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I envision it working without a central authority | 474 comments | Create New Account
Comments belong to whoever posts them. Please notify us of inappropriate comments.
Security by Authority doesn't work either.
Authored by: Wol on Thursday, July 05 2012 @ 04:40 PM EDT
Except that's not what a lot of us understand by "security by
authority".

"Security by authority" == "trust me, I'm Microsoft"

Cheers,
Wol

[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]

I need an OS that DOESN'T trust "Program X"...it assumes it's a virus...
Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, July 05 2012 @ 09:15 PM EDT
That's what all the Virtual Machine environments are really about...not trusting
the combination of software and OS to really do what its supposed to do.

I want an OS that assumes all programs are virus ware/spyware...and lets me
treat them all accordingly.

Then, a secure boot becomes a second line of defense...
(Christenson)

[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]

I envision it working without a central authority
Authored by: jbb on Thursday, July 05 2012 @ 11:13 PM EDT
For FOSS, signing code gives you the benefits of time shifting and the benefits of a web of trust. Getting the public key at the same time and from the same place as you get the code gains you almost nothing because if the code is compromised then the public key could just as easily be compromised.

Ideally, every code creator and every distribution would have their own signing key(s). These would change much less frequently than the code itself. Once you have a key from RedHat and you know that key is valid then you can be sure the code you are getting from RedHat is the code they signed. RedHat, in turn, can be sure it is getting source code signed by the creators.

Once a system like this is in place then infecting a server with malicious versions of code has a much lower chance of infecting downstream systems. The only systems that would be vulnerable would be those that are downloading code and at the same time downloading the public key for the first time. Everyone else will have a cached copy of the public key that does not match the signed code. They can immediately raise the alarm saying the code has been compromised. Even worse for the potential attacker, everyone else can still download the public key and raise the alarm when it does not match the copy of the public key they have stored locally.

I don't see where a central authority would add value to this model except possibly for first time users. But that role is much better served by a web of trust where everyone is vouching for each other. A central authority is a single point of failure and thus an obvious target for attack. A web of trust is more difficult to compromise because attackers would need to gain control of a bunch of systems nearly simultaneously. Even then, if people downstream are caching and verifying public keys, a coordinated attack would be recognized almost instantly.

---
Our job is to remind ourselves that there are more contexts
than the one we’re in now — the one that we think is reality.
-- Alan Kay

[ Reply to This | Parent | # ]

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