLAINTIFF's EXHIBIT 3155<br />
Comes v. Microsoft
</p>
<h1>DR DOS 5.0 Competitive Analysis</h1>
<h2>Marketing Overview</h2>
<p>
DRI announced the next version of DR DOS, version 5.0, on
4/26 in the U.K. for mid-June, 1990
delivery to OEMs. This is a very significant release. It
addresses many of the compatibility
problems that plagued earlier DR DOS releases while also
introducing several important new
features. Based on input from OEMs who have been briefed
by DRI, DRI is particularly focusing on
the laptop/notebook OEM market with this release. They
will be positioning DR DOS 5.0 against
the current Microsoft offerings, and will be attempting to
exploit their 2-3 month time to market
advantage over MS-DOS 5.0. They are telling OEMs that
Microsoft has no on-going commitment
to MS-DOS, and are hoping to get some quick EOM design
wins before MS-DOS 5.0 becomes
generally available.
</p>
<p>
DRI has also indicated that they have plans to market in
the U.S. a packaged version of DR DOS
5.0 through retailers as a general purpose DOS upgrade
product. However, at this point they have
discussed this product with only a couple of large
resellers in the U.S., and have given no
indication to resellers that such a product will be
available soon. So the retail upgrade market
appears to be of lesser importance to DRI.
</p>
<h2>Product Overview</h2>
<p>
The following are the major features of DR DOS 5.0:
</p>
<p>
Compatibility. DRI claims that they have solved the
compatibility problems that they had with
earlier DR DOS releases. They now are claiming
compatibility with MS Net and LAN Manager
based redirectors (3 COM, IBM PC LAN, etc.), MS CD ROM
Extensions and Windows/386 v2.03
and v2.11. DRI is also assuring OEMs that DR DOS 5.0
works fine with Windows 3.0.
</p>
<p>
Memory Management. DR DOS 5.0 provides the capability to
run the DR DOS kernel and BIOS
from either the High Memory Area (HMA) or expanded memory,
which reduces the resident size of
DR DOS in low memory to 20K. DR DOS 5.0 also includes an
expanded memory manager with the
ability to load drivers and TSR's high for 386/486
machines, and for 286 systems which use the
Chips & Technologies NEAT chip set (which supports UM
4.0 in hardware).
</p>
<p>
Shell. DR DOS 5.0 now includes a graphical, CUA compliant
shell ("Navigator"). Navigator
appears to provide the same level of functionality as the
MS-DOS 4.0 shell, with some additional
desktop applications like clock and calculator included as
well. Navigator has a file view capability,
equivalent to what we provide in the MS-DOS 4.0 shell.
Navigator does not support "native view"
(the ability to view a file as it appears when running the
application, a la Lotus Magellan and Norton
Commander).
</p>
<p>
Utilities. Like the previous version of DR DOS (3.41), DR
DOS 5.0 includes a command line edit
and recall utility, and a full screen text editor. DR DOS
5.0 also now includes built-in help screens
for all commands (whereas 3.41 included help text for only
a few commands). Another major new
utility introduced in this release is a file transfer
program ("FileLink"). FileLink provides basic file
transfer capability between 2 PCs (typically a laptop and
desktop) at speeds up to 115K baud
using a serial connection. The only other new utility in
DR DOS 5.0 is file find, which provides the
ability to recursively search all directories and
subdirectories for files that match user-supplied
search criteria.
</p>
<p>
ROM Execution. The kernel and DOS BIOS modules of DR DOS
5.0 are both ROM executable.
command.com and the DR DOS utilities are not ROM
executable, but can be stored in ROM for
execution in RAM. The total ROM space occupied by the DR
DOS 5.0 kernel, BIOS and
command.com is about 96K (the same as DR DOS 3.41). With
the DR DOS kernel and BIOS
executing from ROM, total low memory used by DR DOS is
about 20K.
</p>
<p>
Power Management. DR DOS 5.0 includes a power management
utility known as "BatteryMAX".
BatteryMAX is an external utility that appears to monitor
DOS idles and includes an algorithm for
determining when the system is actually idle. This seems
to be the only functionality that
BatteryMAX provides. DRI provides BatteryMAX in source
form, and it is up to them OEM to provide
the additional pieces (ROM BIOS, device drivers and the
necessary interfaces) that would
complement BatteryMAX to reduce overall system power
consumption.
</p>
<p>
Localization. DRI claims to offer the following localized
versions of DR DOS 5.0: French, German,
Spanish, Italian, Swedish, Portugese, Japanese "and many
other language versions".
</p>
<p>
Availability. June, 1990.
</p>
<h2>MS-DOS 5.0 vs. DR DOS 5.0</h2>
<p>
Assuming that all of DRI's claims about DR DOS 5.0 are
true, it appears that the two releases are
fairly comparable, but on balance MS-DOS 5.0 is a little
stronger<sup>1</sup>. For the laptop/notebook OEMs
(DRI's primary target), MS offers a more complete power
management implementation, and a
smaller DOS in both ROM and RAM space required. The only
edge that DR DOS 5.0 currently has
for these OEMs is the file transfer utility, which we hope
to be able to address with a late addition to
the DOS 5.0 product. A complete feature comparison of
MS-DOS 5.0 vs. DR DOS 5.0 is attached.
</p>
<p>
The major areas in which MS-DOS 5.0 seems to be better
than DR DOS 5.0 are:
</p>
<p>
Power Management. MS-DOS 5.0 takes a broader, system-wide
approach to power management
than does DR DOS 5.0. We provide a system "power monitor"
that provides similar functionality to
DRI's BatteryMAX, but we also go well beyond that. The
MS-DOS power monitor will have the
capability of halting or even slowing down the CPU, in a
way that is compatible with power saving
chip sets such as Intel's unannounced 386SX chipset
code-named "Genesis". MS-DOS 5.0 will
also define a device driver interface that would allow the
MS-DOS power monitor to shut down
system peripherals via power-aware device drivers. It will
also define an API for applications that
wish to become power aware to take advantage of, and
explicit user commands for suspend and
shutdown.
</p>
<p>
Microsoft's system-wide approach to power management is
superior to DRI's, and we should
emphasize this as a key differentiator to laptop/notebook
OEMs. Our approach better reduces
the total OEM effort required to implement system-wide
power management, and best insures that
the OEM can take full advantage of future hardware
platforms such as Intel Genesis.
</p>
<p>
<sup>1</sup> This was the opinion of two U.S. OEMs who had
been briefed by both Microsoft and DRI (AST and Tandon).
</p>
<p>
ROM Economy. The MS-DOS 5.0 ROM implementation occupies
about 70K of ROM space - 26K
less than DR DOS 5.0 in ROM. This is a cost of goods issue
for the OEM. Some OEMs may find
that, with MS-DOS (assuming that they may have
applications, utilities, etc. in ROM as well as DOS
and the ROM BIOS), the 26K ROM space savings allows them
to fit everything into two 64 K ROM
chips - whereas with DR DOS they might have to ship a
third 64K ROM. For price sensitive
laptop/notebook OEMs, which appears to be DRI's primary
target, this could be a real issue.
</p>
<p>
RAM Economy. Both ROM and disk-based implementations of
MS-DOS 5.0 take up less low
memory than the equivalent DR DOS 5.0 implementations.
Because MS-DOS allows
command.com to execute from the High Memory Area (disk
based) or ROM (ROM based), it takes
up about 5 K less of low memory than DR DOS.
</p>
<p>
QuickBASIC Interpreter (QBI). Microsoft will bundle the
QBI with MS-DOS 5.0, while DRI offers
no BASIC at all. QBI is essentially the Microsoft
QuickBASIC product that retails for $99 U.S.,
minus the compiler. It provides a modern, structured
programming environment and will be
perceived by many users as significant value added to
DOS.<sup>2</sup>
</p>
<p>
Media Support. MS-DOS 5.0 supports disk partitions up to 2
GB, while DR DOS supports a
maximum partition size of 512 MB. MS-DOS 5.0 will also
include support for 2.88 MB 3.5 inch
media, while DR DOS 5.0 will not.
</p>
<p>
Localization. We plan to localize MS-DOS 5.0 in more
languages: Chinese, Korean, Dutch and
Swedish, in addition to the languages that DR DOS 5.0
supports.
</p>
<p>
DR DOS 5.0 appears to be stronger than MS-DOS 5.0 in these
areas:
</p>
<p>
Implementation Flexibility. Disk-based DR DOS 5.0 can be
implemented in either the High
Memory Area or expanded memory, while MS-DOS 5.0 cannot be
implemented in expanded
memory. DR DOS is also more modular than MS-DOS, in that
the OEM can load the kernel only
high, while keeping the DOS BIOS low (true for both the
disk and ROM implementations).
</p>
<p>
"Load High". The ability to load TSRs, device drivers,
etc. high provides a nice benefit. DRI claims
that the entire Novell redirector, for example, can be
loaded high, which in combination with
running DR DOS in the HMA or EMS can significantly
increase the amount of low memory available
to applications. However, this is mainly useful to those
OEMs who offer 386 based systems, and
even for these OEMs there are issues which reduce its
appeal. For many 386 systems, particularly
EISA or MCA machines, much of the area between 640K and 1
MB (which is where the load high
feature relocates TSRs and drivers) is already being used,
and so there may not be available space
to load something like the Novell redirector into.
</p>
<p>
File Transfer Utility. This is a nice value-added feature
for laptop PC users. It is not clear how
functional this utility is, however. If it provides
comparable functionality to Traveling Software's
LapLink, then it will have strong appeal to
laptop/notebook OEMs (as many of these OEMs today
license LapLink, or something comparable).
</p>
<p>
Password Protection. This was a standard feature of
previous DR DOS releases as well.
So far there has not been any widespread OEM or end user
enthusiasm for this feature.
</p>
<p>
<sup>2</sup> 1990 <em>[Ed: unclear year]</em> Griggs
Anderson Attitude and Awareness study indicated that 23%
of PC users had done some programming in
BASIC in the preceding year.
</p>
<h2>Competitive Response to DR DOS 5.0</h2>
<p>
On the PR side, we have begun an "aggressive leak"
campaign for MS-DOS 5.0. The goal is to
build anticipation for MS-DOS 5.0, and diffuse potential
excitement/momentum from the DR DOS
5.0 announcement. At this point, we are telling the press
that a major new release from Microsoft
is coming this year which will provide significant memory
relief and other important features. This
was picked up by the major weeklies in the U.S. and was
the page 1 story in PC Week on 4.30
(see attached articles).
</p>
<p>
On the product side, we are looking at adding 2 additional
utilities to MS-DOS 5.0: a file transfer
program, and an undelete utility. We are looking at
acquiring a file transfer, and we have already
done some work on the undelete which could possibly still
be included in MS-DOS 5.0. The file
transfer utility is important in that it would eliminate
the only real advantage that DRI might have for
laptop/notebook OEMs. Undelete would be an important
addition, as it would give us a significant
new utility that DRI does not offer. We will make a final
decision on whether or not to include these
utilities in DOS 5.0 within 2 weeks.
</p>
<p>
In addition to all of the above, we have for the past
several weeks been implementing a competitive
response plan (which was put into effect when we first
learned of DRI's plans for this new release).
The purpose of the plan was to get the MS-DOS 5.0 message
out quickly to OEMs worldwide, and
to resellers in the U.S. Attached is a summary of this
plan and its current state.
</p>
<h2>Feature Comparison: MS-DOS 5.0 vs. DR DOS 5.0</h2>
<table border="1">
<tr><th>FEATURE</th><th>MS-DOS
5.0</th><th>DR DOS
5.0</th></tr>
<tr><td>Load DOS into High Memory Area
(HMA)</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr>
<tr><td>Low memory used by
DOS<sup>1</sup></td><td>15K</td><td>20K</
td></tr>
<tr><td>ROM
executable</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr>
<tr><td>ROM space
occupied</td><td>70K</td><td>96K</td></tr>
<tr><td>Low memory used when DOS is in
ROM</td><td>15K</td><td>20K</td></tr>
<tr><td>DOS power
monitor</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr>
<tr><td>System-wide power
management</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td></tr>
<tr><td>Graphical
shell</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr>
<tr><td>Command line edit and
recall</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr>
<tr><td>Command macro
facility</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td></tr>
<tr><td>Full screen
editor</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr>
<tr><td>QuickBASIC
interpreter</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td></tr>
<tr><td>On-line help for DOS
commands</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr>
<tr><td>Safe format and
unformat</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td></tr>
<tr><td>Disk cache software
included</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr>
<tr><td>Maximum disk partition size</td><td>2
GB</td><td>512 MB</td></tr>
<tr><td>Support for 2.88 MB floppy
media</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td></tr>
<tr><td>Support for more than 2 hard
drives</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td></tr>
<tr><td>Load TSRs, drivers
high</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr>
<tr><td>File transfer
utility</td><td>No<sup>2</sup></td><td>Yes&l
t;/td></tr>
<tr><td>OEM availability</td><td>late August,
1990</td><td>mid June, 1990</td></tr>
</table>
<p>
<sup>1</sup> Assuming DOS is loaded in HMA<br />
<sup>2</sup> Not currently in MS-DOS 5.0 plan but may be a
late addition
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 12 2012 @ 06:17 PM EDT |
http://groklawstatic.ibiblio.org/pdf/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/011607/7000/PX07280.pdf
<p>Plaintiff's<br />
Exhibit<br />
7280<br />
Comes V. Microsoft</p>
<hr />
<p>
<b>From:</b> Hank Vigil<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, July 27, 2004 6:01 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> Amir Majidimehr; Pieter Knook<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Will Poole; Brad Brunell (LCA)<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Sync up on Mobility/DRM support - need
action
</p>
<p>
I had a call with Pekka today to make sure folks focused
post the Finnish holiday on getting ready for the Exec
meeting we will have in August.
</p>
<p>
One clear area Billg and Jorma agreed we should target "a
deal" in the next month is the DRM/strategy for digital
content flow area.
</p>
<p>
I know things are moving very fast on OMA – they
ratified the spec, which is not just about media, but
apparently
for protected documents as well. NOK I guess was a key
driver of this outcome.
</p>
<p>
We do need a very crisp strategy on how we engage/align
with NOK here.
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Amir Majidimehr<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, July 26, 2004 6:27 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> Pieter Knook<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Hank Vigil; Will Poole<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Sync up on Mobility/DRM support --
need action
</p>
<p>
That's what I was trying to do below :). But as you can
see, it didn't happen. Fortunately, the first step of
getting
the resources freed up is there and we can not staff up to
help form the strategy. Meanwhile we are doing this
work with borrowed resources and should have somethlng to
discuss in 2 to 3 months (August is shot
unfortunately).
</p>
<p>
Did this answer your question?
</p>
<p>
Amir
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Pieter Knook<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, July 26, 2004 9:22 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Amir Majidimehr<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Hank Vigil; Will Poole<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Sync up on Mobility/DRM support --
need action
</p>
<p>
I thought Amir you were to setup a meeting with JimAll to
discuss how to manage DRM and
formats across the Windows Platform business.
</p>
<p>
Has this meeting been setup?
</p>
<p>
Sent using Outlook 2003, Exchange 2003 and Windows XP
Professional<br />
<em>[Ed: Telephone numbers omitted.]</em>
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Hank Vigil<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, July 23, 2004 8:24 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Will Poole; Amir Majidimehr; Pieter Knook<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Sync up on Mobility/DRM support --
need action
</p>
<p>
My two cents is that we should do as Will suggests esp.
given the state of the NOK discussions and the evolution
of our OMA strategies. We need to meet on this soon re.
the latter.
</p>
<p>
Bradbr and Amir (or delegate) needs to continue to develop
our approach to NOK for the August meeting.
</p>
<p>
Let's discuss offline.
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Will Poole<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, July 23, 2004 7:13 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Amir Majidimehr; Brian Valentine; Michele
Freed; Jim Allchin<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Pieter Knock; Chris Jones (WINDOWS): Hank
Vigil<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Sync up on Mobility/DRM support --
need action
</p>
<p>
We have not met on this yet. If near term funding
questions are causing us to loose ground, then let's fund
the
effort ASAP and we (WLT) will figure out how to pay the
bill later.
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Amir Majidimehr<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, July 23, 2004 7:09 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Brian Valentine; Michele Freed; Jim
Allchin<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Pieter Knook; Will Poole; Chris Jones
(WINDOWS); Hank Vigil<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Sync up on Mobility/DRM support --
need action<br />
<b>Importance:</b> High
</p>
<p>
So was this discussed at the WLT? If so, what was the
results?
</p>
<p>
If not, then let me say that we are starting to get into a
world of hurt. OMA just approved the DRM V2, and Nokia
is getting ready for a major launch with this technology
yet we are sitting here with no strategy. I have funded
one
head out of my less than empty pocket but can't do more.
Time is running out on this and I don't know the next
steps. All I was asking below was for people to hear us
out on the situation analysis. You all don't hate us that
much, do you :)?
</p>
<p>
I would really appreciate some guidance here.
</p>
<p>
Amir
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Brian Valentine<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, June 24, 2004 12:22 PM<br />
<b>To:</b> Michele Freed; Amir Majidimehr; Jim
Allchin<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Pieter Knook; Will Poole; Tina Krallis
(BRUSCA); Jane Ellis; Chris Jones (WINDOWS)<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Sync up on Mobility/DRM support
</p>
<p>
This should go to the WLT.
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Michele Freed<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, June 24, 2004 10:27 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Amir Majidimehr; Jim Allchin; Brian
Valentine<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Pieter Knook; Will Poole; Tina Krallis
(BRUSCA); Jane Ellis<br />
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Sync up on Mobility/DRM support
</p>
<p>
Adding BV and making thread smaller...
</p>
<p>
I thought this type of issue was exactly the type that was
to be resolve in the WLT?
</p>
<p>
<b>From:</b> Amir Majidimehr<br />
<b>Sent:</b> Thu 6/24/2004 10:19 AM<br />
<b>To:</b> Jim Allchin<br />
<b>Cc:</b> Pieter Knook; Hank Vigil; Will Poole; Tina
Krallis (BRUSCA); Jane Ellis; Michele Freed; Linda
Averett; Mike
Beckerman<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Sync up on Mobility/DRM support
</p>
<p>
Hi Jim.
</p>
<p>
We are trying to get your calendar with Pieter/Hank/Will
to discuss where we should go with respect to formulating
a strategy and executing on a plan with respect to our
mobility platform in general, and DRM/content security
specifically. Pieter and I have already met and agreed
that it makes sense for us to lead the charge here (right
now, it is driven out of MDD). With the recent Intertrust
settlement, our situation in the marketplace has improved,
calling for a new strategy.
</p>
<p>
The reason we need to meet with you is to a) explain the
situation at high level and b) seek your advice on how to
fund this. Because this activity falls in the crack
between the two P&Ls, we have not been able to
identify how we
are going to handle (b).
</p>
<p>
On my part, I have already started hiring a senior program
manager to start figuring out the plan and just
committed $1.1M on licensing technology to obfuscate our
DRM code for MED platform (without it, our DRM
would be cracked in one minute, and in the process
undermine the security we have in Windows or eliminate
premium content availability for open MED platforms). I
did not have budget for either one of these but have gone
on to invest anyway, because I think it is essential to
do, before Nokia eats whats left of our lunch :). But this
is
not going to lead to a viable strategy/product from us
without addition staff to actually building the
technology.
Nor can I take people from LH away to do this work.
</p>
<p>
Since we are just getting started to look at this area, we
won't be in a position to tell you exactly where we should
go But do hope to explain at high level, the opportunity
and pitfalls of the situation. The decision we like to
walk
away with is how much we should increase our investments
for mobility and where those resources should come
from.
</p>
<p>
Can you tell us if you like to meet and if not, how we go
about resolving this?
</p>
<p>
Thanks,<br />
Amir
</p>
[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Friday, July 13 2012 @ 03:25 PM EDT |
It amazes me that the Microsoft was ever allowed to get as bit as it did in the
first place. Industries outside of the software market had to see the growing
dependence on office software and they had the money to fund an industry
standard OS and office software all along. They could have easily financed an
open industry standard for electronic documentation long ago and established
standards for secure official electronic documents (something we still do not
really have). Instead, they let one little corporation from the Northwest grow
into a monster that dictated terms to them. If industry had taken control of
the file formats that they would accept for electronic documentation then that
alone could have prevented the Microsoft monster from rising. Just that.
Industry says these are the file formats then anyone can write programs that
read and write them and no one has a clear advantage. It wouldn't matter if
Microsoft used internal APIs if they couldn't handle the standard file formats
then they are out.
How did Microsoft establish the Office suite in the Market? By having a superior
product? Ya right. They dumped it on the market at no cost at the time America
was complaining about the Japanese destroying the American made TV market by,
you guessed it, dumping. TANSTAAFL - Industry gobbled up the free lunch and has
been paying for it ever since.
Thanks to Android, the computer market may finally become a true commodity
market. That is if it can get through the Forest of Dread wherein live the
trolls of IP.
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