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| Authored by: tknarr on Saturday, June 02 2012 @ 12:27 AM EDT |
It works the same way that SSL certificates work. You have a trusted root key
burned into the hardware. A software vendor can get their key signed by the
holder of the trusted root key. The vendor can then sign boot images. The key
matter is who controls what keys are on the list of trusted root keys (the
equivalent of SSL's CA bundle or the Authorities tab in Firefox's certificates
window). [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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| Authored by: symbolset on Saturday, June 02 2012 @ 03:12 PM EDT |
Let me make this perfectly clear for you: Bill Veghte, only five months ago
the head of Microsoft's Windows division, is now Chief Operating Officer of HP.
By October he might be CEO. Who do you think is going to authorize or deny the
insertion of non-Microsoft crypto keys into HP desktop and laptop TPM chips to
enable the loading of non-Windows operating systems? Bill Veghte. If HP fails
to do so what other PC OEM would dare risk the ire of The Beast?
The timing
is not coincidental. This is a done deal. [ Reply to This | Parent | # ]
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