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What Really Happened to Project Monterey
Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 02:34 AM EDT

I promised you more AIX/Monterey/POWER research, and here it is. First, let's review. We've already established that a primary purpose of Project Monterey, at least from 2000, was to provide a stepping stone to Linux for ebusiness customers especially, and that IBM clearly stated this in promotional and technical materials, some of which SCO participated in publishing.

AIX 5L (the L standing of Linux affinity) was a stopgap operating system for those customers, so Unix users would stay with the operating system until Linux was fully ready for the enterprise. And we've learned that IBM began contributing to Linux at least as far back as 1998, and that it was public knowledge.

We also learned that it was always the plan that Project Monterey would be for POWER, not just for Intel. SCO wasn't involved in that end of the work, obviously, but many articles and press releases from the birth of the project onward established that this was the plan. And we also learned that SCO knew about IBM using SVR4 on POWER as far back as 2001, because it put up a glowing website talking about it.

So that raises an interesting question. If all the above is true, where is the monetary damage to SCO? For that matter, where is there copyright infringement? And it raises one final question: was SCO fully aware how quickly Linux would develop, that it would replace Unix, or did it take them by surprise? I have found the answer to that question.

In an article in August 2001 , in the Register, Caldera -- what SCO then called itself -- predicted:

"In two to five years Linux will surpass where Unix is now."

We knew oldSCO knew, when Project Monterey was going on, that Linux was the future and Project Monterey the stopgap, and now we find out Caldera had a clear picture too. But the date is significant. When Caldera's CEO made that prediction, and he was happy at the thought, it was after the August 2000 date SCO has marked in its 2nd Amended Complaint as being the date IBM began contributing to Linux in ways it now claims to take offense at. It's concurrent with or post all the dates in their complaint about IBM's behavior, except a January 2003 date. And it is after Caldera purchased oldSCO's Unix assets. In SCO's first amended complaint, they told this skewed story to the court:

77. As long as the Linux development process lacked central coordination, its direction was primarily aimed at meeting the computer needs of the Linux programmers themselves. As such, it posed little or no practical threat to SCO or to other UNIX vendors since the Linux developers did not have access to sophisticated high-end enterprise class mulitprocessor systems, nor they they have any particular interest in supporting such systems.

78. The entire direction of Linux development changed with IBM's entry into the open source community and its concerted efforts to control the community for its own economic benefit.

79. In furtherance of its plan to destroy its UNIX competitors, IBM has announced its intention to make Linux, distributed to end users without a fee, the successor to all existing UNIX operating systems used by Fortune 1000 companies and other large companies in the enterprise computing market.

What do you think? Did they present an honest and accurate picture to the court? Remember, this is their basis for damages claim, in the billions. In their dreams.

Anyway, as Richard Stallman pointed out way back when this all began, what IBM has contributed is useful, but not essential. And the kernel has always been centrally coordinated by Linus. That is still true, and IBM has no role at all in coordinating the Linux development process. They don't even get all the code they offer accepted. No company does. That's why from time to time, frustrated CEOs, like Computer Associates' executive the other day, put out annoyed remarks about the kernel not doing what they want it to do and how the kernel is "in danger" blah blah.

In their 2nd Amended Complaint, they reworded it like this, but the idea is the same:

The Functional Limitations of Linux Before IBMs Involvement

80. The first versions of Linux evolved through bits and pieces of various contributions by numerous software developers using single or dual processor computers. Unlike IBM, virtually none of these software developers and hobbyists had access to enterprise-scale equipment and testing facilities for Linux development. Without access to such equipment, facilities and knowledge of sophisticated development methods learned in many years of UNIX development it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Linux development community to create a grade of Linux adequate for enterprise use.

81. Also, unlike IBM, the original Linux developers did not have access to multiprocessor code or multi-processor development methods needed to achieve high-end enterprise functionality.

82. To make Linux of necessary quality for use by enterprise customers, it needed to be re-designed and upgraded to accommodate complex multi-processor functionality that had taken UNIX nearly 20 years to achieve. This rapid re-design was not feasible or even possible at the enterprise level without (a) a high degree of design coordination, (b) access to expensive and sophisticated design and testing equipment; (c) access to UNIX code and development methods; (d) UNIX architectural experience; and (e) a very significant financial investment. The contributions of IBM, which had access to UNIX System V Protected Materials and years of enterprise level experience, made possible this rapid redesign of Linux for enterprise use.

Nevertheless, Caldera's CEO Ransom Love said it would happen, way back in 2001, did he not? So was it impossible? Did he think so? There is a disjoint here. And that is phrasing it sweetly. So what we observers would like to know is, how many times does SCO get to file wild accusations, without proof, that don't match the reality they know perfectly well?

But the main point is, Caldera knew back in 2001 that Linux would replace Unix. Period. Not only that, they helped. Of course, back then Caldera's entire business plan was to merge Unix and Linux, and CEO Ransom Love even announced he would open source Unix some day, as you can verify in Caldera's 10Q of April 30, 2001 and their 8K of May 14, 2001. They wanted to merge the two, as Love explained back then, so they could "take Linux to 32-way systems. . . .On IA32 you can run smaller applications on Open Linux, or bigger back-office applicationss on OpenUnix, which on IA-64 you have OpenLinux and IBM's AIX 5L, which shares 70 percent common code with UnixWare. a lot of people are running their businesses on Unix, while Linux has a tremendous population on Web servers and other front-end servers. So we are taking both and combining them into one platform. . . . Our mission is to enable development, deployment and management of a unified Linux and Unix operating system." So Caldera wanted Linux on the high end, did it not, and was working to make it happen.

Earlier, though, what about Project Monterey? The stopgap? Why was it necessary? Here's how this April 1999 article on ITWeek described the reason for Project Monterey:

Only a few years ago Unix's original goal of providing a unified, non-proprietary operating system was lost in a sea of competing semi-proprietary versions of the platform.

In the last four years, however, the high cost of competing in the marketplace, the rise of Windows NT, and the reluctance of application developers to support more than a handful of Unix variants has forced a dramatic fall in the number of versions under active development.

Analysts expect survival to become even tougher for Unix players with the arrival of Windows 2000 this year, and Merced - the first 64-bit processor to Intel's IA-64 architecture - next year.

The goal became to offer a unified Unix, just one version, to counter the Windows threat. To make that possible, SCO, IBM and Sequent joined forces to publish a set of guidelines for developers to use so they could write for just one platform, so products would be able to run on any Intel Unix system without having to be rewritten or recompiled:

Compaq has also backed another initiative, recently launched by major Unix players, that could be as important as Monterey.

Leading Unix players - including IBM, SCO and Sequent - have agreed to develop and publish a set of guidelines for software developers and hardware manufacturers to make their products run on any Intel-based Unix system without having to be rewritten, or recompiled.

Compaq has joined Intel and HP in backing this standards effort, called the Unix Developers Guide, which is based on specifications drawn up by the Open Group's Unix98 initiative to standardise Unix features across different platforms.

While the Unix Developers Guide will not stop Unix players competing against each other, it will help them to fight a common foe - the one based in Seattle. 'If the Unix players want to compete with Microsoft, they have to make it a lot less irritating for independent software vendors,' says Eunice.

Intel, which is also backing Monterey, recognised this when the project was launched, putting millions of dollars into a fund alongside IBM to encourage developers to write applications for the platform.

'You're beginning to see a genuine desire for one Unix,' says Steve Wanless, senior marketing manager for Sequent. 'The goal is for developers to be able to write for just one platform.'

In an article entitled "Three Blue Letters, Marching Toward Merced", a Research Note by Jonathan Eunice, Illuminata, dated October 30, 1998, which you will have to buy to read, we find out why Project Monterey was needed, namely Unix was struggling in the marketplace, most particularly from the balkanization of the operating system, divided into proprietary versions, each with its own way of doing things. Customers were fed up:

Customers, application developers, and system integrators no longer benefit from, nor will they accept, 99 different variations on the Unix theme. Options are nice, but having too many hues, tones, and subtle shades proves counterproductive because it defeats economies of scale in purchasing, training, and development. That's as true for system vendors as it is for user organizations. Despite an industry-wide game of one-upmanship, most OEMs differentiated themselves only slightly via their house brand of Unix. Yet every year each must pour tens or hundreds of millions of dollars into development to support both the latest processors and innovations such as PCI, I20, Fiber Channel, nuSMP, and 64-bit processors. Consolidation, in one form or another, has become an imperative.

SCO, IBM and Dynix in the short term would continue offering their separate wares, but when the Merced chip was ready, then Project Monterey would come to fruition:

The real product convergence will occur around the Merced launch, or -2H00 on the current schedule. The merged Monterey product will be based on the AIX kernel. We've previously questioned SCO's ability to advance the UnixWare kernel for truly high-end systems, so it's good to see a foundation that provides for sophisticated preemptability, kernel threading, concurrency control, and other genuinely hard system design issues. This is one place IBM's Big Iron skills are hard to approximate, much less surpass. (footnote: Large projects demanding a systematic approach, such as internationalization and directory services, are its forte.) SCO will contribute enhancements, many related to outward system behavior and application packaging.

SCO's complaint portrays it that oldSCO was just swimming along nicely in the marketplace. This report says they were going down slow:

But SCO is under attack by Windows NT, and it remains a low-end provider with 80% of its business attached to its older OpenServer product, not its more modern UnixWare. It's argued multiple times . . . that it's got volume enterprise capabilities well in hand. With IBM's help, perhaps now it does.

So, who needed who, according to this? And now about the POWER architecture. Remember, this paper is dated 1998:

Monterey instances will ship for IA-32, IA-64, and POWER platforms. We expect virtually perfect source compatibility between versions, and perhaps source compatibility between versions, and perhaps useful binary portability of IA-32 executables on IA-64 systems. Intel systems will use a little-endian data ordering; POWER will use big-endian. While this mixed-endian scheme creates some compatibility issues for programmers and within data files, it solves other issues by making Intel versions compatible with Windows NT -- a good trade-off.

There were actually three products planned to come out of Project Monterey, not just one, in planned stages: first, there was a version of SCO's UnixWare for 32-bit Intel processors, with IBM middleware. The second entailed IBM and SCO incorporating UnixWare technology into AIX. Then would come the third, a Unix version that would run on Intel's IA-64 processor architecture. It would all run on PowerPC:

The result, the companies claim, will be a single Unix operating system product line that can run on IA-32, IA-64 and PowerPC platforms, in computers that range from entry level boxes to large enterprise servers.

SCO was counting on being the beneficiary, because it was having troubles:

One immediate beneficiary is SCO, which this week reported a loss for fiscal 1998, but claimed the deal would help it generate far greater revenues in the future.

SCO's ability to stay in the Unix market as it moves towards a 64-bit environment has been under question for some time, given the high levels of investment required -- estimated as at least $100 million annually -- and with many of its earlier partners, including Compaq, and Hewlett Packard, taking their own direction. . . .

Unix has been under threat from NT for the past couple of years, as Microsoft benefits from being able to present developers with a single applications platform, and more effective price competition.

The coming of IA-64 should lead to Unix being more cost effective, which will take away one of NT's advantages, but it is the fragmented nature of the marketplace that is the real stumbling block.

That was the plan and the hopes. But something went wrong, and it has to do with Merced. It wasn't ready when it was supposed to be. In May of 1998, Intel announced Merced would be delayed a year, and wouldn't be ready until 2000. Keep in mind that Project Monterey was designed to be a stopgap measure until Linux was ready. Now the chip is a half year late.

And there were press reports it was too expensive for the desktop, it gave lousy IA32 performance and had heating and other problems. There were even hints Intel wanted to dump Merced and jump to its successor, McKinley. In August of that same year, 1998, a headline appeared, "Is Merced Doomed?"

Touted as a major milestone for Intel and the computer industry in general, Merced, the company's first 64-bit chip, appears to be losing its luster because of delays, performance issues, and upstaging by other processor manufacturers.

Industry experts have called into question the wide-ranging commercial rollout of Merced, which has been pushed back from late 1999 to mid-2000. Instead, it now appears that the chip which will propel Intel deep into the 64-bit computing arena will be McKinley, a Merced successor that's touted as having "twice the performance" and likely to come out in 2001. . . .

"If Merced slips another couple of quarters...this could lead Intel to not market Merced as a product but use it only as a development vehicle," said Linley Gwennap, publisher of Microprocessor Report, writing in themost recent issue of the respected industry newsletter. "Sources indicate that [Merced] facing problems that could jeopardize [its] existence as a viable product," he wrote. "Even if that chip is compromised, however, IA-64 [the name of the 64-bit platform] itself is likely to prosper." . . .

Questions surrounding Merced's commercial appeal arise in part because the delayed launch puts it so close to McKinley. In May of this year the chipmaker said that Merced's launch would be postponed due to its complexity.

Previous statements from Intel executives can also be seen as encouraging computer vendors to wait. At a 1997 chip conference, for instance, Fred Pollack, Intel fellow and director of measurement, architecture, and planning, commented that McKinley will "blow your socks off."

"There's no question that more and more lately we're hearing the mantra 'Wait for McKinley," said Keith Diefendorff, editor in chief ofMicroprocessor Report.

Merced is expected to debut at a speed of 800 MHzcompared to today's 400-MHz chips--and be capable of processing six to eight instructions per every "tick" of the chip's clock cycle. That would constitute an architectural improvement over current and competing chips, according to the report authored by Gwennap. . . .

Despite these impressive gains, Gwennap points out that they would be considered more impressive if the chip came out in late 1999, as originally planned. By mid-2000, Merced's performance will rank it equally with other cutting edge RISC chips.

Although quite different from Merced in some respects, the 21264 Alpha chip from Compaq Computer will likely be available at clock speeds greater than Merced. Compaq is sinking considerable resources into Alpha and touting it as a highly viable 64-bit technology--especially because it is already on the market.

Folks started to abandon the Merced ship. Compaq stunned everyone by announcing that same August that it was dumping Merced for the Alpha chip, saying the Alpha chip was better, because it had more applications, and that by the time Intel delivered Merced, Alpha would be by that time 50% cheaper and two and a half times faster than Merced.

In that same article, Aberdeen then came out with the prediction that "Merced workstation units will reach 350,000 at most in the first year after the chip's release. Overall workstation sales for the same time will come to over 2 million."

Imagine you are IBM now.

So that is a little slice of Project Monterey history, to show you what really happened to Project Monterey. Things went wrong, things completely beyond the control of any of the participants in the project, including IBM. Had Merced worked and been delivered on time, would history have been different? Very possibly. But the plain fact is, it wasn't. And as we now know, the plan was to move some customers to Linux at the earliest opportunity anyhow, and so, when Merced failed to hold up its end, and customers were buzzing about Linux, IBM did what made sense in the market as it found it, not as it made it.

It will be interesting to see how SCO spins this history today when it tries to persuade the court that it should be allowed to amend its complaint yet one more time.


What Really Happened to Project Monterey | 151 comments | Create New Account
Comments belong to whoever posts them. Please notify us of inappropriate comments.
OT Here...
Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 02:44 AM EDT
I was going to post an announcement but since this is a first post I thought I'd
make a place holder for such things.


[ Reply to This | # ]

Corrections go here
Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 02:47 AM EDT
If you notice any mispelings or things that irk the language/grammar police...

[ Reply to This | # ]

What Really Happened to Project Monterey
Authored by: Rudisaurus on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 02:58 AM EDT
It will be interesting to see how SCO spins this history today when it tries to persuade the court that it should be allowed to amend its complaint yet one more time.
Puts a whole new complexion on the phrase "history will be made today", doesn't it?

[ Reply to This | # ]

You can see why IBM are frustrated
Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 03:19 AM EDT
SCO's assertion that a jury will lean their way, well, with gaffes like this on
the public record, it's not exactly going to be rocket science to cut through
their flim-flam.

Let's get this sucker through discovery and onto trial.

[ Reply to This | # ]

Caldera actually donated a dual PII so LInus could work on SMP
Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 03:51 AM EDT
In response to:

81. Also, unlike IBM, the original Linux developers did not have access to multiprocessor code or multi-processor development methods needed to achieve high-end enterprise functionality.

Caldera actually donated hardware for the express purpose of Linux incorporating SMP capability.

Alan eventually found Caldera, which donated the appropriate hardware, leading to to the addition of SMP in Linux. By early 1997, SMP support was already being upgraded to improve scalability (using multiple locks to improve granularity and parallelism). By 2000, the quality of Linux SMP support had surpassed most commercial offerings.

[ Reply to This | # ]

Don't know if tSCOg's coffin lid needs any more nails ...
Authored by: dmarker on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 03:59 AM EDT

because you just hammered in enough extra ones to make their final resting place

Cheers Doug

[ Reply to This | # ]

Which is why Unix assets were worth $7.3 mil in 2001
Authored by: thorpie on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 04:00 AM EDT

Codswallop wrote this in relation to the previous article on "What Really Happened to Project Monterey"

The Caldera 10K for 2001 values the "Existing technology (consisting primarily of UNIXWare and OpenServer)" at $5.8 million" and the "Acquired in-process research and development" at $1.5 million. They paid (nominally, not in cash) $94.697 million for assets they valued at $36.2 million.

So shortly after they bought it, Caldera thought all the Unix technology, complete or in development, was worth $7.3 million!

The reseller channel, on the other hand, was worth $26 million. That's more than 3 times as much.

I'd suggest PJ's research explains why it was worth so little back in 2001, and that the valuation they then gave it was probably fair.

The memories of a man in his old age are the deeds of a man in his prime - Floyd, Pink

[ Reply to This | # ]

Question for Darl
Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 04:15 AM EDT
Don't you just love Groklaw?

[ Reply to This | # ]

What Really Happened to Project Monterey
Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 04:19 AM EDT
While not disputing that the above statements represent the positions of the various Unix vendors, I would like to represent the views of many corporate and individual Unix purchasers (based at least in part on my experiene as "chief hardware architect" for a multinational selling Unix based computers):

All these different initiatives were seen largely as a load of BS. It was these same coporations, (IBM, SCO, HP) that had taken the "one true Unix" and bifurcated it ito a million forks. The "One true Unix" was by definition BSD. because the Internet was devleoped on BSD, and because all students left college with BSD experience. Sure it was really AT&T in theory, but defacto, it was BSD. And if there were problems with BSD, then it was GNU, because the GNU tools worked on all platforms - including the one you were planning to develop after the one you were working on. After all, if you chose Unix, you chose it because you wanted platform independence and portability. That was the motivation for choosing a hard to use OS in the first place.

Why? Because it takes three years for a machine to go from the glint in the eye of a boardroom exec to shiney new kit at a customer's premises (We are not talking PCs here).

How many of the major Unix vendors actually deliver a road map over this kind of timescale? well none, obviously. Although IBM often comes close. Just explain how *I* could expect to ship AIX on My IBM competitive product with AIX (I am not talking clones here).

It has been perfectly clear to most of the Unix world for years that what the Unix world wanted is what they have now - Linux and the *BSDs, and what they did not want is what then had in the 1980s - a zillion incompatible proprietry (enhanced superset) versions from companies with business plans that were based on need to deliver impressive results for the current quarter.

With hindsight, its perfectly obvious that Only open source stands any chance of meeting the needs of hardware vendors, application vendors and customers. Closed source probably cant even satisfy one of these factions.

However, the same does not hold true for applications - with the possible exception of office suites. The reason open source is the answer for the OS is that it is the glue which links the user to the hardware and applications. Provided the OS remains stable, applications and hardware can advance independently - hence WINtel is a success. Except for Web Browsers - they too are glue, and openness and stability may well outweigh other considerations - although security is likley to be a third leg of this platform. The same may turn out to be true of Office suites: in the long run, it may be more important to have one which has a commitment to open file formats on multiple platforms than any other consideration. We shall see!

[ Reply to This | # ]

Access to high-end hardware
Authored by: emmenjay on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 04:27 AM EDT
IBM is far from being the only source of hardware for Linux testing.

The Gelato project, sponsored by HP, Intel and SGI, is entirely dedicated to making Linux run better on high-end IA64 hardware.

Have a look at

I couldn't find it mentioned on the web site, but I know that SGI has made a big box (I *think* 128-way, from memory) available for them to use for some testing.

[ Reply to This | # ]

Has SCO got *any* valid arguments?
Authored by: jmc on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 04:45 AM EDT
I read this (and once again I'm sure we all thank PJ for her hours of
midnight-oil burning putting this together) and wonder yet again is there
*anything* SCO is going to win on? That someone from IBM went off with a pen
belonging to someone from SCO perhaps?

Why are they continuing? IBM can't settle this, it's just too ridiculous, they'd
look stupid.

Makes you wonder how many little folk have got clobbered with bogus suits
without a Groklaw on their side.

[ Reply to This | # ]

Is it the oldSCO engineers who got us here?
Authored by: Mark Levitt on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 05:01 AM EDT
"We've previously questioned SCO's ability to advance the UnixWare kernel
for truly high-end systems, so it's good to see a foundation that provides for
sophisticated preemptability, kernel threading, concurrency control, and other
genuinely hard system design issues."

I think that quote says a lot about newSCO's motivations.

They have a bunch of engineers who, according to market analysts, weren't
capable of adding high-end features to Unixware. Then, along comes some kid (and
a foreigner too!) who manages to get a group of people to do what Unixware
engineers weren't capable of doing themselves.

I think what happened is this: Some SCO (oldSCO) engineers who think they're the
smartest in the world and that Linux is a toy get really annoyed to be bought be
a Linux company. Those engineers, when it turns out the Linux company isn't
very good, seize their chance and start telling the board and anyone who'll
listen that Linux MUST be using stolen UNIX code because "those pesky kids
couldn't possibly have done this on their own!".

Remember, all those "SCO Group" employees like Gupta and the rest of
the New Jersey office are ex-OldSCO (and AT&T) employees.

So now, the board gets greedy. The execs (like Ransom Love) don't think it's a
good idea to accuse Linux of stealing UNIX code. Either becuase they don't
really believe it, or becuase they know what the backlash will do.

But, the board sees only dollar signs. So, they start casting around for a CEO
with experience at extorting money from companies through the threat of
litigation. In comes Darl McBride, who was fired from Icon for doing exactly
that (Or fired for doing it badly, I'm not sure) and has pals with experience
setting up IP lawsuit shops (S2, etc).

So, in short, oldSCO employees are crybabies who can't accept that the F/OSS
development model is just better. They convince the board of their reality. The
board hires a paid gun to try and extort money.

Arrogance and greed compbined.

[ Reply to This | # ]

Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 05:34 AM EDT

Interesting footnote: before AIX-4, AIX was mono-processor.

Several teams *outside* IBM implemented the first multiprocessor POWER systems. I used to work for Bull, I know that Bull had the right to unveil the first multiprocessor system before IBM because they had done the majority of the work. Some links:

As well as the hardware, Bull worked on parallesing the TCP/IP stack.

AIX-4 was mostly developped by IBM Austin.

Bull was also a partnet in the Monterey project, they still have multiprocessor systems based on Itanium...

[ Reply to This | # ]

Was SCOX the victim ?
Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 06:06 AM EDT
It is becoming increasingly clear that (new)SCO are seriously lacking in clues
about what they actually bought.
This leads me to speculate that maybe they were misled about what they were
actually buying.
Maybe they should direct their lawsuits to whoever supervised the due diligence
efforts prior to purchase.

[ Reply to This | # ]

"In two to five years Linux will surpass where Unix is now."
Authored by: tiger99 on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 08:22 AM EDT
At least they got one thing right. Depending how you measure things, by number of installed copies, number of CPUs, number of users, total processing power, gigabytes of storage, or any other units of measure you care to think of, it is certain that Linux passed Unix within that time frame. I think the number of installed copies would have been the first target achieved, but most would have been low-spec PCs. In total processing power the target would have been passed soon after Linux started to sell seriously into the mainframe market.

The only problem is that we can't know exactly how many Linux systems are in use, and by what ratio it has noe eclipsed Unix, whereas we, or rather SCO etc do know to a fair approximation how many Unix licences exist. But thanks to people like DC, they don't necessarily have accurate records of how many are in use, some having been abandoned. Maybe that explains their case against DC in some way, they possibly needed real numbers for marketing purposes, to prove how popular their product was.....

And yes, as everyone seems to be saying here today, Caldera were indeed very pro-Linux for quite a while, so the subsequent rantings of Daft Darl are a total contradiction.

[ Reply to This | # ]

What Really Happened to Project Monterey
Authored by: kberrien on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 09:04 AM EDT
Article reads

"until Linux was ready. Now the chip is a half year late."

Perhaps it should be "the ship is a half year late."

[ Reply to This | # ]

Linux on Alpha
Authored by: philc on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 09:08 AM EDT
In the mid 90's (if I remember the date) I worked on Linux on the DEC 4300. This
is/was an SMP system with 4 64-bit Alpha processors. Linux ran quite well. This
was not a product, it ws something done in the lab.

SCO's claim that IBM wass "the" company that did the innovation and
provided high end systems is not completely accurate.

SCO had their Unix for small x86 platforms and thats about it. The major Unix
vendors, DEC, Sun, HP, SGI, IBM, etc. did the exciting leading edge development
work. I worked on DEC, HP and SGI systems at that time.

[ Reply to This | # ]

correction or problem with article
Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 10:43 AM EDT
you posted this:

But something went wrong, and it has to do with Merced. It wasn't ready when it
was supposed to be. In May of 1998, Intel announced Merced would be delayed a
year, and wouldn't be ready until 2000. Keep in mind that Project Monterey was
designed to be a stopgap measure until Linux was ready. Now the chip is a half
year late.

however the math doesn't add up. If it was due in 1998, then a year late would
be 1999, not 2000. and even so, the final statement is that the chip was
"half a year late" - which is 6 months, not a year.

so which is it?? 6 months? a year? a year and a half? or two years?

Please be more accurate in reporting quotes.

[ Reply to This | # ]

IBM's historic long-term goals
Authored by: MplsBrian on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 10:43 AM EDT
For about a year, spanning 1993 & 1994, I was a contractor at IBM's AS/400
facility. I was a pretty wet-behind-the-ears kid testing a small part of a
then-upcoming release of OS/400. I was using a dumb terminal, an XT maybe? The
hotshots had RS/6000s under their desks. Sometime during my tenure Lou Gerstner
came by (to the facility, not my desk) to give a rah-rah speech to the employees
there - we can recall IBM was in the midst of reinventing itself.

Anyway, I recall attending a meeting at our company (i.e. not IBM) and someone
asked me where I thought IBM was going / what news could I share from 'inside.'
I don't recall where I came up with my answer, but it was: IBM wants to run one
OS across product lines. The guy looked at me like I had 2 heads. This was
long before I, or probably just about anyone, had heard of Linux. AIX was the
clear candidate, as OS/2 was in the midst of a still-birth. Of course, I didn't
give much thought to that answer at the time, but I think it demonstrates that
IBM has been working towards this goal for a long time.

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Have the courts forgotten something important?
Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 10:50 AM EDT
Seems GL/PJ isnt nailing SCO for some major slip ups.
has everyone forgotten, is the court not paying attention?

SCO as it is now, is *NOT* the SCO that was involved with Monterrey or Caldera,
or any of those other things.

why is NewSCO getting away with trying to sue for things that dont even belong
to it? things it has no rights to claim against?

Personally I think the court should nail NewSCO to the wall for this BS. NewSCO
should be told flatly they have no rights to claims made for things that it has
no business or rights in, trying to make claims for things that belonged to
Caldera, etc.

NewSCO seems to be successfully convincing everyone that they are one in the
same with OldSCO, Caldera, etc when really they should be smacked for it.

I think GL needs a document showing just exactly what NewSCO got from OldSCO,
what rights, and things were transferred, etc. So that every time NewSCO tries
to lay claim to something, someone can smack them with the document by reminding
them they have no rights to it!

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What Really Happened to Project Monterey
Authored by: heretic on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 11:56 AM EDT

From Yahoo! SCOXE board: Material for PJ's Monterey Research

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my favorite SCO quote from Monterey period...
Authored by: stevenj on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 12:22 PM EDT still this one, by Doug Michels (CEO of SCO), in the 27 Apr. 1999 edition of the Sydney Morning Herald:
Michels, however, is confident Monterey will stand up against Linux. "Linux is an important force, and largely a force for good," he says. "It has revitalised interest in open systems, and has created a lot of excitement and innovation. It's like a whole free university doing R&D for us; they're able to take risks that we couldn't. But anything that [Linux developers] stumble on that's of benefit, we could adopt in three weeks. And the reality is that big commercial companies like to buy from big commercial companies. Merced hardware will be really expensive and come out at the high end; it's not going to fit the Linux model as well or as quickly [as Intel-based systems]." [emph. added]

(See also here for more quotes from the period, showing that IBM's move to Linux was crystal clear.)

The funny thing is that only one day earlier, in a 26 April 1999 ComputerWorld article, the same Doug Michels also said:

Linux didn't break any new ground. They took the [application programming interfaces] of Unix and re-engineered that lightweight kernel that implemented those APIs. Linux is just a kernel ... but it's nice, elegant and small, easy to understand. So now we've got some punk young kids who've taken and engineered pieces around the Unix [kernel].

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Caldera involved in OSDL
Authored by: mikebmw on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 01:13 PM EDT
Caldera was also involved in the establishing OSDL which had the purpose of
enterprise Linux development and testing in the first OSDL press release.

"SANTA CLARA Calif., Aug. 30, 2000 - Hewlett-Packard, Intel Corporation,
IBM and NEC Corporation today announced the Open Source Development Lab, the
industry's first independent, non-profit lab for developers who are adding
enterprise capabilities to Linux*. The four companies plan to provide
significant equipment and funding to the lab over the next several years.
Additional contributors and sponsors of the lab include Caldera, Dell,
Linuxcare, LynuxWorks, Red Hat, SGI, SuSE, Turbolinux and VA Linux."

This is just another hole in their theory. They knew full well what they were

In a world without fences, who needs gates.

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What Really Happened to Project Monterey
Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 01:51 PM EDT
Microsoft and 64 bit computing. Microsoft had a bite at 64 bit computing when
they were working NT for the Alpha. They dropped that project. So instead of
being on top of things, they are two years out from getting to 64 bit. Along
about the same time, Linus was porting Linux to Alpha in St. Louis.

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Another data point
Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 03:54 PM EDT
I'm with a small startup in the valley. Earlier this week, I interviewed a
former SCO employee for a position with our company. He was there from the USL
days through Caldera.

One of his bullet items in the SCO period (1996-2001) was having completed a
5-day AIX 4.0 Device Driver writing class in preparation for the Monterey
project with IBM.

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Monterey->Linux not so obvious
Authored by: clumbotz on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 05:10 PM EDT
Let's not crow too loudly that "it should have been obvious" to SCO, etc.

Maybe IBM always intended Monterey to be a 'stepping-stone to Linux', but that really was not obvious to everyone. Quite the opposite.

I always assumed IBM & SCO kept getting complaints from customers that stuff downloaded from the net wouldn't work (things like gnu tar & make, and lots of apps which needed them to build from source); that was certainly my biggest problem with all the ATT-UNIX variants back then. Adding Linux compatibilty would have fixed that.

In other words, adding Linux compatibility enabled customers to easily port OSS apps to their old-UNIX systems, and thereby remain happy with old-UNIX. It never occurred to me that IBM or SCO was planning to discontinue selling their proprietary UNIX in favor of Linux. Of course the marketplace might someday force some such change; but in the mean time they were going to make their own OS as useful (i.e. saleable) as possible.

My guess is that IBM dropped project Monterey when they figured out that Linux was going to kill it anyway; they needed to put their engineers onto learning and enhancing Linux so they could actually deploy it in enterprises, and be on the receiving end of the money flow when customers started to pay people to deploy Linux.

Nothing wrong with that, BTW!

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Monterey was *not* originally about Linux
Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 08:01 PM EDT
PJ, this is a great article in all respects except one:
when Project Monterey was started, it had nothing to
do with Linux. Only after the Itanic delays
did it become apparant Linux was a force, at which
point IBM come out with the name AIX5L in hopes of
*competing* with Linux. I remember this fairly well
(I was as obsessive with Unix news back then as I am
about Linux news now).

BTW here's the oldest mention I found on Usenet
of Monterey. It confirms the Power angle, but doesn't
mention Linux at all.

- Dan Kegel

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Did M$ have a hand in what TWO companies did?
Authored by: Anonymous on Thursday, April 21 2005 @ 09:36 PM EDT
It is now common knwledge that Microsoft paid SCO to attack Linux, and Sun
pitched in to help.

What this article suggests to me is that Microsoft may have had a hand in
helping Intel to be 'late' with Merced, to reduce the competition that WIndows
2000 would face.

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History and it's authors
Authored by: Anonymous on Friday, April 29 2005 @ 09:00 AM EDT
...don't you have to win to re-write history? (heh!)

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