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| What Is An "Actual Controversy"? -- A Case Explains |
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Tuesday, February 24 2004 @ 07:19 PM EST
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I'm going to put up some cases as I find them, to help us get clear on what the SCO-Red Hat dispute over whether or not there is an "actual controversy" is all about. Here is a case, Starter Corp. v. Starter Corp. Converse, Inc., that cites one of the cases SCO is relying on, G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser Busch, Inc. Original is at www.tourolaw.edu/2ndCircuit/may96/95-9150.html .
I think the judge's explanation is clarifying on that point and also on the issue of what a declaratory judgment is for.
*************************************************************
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
_______________________________
No. February Term, 1996
(Argued: February 6, 1996 Decided: May 23, 1996)
Docket No. 95-9150
________________________________
STARTER CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
- v -
STARTER CORPORATION CONVERSE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________
Before: McLAUGHLIN and OAKES, Circuit Judges, and OWEN, District Judge.*
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, C. Haight, Judge, granting the defendant-appellee's motion to dismiss plaintiff-appellant's action for a declaratory judgment.
The judgment of dismissal is reversed and remanded.
J. JOSEPH BAINTON, Ross & Hardies, New York, N. Y., for Appellant, Starter Corporation.
HARLEY I. LEWIN, Lewin & Laytin, New York, N. Y., for Appellee, Converse, Inc.
________________________
*Honorable Richard Owen, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
The Starter Corporation appeals from the district court's dismissal of its declaratory judgment complaint against appellee Converse, Inc. on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and its pronouncement that it would decline to exercise declaratory judgment jurisdiction even if an "actual case or controversy" did exist.
Starter is a manufacturer of athletic apparel and Converse is a manufacturer of athletic footwear and licensor of sports apparel. Both parties possess trademark rights in versions of a five-pointed star. This dispute arises out of Starter's planned use of its registered trademarks, a five-pointed star in various designs, called Starter Marks or House Marks, on athletic footwear. In anticipation of this use, Starter filed for registration of its Starter Marks on athletic footwear with the Patent and Trademark Office. Converse opposed the registration of these applications before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board on the ground that if used on footwear, the Starter Marks would create a likelihood of confusion with Converse's star mark, and thereafter advised Starter that if Starter brought any footwear to the marketplace bearing the Starter Marks, Converse would sue Starter for trademark infringement.
Starter, however, commenced this action on May 19, 1995, prior to bringing any Starter footwear to the marketplace, seeking declaratory relief concerning its right to use its House Marks on athletic footwear. On July 19, 1995, Converse moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and on November 13, 1995, the district court granted the motion dismissing Starter's complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to allege an actual "case or controversy" as required for subject matter jurisdiction under both Article III of the United States Constitution and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201(a). The district court further noted that even if an actual case or controversy had existed, it would have exercised its discretion and declined to rule in the absence of any actual rendering of Starter's footwear in the marketplace. This appeal followed.
Starter's first contention before us is that the district court was in error in holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Starter's declaratory judgment action. On appeal from such determination, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. In Re Vogel Van & Storage Inc., 59 F.3d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1995).
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201(a), provides that
in a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and legal relations of any party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
In addition, in order for a federal court to have jurisdiction over an "actual controversy," a federal question "arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States" must be involved, 28 U.S.C. §1331, since it is well-settled that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Albradco Inc., v. Bevona, 982 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1992)(citations omitted). Accordingly, we must first determine whether a federal question exists, and if it does--thereby providing the court with original jurisdiction--we must then determine whether the dispute presents a substantial controversy or merely an abstract question. There is no bright line here. As the Supreme Court explained in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 512, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941),
[t]he difference between an abstract question and a "controversy" contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether there is such a controversy. Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.
If both a federal question and an actual controversy exist, then declaratory judgment jurisdiction may appropriately be exercised. If no such controversy exists, however, the courts are prohibited from rendering an advisory opinion which would be beyond our constitutional power. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937).
Starter's complaint asserts that jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. §1338, which confers original jurisdiction upon the district court in "any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . copyrights, and trademarks . . . ." The Lanham Act, the only Act of Congress relevant to this action, in turn applies only to a mark "use[d] in commerce", defined in 15 U.S.C. §1127 as a mark "(1) on goods when (A) placed in any manner on the goods . . . and (B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce . . . ."
Converse contends that because Starter has not yet begun the manufacture and sale of its footwear, Starter athletic shoes are not yet "in commerce", thus Starter's footwear is not yet subject to the Lanham Act, and therefore no statutory basis for federal question jurisdiction exists. In response, Starter contends that because it has already registered and used the Starter Marks on athletic apparel, the marks are "in commerce" and therefore satisfy the requirements of the Lanham Act, even though Starter has not yet used the Starter Marks on footwear in commerce. Starter, as observed, also owns federal registrations for its House Marks, and has an undisputed real, legal interest in their use. We conclude that Starter's prior use of its marks places the marks sufficiently "in commerce" to sustain federal question jurisdiction under the Lanham Act.
We next turn to the question of whether, at the time the complaint was filed, an actual case or controversy existed. In a declaratory judgment action involving trademarks, the test for an "actual case or controversy" has two prongs, both of which must be satisfied in order to establish declaratory judgment jurisdiction: (1) has the defendant's conduct created a real and reasonable apprehension of liability on the part of the plaintiff, and (2) has the plaintiff engaged in a course of conduct which has brought it into adversarial conflict with the defendant. Windsurfing Intern. Inc. v. AMF Inc., 828 F.2d 755, 757-58 (Fed. Cir. 1987)(applying Second Circuit law). Neither party disputes that the first prong of this test has been satisfied by Converse's unambiguous communication to Starter of its intent to bring an infringement suit should Starter engage in the sale of footwear bearing its House Marks. However, in reliance upon Windsurfing, Converse submits that absent Starter's engaging in the manufacture and sale of footwear bearing the Starter Marks, Starter cannot be said to be using the mark for the purpose of establishing an adversarial relationship that meets the "actual case or controversy" standard, and thus, Converse contends, there is no declaratory jurisdiction.
The district court below saw Starter as pleading "no more than a desire and intention to use its trademark on athletic footwear at a future time," and concluded that Windsurfing required more before athletic footwear bearing the Starter Marks can satisfy the second prong of the justiciability analysis. Starter, however, contends before us, as it did below, that it has pleaded more, and that actual use of the mark is not the appropriate test here, instead urging that the "imminent intention and ability" test, which has its origins in patent case law, is the applicable test. See, e.g., Wembley, Inc. v. Superba Cravats, Inc., 315 F.2d 87, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1963). Applying that test, an actual case or controversy exists where a party has engaged in a course of conduct evidencing a "definite intent and apparent ability to commence use" of the marks on the product. See Golden Gulf Corp. v. Jordache Enterprises, Inc., 896 F.Supp. 337, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), citing G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989).
We find this test appropriate here. Declaratory judgment actions involving trademarks are analogous to those involving patents, Windsurfing, 828 F.2d at 757; Manufacturers Hanover Corp. v. Maine Sav. Bank, 225 U.S.P.Q. 525, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), and principles applicable to declaratory judgment actions involving patents are generally applicable with respect to trademarks. See Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 657 F.Supp. 336, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)(applying the Wembley "immediate intention and ability" test to ascertain justiciability in trademark dispute); Manufacturers Hanover Corp., 225 U.S.P.Q. at 526 (extending liberal interpretation of Declaratory Act's "actual case or controversy" requirement from patent infringement to trademark disputes); 6A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice §57.20 at 57-222, 57-223 (citations omitted). Moreover, in articulating the second prong of the justiciability inquiry, we note that the court in Windsurfing relied upon the trademark case of Polaroid v. Berkey, 425 F.Supp. 605 (D. Del. 1976) in which the court acknowledged the applicability of the immediate intention and ability test by its statement that "the most liberal interpretation of justiciability will not admit to an active controversy in the absence of either some imminent infringing conduct or some assertion of the same." Id. at 609 (emphasis added).
Also persuasive in considering the applicability of this test is the policy animating the Declaratory Judgment Act, which is to enable parties to adjudicate their disputes before either suffers great damage. In re Combustion Equipment Associates, 838 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1988). Declaratory judgment actions are particularly useful in resolving trademark disputes, in order to promptly resolve controversies where the alleged owner of a trademark right threatens to sue for infringement. Accordingly, in such a case, the finding of an actual controversy should be determined with some liberality. Larami Corp. V. Amron, 1994 WL 369251, *4 (S.D.N.Y., Jul. 13, 1994); Manufacturers Hanover Corp., 225 U.S.P.Q. at 526. A more restrictive view would in this case require Starter to go to substantial expense in the manufacture, marketing, and sale of its footwear, and subject itself to considerable liability for a violation of the Lanham Act before its right to even engage in this line of commerce could be adjudicated. We do not read the Act as requiring this. Accordingly, we turn to whether Starter has demonstrated the imminent intent and ability to use its House Marks on athletic footwear in order to determine whether the second prong of the justiciability inquiry is satisfied.
To demonstrate an actual intent and ability to imminently engage in the allegedly infringing conduct, Starter must show more than a vague or general desire to use its House Marks. See Wembley, 315 F.2d at 90; Windsurfing, 828 F.2d at 758. It must be engaged in "meaningful preparation," Arrowhead Indust. Water, Inc.v. Ecolochem, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1988), such that it is "actively preparing to produce the article in question. This is the last point before the point of no return." G. Heileman, 873 F.2d at 990. Whether a declaratory judgment plaintiff has so demonstrated this must be decided on a case-by-case basis, Aetna, 300 U.S. at 239-41; Wembley, 315 F.2d at 89.
Starter's complaint alleges that but for Converse's threat of a trademark infringement suit, Starter would have been immediately prepared, at the time the complaint was filed, to begin manufacture and sale of shoes bearing the Starter Marks. It has invested a significant amount of time and money in this project; designed styles and prepared prototype shoes; conducted a consumer survey; made strategic decisions regarding who should manufacture the shoes; hired an external licensing agent; and attempted to find a manufacturing partner. It is this final step that Starter claims has been delayed by Converse's threats of litigation. Accordingly, we view the total situation here distinguishable from that in Windsurfing, 828 F.2d.at 758, where the court found that the declaratory plaintiff had failed to engage in any conduct that brought it into adversarial conflict with the declaratory defendant regarding the use of trademarks. In the instant case, the steps Starter has taken are specific and evidence a concrete intention to use its House Marks. Accordingly, there is the requisite adversarial conflict here to meet the actual case or controversy requirement, and declaratory jurisdiction is therefore proper.
Having concluded that subject matter jurisdiction exists, we turn to the question of whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in declining to take declaratory judgment jurisdiction in any event. We review the district court's decision to refuse declaratory relief de novo and may exercise our independent judgment in determining whether a declaratory judgment action should be entertained, and thus, if we are of a different view, we may substitute our judgment for that of the court below. Continental Cas. Co. v. Coastal Sav. Bank, 977 F.2d 734, 736 (2d. Cir. 1992).
While it is true that a district court's determination whether to exercise declaratory jurisdiction is denominated as discretionary, Muller v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 404 F.2d 501, 505 (2d Cir. 1968), a district court is required to entertain a declaratory judgment action "(1) when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue, or (2) when it will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding." Continental Cas. Co., 977 F.2d at 737. Here, a declaratory judgment will definitively determine appellant's rights to use the Starter Marks in the athletic footwear market and resolve the demonstrated uncertainty between the parties that has been generated by this controversy, avoiding attendant expenses. Appellant provided the district court with a sample, prototype shoe of the type intended for sale to consumers. Because there is no uncertainty as to how it will use its House Marks on its athletic footwear, the district court is therefore in a position to conduct a trademark infringement analysis. Accordingly, we conclude that this case is one where declaratory jurisdiction should be exercised.
In sum, we find an actual case or controversy to exist conferring subject matter jurisdiction on the district court, and further concluding that because a declaratory judgment would clarify the legal relations at issue between the parties and afford relief from the controversy regarding whether Starter can use its House Marks in the athletic footwear market, declaratory jurisdiction should be exercised here, and we therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings accordingly.
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| Authored by: Xenographic on Tuesday, February 24 2004 @ 07:39 PM EST |
Recently saw this. I am reminded of SCO's legal theories when I read this (and
even more so of SCO's PR, especially that from Darl McBride). Just thought I'd
share:
-----
Folly is a more dangerous enemy to the good than evil. One can protest againt
evil; it can be unmasked and, if need be, prevented by force. Evil always
carries the seeds of its own destruction, as it makes people, at the least,
uncomfortable. Against folly we have no defence. Neither protests nor force can
touch it; reasoning is no use; facts that contradict personal prejudices can
simply be disbelieved--indeed, the fool can counter by criticizing them, and if
they are undeniable, they can just be pushed aside as trivial exceptions. So the
fool, as distinct from the scoundrel, is completely self-satisfied; in fact, he
can easily become dangerous, as it does not take much to make him agressive. A
fool must therefore be treated more cautiously than a scroundrel; we shall never
again try to convince a fool by reason, for it is both useless and dangerous.
* * *
The fact that the fool is often stubborn must not mislead us into thinking that
he is independent. One feels in fact, when talking to him, that one is dealing,
not with the man himself, but with slogans, catchwords, and the like, which have
taken hold of him. He is under a spell, he is blinded, his very nature is being
misused and expoloited. Having thus become a passive instrument, the fool will
be capable of any evil and at the same time incapable of seeing that it is evil.
Here lies the danger of a diabolical exploitation that can do irreparable damage
to human beings.
But at this point it is quite clear, too, that folly can be overcome, not by
instruction, but only by an act of liberation; and so we have come to terms with
the fact that in the great majority of cases inward liberation must be preceded
by outward liberation, and that until that has taken place, we may as well
abandon all attempts to convice the fool. In this state of affairs we have to
realize whit it is no use our trying to find out what 'the people' really think,
and why the question is so superflous for the man who thinks and acts
responsibly--but always given these particular circumstances.[ Reply to This | # ]
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| Authored by: WhiteFang on Tuesday, February 24 2004 @ 07:50 PM EST |
As I read this, the only way that there couldn't be an Actual Controversy is if
SCOX declares in court that A) SCOX is not going to actually sue any end user
and B) SCOX is not going to sue RedHat. And no waffling about reseerving the
right to sue for a later date.
SCOX has threatened to sue RedHat in the future.
SCOX continues to threaten end users and has sent letters indicating that. Many
(unknown number) of these end-users are RedHat clients.
Q.E.D.[ Reply to This | # ]
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 24 2004 @ 08:01 PM EST |
. . .is whether or not "both prongs" were met as, according the the
cited case, they must be.
I would submit that *possibly* yes they have been met and all RH is attempting
to do is bolster their standing.
Additionally, SCOG has an actual *pattern of behaivour* which supports RH's
position.
krp[ Reply to This | # ]
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 24 2004 @ 08:50 PM EST |
I'm not sure how much that case really helps us understand the issues in Red Hat
v. SCO.
Neither
party disputes
that the first prong of this test has been satisfied by Converse's unambiguous
communication to
Starter of its intent to bring an
infringement suit should Starter engage in the sale of footwear bearing its
House
Marks
In contrast, SCO
disputes that it had ever communicated that it would sue Red Hat or a Red Hat
customer (at the time Red Hat filed the suit, anyway). It seems the decision
above is mostly concerned with whether or not the *plaintiff* had come close
enough to beginning the allegedly infringing activity, but the disputes in Red
Hat seem to be all about whether the defendent's behavior was sufficiently
threatening. Another big issue in Red Hat v. SCO is to what extent threats
against customers and potential customers count as a controversy between SCO and
Red Hat. It would be great if you could find a decision that talked about these
issues.
[ Reply to This | # ]
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| Authored by: Yobgod on Tuesday, February 24 2004 @ 08:52 PM EST |
1) Thanks PJ! Excellent, excellent reading!
2) I think the following
(from near the end) may prove relevant in the days to come (emphasis
mine):
a district court is required to entertain a declaratory
judgment action "(1) when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying
and settling the legal relations in issue, or (2) when it will terminate and
afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to
the proceeding."
It certainly seems a stronger statement than trying to
argue that RedHat didn't actually suffer from a reasonable apprehension, and
implies that simple dismissal is unlikely (even if Redhat's motion to add
supplemental information is rejected on some odd technicality). [ Reply to This | # ]
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| Authored by: Jude on Tuesday, February 24 2004 @ 09:01 PM EST |
Well, I doubt Reh Hat has to worry much about that second prong. They are
actively involved in commerce that depends on Linux. AFAIK, selling Linux
distros and support is their entire business.
Whether or not SCO's actions up to the filing of Red Hat's suit constitute a
threat are another matter. I think they do, and so do a lot of other people,
but it will have to be decided by Judge Robinson.
I think SCO was foolish to continue their threatening behaviour even after Red
Hat filed suit. Common sense tells me that the judge should be able to consider
that behaviour as suuporting Red Hat's apprehensions. However, IANAL,
AISAHAAJ.
[ and I sure as heck ain't a judge ]
[ Reply to This | # ]
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| Authored by: gleef on Tuesday, February 24 2004 @ 09:16 PM EST |
So, if I'm readng this right, there's three necessary components for Red Hat
to ask this:
- The court (US District Court of Delaware) must have
jurisdiction over the issue(s) raised
- SCO must have created real
apprehension of liability in Red Hat
- Red Hat must have acted in a way that
puts it in conflict with SCO
The court certainly appears to have
jurisdiction. Issues raised include copyright law and Lanham Act violations.
These are federal laws, it's a federal court, no problem here.
SCO had
made statements,
prior to Red Hat filing the complaint, that would certainly make me fear that
they would sue, were I in Red Hat's shoes. However, some of SCO's statements
mitigate this, implying that they plan 'merely' to sue end users, not Red Hat.
My understanding, however, is if there's unresolved questions (eg. did Red Hat
have "real apprehension"), then the case should be tried, not dismissed. Since
the issue on hand is the motion to dismiss, not the merits of the case, I don't
think SCO has a leg to stand on here.
Red Hat certainly acted in a way
to put it in conflict with SCO. After the threats, after the meeting between
SCO and Red Hat regarding licensing issues, Red Hat continued to ship products
which SCO claimed contained their intellectual property, without paying
royalties to SCO. Sounds like a pretty solid case for a conflict
here.
The other issue SCO raises is technical, that Red Hat has not
supplied appropriate evidence in their pleadings. Is there anything to this? I
can't tell. Even if there is, it strikes me that Red Hat could just withdraw
and refile. If SCO is successful in this regard, it would merely buy them some
time (of course, SCO appears to treat time as more important than success in
regards to these cases).
One question I have is, in the above ruling,
the presumption is that the defendant is threatening to sue the plaintiff. In
this case, the defendant is also accused of threatening to sue the plaintiff's
customers. Red Hat's customers, however, aren't suing SCO, Red Hat is. How
does that fit into the case law regarding declaratory
judgements?
Regardless, it looks to me like the Motion to Supplement the
Record was icing, it really has no substantial bearing on the motion to dismiss.
Likewise, SCO's Memorandum of Law strikes me as equally superfluous, if the
judge was inclined to reject the motion to dismiss, this wouldn't stop him; if
he was inclined to dismiss, I would assume it was because Red Hat's complaint
was lacking in some way, and I don't see how the supplement would make it any
less lacking.
Feedback from those of you more legally knowledgable than
me? [ Reply to This | # ]
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 24 2004 @ 09:23 PM EST |
I was wondering what if a Linux user, preferably a commercial user (e.g. Google,
somebody who received the letters or has been mentioned in SCO's public
statements), were to file for declaratory judgement that they are not infringing
SCO's copyrights by using Linux.
Would SCO motion for dismissal?
[ Reply to This | # ]
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 24 2004 @ 09:54 PM EST |
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989).
Wasn't that case about Heileman managers spreading the rumor that they were
going to market a beer called "Augie Beer"?
[ Reply to This | # ]
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| Authored by: Anonymous on Tuesday, February 24 2004 @ 10:44 PM EST |
This is off topic, but I don't see any good place to post it.
Eben Moglen spoke at Harvard and IMHO this deserves some mention here at
Groklaw. Here's the link: http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/p.cgi/speakers.html
[ Reply to This | # ]
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| Authored by: RealProgrammer on Tuesday, February 24 2004 @ 10:57 PM EST |
"In the instant case, the steps Starter has taken are specific and evidence
a concrete intention to use its House Marks. Accordingly, there is the requisite
adversarial conflict here to meet the actual case or controversy requirement,
and declaratory jurisdiction is therefore proper."
In the instant case, the steps The SCO Group has taken are specific and evidence
a concrete intention to use its Legal Division. Accordingly, there is the
requisite adversarial conflict here to meet the actual case or controversy
requirement, and declaratory jurisdiction is therefore proper.
---
(I'm not a lawyer, but I know right from wrong)[ Reply to This | # ]
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| Authored by: pukeko on Wednesday, February 25 2004 @ 07:56 AM EST |
Interesting. However it made me wonder whether the Novell case might not get in
the way here. It is quite possible to assert that Lehman brothers is not in any
immediate danger of actually being sued. Indeed if Novell wins its case, this
would seem highly unlikely (although with SCO's crack legal team of killer
attack bunnies - who knows!).
SCO of course has not put such an argument forward, and it would be a really
peculiar argument for them to try to make anyway. As in "Nobody should take
our legal threats seriously because another court case is going to cut us off at
the knees". I don't think it is a real threat, but since we're all getting
shirty with each other waiting for things to happen, I thought it might be fun
to throw this bone out there for the pack to chew over.
BTW - When I was writing this I was thinking - hmmm - should I be even writing
this? After all, SCOs people read this site. And then I thought about closed
source software versus open source software and realised that this is exactly
the same thing. Just as security through obscurity is a really bad idea, so too
is law through obscurity. If there is a potential problem, much better to get it
out in the open so that lots of minds can work on it and solve it. What we've
got here is open source law.[ Reply to This | # ]
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| Authored by: James on Wednesday, February 25 2004 @ 10:22 AM EST |
Here's one from one of the few sci-fi authors I really like:
You
do not hire a lawyer for justice. You hire a lawyer for revenge. -- David
Gerrold
I thought that was very fitting :) [ Reply to This | # ]
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| Authored by: rakaz on Wednesday, February 25 2004 @ 11:01 AM EST |
Another very interesting article which explains DJ lawsuits for patent cases can
be found here:
http://www.jmls.edu/ripl/vol3/issue1/shurn.pdf[ Reply to This | # ]
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| Authored by: The_Pirate on Wednesday, February 25 2004 @ 03:28 PM EST |
I'm sorry - i may well be stupid (at least my wife thinks so) but i don't
understand a word.
Really. My head just starts spinning.
So far, i've been able to hang on to whatever output came on these pages -
sometimes with difficulty - but somehow PJ and the rest of the gang here has
been able to help me over the hurdles. Thanks for all your efforts, it has
really been helpful to me.
Not this time. If the above legalese provides 'clarity', i'm lost. Hopelessly.
Could someone boil it down a bit, please?
[ Reply to This | # ]
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- Huh? - Authored by: Anonymous on Wednesday, February 25 2004 @ 07:31 PM EST
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| Authored by: darkonc on Thursday, February 26 2004 @ 03:23 AM EST |
SCO is threatening end-users of Linux, "rather than distributors", and
one of it's arguments is that, because Red Hat is a Distributor, it's only at
risk in a vicarious manner.
<P>
As far as I know, Red Hat 'eats it's own dog food', in that (AFIK) it uses Linux
in the course of it's business. As an end-user of Linux, and independent of it's
status as a distributor, it's just as much at risk of legal action as any of
it's external customers.
---
Powerful, committed communication. Transformation touching the jewel within each
person and bringing it to life..[ Reply to This | # ]
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