Oracle is asking to have a hearing on its motion for judgment as a matter of law. They've asked for July 26 at 8 AM, so unless the judge rules on the filings alone, which is unlikely, we'll certainly be hoping some of you can be there.
Why, you are asking, is Oracle doing this, when it knows the Hon. William Alsup, the presiding judge, isn't buying what Oracle is selling? Footnote one tells us the point:
Oracle recognizes granting JMOL on some of the copyright issues would require the Court to overturn all or part of its order on copyrightability. Nonetheless, Oracle brings this motion to preserve its rights on appeal, particularly since the Court structured the trial to accommodate the possibility of the jury verdict being reinstated on appeal. So this will be an advance peek at the appeal to come and if it's successful at the issues Oracle hopes to be able to try before a second jury. And it's crossing the T's and dotting the I's on Rule 50 motions, as I'll show you.
So what does Oracle view as its best shots?
Actually, we are back to Go with Oracle, as it restates all the claims it had at the beginning of the trial, plus two more. Whatever they didn't win, they ask to win now. What they did win, they want to keep. They say Google infringed its copyrighted files, all of them:
Oracle also proved at trial that Google copied 11 individual code files. The jury found Google infringed its copyrights in one of those files and the Court granted Oracle's JMOL motion as to eight others. ECF No. 1123. Oracle directs this motion to the two remaining files, both of which contained comments Google admits were copied verbatim. It says Google also infringed
the comments in two Java files, it infringed the Java SSO of the 37 APIs -- Oracle goes on and on and on about that -- *and* Google infringed the documentation of the SSO, and it infringed both patents. You can find the arguments about the patents beginning on page 17. Here's a snip of how Oracle says Google infringed the patents:
Google infringes the '104 patent in two ways: the Resolve.c resolution functions that are part of the Dalvik Virtual Machine infringe Claims 11, 39, 40, and 41 and the dexopt tool that is also part of the Dalvik VM infringes Claims 27 and 29. Google infringes Claims 1 and 20 of the '520 patent through the operation of the dx tool, which is part of the Android SDK used by developers. Given the evidence in the record, Google's infringement can be determined as a matter of law, as no reasonable jury could find for Google.
This is a Rule 50(b) motion, meaning it's a renewal of a Rule 50(a) motion that wasn't granted but was brought prior to the jury ruling. If you read about a Rule 50 motion, you'll understand why Oracle is bringing the motion:
The Court should also grant judgment on Google's defenses, as well as other affirmative defenses on which Google did not present any evidence or oppose Oracle's Rule 50(a) motion.
Rule 50. Judgment as a Matter of Law in a Jury Trial; Related Motion for a New Trial; Conditional Ruling Here's Oracle's Rule 50(a) motion for JMOL [PDF] filed during the trial at the end of evidence.
(a) Judgment as a Matter of Law.
(1) In General. If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may:
(b) Renewing the Motion After Trial; Alternative Motion for a New Trial. If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. No later than 28 days after the entry of judgment—or if the motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a verdict, no later than 28 days after the jury was discharged—the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may:
(A) resolve the issue against the party; and
(2) Motion. A motion for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before the case is submitted to the jury. The motion must specify the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment.
(B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.
(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict;
(2) order a new trial; or
(3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.
The jury, according to Oracle, was not properly instructed in certain issues, and on the rest no reasonable jury could find no infringement. Hence, it's the judge's fault and the jury was evidently unreasonable.
In the alternative, Oracle asks the Court asks for a new trial.
Like that's going to happen. Not by the order of *this* court, anyway.
But here's something else. Oracle wants the court to rule that Oracle *owns* the copyrights. If you recall Google raised substantial questions about that and asked for judgment as a matter of law -- remember the blank DVD filed with the Copyright Office? -- but the judge denied Google's motion.
That doesn't mean it couldn't be proven at a trial before a jury, but it never came up again, because Google didn't present the issue to the jury. So Oracle wants it settled now, and in its favor:
By Google's choice, copyright ownership was not posed to the jury.... Google elected instead to present the issue as a question of law for the Court.... The Court denied Google's motion that it was entitled to JMOL as to ownership.... Oracle accordingly believes no issue as to ownership remains. But then, on page 16, Oracle renews its arguments that Google's use of the SSO means its work is a derivative work. But Oracle didn't bring that argument to the jury either. That got dropped, as you can see by reading the jury verdict form. Oracle wants to have its cake and eat it too. If Google didn't bring a matter to trial, it loses the point, in Oracle's mind, but if Oracle didn't bring a matter to trial, it gets another chance to argue the point now. Go figure.
Nonetheless, to be prudent, Oracle requests that the Court grant Oracle judgment as to
ownership of the asserted works.
Oracle says the copied comments in the two Java files are not de minimis, because the amount, to Oracle, is significant -- about 25% of one file and 2.90% of the other.
Comments. They want damages for comments. Oracle states:
Google’s verbatim copying is immediately recognizable. No reasonable jury could find it
was de minimis. Copying can only be de minimis “if it is so meager and fragmentary that
[compared to the work as a whole] the average audience would not recognize the appropriation.”
ECF No. 1018, JI 28; Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). The average audience would never even see the comments, actually. I suppose Oracle would argue the "average audience" would be developers.
Next, it's back to the Java APIs, and Oracle reminds the judge that it was over Oracle's objection that the judge would only let the jury decide if Google infringed Oracle's copyrights in its documentation by copying the English-language descriptions of the APIs. Oracle feels that was improper:
The Court did not submit the issue of whether the SSO of the 37 API packages was also copied into the Android specifications.
Because the jury found Google infringed the SSO of the 37 API packages, a reasonable jury
would have found Google infringed the indisputably identical SSO in the documentation as well. This might be a good time to remind Oracle that the foreman of the jury said to the media after the trial was over that the jury thought by the wording of the judge's instruction that they *had* to find that Google infringed the SSO, as Joe Mullin at ars technica reported on the day of the verdict:
As to the finding of infringement, Thompson said that the jury actually didn't debate it that long. The feeling was that the answer to the infringement question—the first one on the copyright verdict form—had basically been dictated by the judge's instructions. (Judge Alsup told the jury, among other things, that they must assume that the Java APIs are copyrighted.) "We felt that the judge's instructions put us a lot of the way towards finding infringement," Thompson explained.
They thought the judge was saying they had no choice about that, that it had been essentially settled by the judge without their having to do it. That's not the same thing as a jury finding that Google infringed. They just viewed that box as already ticked, pretty much, by the judge's instructions.
Then at the end, it wants judgment as a matter of law that Google's defenses of estoppel and laches fail:
Google failed to prove any of the elements of equitable estoppel. In particular, Google has no credible claim that it relied on Sun/Oracle's conduct to its detriment or that its reliance was reasonable.... Willful infringement. Oracle's hopes for the future are as big as the sky.
Google has not produced evidence to support a laches defense. To prove laches, Google must show that (1) Oracle/Sun unreasonably delayed filing the lawsuit; (2) the delay was inexcusable, and (3) Google suffered material prejudice due to Oracle/Sun's delay. Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 952-57 (9th Cir. 2001). Oracle sued Google on August 12, 2010, less than two years after Google first made its Android source code available to the public (in October 2008) and less than three years after Google first released the Android APIs (in November 2007). RT 1041:14-16 (Morrill); RT 1546:14-16 (Schmidt); RT 1702:22-1704:9 (Rubin); RT 1719:10-18 (Rubin). As a result, there is no presumption of laches, and "the burden is upon the defendant to show that the delay was unexcused and that the defendant suffered injury as a result of the delay."... In 2008 and 2009, Sun engaged in licensing discussions with Google, making any delay reasonable and excusable.... Google also made no showing of material prejudice.
Furthermore, laches is not available in a case of willful infringement.
It times the laches as from the time the Android source code was made public, two years prior to Oracle filing the lawsuit, or at most three years before. But there's a lot more to this story, going all the way back to 2006, as you can see from the trial exhibits alone, but to Oracle, the negotiations between Sun and Google excuses them for not suing before. Actually, Sun did a lot more than negotiate. The CEO offered to help Google with its announcement of Android. It's not Sun that was inclined to sue. It was not the code being revealed that made the difference, either. It was the change of ownership, the transfer of the decision to Oracle.
We have finished the page of all the exhibits, listing them so you can find what they all are.
And then finally, Oracle wants a ruling on the Google defenses against alleged infringement of the patents the jury said it hadn't infringed:
V. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT JMOL ON GOOGLE'S ALTERNATIVE DEFENSES TO PATENT INFRINGEMENT They want that just in case the Federal Circuit disagrees with the jury's finding that the patents were not infringed and on appeal sends it back for a second trial. In that second trial, then, Google would be defenseless as to the alternative defenses. Just the way Oracle likes to fight.
Oracle moved for JMOL as to Google's Sixth (patent misuse), Eighth (use by the U.S.) and Nineteenth (unclean hands) defenses, as well as Google's defense of express license. ECF No. 1168 at 24. Google never presented these defenses at trial and did not oppose the motion. ECF No. 1169 at 18-19. Accordingly, the Court should grant JMOL in Oracle's favor.
In summary, Oracle wants everything.
Here's the part in their motion about the hearing, in case you can go:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the following motion will be heard at 8:00 A.M. on July 26, 2012, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in Courtroom 8, 19th Floor, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California before the Honorable William H. Alsup. If you can go, please email me so I don't worry. Our mirror_slap doesn't think he can go that day.
Plaintiff Oracle will and hereby does move for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), or in the alternative, for a new trial under Rule 59 as set forth more particularly in the Proposed Order filed concurrently with the motion. This motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, documents incorporated by reference, the entire record in this action, any matters of which the Court may take judicial notice, and any evidence or argument presented at the hearing or on reply.
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
MICHAEL A. JACOBS (Bar No. 111664)
MARC DAVID PETERS (Bar No. 211725)
DANIEL P. MUINO (Bar No. 209624)
BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
DAVID BOIES (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
STEVEN C. HOLTZMAN (Bar No. 144177)
DORIAN DALEY (Bar No. 129049)
DEBORAH K. MILLER (Bar No. 95527)
MATTHEW M. SARBORARIA (Bar No. 211600)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
ORACLE AMERICA, INC.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
ORACLE AMERICA, INC.
Case No. CV 10-03561 WHA
ORACLE AMERICA, INC.'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW UNDER
RULE 50(B) OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW
Date: July 26, 2012
Time: 8:00 a.m.
Dept.: Courtroom 8, 19th Floor
Judge: Honorable William H. Alsup
TABLE OF CONTENTS
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES....................1
I. GOOGLE INFRINGED ORACLE'S JAVA-RELATED
Oracle Owns The Asserted Copyrights...............2
II. GOOGLE INFRINGED THE ASSERTED CLAIMS OF THE '104
B. Google Infringed By Copying Comments From Oracle
C. Google Copied Java Specifications Into Android
D. Google's Copying Is Not Fair Use................6
1. Google's Use of the Copyrighted Work Is Purely
E. Judgment Should Be Granted In Oracle's Favor On
Issues That Were Not
a. Google's Use Is Commercial..............6
2. The Copyrighted Work Is Creative In Nature..............8
b. Google's Use Is Not Transformative..............6
3. Google Uses Valuable, Core Portions of the
4. Google's Use Harms The Potential Market For And
Value Of The
Presented To The Jury.................9
1. Oracle Is Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of Law
2. Google Created An Infringing Derivative Work...........16
A. Android's Resolve.c infringes claims 11, 39, 40,
and 41 of the '104 patent
III. GOOGLE INFRINGED THE ASSERTED CLAIMS OF THE '520
because Dalvik bytecode instructions contain symbolic
1. A field index is a symbolic reference that is
contained in a Dalvik
B. Android dexopt infringes claims 27 and 29 of the
2. According to the '104 patent, the "data" that the
references refer to are actual data in a data object...........19
3. Conversion of instruction stream indices to numeric
locations confirms that the indices are symbolic references.........19
IV. GOOGLE'S EQUITABLE DEFENSES FAIL.................22
A. Google Has Not Met Its Burden Of Proving Equitable
B. Google Has Not Shown Laches Bars Oracle's
TABLE OF CONTENTS
V. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT JMOL ON GOOGLE'S
DEFENSES TO PATENT INFRINGEMENT................24
VI. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ORACLE IS ENTITLED TO A NEW
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co.,
960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc)...............23, 24
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)..................8
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994)..................13
Atari v. Nintendo,
975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992)..................14
Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99 (1879)......................4
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569 (1994)........................7, 9
Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best Seam,
694 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1982)................23
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp.,
263 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2001).................23
Dream Games of Ariz., Inc. v. PC Onsite,
561 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2009)................3, 13
Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams &
542 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1976)................4
Elvis Presley Enters. Inc. v. Passport Video,
349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on different grounds in
Flexible Lifeline Sys.
v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2011)...........6, 8, 9
eScholar LLC v. Otis Educ. Sys., Inc.,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40727 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2005)............16
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340 (1991)..................2
Fisher v. Dees,
794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986)..................3
Granite State Ins. Co. v. Smart Modular Techs.,
76 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 1996)..................10
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539 (1985)....................6, 8, 9
Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp.,
634 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Colo. 2009)...............12
In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent
712 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2010)..............24
Jacobsen v. Katzer,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115204 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2009)............4
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys.,
886 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1989)...............4, 15
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,
336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003)..................7
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Seattle Lighting Fixture Co.,
345 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2003)...................11
Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ'g,
512 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 2008)..................7
Lotus Dev. Corp v. Borland Int'l, Inc.,
49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an evenly divided
court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).................15
Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc.,
124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997).................15
Merch. Transaction Sys., Inc. v. Nelcela, Inc.,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25663 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2009)................12
Metcalf v. Bochco,
294 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2002)...............4
Micro Star v. Formgen Inc.,
154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998)...................16
Mktg. Tech. Solutions, Inc. v. Medizine LLC,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50027 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2010)..............4
Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc.,
481 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2007)...................24
Murphy v. City of Long Beach,
914 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1990).....................24
Newton v. Diamond,
388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004)...................3
SAS Inst., Inc. v. S&H Computer Sys., Inc.,
605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)..................16, 17
Satava v. Lowry,
323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003)...................12
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993).................13, 14
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936)..................9, 16
Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.,
203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Sony II")..............14
Sony Computer Entm't Inc. v. Connectix Corp.,
48 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("Sony I").............14
Swirsky v. Carey,
376 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004).................12
Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton,
212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000)..................5
Toro Co. v. R&R Prods. Co.,
787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986)................15
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc.,
715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1983)................16
Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd.,
996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993)..................16
United States v. Necoechea,
986 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1993).................24
Urantia Found. v. Maaherra,
114 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1997)..................4
Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't,
447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006)................6, 8
§ 101................................8, 15, 16
Fed R. Civ. P.
9 James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice §
50.05 (3d ed. 2012).....................10
12 James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice
§ 59.13[a] (3d ed. 2012)....................25
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the following motion will be heard at
8:00 A.M. on July 26, 2012, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be
heard, in Courtroom 8, 19th Floor, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San
Francisco, California before the Honorable William H. Alsup.
Plaintiff Oracle will and hereby does move for judgment as a
matter of law under Rule 50(b), or in the alternative, for a new
trial under Rule 59 as set forth more particularly in the Proposed
Order filed concurrently with the motion. This motion is based on
this Notice of Motion and Motion, the following Memorandum of
Points and Authorities, documents incorporated by reference, the
entire record in this action, any matters of which the Court may
take judicial notice, and any evidence or argument presented at the
hearing or on reply.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Google is liable for both copyright and patent infringement as a
matter of law.
Oracle proved at trial that Google copied thousands of
individual elements contained in 37 Java API packages and all of
the intricate relationships among them. The witnesses for both
parties agreed that designing these APIs took great creativity and
The jury found Google infringed Oracle's copyrights in the
structure, sequence and organization ("SSO") of the 37 API
packages. The jury hung on the issue of whether Google proved its
affirmative defense of fair use, but Oracle is entitled to judgment
that Google's commercial, non-transformative and extensive copying
of Oracle's copyrighted works does not constitute fair use as a
matter of law.1 Oracle is also entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on Google's copying of the SSO of the Java
documentation. Over Oracle's objection, the jury was instructed
only to consider Google's copying of the English language
descriptions contained in the documentation under a virtual
identity standard. ECF No. 1018, Jury Instruction ("JI") 21, 24.
But it is undisputed that the SSO of the Java and Android
documentation is the same as the
SSO found in the code, which the jury found Google infringed.
With proper instructions, a reasonable jury could only have found
copyright infringement of the documentation as well. Oracle is
further entitled to judgment based on Google's creation of a
derivative work from the Java documentation, another issue that,
over Oracle's objection, was not submitted to the jury.
Oracle also proved at trial that Google copied 11 individual
code files. The jury found Google infringed its copyrights in one
of those files and the Court granted Oracle's JMOL motion as to
eight others. ECF No. 1123. Oracle directs this motion to the two
remaining files, both of which contained comments Google admits
were copied verbatim.
In addition, Google infringes United States Patents Nos.
RE38,104 ("the '104 patent") and 6,061,520 ("the '520 patent").
Google infringes the '104 patent in two ways: the Resolve.c
resolution functions that are part of the Dalvik Virtual Machine
infringe Claims 11, 39, 40, and 41 and the dexopt tool that is also
part of the Dalvik VM infringes Claims 27 and 29. Google infringes
Claims 1 and 20 of the '520 patent through the operation of the dx
tool, which is part of the Android SDK used by developers. Given
the evidence in the record, Google's infringement can be determined
as a matter of law, as no reasonable jury could find for
The Court should also grant judgment on Google's defenses, as
well as other affirmative defenses on which Google did not present
any evidence or oppose Oracle's Rule 50(a) motion.
In the alternative, Oracle asks the Court to grant its motion
for a new trial.
I. GOOGLE INFRINGED ORACLE'S JAVA-RELATED COPYRIGHTS
Oracle proved Google's copyright infringement by showing that
(1) Oracle is the owner of the copyrighted works and (2) Google
copied protected elements from those works. ECF No. 1018, JI 23-24.
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
A. Oracle Owns The Asserted Copyrights
By Google's choice, copyright ownership was not posed to the
jury. ECF No. 1018, JI 23; RT 2392:10-2396:6. Google elected
instead to present the issue as a question of law for the Court. RT
2392:12-2394:14. The Court denied Google's motion that it was
entitled to JMOL as to ownership. See ECF No. 1165. Oracle
accordingly believes no issue as to ownership remains.
Nonetheless, to be prudent, Oracle requests that the Court grant
Oracle judgment as to
ownership of the asserted works. As the Court found in denying
Google's JMOL motion, Oracle presented evidence that it was the
owner and copyright holder of the 37 API packages and the eleven
code files. ECF No. 1165 at 1-2. See also TX 476, RT
2233:1-17, 2239:16-23 (Reinhold).
"A certificate of registration raises the presumption of
copyright validity and ownership." Dream Games of Ariz., Inc. v.
PC Onsite, 561 F.3d 983, 987 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); see
also 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). "This presumption of ownership is
true even for individual works that are broadly registered as part
of a compilation or derivative work." ECF No. 1165 at 2 (citing
United Fabrics Int'l, Inc. v. C&J Wear, Inc., 630 F.3d
1255, 1257-59 (9th Cir. 2011)). Google never presented any evidence
showing Oracle is not the owner of the copyrighted works, and the
Court found the issue of whether Oracle owns the works was a
question of fact for the jury, which Google waived its right to
contest by electing not to submit it to the jury. ECF No. 1165 at
2. Oracle also incorporates by reference here its proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law and prior briefing on this issue.
See ECF No. 1049 ¶¶ 1-8, 142-45; ECF No. 1093 at
B. Google Infringed By Copying Comments From Oracle Source
There is no dispute that Google copied comments from two Java
files Google admits the "comments came from the copyrighted
material." ECF No. 1018, JI 27. A comparison of Oracle's
CodeSource.java file (TX 623.9) to Android's CodeSourceTest.java
file (TX 1039) shows that, except for some HTML commands, the
copied comments are "syntactically ... identical." RT
1262:13-1263:4 (Mitchell). Google also copied comments identically
from the CollectionCertStoreParameters.java file. Compare TX
623.10 with TX 1040; see RT 1253:9-10 (Mitchell). The
copied comments are quantitatively significant: they amount to
about 25% of one Oracle file (TX 623.10), and about 2.90% of the
other (TX 623.9).
Google's verbatim copying is immediately recognizable. No
reasonable jury could find it was de minimis. Copying can
only be de minimis "if it is so meager and fragmentary that
[compared to the work as a whole] the average audience would not
recognize the appropriation." ECF No. 1018, JI 28; Fisher v. Dees,
794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). The extent of the copying
"is measured by considering the qualitative and quantitative
significance of the copied portion in relation to the plaintiff's
work as a whole." Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195
(9th Cir. 2004). Even if the copied material is a
"quantitatively very small part" of the work as a whole, "[t]he
smallness alone is not enough by itself to avoid liability."
Mktg. Tech. Solutions, Inc. v. Medizine LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50027, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2010).
C. Google Copied Java Specifications Into Android
Over Oracle's objection, the Court submitted to the jury only
the question of whether Google infringed Oracle's copyrights in its
documentation by copying the English-language descriptions of API
elements. See ECF No. 1018, JI 21; ECF No. 997 at 1-3
(Oracle written objections); RT 2833:15-2389:7 (charging
conference). The Court did not submit the issue of whether the SSO
of the 37 API packages was also copied into the Android
specifications. Because the jury found Google infringed the SSO of
the 37 API packages, a reasonable jury would have found Google
infringed the indisputably identical SSO in the documentation as
The selection, arrangement and structure of documentation is
protectable. Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 959
(9th Cir. 1997); see also Jacobsen v. Katzer, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 115204, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2009) ("selection,
ordering and arrangement" of text files reflecting decoder
information from model railroad manufacturers). This is true even
if the individual elements are not protectable. Metcalf v.
Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The particular
sequence in which an author strings a significant number of
unprotectable elements can itself be a protectable element. Each
note in a scale, for example, is not protectable, but a pattern of
notes in a tune may earn copyright protection.").
In Baker v. Selden, the Supreme Court found the detailed
description in a document of a system is copyrightable even if the
underlying system it describes is not. Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99 (1879). Here, unlike Baker, the structure described
by the Java API documentation is itself copyrightable because it is
the structure of a computer program. Johnson Controls, Inc. v.
Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir.
1989). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit treats Baker as a "blank
forms" case and holds that when such forms are integrated with text
to convey information they are copyrightable. See, e.g., Edwin
K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, 542
F.2d 1053, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 1976). In any event, there is no
question under Baker that the documentation is
copyrightable. That includes its original and creative SSO.
The parties agree the selection and structure expressed in the
documentation is the same as the selection and structure expressed
in the source code. See RT 606:14-608:3 (Reinhold); ECF No.
1043 at 14 (Google JMOL). The jury found Google infringed the
"overall structure, sequence and organization of the copyrighted
works." ECF No. 1089 ¶ 1. This finding was well supported.
Experts for both parties testified the SSO of the 37 API packages
in Android and Java is virtually identical. See RT
1244:17-1246:3 (Mitchell); RT 2214:3-9 (Astrachan) (SSO is
"virtually identical"). Android developer Bob Lee conceded this
too. RT 1174:9-12 (Lee). A reasonable jury could only have found
Google infringed the SSO in the documentation as well.
This question was never put to the jury, however. Instead, at
Google's request, the jury was asked to compare only the English
language descriptions. Even so, a properly instructed jury would
have found in Oracle's favor. Over Oracle's objection, the jury was
asked to determine infringement based on whether the English
language descriptions were "virtually identical" in Java and
Android rather than "substantially similar." See ECF No.
1018 JI 24; ECF No. 997 at 3 (written objections); RT
2399:12-2400:5 (charging conference). Lead Android developer Bob
Lee admitted the English-language descriptions within the Android
specifications were paraphrased from Sun's specifications and were
therefore "substantially similar." RT 1191:4-13, 1175:25-1176:3
(Lee). Mr. Lee was shown three examples of this paraphrasing and
acknowledged the same level of similarity exists across the full
documentation for the 37 Java API packages. RT 1175:25-1176:3
(Lee); TX 610.2, 767.
This admitted paraphrasing warranted judgment in Oracle's favor
of copying of the English-language descriptions even under the
virtual identity standard. But those descriptions should have been
considered together with, and in the context of, the extensively
copied selection, structure, sequence and organization of the API
elements, even if they were not individually protectable. See,
e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th
Cir. 2000) ("It is well settled that a jury may find a combination
of unprotect[a]ble elements to be protect[a]ble ... because 'the
over-all impact and effect indicate substantial appropriation.'")
(citation omitted). For roughly 11,000 pages, the 37 Android
packages are laid out in the same organization, with thousands of
the same names, nearly all the same packages, classes and methods
with the same
relationships among all elements, and a paraphrased English
definition next to each. The Court should have applied the
substantial similarity standard to this range of creative
expression. But Oracle is entitled to JMOL under either a
substantial similarity or virtual identity standard.
D. Google's Copying Is Not Fair Use
No reasonable juror could find based on the trial evidence that
Google met its burden to prove fair use, and Oracle is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on this defense.
1. Google's Use of the Copyrighted Work Is Purely
a. Google's Use Is Commercial
"Although not controlling, the fact that a new use is commercial
as opposed to non-profit weighs against a finding of fair use."
Elvis Presley Enters. Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622,
627 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on different grounds in Flexible
Lifeline Sys. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989 (9th Cir.
Android is hugely profitable. See RT 1458:12-16;
1456:15-19 (Schmidt); RT 2225:182226: 24 (Agarwal). Google
distributes Android to increase use of Google services, which
generate advertising revenue. RT 1458:12-16 (Schmidt). Google
documents describe Android as a "critical" platform for five Google
business units, and a $10 billion opportunity. TX 431 at 3.
Google argues that it only profits indirectly from
Android because it distributes the software free of charge.
See ECF No. 1092 at 8. This does not matter. Google's use is
clearly commercial. "The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction
is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but
whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the
copyrighted material without paying the customary price." Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562
(1985). The first factor weighs strongly against fair use.
b. Google's Use Is Not Transformative
"A use is considered transformative only where a defendant
changes a plaintiff's copyrighted work or uses the plaintiff's
copyrighted work in a different context such that the plaintiff's
work is transformed into a new creation." Wall Data Inc. v. L.A.
Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 778 (9th Cir. 2006). "In
cases where 'use is for the same intrinsic purpose as [the
copyright holder's] ... such use seriously weakens a claimed fair
use.'" Id. (quoting Worldwide
Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227
F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000)). The Supreme Court explains: "The
enquiry here may be guided by the examples given in the preamble to
§ 107, looking to whether the use is for criticism, or
comment, or news reporting, and the like, see § 107."
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79
(1994) (citations omitted).
In Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ'g, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the defendant's claim that its karaoke machine was
transformative, noting, "It is reasonable to infer that Leadsinger
does not add to or alter the copyrighted lyrics, which would
undermine the device's ability to enable consumers to sing along
with the recorded music." 512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir. 2008). Ninth
Circuit cases following Campbell have found transformative
use where the accused infringer's work "served an entirely
different function" from the original. See Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003). This is
not the case here. Oracle objected to giving the jury an
instruction on transformative use. See, e.g., ECF No. 1005
Unlike the parody in Campbell, Google's use of the copied
materials in Android is nothing like "the examples given in the
preamble to § 107." See 17 U.S.C. § 107. Google's
purpose for the Java APIs was the same as Oracle's: to attract
developers by providing them with pre-written libraries of reusable
code. See RT 584:10-585:5 (Reinhold); RT 1783:15-22
(Bornstein) ("The goal of the project was to provide something that
was familiar to developers"). Google's argument that it
"transformed" Java by creating the first full smartphone stack to
use the Java APIs is simply false. Oracle licenses the Java APIs in
its Java ME products for exactly this purpose. Smartphones
including the RIM Blackberry, the Danger Sidekick/Hiptop, and the
Nokia Series 60 incorporate Oracle's licensed technology. RT
959:20-23 (Swetland); 1585:21-23 (Rubin); 300:18-19 (Ellison);
383:6-9 (Kurian); 1102:3-10 (Cizek); 1922:22-25 (Gering).
The difference between Android and these other platforms is not
expressive transformation but business strategy. If Google's
position were accepted, the idea of "transformation" would severely
undermine copyright protection: anyone claiming to have a better
business model for distributing the copyrighted work would be able
to claim "fair use." That Google licenses Android under the Apache
"open source" license while Oracle licenses Java both commercially
and under a different open source license — the GPL —
2. The Copyrighted Work Is Creative In Nature
Copyright law specifically protects computer programs. 17 U.S.C.
§ 101. The Ninth Circuit has held that while "software
products are not purely creative works, copyright law nonetheless
protects computer software." Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 780. In
that case, the court found the "nature of the work" factor weighed
against fair use where the software products "were developed over
several years, and required a multi-million dollar investment ..."
Id. Oracle presented undisputed evidence of both at trial.
See, e.g., RT 687:21-688:24 (Reinhold).
Moreover, witnesses from both sides testified that designing
APIs was a creative endeavor. See, e.g., RT 513:12-18;
513:21-514:12; 515:14-23 (Screven); 627:21-628:1 (Reinhold);
741:9-742:3; 747:5-9; 748:7-13; 752:5-14; 831:17-832:4 (Bloch);
1220:6-12; 1238:11-1239:12; 1240:16-20 (Mitchell); 1775:3-16
(Bornstein); RT 2209:7-8 (Astrachan); TX 1090 (Astrachan Dep.).
This factor also weighs against fair use.
3. Google Uses Valuable, Core Portions of the Copyrighted
In analyzing the third factor, courts look at the quantitative
and qualitative significance of the material taken in relation to
the plaintiff's work. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65
(1985) (finding infringement based on copying of 300 words of
Gerald Ford's memoirs).
Google engineers testified they selectively copied what they
thought were the best APIs for a mobile platform, the "good stuff"
from Java. See RT 1782:6-1785:4 (Bornstein); RT
981:22-982:21 (Lee); TX 1067 (Lee Dep.). But unlike Harper &
Row, Google copied thousands of elements from the 37 API packages
and their entire SSO. RT 1248:11-1249:25 (Mitchell); RT
2191:9-2192:3 (Astrachan). Google's expert agreed these
declarations would "replicate every structural and organizational
element" of the 37 packages in suit. RT 2191:17-20 (Astrachan).
Google copied not just the heart of Oracle's work, but its spine
and much of its skeletal structure.
Google's argument that it copied only what was necessary for
compatibility is legally and factually incorrect. When an intended
use is commercial, courts give little weight to the claim that a
defendant only copied what was necessary for its intended use. In
Elvis Presley, the Ninth Circuit found no fair use for
television performance excerpts in an Elvis biography, despite
acknowledging that "[i]t would be impossible to produce a biography
of Elvis without showing
some of his most famous television appearances for reference
purposes." 349 F.3d at 629. That Google added its own
implementation of the method bodies is no excuse. "[N]o plagiarist
can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not
pirate." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565 (quoting
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d
4. Google's Use Harms The Potential Market For And Value Of
The Copyrighted Work
Courts balance the first and the fourth fair use factors. "[I]f
the purpose of the new work is commercial in nature, 'the
likelihood [of market harm] may be presumed.'" Elvis
Presley, 349 F.3d at 631 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001)). In
assessing this factor, it is necessary to "consider not only the
extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the
alleged infringer, but also 'whether unrestricted and widespread
conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant ... would result in
a substantially adverse impact on the potential market' for the
original." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. Courts look not at
harm to the market for potential derivative works as well.
See id. at 592-93.
Android's infringement has substantially harmed the actual and
potential market for Oracle's Java mobile products. There are
750,000 Android-compatible device activations each day, and each of
those devices contains the 37 API packages from Java. RT 1017:4-16
(Morrill). Android phones compete directly with Java smart phones
(such as the RIM Blackberry). RT 1922:22-25 (Gering); see
also RT 2062:5-12 (McNealy). Furthermore, Google has fragmented
Java and undercut its "write once, run anywhere" promise. TX 172
(email from Bornstein to Rubin describing Android as a "fork" of
Java); RT 2287:13-2288:5 (Mitchell); see also RT 984:22-24;
981:19-21 (Lee); 1010:1-7 (Morrill) (Android is not Java
compatible). Android is diverting licensing revenue to which Oracle
is entitled for its Java mobile products. This factor also weighs
strongly against fair use.
E. Judgment Should Be Granted In Oracle's Favor On Issues
That Were Not
Presented To The Jury
1. Oracle Is Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of Law On
The issue of copyrightability of the 37 API packages was
determined by the Court, not the
jury. Accordingly, no motion for JMOL is required. See
Fed R. Civ. P. 50(a)-(b); Granite State Ins. Co. v. Smart
Modular Techs., Inc., 76 F.3d 1023, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Rule 52 governed equitable estoppel claim tried to court because
"Rule 50(a) applies only to issues tried by a jury"); 9 James W.
Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 50.05 (3d
ed. 2012). Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, Oracle
requests JMOL on copyrightability here. Oracle incorporates by
reference its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on
copyrightability, and its response to Google's proposed findings.
See ECF No. 1049 ¶¶ 1-57, 142-165; ECF No. 1081 at
1-16, 37-55. Oracle also incorporates by reference the prior
briefing on copyrightability. This includes ECF Nos. 339, 611, 780,
824, 833, 853, 859, 900, 956, 986, 1118, 1138, 1191 and 1197.
The evidence presented at trial on copyrightability was
overwhelming. As noted in section I.D.2 above, fact and expert
witnesses from both sides testified that designing APIs is a
creative and challenging task. Nobody testified to the
The API packages themselves are expressed in a detailed and
complex structure, with many hierarchies and interdependencies.
These were illustrated in part in TX 1028, the Java API package
poster used by developers when programming for J2SE version 5.0.
This poster reflects only the high level class and interface
relationships for some of the API packages in version 5.0. RT
599:15-600:3 (Reinhold). The types of relationships shown at trial
included the following: (1) classes can have one or more
subclasses, each of which inherits the methods and fields of the
classes above it in the hierarchy (RT 1225:10-16 (Mitchell)); (2)
interfaces are used to relate different classes that share common
characteristics (RT 589:13-17, 590:5-23, 601:22-25 (Reinhold)); (3)
methods can contain parameters that are defined in other classes
located within, or outside, the package in which the method is
found (RT 1239:24-1240:8 (Mitchell)); (4) classes and subclasses
can be contained within the hierarchy of one package but defined in
another (RT 601:14-24 (Reinhold)); (5) interfaces are often
arranged hierarchically in a manner similar to classes (RT
The detailed expression of this structure cannot possibly be
just an idea, as Google has sometimes claimed. Nor is it driven or
constrained by function. Very little structure is required for the
APIs to operate with the virtual machine or computer. If function
were the only concern,
all of the classes could have been placed in a one giant
package. RT 619:13-23 (Reinhold). A primary purpose of the
structure, sequence and organization of the APIs is to make them
easy to learn and easy for developers to use. RT 619:24-620:6
(Reinhold); RT 741:2-742:2 (Bloch); TX 624 at 4. Aesthetics matter.
RT 752:5-14 (Bloch).
The many creative choices exercised by API designers extend not
just to the selection and structure of classes and methods to carry
out a given API, but also to the decision whether to include a
particular API package in the library in the first place. There is
no requirement that any particular API be included, or that any
specific method or class be included within that API. The Java API
packages have grown dramatically, from the seven API packages that
were included in the first release, to the 166 packages included
with version 5.0, to 209 packages included with version 7.0. RT
631:19-25 (Reinhold). The individual API packages themselves have
also significantly expanded over time. See, e.g., RT
1243:13-1244:16 (Mitchell) (growth of java.util). Compare TX
2564 at 615 with TX 610.2 (showing java.util had only 10
classes and 113 methods in 1996 compared to 49 classes and 762
methods in version 5.0). Dr. Reinhold testified that Sun and Oracle
did not have to create so many Java API packages, but did so "in
order to - to encourage the adoption of the Java platform by adding
more and more facilities to make it an attractive platform for
developers to use." Id. at RT 632:1-6 (Reinhold). Other
software platforms, like C, have much less extensive APIs.
See id. at RT 632:7-20 (Reinhold).
The Court should also grant JMOL for Oracle on the
copyrightability of the selection and arrangement of the names in
the 37 Java APIs. Both parties testified that API designers
thoughtfully selected thousands of names for aesthetic purposes and
consistency. RT 628:2-21 (Reinhold); TX 624 (Bloch presentation) at
17 ("Code should read like prose."); RT 746:20-748:13 (Bloch). The
names are organized within the same complex and creative structure
as the API elements they label. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Seattle
Lighting Fixture Co., 345 F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2003)
(combination of unprotectable elements is eligible for copyright
protection "if those elements are numerous enough and their
selection and arrangement original enough that their combination
constitutes an original work of authorship."). Many cases have held
the selection and arrangement of individually unprotectable
elements within a software program,
including names, can be copyrightable. See, e.g., Merch.
Transaction Sys., Inc. v. Nelcela, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25663, at *58 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2009); see also Health Grades,
Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1238 (D. Colo. 2009) (declining to find short phrase that was
original expression uncopyrightable).
Google did not establish at trial that the doctrines of merger
and scenes a faire apply to bar copyrightability of APIs.
The Court warned Google on summary judgment that it would have to
present evidence as to each specific element of the APIs it
contended was unprotectable. ECF No. 433 at 9. Google did not
present sufficient evidence at trial to establish any particular
method declaration was a scene a faire or was the only
possible way to express a given function.
Nor could it have. It is apparent, given the complexity of the
structure and the many possibilities for selection, that there are
countless ways to design and express the Java API packages, so the
doctrine of merger does not apply. See Satava v. Lowry, 323
F.3d 805, 812 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Under the merger doctrine,
courts will not protect a copyrighted work from infringement if the
idea underlying the copyrighted work can be expressed in only one
way, lest there be a monopoly on the underlying idea"). Dr.
Reinhold testified that "In anything except the most trivial API
design, there are so many choices to be made I wouldn't even know
how to start counting them." RT 627:21-628:1 (Reinhold); see
also id. at 2228:2-16 (discussing complexity of java.nio
design). Professor Mitchell agreed, emphasizing that API design
starts with a "clean slate." RT 1240:9-20. It took almost two years
to design the APIs for java.nio and its related sub-packages, and
the specification went through over 30 separate drafts. RT
623:17-626:13, 627:21-629:6 (Reinhold). No Google witness disputed
any of these points.
Google also did not put on any evidence at trial sufficient to
establish scenes a faire. "Under the scenes a faire
doctrine, when certain commonplace expressions are indispensable
and naturally associated with the treatment of a given idea, those
expressions are treated like ideas and therefore not protected by
copyright." Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 850 (9th Cir.
2004). The evidence showed APIs solving the same kinds of problems
can be designed very differently. Dr. Reinhold gave the example of
the java.util.logging API package, contrasting it with a competing
open source Java logging API called Log4J. RT 630:11-631:18
Mitchell discussed how data collections are handled in different
ways in APIs in Java, C++ and Smalltalk, and how even within Java,
the design of the Java.util package has changed significantly over
time. RT 1240:23-1244:16 (Mitchell).
It is undisputed that Google could have written its own
different APIs to provide the functionality of the Java APIs. RT
2213:8-10 (Astrachan). This is proven by the fact that Google did
write many of its own APIs when it wanted to. RT 2213:17-19
(Astrachan). Even at the individual method level, Google could have
used different method names, different parameter names, a different
parameter sequence, or thrown exceptions in a different order or
not at all and still accomplished the same task. See, e.g.,
RT 1249:2-12 (Mitchell); ECF No. 1191 at 2-3; ECF No. 1118 at
12-13; TX 984 at 302-04. But this case was never about any one
individual method or group of methods. It was about Google's nearly
identical copying of the selection, sequence, structure and
organization of thousands of methods and other API elements. Even
if Google were correct that the declaration of an individual method
is uncopyrightable, Google selected and implemented thousands of
Oracle's declarations in the same SSO in which Oracle wrote them.
"[A] claim of copyright infringement can be based on infringement
of a combination of unprotected elements." Dream Games, 561
F.3d at 988. In addition, even if Google could prove merger, it
would still be liable for its "nearly identical copying." Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir.
Google also contended at trial that the 37 API packages are
simply a "functional requirement for compatibility." This is not
the correct legal standard. Google relies on Sega and
Sony, both of which are reverse engineering fair use cases
with clearly distinguishable facts.
Google has also not shown the Java APIs are merely "functional
requirements." All computer programs are functional, as is the
source code that expresses them. Claiming something is functional,
without more, says nothing. The Ninth Circuit did not conduct a
detailed analysis of this issue in Sega because the question of
infringement in the final product was reserved by Sega and left for
remand. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993). But the decision shows that in
determining whether an element of a computer program is a mere
functional requirement the court will look to the level of creative
That is what the court used to distinguish the S-E-G-A 20 byte
initialization code from the "original program" in Atari
v. Nintendo, 975 F.2d 832, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Sega,
977 F.2d at 1524 n.7 (emphasis in original). As discussed above,
the API package designs are highly expressive, not merely
functional, and their design is important to developer
Similarly, in Sony, the Ninth Circuit and district court
opinions both emphasize that Sony did not accuse the final product
of infringement. See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm't Inc. v.
Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1217 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
("Sony I") ("Sony's copyright infringement claim is based on a
theory of intermediate infringement.") (emphasis added);
Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596,
904 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Sony II") ("nor does Sony contend that
Connectix's final product contains infringing material"). As a
result, neither decision analyzes what was copied in the final
product at all, and there is no indication in the opinions that
what was copied contained creative expression or was similar to the
Google also uses the term "compatibility" very differently from
the Ninth Circuit in Sega. The API packages are not like a
hardware interface that Google had to adopt if it wanted to use the
Java programming language. As noted above, Google designed many of
its own API packages, and the experts agreed that Google could have
designed its own corresponding 37 API packages if it wanted to.
Only about 60 classes must be present in the APIs for the Java
language to function, and for most of these there is no requirement
that the class contain any particular method or methods — the
language simply expects that a class by that name will exist. RT
684:16-685:2 (Reinhold); RT 2196:1-4 (Astrachan); TX 1062; TX 984.
Google copied far more. It also copied far more than would have
been required for compatibility with the APIs, copying, for
example, thousands of parameter names and throws clauses.
See RT 1248:11-1249:12 (Mitchell); ECF No. 1191 at 3.
Moreover, the evidence showed Android is not compatible with
Java. See, e.g., RT 1007:6-11 (Morrill) (Android not
compatible); TX 383 at 8 (Android FAQs); RT 1331:16-1332:2
(Mitchell); RT 2221:11-2222:3 (Astrachan) (entry point must be
changed); RT 2287:9-22 (Mitchell) (bytecode); ECF No. 1118 at 18-19
(listing example categories of Java applications that will not run
on Android). Dan Bornstein testified that achieving compatibility
was not even a
goal for Google. RT 1783:15-22. And Google presented no evidence
that copying the 37 API packages allowed the meaningful re-use of
any significant amount of pre-existing code. By implementing a
partial version of Java, Google harmed compatibility, not furthered
Lastly, Google did not present sufficient evidence to show the
APIs are a "method of operation" or "system" under section 102(b).
The sweeping approach that "methods of operation" are
uncopyrightable taken by the First Circuit in Lotus v.
Borland has never been adopted by any other circuit. The Tenth
Circuit expressly declined to follow Lotus. Mitel, Inc.
v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1372 (10th Cir. 1997). In
determining whether the nonliteral components of a program are
protectable, the Ninth Circuit looks at "whether, on the particular
facts of each case, the component in question qualifies an the
expression of an idea, or an idea itself." Johnson Controls,
886 F.2d at 1175.
Lotus also incorrectly defines "method of operation" as
"a means by which a person operates something." This is very close
to the definition of computer program under the Copyright Act,
which is "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly
or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result." 17 U.S.C. § 101. It threatens to swallow the rule
whole. The Java APIs also do not fit the Lotus definition of
"method of operation" because they are not "a means by which a
person operates something." The Lotus court viewed the Lotus
1-2-3 menu command hierarchy as a "method of operation" because the
commands were the actual keystrokes that a person would type to use
the Lotus 1-2-3 program. Lotus Dev. Corp v. Borland Int'l,
Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 809 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an evenly
divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); see id. at 815.
Those are not the facts here. On a computer or an Android phone,
there is no key or touchscreen menu labeled
"HandshakeCompletedEvent," or "getCipherSuite()," or anything
corresponding to the thousands of other Java API elements.
Google also never proved the APIs are a "system." It never even
defined what it meant by "system" at trial. But even if the APIs
could be labeled a system at a higher level of abstraction, their
particular expression is still protected by copyright. Toro Co.
v. R&R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986)
(expression of parts numbering system copyrightable if
2. Google Created An Infringing Derivative Work
The Android source code for the 37 API packages was derived from
Oracle's copyrighted API specifications. Former Android engineer
Bob Lee admitted Google consulted the Java API specifications when
developing Android. RT 982:25-983:3 (Lee); see also RT
981:7-21 (Lee). Google's outside contractor, Noser, was hired to
implement core libraries based on the Java API specifications. RT
985:3-6 (Lee). Dan Bornstein confirmed his team used the Java
specifications to derive information for implementing the APIs in
Android. RT 1836:19-1837:2 (Bornstein).
A "derivative work" is defined as "a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation ... or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101. Ninth Circuit law supports Oracle's derivative works
claim. See, e.g., Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107,
1112 (9th Cir. 1998) (seller of new levels for video game infringed
by copying "story" of plaintiff's video game even though it did not
copy computer art files); see also Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v.
Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1373-74 (2d Cir. 1993)
(detailed recounting of plot elements of television series was
The Java API specifications are the detailed description of the
class libraries. They are like a detailed plot outline, and are
just as protectable. See Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 55-56 ("The
play is the sequence of the confluents of all these means, bound
together in an inseparable unity; it may often be most
effectively pirated by leaving out the speech, for which a
substitute can be found, which keeps the whole dramatic
meaning.") (emphasis added); see also Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1983)
(reversing decision as to whether plots of Star Wars and Battlestar
Galactica were sufficiently similar to support infringement claim).
Courts have applied the reasoning in Sheldon to cases
involving computer programs. See, e.g., eScholar, LLC v. Otis
Educ. Sys., Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40727, at *25 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 3, 2005) (comparing copyright protection of structure of
computer program to plot elements in Sheldon). Micro
Star applied a similar analysis. 154 F.3d at 1112. Likewise, in
SAS Inst., Inc. v. S&H Computer Sys., Inc., the court
held defendant created an infringing derivative work that was
"based on" the SAS software by copying its structure even though
there were relatively few examples of line-by-line copying,
emphasizing that: "to the
extent that it represents copying of the organization and
structural details of SAS, such copying pervades the entire S&H
product." 605 F. Supp. 816, 830 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (emphasis
The reasoning of these cases applies equally to Google's copying
here. But Google's copying was much more extensive. Google expert
Owen Astrachan conceded that the Android source code was "based on
the specification" (RT 2219:7-18 (Astrachan)), and that the copied
method declarations in Android are like the "sub-sub-sub-chapter
headings" in the SSO. Id. at 2215:2-5; see also RT
1253:16-18 (Mitchell) ("[T]he narrative is reflected in the source
code because the source code is a program that in a sense carries
out that narrative, does what the explanation requires for this
method."). As in SAS, Google's deliberate copying of the SSO
"pervades the entire" 37 Android API packages. SAS, 605 F.
Supp. at 830. Over Oracle's objection, the jury was not given an
instruction on the creation of a derivative work in the Android
code from the Java documentation. See RT 2434:2-2435:17
II. GOOGLE INFRINGED THE ASSERTED CLAIMS OF THE '104
A. Android's Resolve.c infringes claims 11, 39, 40, and 41 of
the '104 patent
because Dalvik bytecode instructions contain
The only dispute as to infringement by Android's Resolve.c is
whether Dalvik bytecode instructions contain "symbolic references."
RT 4106:21-22 (Jacobs); RT 4154:6-11 (Van Nest).
1. A field index is a symbolic reference that is contained in
a Dalvik bytecode instruction
A field index in a Dalvik bytecode instruction meets the Court's
definition of "symbolic reference." The Court construed the term
"symbolic reference" as "a reference that identifies data by a name
other than the numeric memory location of the data, and that is
resolved dynamically rather than statically." ECF No. 137 at
A field index — also called field@CCCC generally or "01"
in specific examples of field indices in the trial testimony
— is a reference to data to be obtained in accordance with a
corresponding numerical reference, and identifies that data by a
name other than the numeric memory location of the data. RT
3228:14-3229:25 (McFadden); RT 3303:2-3304:20 (Mitchell). In order
to obtain data from the data object containing the value of the
field, the Dalvik VM uses the resolver functions of Resolve.c to
resolve the field index to a numeric memory location that is
then used to obtain the value. RT 3646:24-3647:25 (McFadden); RT
3308:18-3309:24 (Mitchell). The Dalvik VM resolves type indices,
method indices, and string indices in much the same way as field
indices, and these indices are symbolic references for the same
reason. See RT 3239:17-21 (McFadden); 3310:4-3311:1
(Mitchell); TX 736 at 2.
The Dalvik bytecode instruction that was the focus of both
parties' evidence and argument is the IGET instruction, which
corresponds to the "LOAD 'y'" instruction in the '104 patent. RT
3297:10-3302:2 (Mitchell); RT 3956:2-3961:6 (August). The IGET
instruction (together with the IPUT instruction) "[performs] the
identified object instance field operation with the identified
field, loading or storing into the value register." TX 735 at 6
(emphasis added). The IGET instruction contains three operands
— vA, vB, and field@CCCC — where the third operand
field@CCCC is the field index. TX 735 at 6; RT 3221:8-10
(McFadden). The field index in the IGET instruction identifies the
field from which the data is to be obtained by IGET. Mr. McFadden
Q. Can you explain what the iget instruction is?
RT 3221:2-7 (McFadden); see also RT 3968:10-15 (August).
Thus even Google's witness's testimony established that the "data"
that the IGET instruction specifies and retrieves is data from the
instance of an object.
A. That is the instance field get instruction. What that means
is there is an object somewhere and you need to get a piece of data
out of it. The data is stored in fields. So what this instruction
does is it finds the instance of the object and retrieves the data
from the specified field.
Every Google witness confirmed the field index contained in
Dalvik's IGET instruction is not the numeric memory location of the
value of the data from the instance of an object. Messrs. McFadden
and Bornstein testified it was not. RT 3614:22-3615:16 (Bornstein);
3761:19-3762:6 (McFadden). Google's expert Dr. August likewise
testified likewise. RT 3970:20-3971:3 (August). Indeed, "the Dalvik
IGET instruction never contains the numerical memory
location of the actual field data that it is supposed to get." RT
3761:14-18 (McFadden) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, no reasonable jury could conclude that the field
index in a Dalvik IGET instruction is not a symbolic reference to
the "actual field data that it is supposed to get." Under
the Court's construction, for the field index in the IGET
instruction to be a symbolic reference, it is enough that it
identifies — "specifies," in Mr. McFadden's words —
data to be obtained, by something other than the data's
2. According to the '104 patent, the "data" that the claimed
references refer to are actual data in a data
That data from an instance object is the "data" that the claimed
symbolic reference refers to, and not some other data, follows from
the claim language of the '104 patent, because that is the data
that is "obtained" or "thereafter used" in the asserted claims. RT
3311:23-3312:19 (Mitchell); RT 3759:12-3760:23 (McFadden); RT
3954:12-18 (August); 3958:1-3959:4 (August); TX 4015, 7:12-13,
12:16-18, 12:30-31, 12:44-45. Actual data in a data object is what
is identified by an exemplary symbolic reference ("y") in the
specification. TX 4015, 1:65-67 ("[A]n instruction that accesses
or fetches y, such as the Load instruction 14' illustrated in
FIG. 1, references the variable y by the symbolic name 'y'.")
(emphasis added); Fig. 1B (illustrating "data object" containing
actual values 23 and 17). The experts agreed the purpose of the
LOAD instruction described in the patent is to obtain the value
from the data object. RT 3298:20-24 (Mitchell); RT 3960:25-3961:6
(August). The symbolic reference is to the data obtained,
not some other information, such as information used to resolve the
symbolic reference (which is not even illustrated in the
Under the Court's claim construction, a symbolic reference
"identifies data." In Android, actual field data in an instance
object is "data," as Google's expert testified. RT 4002:5-16
(August). The actual field data in an instance object is "data" in
the Court's claim construction, and the field index is the symbolic
reference that identifies that data, by a name other than the
numeric memory location of the data. Thus the jury's verdict was
3. Conversion of instruction stream indices to numeric memory
locations confirms that the indices are symbolic references
That JMOL of infringement should be granted is confirmed by the
fact that Dalvik's field indices are resolved to numeric
references. If they were numeric references and not symbolic
references, there would be no need to convert them to numeric
references. But the indices are resolved. Google engineer McFadden,
who wrote the Dalvik source code at issue, confirmed this
at trial. RT 3236:6-11 (McFadden). Mr. McFadden's source code
comments also establish that the Dalvik resolving functions convert
an index contained in the instruction stream into a pointer:
When a class, method, field, or string constant is referred to
from Dalvik bytecode, the reference takes the form of an integer
index value. This value indexes into an array of type_id_item,
method_id_item, field_id_item, or string_id_item in the DEX file.
The first three themselves contain (directly or indirectly) indexes
to strings that the resolver uses to convert the instruction
stream index into a pointer to the appropriate object or
TX 46.14 at 1 (emphases added). Mr. McFadden confirmed this was
an accurate description, and that if the instruction stream index
were the numeric memory location, it would already be a pointer and
there would be no need to convert it. RT 3234:22-3235:13,
B. Android dexopt infringes claims 27 and 29 of the '104
Oracle is also entitled to JMOL on infringement of '104 patent
claims 27 and 29 by Android's dexopt. Google's engineers testified
that dexopt resolves symbolic references into numerical references.
See, e.g., RT 3769:8-12 (McFadden). There were only two
disputed issues regarding infringement: whether Dalvik dexopt
bytecode instructions contain symbolic references and whether
dexopt resolves symbolic references dynamically rather than
statically. See, e.g., RT 3841:2-19 (August). The first
issue is the same as that with respect to Android's Resolve.c and
should be resolved in Oracle's favor as discussed above. With
respect to the second issue, the evidence at trial showed that
dexopt resolves symbolic references dynamically, not
Mr. McFadden admitted that the resolution process depends on the
conditions actually existing on the handset. RT 3769:13-17
(McFadden); see also RT 3255:20-25 (McFadden) (admitting
need to run dexopt when performing system update because memory
layout could change). Dr. Mitchell agreed. RT 3330:24-3331:21
(discussing McFadden testimony). That is sufficient under the
ordinary meaning of "dynamic."
Undisputed testimony established that dexopt is performed with a
running Dalvik virtual machine. RT 3580:21-23 (Bornstein). When
asked whether "dexopt process[es] the dex files when the Dalvik
Virtual machine is running," Google expert David August responded,
"Sometimes." RT 3988:14-3989:23 (August). That dexopt runs at
"runtime" is another sufficient, although not necessary, basis on
which to show dynamic reference resolution. Dexopt
must process dex files while the Dalvik Virtual Machine is
running because it needs information only available at runtime, as
Google's internal documentation confirmed. TX 105 at 2-3.
Responding to a customer question asking why dexopt had to run at
runtime rather than compile time, a Google engineer said it was
"normal behavior" and quoted from that documentation to provide an
explanation as to "why some of these optimizations can only be
performed at runtime." TX 1094.
The ordinary meaning of "dynamic" does not require "at runtime."
Mr. McFadden admitted that dexopt is dynamic if "dynamic" means
"depending on conditions on the handset which can change from time
to time." See, e.g., RT 3769:23-3770:1 (McFadden). But even
if "dynamic" did require resolution "at runtime," no reasonable
jury could find that dexopt did not run at runtime. The Court
should grant JMOL in Oracle's favor.
III. GOOGLE INFRINGED THE ASSERTED CLAIMS OF THE '520
Oracle proved Google's dx tool infringes Claims 1 and 20 of the
As stated in the patent handouts, Google concedes all steps of
Claims 1 and 20 are performed except the "simulating execution"
step. TX 1106 at 7-8. But the indisputable evidence is that
"simulating execution" is performed by the dx tool; indeed
the author of the dx tool expressly described it as such in
the source code comments. RT 3547:20-21 (Bornstein); TX 46.16 at
line 37 ("Class which knows how to simulate the effects of
Google's code also demonstrates that the dx tool performs these
"simulating execution" steps. A code file called "Simulator.java"
within the dx tool simulates execution of Java bytecodes to convert
them to Dalvik bytecodes. The engineer comments in the code state
that Simulator.java is a class designed to "simulate the effects of
executing bytecode." TX 46.16 at lines 37-43, 86-105. The file
calls upon the parseInstruction and parseNewarray methods to assist
with understanding the instructions. TX 46.16 at line 99; TX 46.17
at lines 211, 887; see also RT 3341:17-3344:7 (Mitchell). As
a result of Simulator.java and the methods it invokes, the bytecode
instructions are examined without being executed, their static
initialization is determined, and a shorter "fast instruction" is
generated to replace the long list of bytecode instructions.
Id. This precisely matches the "simulating execution" step
of the asserted claims.
Google's expert, Dr. Parr, conceded the dx tool does "identify
the static initialization of the array" by examining the "bytecodes
of the clinit method against a memory" and "without executing the
bytecodes." RT 3793:2-5, 3807:10-14, 3820:12-22, 3821:16-23,
3822:17-3823:13 (Parr). With those concessions, he acknowledged the
sole remaining issue was whether the dx tool process for
identifying static initializations could be characterized as
To avoid the effect of these admissions, Google imported
additional, non-existent limitations into the claims. First, Dr.
Parr claimed the dx tool cannot be simulating execution of
bytecodes because it does not manipulate a stack to determine
static initializations of arrays. RT 3794:15-3795:21, 3801:19-21
(Parr). But as Dr. Parr conceded, the asserted claims do not
mention stack manipulation. TX 4011, 9:47-62, 12:3-7; RT 3794:20-23
(Parr); see also RT 4032:23-4033:8 (Mitchell). Nor was the
term "simulating execution" construed to require stack
manipulation. "Stack manipulation" is an express limitation of
dependent Claim 3, establishing that the limitation is not a
requirement of "simulating execution" in independent Claim 1.
Second, Dr. Parr argued that the dx tool identifies static
initializations through pattern matching, which he contends is
distinguishable from "simulating execution" of bytecodes. RT
3798:22-3799:3. But there is nothing in the claim language or
patent specification stating "simulating execution" cannot be
achieved through pattern matching. Indeed, because Android's
pattern matching determines the effect of executing the static
initialization bytecodes without actually executing them, no
reasonable jury could find the dx tool did not simulate
The Court denied Oracle's Rule 50(a) motion for JMOL, limiting
"simulate execution" to "manipulation of a stack by pushing,
popping, and replacing values from the top of an operand stack."
ECF No. 1201 at 10. In doing so, the Court limited the scope of
Claims 1 and 20 to a disclosed embodiment, in contravention of the
claim language. Under the ordinary meaning of "simulate execution,"
Oracle is entitled to JMOL.
IV. GOOGLE'S EQUITABLE DEFENSES FAIL
The Court has already granted judgment on Google's defenses of
waiver and implied license. ECF No. 1203. It should also grant
judgment as to equitable estoppel and laches.
Oracle incorporates by reference its proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law and
prior Rule 50(a) briefing on Google's equitable defenses.
See ECF No. 1049 at 11-26, 30-35; ECF No. 1081 at 16-37,
A. Google Has Not Met Its Burden Of Proving Equitable
Google failed to prove any of the elements of equitable
estoppel. In particular, Google has no credible claim that it
relied on Sun/Oracle's conduct to its detriment or that its
reliance was reasonable. The jury so advised in its Phase I ruling.
ECF No. 1089 ¶ 4.B. Overwhelming evidence at trial showed
Google was aware that Sun had copyrighted its Java source code and
API specifications and had patents that covered its virtual machine
technology and that it faced potential legal action by Sun in
connection with Android. See, e.g., RT 695:11-697:19
(Reinhold); RT 756:9-18 (Bloch); RT 951:8-953:9 (Swetland); RT
983:4-15 (Lee); RT 1541:3-7 (Schmidt); RT 1356:6-19, 1689:19-25,
3204:6-3205:3 (Rubin); RT 2993:4-24 (Lindholm); TX 18; TX 25 at
389; TX 149; TX 273; TX 405; TX 610.1 at 1; TX 610.2; TX 980 at 6;
TX 1029; TX 1051 at 1; TX 2347; ECF No. 1049 ¶¶ 62-65,
130, 132; ECF No. 1081 ¶ 66. Google decided on its Android
development path and implemented its infringing technology
regardless of any Sun or Oracle statements, actions, or inactions,
and Google has never proven otherwise. TX 1029; ECF No. 1049
¶¶ 62-65, 96, 98, 114, 117. JMOL against Google is
B. Google Has Not Shown Laches Bars Oracle's Infringement
Google has not produced evidence to support a laches defense. To
prove laches, Google must show that (1) Oracle/Sun unreasonably
delayed filing the lawsuit; (2) the delay was inexcusable, and (3)
Google suffered material prejudice due to Oracle/Sun's delay.
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 952-57 (9th Cir.
2001). Oracle sued Google on August 12, 2010, less than two years
after Google first made its Android source code available to the
public (in October 2008) and less than three years after Google
first released the Android APIs (in November 2007). RT 1041:14-16
(Morrill); RT 1546:14-16 (Schmidt); RT 1702:22-1704:9 (Rubin); RT
1719:10-18 (Rubin). As a result, there is no presumption of laches,
and "the burden is upon the defendant to show that the delay was
unexcused and that the defendant suffered injury as a result of the
delay." Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best Seam,
Inc., 694 F.2d 570, 580 (9th Cir. 1982); A.C. Aukerman Co.
v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1038 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (en banc). In 2008 and 2009, Sun engaged in
licensing discussions with Google, making any delay reasonable and
excusable. See, e.g., RT 1071:23-1073:18 (Cizek); TX 1002;
TX 1029; In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent
Litig., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2010);
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033. Google also made no showing of
Furthermore, laches is not available in a case of willful
infringement. See id. at 1032.
V. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT JMOL ON GOOGLE'S ALTERNATIVE
DEFENSES TO PATENT INFRINGEMENT
Oracle moved for JMOL as to Google's Sixth (patent misuse),
Eighth (use by the U.S.) and Nineteenth (unclean hands) defenses,
as well as Google's defense of express license. ECF No. 1168 at 24.
Google never presented these defenses at trial and did not oppose
the motion. ECF No. 1169 at 18-19. Accordingly, the Court should
grant JMOL in Oracle's favor.
VI. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ORACLE IS ENTITLED TO A NEW
In the alternative, if the Court declines Oracle's request for
JMOL, Oracle requests a new trial on the issues of: (i) Google's
copying of comments; (ii) Google's copying from Java documentation
into Android documentation; (iii) Google's creation of an
unauthorized derivative work; (iv) copyrightability of the 37 Java
API packages; and (v) Google's infringement of the '104 and '520
patents. In addition, because the jury did not reach a verdict on
fair use, Oracle is entitled to a new trial on that issue if the
Court's copyrightability order is reversed.
Following a jury trial, a court may grant a new trial "for any
reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an
action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A).
"Historically recognized grounds include, but are not limited to,
claims 'that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence,
that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the
trial was not fair to the party moving.'" Molski v. M.J. Cable,
Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
"[E]rroneous jury instructions, as well as the failure to give
adequate instructions, are also bases for a new trial." Murphy
v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1990). The
cumulative prejudice from multiple errors may warrant a new trial.
See, e.g., United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1282
(9th Cir. 1993). A new trial may be held on issues not tried to the
jury if it could be obtained under similar circumstances in a jury
12 James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice §
59.13[a] (3d ed. 2012).
Oracle is entitled to a new trial for all the same reasons it is
entitled to JMOL. These reasons are described in detail above and
are incorporated by reference here. For the jury issues these
include, but are not limited to: (1) the jury's finding of
non-infringement on copied comments, documentation and the '104 and
'520 patents is against the clear weight of the evidence; (2) the
Court erroneously instructed the jury (a) to compare only the
English language descriptions of the Java and Android
specifications, and (b) to apply a virtual identity standard; (3)
the Court erred in not submitting to the jury the issue of Google's
creation of a derivative work from the Java documentation.
Oracle is also entitled to a new trial as to infringement of the
'104 patent based on the Court's failure to give a curative
instruction and its erroneous response to the juror's question on
May 22 at 10:35 a.m. In that response the Court stated, among other
things, that the reference "is either going to be a numeric
reference or it's going to be a symbolic reference" but "can't be
both." See RT 4352:8-4354:8; ECF No. 1189. Neither the '104
patent nor the Court's claim construction order contain such a
limitation. The jury returned its verdict shortly thereafter.
Oracle is entitled to a new trial on the Court's
copyrightability order on the grounds that it would cause manifest
injustice and contains manifest errors of law and fact. These
errors include, but are not limited to: (1) the finding that to
carry out a given function method declarations must be identical;
(2) the conclusion that a method specification is an idea and its
implementation is expression; (3) the conclusion that the Java APIs
are an uncopyrightable method of operation or system; (4) the
finding that a user must make use of Oracle's java.lang, java.io
and java.util packages to make worthwhile use of the language; (5)
the finding that Google replicated what was necessary to achieve a
degree of interoperability, but no more.
Oracle reserves all other grounds as to which a new trial may be
granted on appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, Oracle is entitled to judgment in its
favor as set forth above. In the alternative, the Court should
grant Oracle's motion for a new trial.
Dated: June 20, 2012
MICHAEL A. JACOBS
MARC DAVID PETERS
DANIEL P. MUINO
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
By: /s/ Michael A. Jacobs
Michael A. Jacobs
Attorneys for Plaintiff ORACLE AMERICA, INC.
1 Oracle recognizes granting JMOL on some of the copyright issues
would require the Court to overturn all or part of its order on
copyrightability. Nonetheless, Oracle brings this motion to
preserve its rights on appeal, particularly since the Court
structured the trial to accommodate the possibility of the jury
verdict being reinstated on appeal. See ECF No. 1202 at 2.
Although not required to do so, Oracle also moves for JMOL on
copyrightability out of an abundance of caution. See Section