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Lexmark's Request for Re-Hearing Denied |
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Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 09:51 AM EST
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You may remember that back in October, I told you about the Lexmark case. It, along with the Skylink case (the garage door opener case), was an attempt to stretch the DMCA. The 6th Circuit US Court of Appeals ruled against the company.
Lexmark asked for a re-hearing, and it has just been denied. That leaves them with the choice of trying to get the US Supreme Court to give them a hearing on the relevant issues or to face the reality that their effort to control the aftermarket using the DMCA failed. The case isn't over, but the DMCA issue is, barring a Supreme Court review.
Here's what Static Control Components, SCC, the company on the other side of the case, said in its press release: "This is a very gratifying decision," said SCC CEO Ed Swartz, on the
latest setback for Lexmark. "We feel that the public interest has been served
by a knowledgeable court to not allow a greedy OEM to use the law to
perpetuate an electronic monopoly. Consumers and justice have been served."
On December 30, 2002, Lexmark filed a lawsuit against SCC. In the suit
Lexmark claimed that SCC's Smartek 520/620 chips violated the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.
"We have asserted from the outset that this is a blatant misuse of the
DMCA. The Sixth Circuit's ruling and the court's decision not to hear
Lexmark's request for another hearing solidifies and supports our position
that the DMCA was not intended to create aftermarket electronic monopolies,"
said Swartz, who pointed out that such monopolies could cost consumers
billions of dollars each year.
According to SCC General Counsel William London, "The case is scheduled
for trial in December of 2005 on what remains of Lexmark's claims, and on
Static Control's claims against Lexmark for violating several state and
federal antitrust and anticompetitive statutes.
The Lexmark case was about printers, about toner. Lexmark set it up so no other manufacturer's toner could work with Lexmark printers except its own, and it "protected" this scheme with some software code and then sued a rival under the DMCA for reverse engineering so its own toner would work with Lexmark printers. This court found that the DMCA is about preventing piracy, not enabling a monopolist seeking to enforce its will on a smaller rival.
I see a link to the SCO fiasco, because of what the Court of Appeals said in their ruling. I viewed SCO as also trying to extend copyright to cover ideas, and the Lexmark ruling says you can't. Of course, SCO never gives up, so they now claim it's all about contract control, but at the beginning, that wasn't the song they sang. Contract control is a separate analysis, because you can contract away your rights, if you are dumb as a rock, but when they began, I believed they intended to extend the reach of copyright. The trouble with flawed laws like the DMCA is, flawed individuals try to bend them to their flawed wills. Happily, we have a judiciary to block the worst and most egregious attempts. Here's what the case was about, in the words of the judge who wrote the opinion for the Court of Appeals: SUTTON, Circuit Judge. This copyright dispute involves two computer programs, two federal statutes and three theories of liability. The first computer program, known as the “Toner Loading Program,” calculates toner level in printers manufactured by Lexmark International. The second computer program, known as the “Printer Engine Program,” controls various printer functions on Lexmark printers.
The first statute, the general copyright statute, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., has been with us in one form or another since 1790 and grants copyright protection to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” id. § 102(a), but does not “extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,” id. § 102(b). The second federal statute, the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., was enacted in 1998 and proscribes the sale of products that may be used to “circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work” protected by the copyright statute.
These statutes became relevant to these computer programs when Lexmark began selling discount toner cartridges for its printers that only Lexmark could re-fill and that contained a microchip designed to prevent Lexmark printers from functioning with toner cartridges that Lexmark had not re-filled. In an effort to support the market for competing toner cartridges, Static Control Components (SCC) mimicked Lexmark’s computer chip and sold it to companies interested in selling remanufactured toner cartridges.
Lexmark brought this action to enjoin the sale of SCC’s computer chips and raised three theories of liability in doing so. Lexmark claimed that SCC’s chip copied the Toner Loading Program in violation of the federal copyright statute. It claimed that SCC’s chip violated the DMCA by circumventing a technological measure designed to control access to the Toner Loading Program. And it claimed that SCC’s chip violated the DMCA by circumventing a technological measure designed to control access to the Printer Engine Program. On the issue of ideas and whether they can be copyrighted:
But even if a work is in some sense “original” under § 102(a), it still may not be copyrightable because § 102(b) provides that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of [its] form.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). This provision embodies the common-law idea-expression dichotomy that distinguishes the spheres of copyright and patent law. “[U]nlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea itself.” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101–02 (1880) (explaining that while a book describing a bookkeeping system is worthy of copyright protection, the underlying method described is not); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992) (“It is a fundamental principle of copyright law that a copyright does not protect an idea, but only the expression of the idea.”). While this general principle applies equally to computer programs, id.; see also House Report at 5667 (extending copyright protection to computer programs only “to the extent that they incorporate authorship in programmer’s expression of original ideas, as distinguished from ideas themselves”), the task of separating expression from idea in this setting is a vexing one, see Altai, 982 F.2d at 704 (“The essentially utilitarian nature of a computer program further complicates the task of distilling its idea from its expression.”); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819–20 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring). “[C]ompared to aesthetic works, computer programs hover even more closely to the elusive boundary line described in § 102(b).” Altai, 982 F.2d at 704.
In ascertaining this “elusive boundary line” between idea and expression, between process and nonfunctional expression, courts have looked to two other staples of copyright law—the doctrines of merger and scènes à faire. Where the “expression is essential to the statement of the idea,” CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Lotus Dev., 49 F.3d at 816 (“If specific words are essential to operating something, then they are part of a ‘method of operation’ and, as such, are unprotectable.”), or where there is only one way or very few ways of expressing the idea, Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1519 n.27 (11th Cir. 1997), the idea and expression are said to have “merged.” In these instances, copyright protection does not exist because granting protection to the expressive component of the work necessarily would extend protection to the work’s uncopyrightable ideas as well. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd.,, 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 319 n.2 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that where idea and expression are intertwined and where non-protectable ideas predominate, expression is not protected); see generally Nimmer § 13.03[B][3]. For computer programs, “if the patentable process is embodied inextricably in the line-by-line instructions of the computer program, [ ] then the process merges with the expression and precludes copyright protection.” Atari I, 975 F.2d at 839–40; see, e.g., PRG-Schultz Int’l, Inc. v. Kirix Corp., No. 03 C 1867, 2003 WL 22232771, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2003) (determining that copyright infringement claim failed because expression merged with process in computer software that performed auditing tasks).
For similar reasons, when external factors constrain the choice of expressive vehicle, the doctrine of “scènes à faire”—“scenes,” in other words, “that must be done”—precludes copyright protection. See Twentieth Century Fox Film, 361 F.3d at 319–20; see generally Nimmer § 13.03[B][4]. In the literary context, the doctrine means that certain phrases that are “standard, stock, . . . or that necessarily follow from a common theme or setting” may not obtain copyright protection. Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 838. In the computer-software context, the doctrine means that the elements of a program dictated by practical realities—e.g., by hardware standards and mechanical specifications, software standards and compatibility requirements, computer manufacturer design standards, target industry practices, and standard computer programming practices—may not obtain protection. Id. (citing case examples); see Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1524 (“To the extent that a work is functional or factual, it may be copied.”); Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming district court’s finding that “[p]laintiffs may not claim copyright protection of an . . . expression that is, if not standard, then commonplace in the computer software industry”). As “an industry-wide goal,” programming “[e]fficiency” represents an external constraint that figures prominently in the copyrightability of computer programs. Altai, 982 F.2d at 708.
Generally speaking, “lock-out” codes fall on the functional-idea rather than the original-expression side of the copyright line. Manufacturers of interoperable devices such as computers and software, game consoles and video games, printers and toner cartridges, or automobiles and replacement parts may employ a security system to bar the use of unauthorized components. To “unlock” and permit operation of the primary device (i.e., the computer, the game console, the printer, the car), the component must contain either a certain code sequence or be able to respond appropriately to an authentication process. To the extent compatibility requires that a particular code sequence be included in the component device to permit its use, the merger and scènes à faire doctrines generally preclude the code sequence from obtaining copyright protection. See Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1524 (“When specific instructions, even though previously copyrighted, are the only and essential means of accomplishing a given task, their later use by another will not amount to infringement.”) (quoting National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report 20 (1979)) (emphasis added); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., Nos. 884805 & 89-0027, 1993 WL 207548, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 1993) (“Atari III”) (“Program code that is strictly necessary to achieve current compatibility presents a merger problem, almost by definition, and is thus excluded from the scope of any copyright.”).
In trying to discern whether these doctrines apply, courts tend to “focus on whether the idea is capable of various modes of expression.” Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253); Atari I, 975 F.2d at 840 (“The unique arrangement of computer program expression which generates [the] data stream does not merge with the process so long as alternate expressions are available.”). The question, however, is not whether any alternatives theoretically exist; it is whether other options practically exist under the circumstances. See Altai, 982 F.2d at 708 (“While, hypothetically, there might be a myriad of ways in which a programmer may effectuate certain functions within a program . . . efficiency concerns may so narrow the practical range of choice as to make only one or two forms of expression workable options.”); Atari I, 975 F.2d at 840 (noting that “no external factor dictated the bulk of the program” and finding the program copyrightable). In order to characterize a choice between alleged programming alternatives as expressive, in short, the alternatives must be feasible within real-world constraints. . . .
One last principle applies here. Even if the prerequisites for infringement are met—the copyright is valid and SCC copied protectable elements of the work—Congress has established a fair use defense to infringement claims to ensure that copyright protection advances rather than thwarts the essential purpose of copyright: “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). Congress has permitted others to use copyright-protected works, “including . . . by reproduction,” when courts determine the use to be “fair” according to a non-exhaustive list of factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107. With respect to computer programs, “fair use doctrine preserves public access to the ideas and functional elements embedded in copyrighted computer software programs.” Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603 (9th Cir. 2000).
SCO wanted this not to be so, I believe, and hoped to use their case to try to establish that ideas in software can be copyrighted. Of course, their copyright position crumbled underneath their feet, but I have always believed that was part of their strategy and their goal. If so, that dream has died.
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Authored by: Erwan on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 10:40 AM EST |
If any...
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Erwan[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: seanlynch on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 10:42 AM EST |
OT here please... [ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: amabes on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 11:28 AM EST |
Not trying to be trollish here, but am I the only one that finds it a little bit
interesting that Lexmark is a spin-off of IBM?
Anthony[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 11:29 AM EST |
This whole case is a bit ironic when you consider that
Lexmark was spun off from IBM.[ Reply to This | # ]
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- Ironic - Authored by: amabes on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 11:30 AM EST
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Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 11:32 AM EST |
I had completely forgotten about SCOG's DMCA threat. I guess we can just lump
that lie / broken promise along with such goodies as
AIX audits
Linux invoices
and promises to sue
Cluster users
Hollywood
Weta
Hosting providers
etc ...
[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: seanlynch on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 11:45 AM EST |
2005 is staring out to be a good year.
The DMCA not being extended into a new tool to reduce competition.
SCOX facing delisting because its business practices are questionable and not at
all succsessfull.
Microsoft announcing IE7 to ship before Longhorn. Did something light a little
fire(fox) under Microsoft to get them moving?
Wow, companies might actually have to strat competing with viable products in
order to earn customer dollars, instead of relying on lawmakers to ensure
monopolies. We can hope can't we?[ Reply to This | # ]
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- Heh - Authored by: Jude on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 11:57 AM EST
- Heh - Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 02:06 PM EST
- Heh - Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 08:26 PM EST
- Heh - Authored by: jlp on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 02:43 PM EST
- 2005 is staring out to be a good year - Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 01:59 PM EST
- Microsoft Doors. - Authored by: Aladdin Sane on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 04:23 PM EST
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Authored by: evbergen on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 12:00 PM EST |
Of course I'm very happy with this ruling. Let manufacturers make money the good
old way, without resorting to business models that turn consumers into the
hapless monopoly slave variety.
However, it will also be an excellent case in point for those forces
(*cough*sapmicrosoftintelphilips*cough*) that go around Europe
blackmailing^Wlobbying^Wexplaining that copyright is insufficient protection for
information-based industrial products, and that therefore patent protection is
needed.
The next thing that will happen once patents are firmly in place, AdTI-like
shills will start writing white papers on how the industry would flourish better
without copyrights on software, that there is no artistic freedom in
mathematics, which source code essentially is, and so on. Some confused BSD folk
will join the choir.
And then, kaboom, instant annexation of all Free and Open Source software, even
driving the original developers off their turf. Because the cheap and automatic
copyright will not protect the creations of SMEs and individuals anymore, the
businesses with large patent portfolios get to dictate what products are allowed
and who gets to run what.
The only competition will be among those large firms that control the software
trade with their patent farms, and the money they'll have to spend on their
patent battles, together with the tax that comes with any monopoly, will drain
the consumer and drag innovation to a standstill.
A return to the feudal system: you need to be a member of the guilds for you to
practice your art.
Oh sure, a free software developer or his customers won't be sued immediately as
long as he doesn't capture too big a market share and the guilds can profit from
his unprotected work, but as soon as he becomes a nuisance, a nice sunglasses
& suit type comes along with that "nice outfit you've got
here"-line.
Mark my words; as soon as a stronger patent regime is in place, you'll start to
hear voices from the proprietary world to abolish copyright on pure computer
code.
The best to all,
Emile.
[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Groklaw Lurker on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 12:04 PM EST |
Hopefully, SCO will soon be de-listed from NASDAQ. After their inevitable losses
in the IBM and Novell cases, they will fade away into the dust bins of history,
their notoriety remembered by a few attorneys and electronics industry
historians.
Sadly, many earnest, skilled and dedicated employees of SCO will be (and some
already have been) left hanging out to dry as a result of the extortionist bids
of the SCO management team. I hope they will be remembered and will enjoy
success in their search for employment. It is unfair to paint them with the
brush we have reserved for McBride, Stowall and the others.
GL
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(GL) Groklaw Lurker
End the tyranny, abolish software patents.[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 12:10 PM EST |
Contract control is a separate analysis, because you can contract away your
rights, if you are dumb as a rock,
I take issue with this sentence, because even very smart people can contract
away their rights. If EULAs are legal and enforcable in your jurisdiction, then
it's extremely easy--owning a Windows box to play games on is enough.[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 12:14 PM EST |
<a
herf="http://www.drunkenblog.com/drunkenblog-archives/000473.html">
Here</a>[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: fb on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 12:14 PM EST |
SCO...hoped to use their case to try to establish that ideas in
software can be copyrighted...
David Boies is supposed to
be strongly motivated by the cases that change where the legal boundaries are
drawn. Just to prove he can, I guess.
Getting paid tens of millions can't
hurt either.
[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 12:16 PM EST |
It would be good to have a competent view of other areas this ruling would
affect. e.g. attempting to run Linux on 'protected' hardware such as xbox.[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 12:34 PM EST |
"Anyone who buys a Lexmark printer may read the literal code of the Printer
Engine Program directly from the printer memory, with or without the benefit of
the authentication sequence, and the data from the program may be translated
into readable source code after which copies may be freely distributed."
Perhaps to invoke the DMCA you need to have the code in memory encrypted also.
Anyone care to comment?
--
MadScientist[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 12:37 PM EST |
At one point the judge says that the end user, not the copyright holder, is the
final arbitor over who can access the legally purchased product.
Doesn't that put a hole in using the DMCA for things like CSS or trusted
computing?
Or does that mean that the DMCA only has effect when you are licensing
something, but not purchasing a product which happens to have some access
mechanism in the firmware?
And finally, PJ, you say that the judge said the DMCA is about piracy, meaning
copyright violations.
But the courts have ruled that the DMCA applies (in the 2600 case and the CSS
case) even when no copyright infringements take place (any actual copying or
temporary cpoies made to RAM or whatever) are protected under fair use. Was
this an offhand comment or was it based on something like precident, the text of
the law, or the intent of Congress. If it was based on the intent of Congress,
I'd be curious to hear about how that works (how often it is used, other
interesting uses, etc.).
Thanks in advance.[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 01:12 PM EST |
Note: I'm writing this from a European perspective, and I'm not particularly
versed in the specifics of U.S. law, so please bear with me for any factual
inaccuracies. I hope you can relate to what I write
anyway.
I see a link to the SCO fiasco, because of what the
Court of Appeals said in their ruling. I viewed SCO as also trying to extend
copyright to cover ideas, and the Lexmark ruling says you
can't.
I have two issues with this. First, it's a pretty
weak link, as it's not clear what constitutes an "idea" here. Lexmark doesn't
(to my knowledge) claim that copyright is supposed to cover the idea of
replacing a toner cartridge; that's merely one way of interpreting their
lawsuit. Second, the DMCA (to my knowledge) prohibits circumventing access
control pertaining to the protected work only, not access control in
general (such as controlling access to the mechanics of a printer, as Lexmark
would perhaps like us to believe).
I think the crucial issue at stake in
this case is what constitutes "circumvention", not whether copyright covers
"ideas". The anti-circumvention provisions in the DMCA and copyright legislation
of other countries are a fairly recent phenomenon, and I would argue they don't
form a natural part of copyright protection. Rather, these provisions have been
added as a supplement to copyright; they offer legal armor to technical
protection to be used where copyright protection is deemed
insufficient. If the anti-circumvention provisions were removed, it would still
be illegal to copy legally protected computer programs or other works
of art, and it would neither affect your ability to implement the same idea in
your own products.
If Lexmark wants a monopoly on the mechanism they use
to interface a toner cartridge with a printer, they should look at patent law,
not copyright. And I think they would still find it difficult to enforce a
patent, even if they could get one. Just as copyright was never meant to prevent
burglars from entering someone else's house by copying his keys, neither were
patents. And in this case, Lexmark had already sold the house, thereby allowing
the buyer to use whatever keys he liked. [ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: llanitedave on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 01:39 PM EST |
"...to block the worst and most egregious attempts."
A FLAWED judiciary, unfortunately. These cases that make lawyers rich also make
justice and fair play dependent on decisions involving only wealthy players.
The judicial system that we have dispenses justice ONLY to those that can afford
to pay -- the great majority have to be happy with the crumbs that fall from the
corporate table.
This is absolutely an unsatisfactory and unjust system, which is threatening to
collapse under its own weight.
---
Of course we need to communicate -- that goes without saying![ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 02:24 PM EST |
One thing in this ruling caught my eye.
'The second federal statute, the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17
U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., was enacted in 1998 and proscribes the __sale__ of
products that may be used to “circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work” protected by the copyright statute.'
May I assume a judge would use the exact wording ? If so it appears that the
DMCA prevents you selling a mechanism that bypasses copy protection but would
not prevent you from offering such for free ... would someone who actually knows
what they're talking about care to comment ?
Greg.[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 03:15 PM EST |
is not this judicial argument. This was the wrong fight.
Company A creates unusable product, company B makes it useable, and we want
company B to win in a fight with company A, so that we can continue using an
unusable product.
The right way to have fixed this was by consumers not buying Lexmark printers
with these toner restrictions. That would have been a far more powerful verdict
than anything the court could handout.
That requires an informed consumer, bit too much to ask nowadays.
As a matter of clarifying law, this case was good. As an aid to making an
unusable product survive in the market, this is terrible. I understand that the
product could die out as a result of this case (because of cheap toners). But I
really wish it would have been by direct consumer reaction than this roundabout
mechanism.[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 22 2005 @ 11:20 PM EST |
Working for a facility that uses a large number of Lexmark printers, I see
departments "economizing" by buying non-Lexmark cartridges, and then
expecting me to "fix" the printer when the output is smeared,
inconsistent, or just otherwise sub-standard.
I would rather see Lexmark license the "code" to toner cartridge
manufacturers that agree to meet "OEM" standards, or at least SOME
standards above total crap.
Sure would save a lot of printer techs a lot of work, and a lot of time arguing
with PHB's about what the problem with their printouts REALLY is.
I do not believe by any means that ALL non-Lexmark carts are sub-standard, there
are brands that are even superior. It just seems like my employer buys the
crappy ones every time.[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Wednesday, February 23 2005 @ 02:47 PM EST |
While I agree with SCC's Ed Swartz that this was "a blatant misuse of the
DMCA," I couldn't help but smile when I read this part of judge's last
paragraph:
Congress has established a fair use defense to
infringement claims to ensure that copyright protection
advances rather than thwarts the essential purpose of
copyright: “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8;
In fact, throughout this document, the judge references many
"lock-out" systems, and points out that the company doing the locking
out can't control the people who come up with ways of circumventing it. The
reference to Nintendo of America really threw me, as I remember vividly all that
crap with Tengen on the old NES and Game Genie on the SNES.
So while it disturbs me greatly that our leaders, elected or appointed, can be
bought out (or at least swayed) to pass crap like the DCMA into law, the
judicial system of our government is not so easily persuaded. Maybe in a few
years (10? 20?) we'll see the DMCA heavily neutered. And if so, we can look
back to this case as one of the many small sparks that lit the fire.[ Reply to This | # ]
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